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ABSTRACT
In most competitive democracies, the allegedly US inspired 
changing campaign practices of the 1980s and 1990s have been 
subjected to intense scrutiny. India, as the largest democracy 
has also seen the use of modern techniques of political marketing 
alongside conventional forms of electioneering. These 'Western' 
techniques were first adopted in 1984 by Congress-(Indira) under 
Rajiv Gandhi. By 1991, these techniques were common place with 
almost all the political parties hiring the services of 
professional advertising agencies during elections. Campaigns 
began to be adapted from western models, melding the 'American' 
techniques with rallies, public meetings and door-to-door 
campaigns. Audio and video cassettes have been adapted to the 
Indian context, most notably the video-on-wheels.
This research on Political Communications in the . general 
elections and its effectiveness is one of the first of its kind 
on India, the literature having concentrated on voting behaviour 
in relation to socio-economic characteristics. The importance of 
communication during elections has been inadequately researched 
because of the diversity of the country. Through a content 
analysis of the coverage of election information in the media and 
case studies of party campaigns, the study evaluates the campaign 
practices in the mass media and conventional interpersonal forms. 
It highlights the electronic and outdoor forms like posters, wall 
writings, symbol displays and cutouts that were important during 
the 1991 elections. The thesis then examines the impact of these 
campaigns through a panel survey on a sample of 1155 electors 
from the three constituencies of Hyderabad, Secunderabad and 
Nagarkurnool in Andhra Pradesh. The voting patterns have been 
evaluated in relation to access to and the impact of different 
forms of political’ communications.
Research revealed that Indian political communication campaigns 
were well organised and professional advertising agencies were 
hired to promote the parties. Campaigns have been systematically 
planned through the development of creative and media strategies.
Apart from the mass media channels, interpersonal forms continued 
to be important to reach the diverse electorate. There was a high 
level of exposure to newspapers, radio and television which were 
sought as important sources for election related information. 
Interpersonal forms were found to be persuasive. Education, 
urbanization, gender, caste and religion are important factors 
influencing the voters' perceptions and receptivity to electoral 
communications.
But, while increased level of information does heighten the level 
of political awareness, it does not determine the final outcome. 
An important aspect was that families largely tended to vote as 
single units with men generally deciding who to vote for. Women 
showed relatively little interest in politics (though comprising 
an important 45% of voters) and their under representation in the 
study necessitated the need for weighting.
The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the 
middle of the elections adds an important dimension to the 
research, from those who voted in a normal election and those in 
the 'sympathy wave'. This study, though conducted under unusual 
circumstances does provide a much needed insight into the 
political changes in the country and the increasing use of US 
inspired media driven campaign practices of political marketing 
combining comfortably with conventional practices of political 
marketing in India. A final yet important aspect of this research 
is the exploration of the problems of survey research in a 
country of cultural plurality such as India.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of political marketing is inextricably linked with 
the United States of America (USA). Campaigning styles, 
techniques and strategies, conceived in America are now evident 
in many competitive democracies. Campaign practices are changing 
and have become the subject of intense scrutiny. This process of 
professionalization of campaigns is popularly seen as 
'Americanization'1. India as the largest competitive democracy 
in the world has witnessed parallel but mutated changes since the 
1980s. What is new is not only the introduction of modern methods 
into campaigning, but the increased sophistication, adaptation 
and integration of traditional forms into the modern techniques 
(Sarwate, 1990). The present thesis attempts to examine the 
political changes and the use of mass media during the 1991 
elections in India. The objectives are to compare the content, 
strategy and the new techniques adopted in planning of campaigns 
by the parties and to evaluate their impact on a sample of the 
electorate.
India, unlike other third world democracies has withstood the 
onslaught of several political crises including two major 
political assassinations, but has kept its democratic control and 
has yet to see a military coup. In a country where over 500 
million people vote, with just over 50% literacy and low 
communication facilities, the effort and amount spent in 
conducting the elections is enormous (Kumar, 1991)
The concept has been variously described by scholars 
studying the election campaign systems in various countries. 
(Elebash, 1984; Schou, 1992; Scammel and Karan, 1992) American 
campaigns have been researched, analyzed and innovative 
techniques have been adopted in most countries. Latest literature 
from around the world reflects on the process of political 
communication leading to a kind of global culture with the 
modernization of political campaigns.
Indian elections are grand festive occasions. The entire country 
is decked with flags, banners, posters, wall writings, symbol 
displays, and recorded political songs and speeches of candidates 
blare out from loudspeakers hung from electric poles and 
treetops. The country is in election fever. Until the early 
1980s, election campaigns were dominated by country wide tours 
of party leaders who generally addressed large audiences, held 
rallies and processions while party activists persuaded voters 
through door-to-door meetings.
Print media such as newspapers generally covered election news 
and reported the campaign meetings of leaders, but posters, 
handbills and leaflets popularized campaign themes. Walls became 
battle grounds for wars of slogans, satire and abuse. These modes 
and others such as street theatre and corner meetings continue 
to be important, but, since the 1980s campaigns have included the 
extensive use of mass media using the evolving mass technologies.
The modernization of election campaigns in India could be 
attributed to the Cong.I2 leader Rajiv Gandhi and his youthful 
team, who extensively used the media, introduced mass media 
campaigns through political advertising in print and electronic 
media thereby ushering a new era of political communication in 
India. His methods, sometimes accepted, sometimes sneered at, are 
now a norm in political campaigning. The process of modernization 
is seen not only in the adoption of modern western techniques, 
but also in the development of indigenous systems of political 
communication alongside the conventional forms to suit the 
diverse character of Indian democracy.
The Indian National Congress (INC) is one of the oldest 
national parties. Since Independence the party has undergone 
several splits and only one Congress(I) enjoys national 
following. (I) being referred to as 'Indira'. We refer to this 
faction of the Congress party as Cong.I.
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The changes were also in the professionalization of campaigns^ 
(and thereby commercialization of parties and candidates). The 
1991 election, on which this study is focused, was claimed in the 
newspapers as one of the biggest media events. Following the 1984 
and 1989 election campaigns mainly dominated by Cong.I, 
electioneering took a new turn. Planned political campaigns 
became common place and almost all political parties were using 
professional advertising agencies with well defined strategies 
to woo, if not necessarily to win the votes.
^Like the US presidential campaigns, Indian campaigns adopted the 
personality oriented mode of campaigning with campaigns revolving 
around leaders of the competitive parties. Press advertisements, 
and the audio visual media extensively projected the party 
leaders
Almost all parties used the negative attack strategies as 
described by Garromone (1984) and Carter and Copeland (1984). 
However, in India the experience of Americanization of elections 
campaigns, especially the negative style attack campaigns used 
by Cong.I in 1989 had proved ineffective and invited criticism 
from the members of the party itself7J In 1991, educated by the 
lesson of 1989, the Cong.I campaign was positively oriented to 
reflect secularism and stability. The Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) with its religious orientation, used different techniques 
to influence different strata of voters. While religion was used 
to arouse the rural and the economically backward sections, an 
advertising campaign during, elections in leading newspapers 
directed at the urban literate voters attacked Cong.I. The 
Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP), Janata Dal/National Front (JD/NF)
7J While media managers are being sent to America from other 
countries for observing campaign strategies and acquiring new 
techniques of campaign strategies (Scammel, 1991), we are not 
sure if such has been with India. However, in India since the 
1984 elections, campaigns are being managed by professional 
marketing and advertising agencies and political accounts are 
being much sought after by agency professionals.
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and regional parties used the vernacular press and other 
electronic and interpersonal forms to present their policies.
The scientific use of opinion polls, introduced in the 1984 
elections have now become an essential tool for predicting 
election trends and poll outcomes in India. Several research 
organizations including the Indian Market Research Bureau (IMRB) , 
Marketing and Advertising Research Group (MARG) and Operations 
Research Group (ORG) have been actively involved in conducting 
nation-wide pre-poll surveys and exit polls. Despite initial 
interest, most political parties and candidates, especially the 
JD/NF members expressed scepticism about their significance and 
ridiculed them as being as biased and unreliable as astrology.
The distinct Indian developments in campaigning have been in the 
system of 'narrowcasting7. Paley and Moffett (1984) have 
described narrowcasting as the process of targeting specific 
messages to specific audiences through the use of mass 
communication technology. Given the effectiveness and impact of 
audio-visual media in a largely illiterate electorate, political 
parties have developed audio cassettes and video films. As the 
broadcast media of All India Radio and Doordarshan under the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I & B), Government of 
India does not allow any real political debate, these films are 
generally shown through mobile vans with sophisticated audio 
visual equipment popularly called video-on-wheels.(VOWs). VOWs 
are claimed to be the most effective political communication hard 
sell that has been undertaken in India. 7Entertainment Culture7 
stepped into the Indian election campaigns4 .
The changes in political and cultural systems, as well as growth 
of media systems between 1989 and 1991 affected political
4 Interviews with Party spokespersons and Dr.J.K.Jain of 
Jain Studios, New Delhi. Moreover, the excessive use of films in 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) by Nandamuri Tarakarama Rao (NTR) can be 
mentioned here. The strategy of the party was to entertain first 
and then inform.
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communications. The political climate was riven with cultural and 
religious influences, presenting a 'cultural political system'5 .
During the first three decades of Independence, the Congress 
propounding a secular ideology, had enjoyed support at the 
national and state levels, with other parties being bracketed as 
communal or communist. During the period 1985-1991 the general 
support for Cong.I had gradually eroded. In 1977, and again in 
1989, the opposition parties combined to defeat the Cong.I. In 
1991 there were no alliances between the various political 
parties, except between the JD and Communist parties and each 
sought to exploit its own appeal, especially the BJP and JD/NF 
gained popularity, the former by arousing the sectarian spirit 
of the Hindu masses and the latter, to bring about caste based 
social justice, giving rise to a multi-party system in the 
country, yet with Cong.I domination.
£i O C ^ V i o c J J r
The 'Mandir' and 'Mandal' symbolising issues of religion
and caste came to the forefront during the 1991 elections. To an 
extent the media, especially television helped in mobilising 
these issues. Influential Indian mythologicals, 'Ramavana' and
'Mahabharata' were serialised on television (TV), rekindling the 
Hindu religious spirit. The BJP, which was rejected for years as 
a communal party, was quick to take advantage of the religious 
awareness among the people. Their leader, L.K.Advani went on an 
all India tour to arouse the Hindus with the promise of building 
the temple at Ayodhya, claimed to be the birth place of Lord 
Rama, the site of the now demolished mosque. On the other hand, 
the JD/NF, a combination of national and regional parties, 
stirred the caste divisions to implement the Mandal Commission 
Report(MCR) on the reservation of jobs for the Backward Classes 
(BC) to bring about social justice. This had led to a country­
5We refer to the cultural upheavals such as those of caste 
and religion besides ethnic and separatist movements which played 
an important role in the electoral contests. Election campaigns 
were dominated by references to cultural and mythological aspects 
besides matters of state like the economy, law and order, 
unemployment, rising prices and poverty.
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wide agitation among the upper caste students, especially in 
north India who felt further deprived of the already scarce jobs.
In the past decade, India has witnessed a phenomenal growth of 
its mass media. There was an increase in the number and reach of 
newspapers. Newspapers are important sources of information and 
during elections extensive coverage is given to election news. 
Since 1980, advertising campaigns by political parties were 
introduced to persuade the electorate.
Radio and TV under the Ministry of I & B, reaching 97% and 84% 
of the population respectively, were geared to create greater 
awareness of the political process and to increase political 
participation. Political advertising is not allowed, but parties 
recognised as national or state by the Election Commission (EC) 
of India are given a limited time for 15 minutes to present their 
strategies and appeal to the people (Chapter II) . However, 
planned political marketing and advertising strategies have 
increased the amounts spent on campaigns, with a record estimated 
Rs.10,000 million (£200 million) spent on the 1991 elections, as 
much as the annual plan outlay of a big Indian state. Between 
1957 and 1991, the cost of conducting the elections went up 25 
times with Rs.1,540 million (£30.8 million) being spent by the 
government in 1991 (Kumar, 1991) . It would be interesting to note 
the expenditure patterns in the next elections scheduled in 1996, 
as the Election Commission is planning to redefine the rules and 
regulations regarding the amount of money to be spent by the 
parties.
In future, the manner in which mass media are used and campaigns 
conducted, will be an indication of political socialization and 
participation of the electorate in the political process, which 
again presents a formidable task in such a diverse country as 
India. India is most noticed by its 'Unity in Diversity' . Its 
cultural diversity stems from the ethnic origins, religions and 
languages which play a significant role in the social and 
political system of the country. There is a vast urban and rural
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divide with 70% of the population living in rural areas. There 
are eight major religions of which Hinduism is the dominant one 
with 82.6% of the population, Muslims account for 11.4%, 
Christians for 2.4%, Sikhs comprise 2%, Buddhists 0.7%, Jains 
0.5% and others 0.4%. Just over half, 52.21%^ the population is 
literate, with 15 officially recognised languages and over 200 
dialects. The heterogeneity of the country makes each one of its 
twenty five states a country in itself with its own peculiar 
customs, language, traditions and culture. Given the diverse 
characteristics of Indian states, it was not possible to tackle 
the whole country and hence research was concentrated on the 
state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) which presents a vibrant political 
system.
AP is the fifth largest state in India and can be divided into 
three levels of competitive politics: the national politics of 
Cong.I, the regional politics of Telugu Desam Party (TDP) led 
by popular cinema actor Nandamuri Tarakarama Rao(NTR), and third 
an independent local party, the Majlis-Ittehadul-Muslimeen (MIM) , 
practising communal politics in the capital city of Hyderabad.
The objectives of the thesis are two fold: first to examine the 
marketing strategies of the political parties and second, to 
evaluate the political perceptions and impact of campaigns on 
voting behaviour on a sample of the electorate drawn from three 
constituencies, Secunderabad an urban, Hyderabad an urban-rural 
and Nagarkurnool a rural constituency.
fcl'tcfoftl CbVitalSXtO*
Though efforts were made by the^JSC^and political parties to 
increase participation and minimize poll violence, the overall 
voter turnout was only 51.13%, 12 percentage points less thanin 
1984 elections and three percentage points less than 1989. 
Indians witnessed one of the bloodiest elections, with the
6The overall literacy rate is 52.21% (Excluding Jammu and 
Kashmir) with 64.13% for males and 39.29% for women. Source: 
India Reference Annual 1994.
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assassination of Cong.I leader Rajiv Gandhi and more than 350 
persons including candidates killed in poll violence.
Indian election studies have concentrated on the electoral
process and voting behaviour in the context of socio-economic
factors. Few studies have actually focused on the use of media
as sources of information and its impact on political information
and behaviour (Varma and Narain, 1973; Kar & Chaudary, 1996).
Limited importance is given to what the candidates actually say
during campaign periods and how information flows from various
media towards the ultimate voting behaviour. This vacuum can be
partly attributed to the fact that given the Indian diversity,
there was no uniform medium of communication, and access to print
media was a limiting factor with low literacy and multiplicity 
fkt Ifci11Q.of languages, ^adio and television, the media of the masses do 
not allow any real political debate or political campaigning 
(Chapter II) . Second, the use of media and organized/planned 
political communication strategies are a fairly recent phenomenon 
in Indian elections. However, despite the limitations, political 
marketing has become an essential force in Indian elections, 
where mass media along with conventional and other indigenously 
developed electronic forms have been used to reach the diverse 
Indian electorate.
This research links communications and political conflict to the 
socio-economic profile of voters in AP. Mass mobilization 
programmes and tactics were extensively used by politicians for 
influencing the voters. The assassination of former Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi midway through the poll contributes 
additional insights into the political communications process and 
the ultimate voting behaviour.
Case studies provide a structured analysis of the campaigns of 
five political parties and the voter education campaign by the 
Central government. The information was collected through primary 
and secondary sources, especially by a series of interviews with 
spokespersons of political parties at the national, regional and
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local levels, government officials, advertising professionals and 
producers of audio visual-media. Further information was 
collected from the party literature, newspaper reports and news 
broadcasts on radio and TV and reviewing of political videos and 
video magazines.
A two phase panel survey was used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of campaigns from a sample of 1155 voters selected randomly from 
particular wards in the three parliamentary constituencies. Data 
ollected in the run up to the elections, and again after the 
results were declared. In the heat of the Indian summer, 19 
interviewers along with the researcher were involved in the 
collection of information through a structured questionnaire. 
There was a high non-response rate from women and so the sample 
was weighted to get a balanced view of male and female 
respondents. It required a lot of perseverance to convince 
respondents that the data was for academic work and not to make 
them targets of some unknown threats. There was a major 
difficulty in locating the respondents even once, leave alone 
twice, with the disorganised system of house numbers.
Following this introduction, the thesis is divided into ten 
chapters. The first chapter provides a theoretical framework 
reviewing the development of political communication effects 
research in the major democracies and gives a perspective on 
India. The second chapter focuses on the recent political changes 
in India and AP especially between 1989-1991. We give a general 
analysis of the issues and trends observed in the run up to the 
1991 elections, the role of caste and religion in the political 
system, criminalization of politics and poll violence including 
the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. This is followed by a 
discussion of the Indian media systems and their use during the 
1991 elections. The coverage of election news and advertisements 
in the press and the election related programmes on radio and TV, 
nationally and in AP.
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The third chapter is devoted to the studies of the election 
campaigns of political parties and the Voter Education Campaign 
by the government. The parties include Cong.I, BJP, TDP, JD/NF 
and MIM. The fourth chapter is the first that discusses the 
survey results. We present the socio-economic and political 
profile of the respondents in the three constituencies and 
establish the extent and frequency of exposure to media. We then 
examine the political interest and attitudes towards the 
government to establish the level of interest in politics and 
thereby the readiness for election campaigns.
The fifth chapter analyses the exposure and impact of election 
related information given in the mass media; newspapers, radio 
and TV on the respondents. The sixth chapter examines the 
exposure and impact of the alternate electronic media used in 
elections, especially the development of audio cassettes, video 
tapes and films.
In the seventh chapter, we discuss the outdoor displays such as 
posters, handbills and cutouts which are important reminder 
media. The eighth chapter examines the interpersonal forms of 
election campaigns: first it evaluates the public meetings,
walkabouts, and door knocking. Second, the internal influences 
of family, friends and local leaders are evaluated to compare the 
importance of mass and interpersonal sources in voting behaviour.
In the ninth chapter, the voting and non-voting behaviour of the 
respondents and the impact of the election campaigns are 
determined. The final chapter summarises the inferences drawn 
from the above chapters, comparing the campaign trends of the 
political parties with the exposure and use of mass and 
interpersonal forms and suggests the integrated forms of 
political marketing strategies and future research on political 
communication programmes in India.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL APPROACH, COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AND RESEARCH
DESIGN
SECTION I
Political communication exists in all democratic and non 
democratic systems (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981). Considerable 
literature has evolved in this area in the western democracies, 
but in India, with its diversity and complex media, systems, it 
becomes difficult to compare electoral communication systems in 
totality. However some reflections on the modernization of Indian 
election campaigns are possible. In this chapter we examine the 
literature on the political and media systems that has led to the 
development, use and effects of political communication systems 
in the world and in India. In the second part, we provide a 
methodological framework for study.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
During the period between the two world wars, the mass media were 
perceived as direct, powerful and uniform on atomised 
individuals, and thus, could be successfully deployed to 
manipulate people's opinions, attitudes and behaviours in a 
relatively short period of time.
The 'Bullet Theory, the 'Hypodermic Needle theory', the 'Stimulus 
Response Model', the 'Mathematical theory of communication' and 
'SMCR Model' were some of the terms used to reinforce the 
omnipotent source and the passive receiver stereotype (McQuail 
and Windhal, 1983) . Katz (1963) notes that the model in the minds 
for early researchers seems to have consisted of i) the all 
powerful media was able to impress ideas on defenceless minds, 
and ii) the atomised mass audience were connected to the mass 
media but not to each other.
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The years succeeding the world war II were witness to the 
emergence of and consolidation of communication research as a 
distinct domain of investigation^ The first unity that was 
evident among scholars most involved with the coalescence of 
communication research during the later part of the 1940s was the 
analysis of public opinion, propaganda, and the uses and effects 
of communication.
Those who brought forth communication science, inherited 
traditions of thought emphasising the centrality of 
communications in political life and the importance of science 
to social understanding and informed political action in 
democratic life. An intersection of viewpoints of some of the 
best minds in sociology, psychology and political science raised 
important new questions: jfhat specific effects do mass media have 
on individuals and the general community? What is the process by 
which these effects occur? (Severin & Tankard, 1979) .
Pioneering research (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944;
Hoveland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 1949; Hoveland, Janis & Kelly, 
1953; Klapper, 1960) led to reconceptualisation of the process 
of mass media effects from powerful dominance to minimal impact.
In 'The People's Choice' (1944), popularly called the voter
study, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet's study was oriented to 
measuring the impact of mass media in influencing peoples 
political decisions against the backdrop of the 1940 US
presidential elections. The study unearthed the fact that 
individuals were more influenced in their political decisions by 
members of their primary and peer groups than the combined mass 
media. The mass media appeared to have little impact in
influencing peoples political decisions. Even exposure to mass 
media was quite poor.
While debunking the theories/models of powerful media effects, 
the study discovered that there was one segment which was more 
exposed to the mass media than other individuals in the
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community. Researchers concluded that these influential or 
opinion leaders then influenced others in the community.
Thus, the effects of mass media were seen as being indirect. Two 
significant theoretical streams namely the Two-Step Flow (Katz 
and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Katz, 1957) and the Diffusion (Lerner, 
1958; Lionberger, 1960; Rogers, 1962; Frey, 1973; etc.) 
strengthened the notions of indirect effects of mass media. Work 
of Hoveland and his colleagues (Hoveland and Kelly, 1953) found 
that people defended themselves against persuasive messages in 
three ways: selective exposure, selective perception, and
selective retention. Klapper (1960) concluded that persuasion in 
mass communication functions far more frequently as an agent'of 
reinforcement than as an agent of change.
However Ball-Rokeach and Defleur (1976) argued that at a time 
when public confidence in many social and political institutions 
had steeply declined, both parties and voters become more 
dependent on media resources, the former as a means of access to 
the electoral audience as their own channels started to wither 
and lose credibility, the latter for impressions of what was at 
stake, as previous suppliers of guidance had lost their 
authority.
Renewed interest in mass media effects has been hailed as the 
return to the concept of the powerful mass media (Neumann, 1974) . 
Works in this genre have begun to reflect the power of mass 
media, especially television in affecting attitudes, thinking and 
behaviour of voters (Lang and Lang, 1966; Narain, 1973; Blumler 
and Mcleod, 1974; Jack and Kline, 1974; Kraus and Davis, 1976; 
Goldenberg and Trau<goXf, 1980; Joslyn, 1981; Kaid, 1981; etc) .
In recent years, TV has formed a common source of election 
information and has led to a reduction in selectivity in voters 
exposure to party propaganda (Mendelson & O' Keefe, 1976; Sears 
& Chaffee, 1979; Patterson, 1980; Kaid & Davidson, 1986) . It has 
been argued that people could sensibly debate their collective
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actions only if they shared a common fund of knowledge or 
information (Pye, 1969).
Blumler and his associates (Blumler & McQuail, 1968; Blumler & 
Katz, 1974) applied the cognitive effects oriented Uses and 
Gratifications approach to the study of political behaviour, the 
emphasis here is on media content and how members of the audience 
process media materials in accordance with gratification of their 
needs.
McCoombs and Shaw (1977) applied the Agenda Setting approach 
which assigns the mass media the role of making people aware of 
important issues of the day by constructing agendas for society. 
Though the media may not always be successful in telling people 
what to think about.
The use of media convergence and co-orientations models have also 
been used. These models emphasise information exchange among 
individuals so as to move towards common ground and shared 
meaning (Me Leod & Chaffee, 1973).
Butler & Stokes (1974) in their study stated that the concept: 
voters voted as they always had, had decreased with the 
identification with a political party. Second, they found that 
floating voters could not be ruled out of political communication 
network as they are quite adequately informed and as politically 
interested as the party loyalists.
There is a greater use of media information by those making 
voting decisions during the campaign than those with stable 
preferences throughout the campaign (Varma & Narain, 1975; 
Patterson, 1980) . Therefore, there is an element of impact of 
mass media use in changes in political behaviour.
The role of political advertising has increased, with attention 
being paid to advertisements in the print media and television 
(Roper, 1977; Weaver, Willhot & Reid, 1979). Guggenhi^em (1986)
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estimated that 70% of what people know about party programmes 
came from party advertisements.
The earliest studies on political advertising and voter behaviour 
were conducted by Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee (1954) and 
Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes (1960) to which most modern 
studies trace their origin. In 'The Unseeing Eye', Patterson & 
McLure (1976) remarked that overall political advertisements 
provided voters with four times more information about campaign 
issues than did news.
Kern (1989) observed that political advertising, like its 
commercial counterpart, now appeals to the individual in his/her 
own right, not just as a member of an economic and social class, 
a political party or other. Hard hitting 30 to 60 seconds 
television spots incorporating negative attack strategies support 
political debates, election meetings of candidates and leaders. 
An important aspect of the 1980s was the development of negative 
advertising (Sabato, 1980; Erhnhalt, 1985; Hickey, 1986; Johnson, 
Carter & Copeland, 1987; Guskind & Hagestorm, 1988; Kern, 1990) . 
Carter & Copeland (1989) observed that negative advertising has 
come of age and any political campaign must be prepared to use 
and counter it. While Stewart (1975) called these Mudslinging 
advertisements. Nugent (1987) argued that negative political 
advertising actually opens up campaign debates.
Garromone's (1984) survey of voter attitudes to negative 
advertising is revealing. Three fourths of the respondents 
expressed disapproval of negative political advertising. Voters 
in the survey reported that negative political advertising had 
a strong influence in their evaluation of the sponsor.
Despite being offensive, negative themes imported from the US, 
have now become dominant in political advertising in other 
countries during elections. In India too, during the 1989
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elections, negative themes were particularly used in the Cong.I 
campaign. The party lost and the campaign became a target of 
criticism from within and outside the party. In 1991, the BJP 
used attack strategies, while the Cong.I, having learnt its 
lessons in 1989, had a more positive thematic approach.
Paley & Moffett (1984) saw the New Electronic Media (NEM) as 
changing the face of political marketing. Video cassettes and 
able television were extensively used for election campaigning. 
However, TV continues to be the most powerful medium making 
election campaigning all over the world look more and more like 
that in the US (Sabato, 1980; Strand, Dozier, Hofsetter & 
Ledingham, 1983).
In India, with the state owned Doordarshan being virtually
inaccessible to political parties, video films have emerged as
an alternative,. These films screened using mobile vans called 
l y i lC o  O il  ( M e t f S J
VOWS'L VOWs reach voters in the remotest areas and are being 
claifned by parties to have the highest impact.
The 1980s also saw a switch from issue related to personality 
related advertising. Joslyn (1980) enumerated a repertoire of 
traits such as compassion, sympathy, integrity, strength, 
knowledge, etc., of candidates used by advertising agencies to 
persuade the electorate that the candidate is right for the job. 
McGinnis (1969) observed that in television advertising it is the 
leaders' personality which influences voters. Thus, style becomes 
substance. Kaid & Davidson (1987) explained that video styles in 
political advertising is a combination of factors: verbal
content, nonverbal content, film production techniques, and the 
methods of self portrayal. In India too scripts and songs for 
films were done for leaders like Rajiv Gandhi, V.P.Singh, 
Chandrashekhar and NTR, among others.
Political advertising has drawn themes from culture and a body 
of research literature has also focused on culture (Kern, 1989) . 
Leymore (1975) has examined mythology as a means of political
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marketing which has been widely used in campaigns to project the 
Indian cultural and religious traditions.
Political advertising also utilizes other appeals that may be 
purely entertainment oriented. Humour, linguistic, aural and 
visual devices are believed to have symbolic or religious 
connotation (Kaid, Nimmo & Sanders, 1989). The information and 
entertainment format was used to project ideology, leaders and 
parties. Political songs in India were drawn from popular culture 
and leaders were projected as gods. Video films used the 
information and entertainment format that included history, 
mythology and humour.
Mass media, NEM have and continue to be used in contemporary 
democratic societies in electoral campaigns. However, in the 
Indian context the impact of interpersonal channels, about which 
not much information is available in western studies, but 
referred to in Indian electoral studies, will be examined in this 
study.
Therefore, we conclude that the effects of political 
communication had become an important means of communicating with 
the audiences to form a common fund of knowledge for voters' 
selection and approval. The use of planned political 
communication strategies, within the framework of the changing 
media and political environment has given rise to a need for in- 
depth research on the effectiveness of political communication 
in democracies.
SECTION II
THE METHODS OF ENQUIRY
Three methodological approaches were used in evaluating the 
election campaigns and their impact: Content Analysis, Case study 
and a Panel Survey.
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1. THE CONTENT ANALYSIS
Content analysis is the research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content 
of communications (Berelson, 1952). Walizer and Weiner (1978) 
have defined it as any systematic procedure which is devised to 
examine the content of recorded information. Krippendorf (1980) 
defined Content Analysis as a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context. The 
subjects of content analysis are ordered under major headings 
which progressively refer to the characteristics of communication 
content, the causes of content, and the consequences of content. 
We use this technique in this study to classify the content of 
the election related programmes on radio and TV and quantify the 
time spent on each of these programmes.
2. THE CASE STUDIES
A Case is a written description of an organization covering a 
certain period of time. It contains information about the 
organization's history, its internal operations and its 
environment. This method was used to evaluate and give a 
structured analysis of the techniques used by parties in the 
election campaigns. The method of studying the campaigns was 
similar to the advertising process for any commercial or social 
campaigns and was based on the steps involved in the process of 
campaign planning; 1.Analysis of the market, 2.Objectives of the 
campaign, 3 .Approximate budget if available, 4.Creative strategy, 
5.Media strategy 6.Interpersonal Channels and 7.Any pre or post­
campaign research to test the campaign. The parties studied were: 
Cong.I, BJP, TDP, JD/NF and MIM.
The Analysis of the market involved the initial research that was 
conducted by the agencies or the party to get the electorate's 
opinions on the party policies and personalities of leaders. 
Secondly the Objectives of the campaign that were set for 
targeting the communication strategies to the diverse electors. 
The third step focused on the Budget, the most difficult aspect 
of Indian elections. Though it is widely known that rivers of
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money flow into Indian elections, one could not estimate how much 
money is spent on electioneering as well as the sources of 
income. None of the party spokespersons, advertising agency 
professionals or producers of audio visual media were prepared 
to disclose this. Some clearly stated that given the vastness of 
the country it was difficult to estimate and allocate. Therefore 
a detailed breakdown of expenditure could not be estimated for 
any political party. Here we have used the data from the ORG, 
which conducted a content analysis of advertising space used by 
various political parties all over the country to get a fair idea 
of the money spent by political parties in newspapers and 
magazines. Spokespersons of various political parties estimated 
that press advertisements represent less than half (approximately 
30-40%) and an unestimated amount was spent on electronic forms; 
the production, translations, duplication and screening of video 
films and audio cassettes. Added to these were the all India 
election tours of party leaders, organization of public rallies, 
processions and the production and distribution of handbills and 
leaflets.
Fourth, we examined the Creative strategies developed for 
communicating party messages; the themes, issues and appeals in 
targeting various segments of the electorate. In each of the 
campaigns, we focus on themes used in press advertisements. In 
the audio and video cassettes, we review the content and format 
of the messages for an understanding of how these media have come 
to be regarded as extremely successful in Indian electioneering.
Fifth, the Media strategies included the selection, frequency and 
scheduling patterns of advertisements in print media, screening 
of videos and films and coordinating other promotional 
activities. Sixth The interpersonal forms and other strategies 
of campaigning such as public meetings, tours and walkabouts, 
door-to-door campaigns, mobilization of social and religious 
groups and rallies are also discussed.
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Last, we investigated if any Pre-testing and post-testing was 
conducted to gauge the effectiveness of the campaigns. Given the 
limitations of time, no large scale research for pre-testing of 
campaigns was undertaken. Last we sought to explore the 
effectiveness of these campaigns on audiences in terms of 
exposure, use and help in their electoral behaviour through a 
panel survey.
3. THE PANEL SURVEY
Surveys are being used in most areas of political communication 
studies as is confirmed by the frequent reporting of survey 
results in popular media, particularly during election periods 
when the public continually hears or reads about popularity polls 
to ascertain candidate's positions with the electorate (Wimmer, 
Dominic et. al, 1984) . In survey research, one collects data from 
all or part of a population to assess the relative incidence, 
distribution and interrelationships of naturally occurring 
phenomena (Kidder & Judd, 1986). The vast technological inputs 
in political campaign communications have increased the 
importance of surveys, both in the run-up to and the post­
election phases as well as a mode of continuous monitoring of 
electoral involvement and attitude towards parties and 
candidates. A number of researchers (Katz, 1962; Sears & 
Chaffee, 1979) have variously documented the importance of survey 
research as a methodological strategy for testing the effects of 
political communication.
In the present study we have used 'descriptive' and 'analytical' 
survey techniques. This involved the need to describe the socio­
economic status of the respondents and analyze their political 
behaviour through the use of independent, dependent and 
intervening variables. This was done through a structured 
interview schedule which involved the interviewers visiting the 
re spondent s' home s.
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THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF THE SURVEYS
The survey was conducted in two phases, first in the run-up to 
the elections, between 30 April and 7 May, 1991 and second in the 
post-election period, between 22 June and 4 July 1991, a week 
after the results were declared. In the first phase, 46 questions 
were set, all but one was close ended. The average time for each 
interview lasted between 35-50 minutes. In the second phase, 35 
questions were framed, all but one was close ended. Respondents 
were free to give their own answers as the option of 'any other' 
with a blank space was given to include an answer not mentioned 
in the questionnaire and specify their answers with relevance to 
the question. Before the first phase of the survey a pilot study 
was conducted to test the questionnaire on a randomly selected 
sample of voters.
PILOT STUDY
The announcement of a premature general election gave us a short 
lead to organise our work and conduct a pilot study to find out 
if the questions were understood and if one could get correct and 
reliable information. Hence, 30 copies of the first questionnaire 
were photocopied and 30 respondents drawn from various segments 
including students, government employees, housewives, doctors, 
a state minister and teachers were randomly selected by the 
researcher and a post-graduate student. This initial informal 
testing proved valuable as the respondents made suggestions on 
changing the wording of some questions. It was also possible to 
include more questions to recheck certain data where there was 
a possibility of ambiguous answers or a chance of giving wrong 
answers.
THE INTERVIEWERS
To reach the sample 19 interviewers were selected, seven each in 
Nagarkurnool and Hyderabad and five in Secunderabad. One person 
was made the leader of the group in each constituency to monitor 
and coordinate the work. The post-graduate students of Osmania 
University, Hyderabad assisted in Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The 
other interviewers were from various backgrounds and comprised 
of housewives, research students and local teachers in
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Nagarkurnool. Teachers of the local schools were specially chosen 
as they are generally respected in the rural environment. 
Moreover, they had been collecting data for the 1991 census just 
two months prior to the present study. They were familiar with 
people and would be able to interpret questions with ease.
The interviewers were given detailed instructions and were 
advised not to persist with certain questions like those related 
to income, caste or voting intention. The questionnaire was 
formulated in English, but was translated into Telugu, the local 
language for respondents in rural areas. The interviewers in the 
urban and semi-urban areas were able to translate the questions 
into Urdu or Telugu. Most questionnaires were administered by the 
interviewers, but if the respondent wished, he or she was given 
a questionnaire to fill out and return.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the study is limited to the responses of voters in 
the three constituencies of AP. We cannot generalize the data as 
being necessarily similar for the entire state or country. 
Several problems arose during the course of the study which we 
think are important to highlight. In the first phase itself we 
found that many members selected from the voters7 list were 
unavailable at the given address. Second, since the house 
numbering in the localities is poor and complicated, it was 
difficult for interviewers to locate some of the households. Many 
of the respondents even after being located with some difficulty, 
thought they were being targeted for some reason and refused to 
answer.
The problems with women respondents was greater, even when 
approached by women interviewers. Many were mistaken as sales 
persons and were refused entry. Some women who agreed to answer 
the schedule lost interest half way through and called in their 
menfolk to answer on their behalf. In Hyderabad and Nagarkurnool 
constituencies, it was most difficult to persuade women
22
respondents. This non-response was very discouraging and 
consequently we had a large proportion of men in our sample.
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, while offering an important 
dimension to the study created problems in the collection of data 
in the second phase. Again, there was a problem of relocating our 
respondents, we found that in some cases, though the address of 
the respondent was the same, the name of the household member who 
answered the questions in the first phase was different.
There was also a problem with interviewers especially in 
Nagarkurnool, most of whom being teachers returned to school 
after the summer break and the initial enthusiasm had given way 
to indifference. However, we persuaded them with more financial 
assistance to continue and finish the work which was extended by 
two more weeks. Overall we got a fairly good response and despite 
the problems the report gives much insight into the campaign 
communication systems and electoral behaviour.
INDIA - THE UNIVERSE OF STUDY
India is the largest democracy in the world, with an electorate 
of 521 million in the 1991 elections1 out of a population of 
846.3 million. The country is divided into 25 states, each with 
its own peculiar language, customs and traditions. The Indian 
Parliament is based on the Westminster model, comprising of two 
houses, The Upper House called Rajya Sabha (RS) and House of the 
People called Lok Sabha (LS). The RS consists of 245 members of 
which 233 members are elected by the representatives of the LS 
and State Legislatures and 12 are nominated by the President of
1 In the 1989 election the electoral size had increased to 
498 million from nearly 174 million in the first elections in
1952. India has had a system of universal adult suffrage ever 
since it became a republic in 1950, After the passing of the 62nd 
amendment of the constitution in 1988 the voting age was lowered 
from 21 to 18 years adding another 10-11 percent voters to the 
electoral registers in the 1989 elections. Indian citizens 18 
years and over are eligible to vote in the Lok Sabha 
(Parliamentary) and the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative Assembly) 
elections.
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India in recognition of services in fields of literature, 
science, arts and social services. The LS consists of 545 members 
of which 543 are directly elected by the people from individual 
constituencies all over the country and two are nominated by the 
president. Elections are held every five years unless unusual 
circumstances lead to mid-term elections. The country is divided 
into 3941 assembly constituencies which are grouped together to 
form 543 LS constituencies. Normally seven assembly 
constituencies form one LS constituency, though this figure can 
vary from state to state. The LS seats are generally allotted to 
the states in proportion to their population.
ANDHRA PRADESH - THE AREA OF STUDY
The present section gives a brief background to AP where this 
study was conducted, followed by an overview of the 1991 
elections and profiles of the three constituencies. AP is the 
fifth largest Indian state both by territory and population and 
the largest state in south India, the size and population of 
which may be roughly equivalent to that of Italy. Table 1.1 gives 
some of the major characteristics of AP in its Indian context. 
The state covers 276,754 Sq.Km, accounting for 8.4% of India's 
territory with a population of 66.3 million3 with an urban 
population of 17.8.million (26.79%) 3 . AP has one of the lowest 
literacy rate at 45.11%, compared to an all India average of 
52.11%. The literacy of women is much lower at 33.71% compared 
to men at 56.24%. The state is largely agricultural with 74% of
The urban population of the state at 17.8 million (26.79%) 
increased by three percent since 1981 (23.32%) and is a little 
higher than the all India percentage of 25.70%. Every fourth 
person in the state is living in an urban area. The population 
of urban areas is increasing, partly due to growth in population 
and also due to migration from rural areas in search of 
employment.(Source A.P. Census 1991 and A.P.Year Book 1993.)
-5
Urban areas are recognised if, there are: a) minimum
expected population of 50,000, b) there is minimum expected 
,population density of 400 persons per Sq.Km and c) at least 75% 
of the male working population is engaged in non agricultural 
pursuits.
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the state's population living in villages and 70% of the 
workforce being dependent on agriculture and allied activities. 
Caste divisions in AP play a significant role in the political 
system. The most significant castes are the Brahmins, Vaishyas, 
Reddys, Kammas, Rajus (Kshatriyas) , Kapus, Velamas and the 
Harijans. Politically the Reddys, Kammas, Kapus and Velamas are 
the 'Dominant castes' (Srinivas, 1982)4 . It was estimated that 
the Reddy community constitutes 12% and Kammas comprise 8% of the 
total population (Hanumantha Rao, 1983). Among the lower castes, 
the percentage of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes(ST) 
in the 1991 census was 15.9% and 6.31% respectively and 
constitute 16.73% of the total Indian population. Religious 
following includes: 88% Hindus, 8.5% Muslims and 2.7% Christians 
and 0.8% others. Muslims dominate the urban agglomeration of 
Hyderabad. Their political behaviour is discussed in Chapter III.
4 Srinivas (1982) in Social Change in Modern India . 
describes them as numerically strongest in the village and 
economically and politically influential. The Reddys dominate the 
Telangana and Rayalaseema districts while the Kammas are powerful 
in the coastal districts with the Kshatriyas and Kapus concentred 
in the Godavari and northern districts of Vishakapatnam and 
Vizianagaram.
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TABLE 1.1 SOCIO ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ANDHRA 
PRADESH AND ALL INDIA
Characteristics Andhra Pradesh All India
Population (Millions) 66.3 843 .9
Males (Millions) 33.6 437.6
Females (Millions) 32 .7 406.3
Total Voters 42,747,862 501,019.356*
Percentage of votes 
polled in 1991
56.35 51.13
Sex ratio (No.of 
females for 1000 males
972 929
Percentage Literacy 
(Total)
45.11 52.11
Percentage Literacy 
(Males)
56.24 63.86
Percentage literacy 
(Females)
33 .71 39.71
Percentage of Urban 
population
26.79 25.70
Percentage of working 
population (total)
45.3 37.60
% of working Males 55.4 51.50
% of working Females 34.8 27 .1
Density per sq.km 241 267
♦Excluding Punjab where elections were postponed
Source: Andhra Pradesh Year Book,1993 & The Tenth Round, PTI
1992.
THE STATE AND ADMINISTRATION
AP comprises two political entities, Andhra, which was part of 
the erstwhile composite state of Madras in British India, and 
Telangana, a part of the Nizam's dominions in the former princely- 
state of Hyderabad. The Telugu speakers of Andhra are the second 
largest linguistic group in the country with a highly developed 
ancient civilization and culture. Over the course of time, their 
demand for a separate state emerged as an integral part of the 
national movement. The fast unto death by Potti Sriramulu
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resulted in the first linguistic state of Andhra on 1 October,
1953. Subsequently on 1 November, 1956 with the reorganization 
of states, the Telugu speaking areas of the old Hyderabad state 
were merged with Andhra to form Andhra Pradesh with Hyderabad as 
the capital. Economically and in some respects politico- 
administratively, the state has three natural regions of 
Telangana5, Rayalaseema^ and Coastal Andhra or Circars7 spread 
over 23 districts (Aleem & Aleem, 1988) .
The state administration is run by the Council of Ministers with 
the Chief Minister as its chairperson and Governor as the head 
of state. The choice of the chief minister has been a complex 
problem in the state, even between the Congress factions; area, 
caste and group rivalries have played a decisive role in the 
choice. Caste factors have been important in the selection of 
candidates and the chief ministers (Ambedkar, 1992) . Political 
trends in AP can be better appreciated in the context of the 
persistent endeavour of the aspiring landed power-groups formed 
round the dominant sub castes (Jatis) in the three regions which 
struggle within the framework of democracy and representative 
institutions to acquire political authority (Khan, 1969). The 
Council of Ministers in AP reflect the geopolitical character of 
the state. It is constituted taking into account its Andhra and 
Telangana regions along with the seniority and service of members 
of the majority party. The dominant castes among the Reddys and
5The Telangana region comprises of 10 districts and extends 
over an area of 114.9 thousand sq.Kms. It accounts for 41.7% of 
the total area of the state. The districts included are 
Hyderabad, Warangal, Sangareddy, Nalgonda Rangareddy, Khammam, 
Nizamabad, Medak, Mehboobnagar and Adilabad.
■ ■ ■° The Rayalaseema region consists of four districts;
Kurnool, Cuddapah, Ananathapur and Chittoor and accounts for 
24.46% of the total area of the state and 17.97% of the 
population of the state.
7The Coastal Andhra region comprises of nine districts and 
accounts for 34.34% of the area covering the entire coastline of 
970 kms. The major districts of the region are Srikakulum, 
Vizianagaram, Vishakapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, 
Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam and Nellore.
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Kammas receive adequate, sometimes significant, representation. 
One or two Muslims are also included, though they may not be 
assigned important portfolios. Representation of BCs is also 
assuming importance with reservations in some assembly and 
parliamentary constituencies.
THE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION
The electoral politics of AP represents a unique three-fold 
system; the National politics of Cong.I, BJP and Communist 
parties, the regional politics of TDP and local politics in 
Hyderabad represented by MIM, an independent party dominated by 
the Muslim population of Hyderabad. AP is represented in the LS 
through 42 constituencies of which 34 are in the general 
category, six are reserved for SCs and two for STs. Three 
constituencies: Hyderabad, Secunderabad and Nagarkurnool were 
selected for the present study. Nagarkurnool is a reserved 
constituency for a SC candidate while the other two are in the 
general category. The main parties in the state are Cong. I and 
TDP. The other parties are: Communist Party of India (CPI),
Communist Party of India (Marxists) CPI (M) and BJP with other 
parties including MIM in Hyderabad.
AP has been a Cong. I dominated state both at the parliamentary 
and assembly levels except for one term during 1983-89 when the 
TDP led by NTR held power for six years. Since the first general 
elections in 1951-1952 until 1982, Cong.I has enjoyed majority 
support in the LS elections with 40-57% share of the AP vote. In 
1989 the Cong.I regained control over the state administration 
and in 1991 gained a majority in the LS polls.
Until 1982, in the State Legislative Assembly, Cong.I domination 
continued despite frequent changes of chief ministers and 
constant dissidence within the party. No Cong.I chief minister 
was in office for a full period of five years®. However, NTR the
8 Since 1956, the state has had 14 Chief ministers, Two 
were chosen as Chief Ministers three times and two were elected 
twice. No Chief minister was in office for a full period of five
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TDP chief, after one political upheaval9, completed his term. 
The frequent changes of chief ministers when Indira Gandhi was 
Prime minister at the high command of Cong. I led to a significant 
phase in the state's politics. NTR, the matinee hero of the 
Telugu silver screen who acted in social, historical and 
mythological roles for over three decades started the TDP in 
1982. An extremely popular and well loved film personality, NTR 
toured the state arousing a sectarian spirit among the Telugus 
for restoring their honour and for regional representation10. 
The Telugu newspaper 'Eenadu', started at about the same time by 
media baron Ch. Ramoji Rao, contributed to NTR's popularity. The 
paper used various marketing strategies including the 
distribution of free copies to increase its readership and 
thereby gather support for TDP across caste and class groups and 
also amongst women11.
AP politics had been dominated by Reddys, but the Kammas, as the 
economically dominant caste group, intent on securing power were 
also motivated by TDP. There was a general feeling among the 
Kammas that though they constituted 8% of the population they 
were never able to occupy pivotal positions in the ministry. This 
support steered the party to an overwhelming win in the 1983 
assembly elections which won 201 out of 293 seats with a 45.9%
years. Most of them were out within months, few of them served 
between 2-3 years and only one could serve for four years.
9 N.Bhaskar Rao, NTRs deputy and Finance Minister with some 
TDP members and with the support of Cong.I and Governor D. Ram 
Lai tried to topple NTR's democratically elected government in 
his absence while he was abroad for medical treatment. NTR 
subsequently proved his majority and restored his position as the 
Chief Minister.
10 Lai (1990) opines that Cong.I was riddled with the twin 
vices of factionalism and nepotism leading to frequent shuffling 
of chief ministers.
11 NTR had a vast following of women through the 
mythological roles that he played in films. In rural areas women 
worshipped him and many performed religious ceremonies in front 
of him on his election tours. (Source: Election video film of TDP 
1991) .
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of vote share reducing the Cong.I strength from 248 to a mere 60 
and 33.6% vote share. NTR was elected as the chief minister.
In the 1984 LS elections the support for NTR continued. Despite 
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, AP bucked the 
national trend and voted against Cong.I reducing its majority 
from 41 to 6 out of 42 seats with 41.8% vote share. TDP not only 
won 30 seats with 44.8%, but also emerged as the largest 
opposition group in the LS.
Five years later, in 1989 there was a shift in support towards 
the Cong.I. in the Assembly and LS elections. NTR was thrown out 
of power. He himself lost his Kalwakurty seat but won from 
Hindupur. Cong.I formed the state government headed by Chenna 
Reddy, a veteran politician who became chief minister for the 
third time. The toppling game continued and within two years, 
Chenna Reddy was replaced by Vijaya Bhasker Reddy after the 
government failed to control the communal riots in the state. 
Since then, three chief ministers have been replaced and one may 
see more replacements before the state polls in 1994. In the 1989 
LS elections, Cong.I regained 39 of the 42 seats with a margin 
of 50.9% votes, reducing TDP strength from 30 to just two with 
34.4% vote share. Two years later, in the run up to the 1991 
elections, the state was riven with communal riots, with acute 
law and order problems and with frequent changes of chief 
ministers. The competing party, the TDP was again in electoral 
contest, with BJP also attempting to make inroads into the state.
During the 1991 election, polling was held in two phases - 20 
May and 15 June 1991. In the first phase, 17 constituencies went 
to the polls on 20 May while the remaining 25, originally 
scheduled for 26 May were postponed to 15 June 1991, after the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. About 609 candidates (583 men and 
26 women) contested in AP for 42 seats. Cong. I fielded 42 
candidates, TDP contested 35 and BJP 41 seats. Secunderabad, the 
urban constituency of AP had 38 candidates, the highest number. 
Four belonged to recognised parties, namely Cong.I, JD, BJP and
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TDP and 34 independents. The overall turnout in AP was 61.42%# 
10 percentage points more than the national average. There was 
not much difference in the turnout in the first and second phases 
of the election.
The elections were marked by violence and a re-poll was ordered 
following snatching of ballot papers and boxes. The assassination 
of Rajiv Gandhi after the first phase of elections gave rise to 
violent political riots in the state. It was alleged that Cong.I 
supporters were involved in damaging properties and campaign 
material of TDP, BJP and other political parties. A six day 
hunger strike by NTR to protest against the alleged Cong.I 
atrocities and a video film did not check the sympathy wave for 
Cong.I following the assassination (See Chapter III).
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ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS IN AP
The results in AP showed obvious shifts in the voting trends in 
the two phases. While TDP dominated the pre-assassination 
results, the sympathy factor helped the Cong.I in the second 
phase. TDP and its allies gained 15 (TDP-13, CPI-1 CPM-1), of 17 
seats (In 1989 Cong.I had won 15 of these 17 contested seats, 
one each by the TDP and MIM) . Here it would not be wrong to 
presume that TDP could have gained a few more seats, if it were 
not for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.
TABLE 1.2 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS CONTESTED, WON
AND PERCENTAGE OF VOTES POLLED IN 1991
Political Party No. of
seats
contested
No of 
seats 
won
Percentage of 
votes polled
Cong. 1 42 25* 45.56
TDP 35 13 32.26
BJP 41 1 9.63
CPM 2 1 2.43
CPI 2 1 1.87
MIM (Registered 
party)
1 1 1.79
JD 2 0 0.55
Other Registered 
Parties
18 0 0.20
Congress (0) 1 0 0.90
JP/JD(S)/Lok Dal 
/others
33 0 0.34
Bahujan Samajwadi 
Party
29 0 0.38
Independents 403 0 4.10
Total 609 42 100
Source: Report on the Tenth General elections to the House of
People 1991. Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
In the total analysis as shown in the table 1.2, Cong.I won 25 
seats with 45.5% vote share, while TDP gained 13 seats with 32.2% 
vote share. BJP won only the Secunderabad constituency, but made 
inroads in the state politics with 9.64% vote share and gave a
tough contest to the MIM chief Sultan Salauddin Owaisi in 
Hyderabad. The CPI, CPM and MIM gained one seat each. In the 
following section we briefly analyze the three constituencies 
under study.
PROFILES OF CONSTITUENCIES UNDER STUDY
Three constituencies were selected to investigate a differential 
response, if any, from different segments of electors exposed to 
mass and traditional forms of campaigning. Hence an urban 
constituency, Secunderabad, an urban-rural constituency of 
Hyderabad and a rural constituency reserved for an SC candidate, 
Nagarkurnool were selected. Each constituency had its own 
distinctive political contest: in Hyderabad, we observed communal 
politics of BJP and MIM; in Secunderabad the effect of the 
extensive BJP campaign on an urban electorate dislodged the 
Cong. I ,• and in Nagarkurnool, how the sympathy wave contributed 
to Cong.I victory. Table 1.3 compares some of the characteristics 
of the constituencies.
33
TABLE 1.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE
CONSTITUENCIES
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
Total
Electorate
1,183,787 1,296,145 1,001,633
Electorate
Composition
Urban Urban-Rural Rural/
Reserved for 
SC candidate
% Voter Turnout 45 .08 77 .12 59.96
Number of 
Candidates
38 26 10
Party won BJP MIM Cong.I
% of votes 
polled by 
winning party
48.19 46.18 44 .74
% margin of 
victory with 
the nearest 
party
16.1 over 
Cong.I
4.01 over BJP 8.68 over 
TDP
Date of 
Election
20 May, 1991 20 May 1991 15 June, 
1991
Source: Report on the Tenth General Election to the House of 
People in India 1991. Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
HYDERABAD
Hyderabad is the capital of AP and the fifth largest city in the 
country. The Hyderabad constituency comprises of four urban and 
three rural assembly constituencies of which Charminar, 
Chandrayangutta, Yakutpura and Karwan are urban and Tandur, 
Vikharabad and Chevalla are rural. It covers an area of 217 
sq.km. with a population of 3,091,718. It accounts for nearly one 
fourth of the urban population of the state with the highest 
literacy rate at 56.75% compared to Nagarkurnool at 33.77%. The 
constituency has been dominated by the communal factions of MIM 
led by Sultan Salauddin Owaisi. The city experienced intense 
communal riots in the run up to the 1991 elections.
During the elections there was intensive campaigning by the BJP 
and MIM, both activating their communal groups. BJP was 
extensively supported by the business community (Marwaris) to
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dislodge the MIM. Of the 26 candidates in the elections, the 
contest was effectively between the communally oriented groups, 
the BJP and MIM.
The election, held in the first phase on 20 May 1991, was marked 
by violence, rigging and snatching of ballot boxes. The turnout 
has always been a high in most elections but in 1991, there was 
a record turnout of 77.12% voters. Re-poll was ordered in 65 
polling booths as some booths recorded an improbable 90% voting. 
The results declared after re-polls, favoured the MIM. Owaisi won 
the seat for the third time with a margin of 4.01% votes, 
obtaining 46.18% vote share with BJP at 42.17%.
SECUNDERABAD
Secunderabad is the only completely urban constituency in AP with 
an electorate of 1,183,787. However, the voter turnout at 45.08% 
was the lowest in the three of the constituencies. The urban 
assembly constituencies include Vijaynagar colony, Musheerabad, 
Maharajgunj, Sanathnagar, Khairtabad, Himayatnagar and Asifnagar. 
Secunderabad was mostly represented by Cong. I except in 1971 when 
it was represented by the Telangana Praja Samithi. Since 1979, 
five LS elections were held in this constituency including two 
by-elections.
In 1991 there were 38 candidates, the highest in AP, of which 35 
were independents or belonged to minor parties and the other 
three were from the Cong.I, BJP and TDP. The effective contest 
was between the sitting MP, T.Mannema of the Cong.I, K.Pratap 
Reddy from TDP and Bandaru Dattatreya of BJP. Secunderabad had 
never before the 1991 election witnessed any communal politics 
as evidenced in the 1991 elections. The BJPs campaign won them 
a seat to help them make inroads into the state politics. 
T.Mannema contesting for the third time, lost to the twice 
defeated BJP candidate, Bandaru Dattatreya by a margin of 85,063 
with a 48.19% vote share. JD, represented by Pratap Reddy, 
supported by TDP and Left parties gained 17.74% vote share.
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NAGARKURNOOL
Nagarkurnool is a rural constituency and also a reserved one for 
a SC candidate. It is part of the Kurnool district with a 
population of 2,967,837 and a literacy level at 33.77%, which is 
one of the lowest in AP. With an electorate of 1,001,633, the 
constituency was represented by Cong. I in nine of the ten Lok 
Sabha elections except in 1984 when a TDP candidate won. 
Nagarkurnool comprises of seven assembly segments: Achampet, 
Nagarkurnool, Kalwakurty, Shadnagar, Jadcherla, Kollapur and 
Pargi. The closely contested election was between Mallu Ravi of 
Cong.I, Mahendranath of TDP and K.Laxman of BJP. Elections to 
this constituency were held on 15 June after the assassination 
of Rajiv Gandhi. The voter turn out was only 59.96%, compared to 
70.5%. in 1989. Cong.I candidate Mallu Ravi, won with 44.74% vote 
share followed by TDP with 36.06% and BJP with 13.34% vote share. 
Cong.I and TDP share decreased since 1989 from 53.9% and 43.4%. 
The BJP which contested for the first time gained.
THE SAMPLE FOR THE STUDY
The sample was selected from the three constituencies. Each
parliamentary constituency comprised of seven assembly
constituencies which were again divided into wards. Each ward was 
further divided into localities. About 8-10 localities covered 
a polling-booth area. In each polling-booth the number of voters 
ranged from 1000-1500. The voter list of one polling booth was 
randomly taken from each assembly constituency.
A random sample of about 50 voters from each assembly
constituency was selected. The voters were marked and care was 
taken to have an equal number of men and women in the sample. As 
50 voters were chosen from each of the seven assembly
constituencies, a total of 350 voters was the sample per
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parliamentary constituency, making a total sample of 1050 voters 
to be interviewed. The names and addresses of the voters were 
transcribed and interviewers were asked to approach the listed 
members of households. However, if the listed members were not 
available or did not want to answer the questions, the next 
adjacent household was to be taken. Anticipating the problems 
that may arise due to non-responses or any other incidental 
occurrences, extra questionnaires were distributed whereby each 
parliamentary constituency had 400 questionnaires.
Though care was taken to include an equal number of men and women 
in the sample, the response from women was 28% compared to 72% 
men. In order to get a fair representation of the women from the 
three constituencies the sample was weighted against the total 
number of voters in each constituency. The actual voter turnout 
in the constituencies was taken from the Report on the Tenth 
General Election to the House of People for the 1991 General 
Elections by the EC.
In Secunderabad the number of women had to be weighted against 
the men while in Hyderabad and Nagarkurnool it was the opposite. 
This was mainly because in Secunderabad a higher percentage of 
women responded to the questionnaire.
TABLE I.4 SECUNDERABAD
Secunderabad 
Cons t i tuency
Men Women Total
Total voters from 
the constituency
333,917 199,749 533,666
% of total voters 62.6 37.4 100
Sample of the 
present study
199 135 334
% From sample of 
present study
59.6 40 .4 100
Weighted 
sample by 1.136 
(multiplier)
226 135 361
% from weighted 
sample
62.6 37.4 100
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TABLE 1.5 HYDERABAD
Hyderabad
Constituency
Men Women Total
Total voters from 
the constituency
539,960 459,642 999,602
% of total voters 54 46 100
Sample of the 
present study
267 70 337
% of sample from the 
study
79.2 20.8 100
Weighted sample by 
3.257 (multiplier)
267 228 495
% from weighted 
sample
54 46 100
TABLE 1. 6 NAGARKURNOOL
Nagarkurnool
Constituency
Men Women Total
Total voters 314,478 286,130 600,608
% from total voters 52.4 47.6 100
Total from the sample 156 45 201
% from sample 77.6 22 .4 100
Weighted sample by 
3.178 (multiplier)
156 143 299
% of weighted sample 52.3 47.7 100
TABLE 1.7 THE PRESENT SAMPLE (WEIGHTED)
Constituencies Men Women Total
Secunderabad 226 135 361
Hyderabad 267 228 495
Nagarkurnool 156 143 299
Total 649 (56.2%) 506 (43.8%) 1155
Therefore, in order to get a balanced representation of males and 
females in the weighted sample we had a total number of 649 or 
56.2% men and 506 or 43.8% women. This was essential as the low 
percentage of women's responses would give an obvious edge to 
male respondents in the analysis.
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CHAPTER II
INDIAN ELECTORAL. SYSTEM, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, MASS MEDIA 
AND THE 1991 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
SECTION I
INDIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
In India elections to the LS are normally held every five years 
unless the Parliament is dissolved under unusual conditions then 
mid-term elections are held. Since independence in 1947, ten 
general elections have been held, the last one was in 1991 
(Fig-1) when mid-term elections were held.
FIGURE. II.l TERMS OF THE LOK SABHA
TERMS OF LOK SABHA
Lok Sabha 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8lh 9th
Term  5Y 5Y 5Y 45.7M 70M 29M 5Y 5Y 15M
Y  -  Y e a rs  M -  M o n th s
Election
Source: Arun Kumar, The Tenth Round: The Story of Indian
Elections (1991), PTI.
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In the Westminster system, a government must command a 
parliamentary majority. Most Indian elections since 1952 had 
produced a definite result and a clear majority for a single 
party. In the first three general elections held in 1952, 1957 
and 1962, Congress won massive majorities in the LS as well as 
in most state Legislative Assemblies, except in Kerala in 1957 
when the CPI came to power in the assembly elections.
Until March 1977, India had been labelled a 'one party dominant 
political system'. The electorate expressed its faith in a 
leadership that could rise above party, sectarian and personal 
interests and was capable of laying the foundations of economic 
prosperity (Gupta, 1985) . Though the Congress has never won more 
than 48.1% (1984) of total votes polled, yet it has formed the 
government in eight out of ten elections, six times with a 
substantial majority. However, since 1967, there has been a 
gradual decline in support for Congress, as other parties tried 
to establish themselves. In 1971, Congress won the election but 
not with a substantial majority.
In 1977, India was close to a two party system when four distinct 
national parties, Congress (0), various gjSc^ fellst groups like the 
Bharatiya Lok Dal (Peoples Party of India), Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
(BJS) (Indian People's Assembly) came together to form the Janata 
Party (JP) as a united opposition to Congress and went to form 
the government with Morarji Desai as Prime Minister. The 
coalition government lasted less than three years and Congress 
was returned to power after the mid-term elections in 1980.
In 1980, the JP split to form the JD led by Chandrashekhar and 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee. In 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated and in 
the general elections that year, the component parties contested 
the elections separately as the Indian National Congress 
(Socialist), BJP, Lok Dal and Janata Party along with Cong.I and
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Communist Parties. Cong.I won the elections, with a majority'of 
415 seats and formed the government with Rajiv Gandhi as the 
Prime Minister.
i
In AP, the 1984 elections saw the rise of TDP on the national 
scene as the single largest party in the opposition with 30 
seats. But in the 1989 and 1991 general elections, no single 
party has gained an absolute majority. In 1989, the non-Congress 
parties united again, this time under the leadership of 
V.P.Singh, a former Finance Minister in Rajiv Gandhi's cabinet 
and defeated Cong.I. The National Front Government was formed 
with support 'from the outside' by the BJP, Communist and other 
parties to form a 204 member National Front Parliamentary Party 
(NFPP). However due to internal conflicts V.P.Singh's government 
was out of office in eleven months and five days.
The leadership was taken up by Chandrashekhar who formed the 
government with only 54 MPs, mostly defectors from JD, to form 
the Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP). He also functioned with the 
'outside support' of Cong. I led by Rajiv Gandhi. However a flimsy 
reason regarding surveillance by two constables at the residence 
of Rajiv Gandhi led to withdrawal in support by Cong.I. Rather 
than face defeat in parliament, Chandrashekhar announced his 
resignation requesting a dissolution. The second minority 
government lasted only four months. Parliament was dissolved and 
mid-term elections were called by the President through a 
notification by the EC on 12 April, 1991.
After the fifteen month rule of the minority governments and the 
prospect of another hung Parliament sparked off a debate whether 
India should change over to a new electoral system 1
1 Some of the systems debated were the 'Proportional 
representation methods as in some European countries and 'List 
system' in Germany, the 'Two Ballot system' in France and the 
'Alternative vote' system in Australia. However India continued 
with the 'first-past-the-post system in its electoral battles 
with a growing number of parties and candidates along with an 
increase in the electorate.
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The 1991 elections saw the emergence of a multi-party system. For 
the first time the TINA factor (There Is No Alternative (to 
Cong.I) had disappeared. There were four major parties, led by 
four prime ministerial candidates, three of whom had already 
served as Prime Ministers - Cong. I led by Rajiv Gandhi and later 
after his assassination by P . V.Narasimha Rao, SJP led by 
Chandrashekhar, JD/NF led by V.P.Singh and BJP led by L.K.Advani.
THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
THE CONGRESS-I
The Indian National Congress(INC) is the oldest national party 
founded in 1885 by A.O Hume. On several occasions the party split 
and each part claimed to be the true successor, but only one 
Congress(I) under the leadership of Indira Gandhi has retained 
national following. The Congress Party has won eight of the ten 
parliamentary elections held since 1952. In 1984, Cong.I's 
leadership was taken over by Rajiv Gandhi after the assassination 
of Indira Gandhi. Since his assassination during the 1991 
election, the party has been led by the present Prime Minister, 
P.V.Narasimha Rao.
support for the party was largely in the Hindi speaking states 
of northern and central India. The party is supported by 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 
(World Hindu Organization). Prominent leaders of the party are 
Dr.Murli Manohar Joshi, L.K.Advani, A.B.Vajpayee and Vijay Raje 
Scindia. During the 1991 elections the party emerged as the 
largest opposition party winning 119 seats.
JANATA PARTY /JANATA DAL
The JD originated from Swatantra Party formed in 1961. Just 
before the 1977 elections, four national parties, the INC(O), 
Bharatiya Lok Dal, BJS and Socialist Party merged together to
Far. It was one of the Hindu
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP)
t-ffx /
 nationalist parties. The
to/LBJS7 founded in 1951 by
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form the Janata Party which won the election but governed for 
less than three years. The party split in 1979 into two groups: 
JP led by Chandrashekhar and Janata Party (S) (S stood for 
Secular) led by Charan Singh and Raj Narain (Later, it was known 
as Lok Dal).
In 1980, the Janata Party underwent a further split into the 
Janata Party led by Chandrashekhar and the BJP led by A.B. 
Vajpayee. In 1980 the Janata Party was part of the Janata Dal 
while BJS renamed as BJP emerged as an independent party.
JANATA DAL / NATIONAL FRONT (JD/NF)
JD was started in 1988 by V.P.Singh by merging of three parties- 
JP, Jan Morcha and Lok Dal. The NF was formed in alliance with 
Congress(S), regional parties like the TDP, Asom Gana Parishad 
(AGP) and Dravida Munetra Kazahagam (DMK) which formed the short 
lived government in 1989. The party split in 1990 into JD led by 
V.P.Singh and SJP led by Chandrashekhar. In 1991, JD/NF attempted 
to regain power with support from the regional parties. The party 
gained only 54 seats compared with the 143 they won in 1989. The 
prominent leaders in the / party include; NTR, S.R.Bommai and 
Jaipal Reddy.
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES
The Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India
(Marxists) (CPM) are recognised as national parties. Communist
strength has been largely confined to West Bengal, the small
neighbouring states of Tripura and Manipur and to the southern
state of Kerala with pockets of strength in Assam, Andhra Pradesh
and Bihar. These parties have been in alliance with the NF since
Ac*
1980. Some of the prominent leaders of the^party are; Jyoti Basu 
(CPM) Harkishan Singh Surjeet, E.M.S Namboodripad (CPM) and 
Indrajit Gupta (CPI).
SAMAJWADI JANATA PARTY (SJP)
SJP was formed in 1990 under the leadership of Devi Lai and 
Chandrashekhar after the split in the JD. It was the youngest
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national party to form a minority government with 54 MPs that 
lasted for four months in 1990. During the elections the party 
based its strategy on its performance in four months compared to 
the 40 years of Cong. I. The party was nearly routed gain^fing only 
five seats.
TELUGU DESAM PARTY (TDP)
TDP was started by film hero turned politician, NTR as a regional 
party from AP in 1982. The party won the assembly elections in 
the state and was in power from 1983 - 1989. The party was ±3F 
w&GtiC(the NF with NTR as the chairman. In 1989, the 
party lost power in the state elections and their number slid 
from 30 to two in the LS elections. In the 1991 LS elections the 
party improved its position to 13 seats.
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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN INDIA : AN OVERVIEW
In this section, we first look at political communication in 
elections since 1952. We review some of the relevant literature 
on the impact of election campaigns on voting behaviour. Most 
studies have concentrated on the process of elections and socio­
economic factors affecting voter behaviour, some of these 
references have been quoted with the findings of the present 
study.
In India, it was mainly Cong. I that has contributed to the 
development of new techniques of election campaigning. The 
changes in the political systems have also prompted the increased 
need for campaign communications. Innovations in campaigns were 
more pronounced during the mid-term elections, when there was a 
greater need for rebuilding the images of parties and leaders.
Early Indian political communication in the 1950s was 
characterised by public meetings processions, pamphlets and wall 
writings. Electoral contests were dominated by large number of 
grassroots party workers deployed to mobilize voters in house-to- 
house campaigns. During the first three general elections 
following independence, in 1952, 1957 and 1962, Congress
dominated at the centre and in the states.
From the fourth general elections in 1967, there was a gradual 
decline in support for the Cong.I. Pattabhiram (1967) evaluating 
the third general election concluded a gradual decline in the 
Congress power. More importantly, his analysis suggests a 
consistent rise in political awareness, sense of political 
efficacy, sophistication about politics and involvement in 
politics among voters from 1967-71.
The split in the party in 1969 was followed by the first mid-term 
elections in 1971. The election also prompted the need for 
greater support for Indira Gandhi as the popular leader of
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Congress. In 1971 Indira Gandhi launched the campaign with the 
slogan 'Garibi Hatao' (Eradicate Poverty). The campaign theme, 
largely communicated through her speeches and posters, led to a 
Cong. I victory with 352 of the 500 seats with 43.7% share of 
vote.
The 1977 general elections, following the 'Emergency' period 
(1975-76)2 saw the debacle of the Congress. The united 
opposition parties that formed the Janata Party, built their 
campaign strategies around the alleged excesses of the Emergency. 
'Restore Democracy' was the election theme of the victorious 
Janata Party. The Congress strength decreased from 352 to 154 
with 34.3% vote share.
After 28 months, India was again at the polls with the 
disintegration of the Janata government. The Congress(R) was 
renamed as the Congress(Indira) - (Cong.I) with the symbol of 
the 'Hand'. An intensive campaign was launched to rebuild the 
image of Indira Gandhi and Cong.I. Political advertising was 
attempted during the elections through a Delhi based agency 
called Graphisads. The campaign was built around the theme 'Elect 
a government that works'. The campaign, mostly through newspaper 
advertisements was noticeable for the 'Onion advertisements-3 - 
which exemplified the issue of price rise and attracted much 
attention when Congress and Opposition parties were struck with 
retaliation and counter retaliation. However, Indira Gandhi, 
despite the newspaper advertisements and posters, largely 
depended on her elections tours and campaign meetings all over
2 During 1975-76, Mrs Gandhi had declared a state of 
Emergency in the country. Leaders of the other parties were 
jailed and restrictions were imposed on the press.
2 The advertisement made a comparison with the rise in the 
price of onions from Rs.1.50 (£0.03)during Indira Gandhi's rule 
to Rs.5.00 (£0.10) during the 28 months of Janata rule. The
Janata counter attacked the Congress through an ad with the 
headline 'Priceless lies' of the Congress arguing that the price 
of onions was Rs.4.50 (£0.09) during Indira Gandhi's time and the 
slogan was counter attacked with 'Elect a government that works 
for the people'.
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the country. In 1980, Congress regained power with 353 seats and 
42.7% vote share.
A change in style of political campaigning was seen since 1984 
when Rajiv Gandhi took over the leadership of the party after the 
assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi. It altered not only 
the political system but also the entire process of electoral 
campaigning. The nation had been thrown into a turmoil in the 
aftermath of the assassination of Indira Gandhi and there was 
wid-'cjpread violence with the Sikh community being the main 
targe of violence4 .
During the 1984 elections, Arun Nanda of Rediffusion Advertising 
agency and a friend of Rajiv Gandhi was entrusted with the Cong. I 
campaign. The western educated young leader was convinced that 
a systematic professional approach to political advertising could 
pay dividends. For the first time, an organised political 
campaign was conceived in India during the 1984 general 
elections. Intense background information was gathered on a 
highly complex Indian electorate.
Under the circumstances, a multi-media campaign was built around 
the theme 'National unity'. Cong.I tried to project itself as the 
party of national unity and integrity, the only one that could 
unite India, end violence and terrorism and offer hope. The 
advertising exploited the grief at the death of Indira Gandhi in 
a none too subtle way. Press advertisements called for unity and 
support, posters showed the bullet-ridden, blood splattered body 
of Indira Gandhi. Her recorded speeches at public meetings, 
especially the last one in Orissa were heard all over the country 
through audio cassettes.
This campaign also introduced the use of films, later on through 
the use of video, political films developed into a major 
communications tool. The film on Indira Gandhi, 'Maa' (Mother),
4For Details see Prar ny Gupte, (1989)The Challenge of 
Change 1989 pp 57-85
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caused a tremendous emotional response; after sobbing over her 
death the audiences were invited to brighten up at the prospect 
of her son continuing her dynasty though the film 'Amethi Ka 
Suraj7 (The sun of Amethi)- the constituency inherited by Rajiv 
Gandhi). Cong.I swept the election on the emotional tide, gaining 
415 of the 543 or 76% seats and a vote share of 48.1% in the Lok 
Sabha, the highest since the first elections. Rajiv Gandhi became 
the youngest ever Prime Minister of India.
Five years later, in the run up to the next general elections in 
1989, Cong.I was facing several political crises. Terrorism was 
still growing unchecked, despite a Cong.I pledge five years 
earlier to remove it, but more important were the corruption 
charges against members of the Cong.I government in connection 
with the infamous Bofors Gun Deal. According to press reports the 
prime minister himself was involved5 .
In the follow up to the 1989 elections, the opposition parties 
united as the NF for the second time under Rajiv's former finance 
minister, V.P.Singh to challenge the Cong.I. Cong.I's electoral 
success in 1984 prompted rival parties to follow its lead in the 
use of political advertising. The Cong. I campaign was again drawn 
up in 1989 by Arun Nanda's Rediffusion Agency with the theme of 
'My Heart beats for India'. Cong.I adopted an attack strategy 
warning of the perils of coalition government: lawlessness,
communalism, disorder and disunity. The 1989 election saw the 
introduction of American-style negative advertising. Full and 
half-page newspaper advertisements were splashed all over the 
national and regional newspapers. The images of the press 
advertisements were intended to frighten: fighting cocks, broken 
dolls, grinning crocodiles and barbed wire fences - seeking to 
ridicule the notion that the opposition were capable of uniting.
5 The national newspaper The Hindu (Madras) gave extensive 
coverage through well investigated reports on the alleged 
involvement of Cong.I in the Bofors Gun Deal.
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The reaction, however, was a backlash against the party**. The 
Cong. I campaign backfired because at the same time that scorn was 
being poured on the idea of opposition unity, the opposition did 
unite. On another occasion an advertisement with the slogan: 'I 
won't let anyone turn the streets into streets of fire' coincided 
with the outbreak of communal violence in northern India.
While the Cong.I attacked the opposition unity, the opposition 
raised the issue of corruption against the Cong.I with Rajiv 
Gandhi being the prime target. Through posters, public meetings 
and media support, V.P.Singh and other opposition leaders accused 
the Cong. I of innumerable charges of corruption and also the 
misuse of electronic media. Unlike the Cong.I press campaign, 
lack of funds prevented the use of newspapers by other parties, 
but the NF got vast publicity through a parody of Cong. I 
advertisements in a popular newspaper Indian Express published 
from 16 centres all over India.
When the election was held, Congress crashed from its landslide 
of 76% seats to 40%, and although it was still the single largest 
party it could no longer form the government. In view of other 
difficulties and accusations of corruption, the Cong.I campaign's 
contribution to the debacle may have been slight, however it took 
a large slice of the blame. A finger was pointed at the small 
coterie of Westernized politicians and professional advertisers, 
removed from the grass roots reality, with no understanding of 
the 'hearts' and 'minds' of the people7.
By 1991, planned political campaigning was commonplace; all the 
parties used professional advertising agencies and commentators 
feared the election campaign would be the most socially divisive 
in Indian history. Four main parties were now involved: The
Cong. I, BJP, JD/NF, and SJP and each party had drawn upon support
^India Today 15 Nov 1989. There were protests from the 
Cong. I MLAs for the campaign to be withdrawn, but since the prime 
minister was involved, it continued.
7 India Today March 1990.
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of advertising agencies for building on strategies and use of 
communication techniques. An indepth analysis is discussed in 
Chapter III. We review a body of Indian literature which has 
focused on political communication and voting behaviour to 
provide a framework and perspective for our study.
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND INDIAN ELECTION STUDIES
Indian literature on election campaigns has been limited, though 
research on elections began in 1952®. In India, the Indian 
Institute of Public Opinion (IIPO), has pioneered election 
studies, but in recent years, IMRB, ORG, MARG and other agencies 
have regularly monitored opinion polls to predict election 
results.
U
^j(ost studies on Indian elections before 1975, the political 
system is characterised by the dominance of a single party 
(Cong. I) and must therefore be examined in the light of 
developments since the mid-seventies. Others cover a significant 
part of research in the field of voting behaviour in the assembly 
and parliamentary constituencies. These studies have considered 
the support to a particular party as a 'dependent phenomenon' and 
have tried to explain this with a number of socio- economic 
variables such as the primordial influences including family and 
kinship, caste and community and the standard factors of age, 
sex, education, class, income and rural-urban composition of the 
population.
The multifarious factors that have influenced the Indian 
electorate were party affiliation, personal image of leaders and
o
° Election studies were sponsored by the Research Programmes 
Committee of the Planning Commission and a large number of 
studies are being carried out by the university departments of 
Political Science and Research Centres in India. The Centre for 
Study of Developing Societies has contributed largely to the 
study of electoral behaviour in the country and their nationwide 
sample surveys have generated a great deal of data to provide a 
profile of the Indian voter in terms of party identification, 
political knowledge, electoral involvement, sense of political 
efficacy and voting decision.
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candidates and electoral issues. The main reasons for party 
preference have been identified in broad categories such as past 
record and future expectations, group representations, ideology 
and programmes, role in the freedom struggle, the ruling party, 
family traditions, and caste/community (Quaraishi, 1989) . Party 
affiliation was seen to be taking priority over the individual 
candidate, particularly in the case of national elections.
Eldersveld & Ahmed (1978), concluded that on most measures of 
political development such as knowledge about politics, level of 
political interest, psychological involvement with the outcome 
of the political actions, extent of political activity, belief 
in a party system and elections, strength of identification with 
parties, sense of political efficacy, the Indian system was a 
clearly developed polity.
Weiner, Osgood & Others (1975), in their study of electoral 
politics in the Indian states examined major cleavages in the 
Indian politics based on class, caste, tribe, religion and 
language, region and factional alignments. Some pilot studies 
have examined party and electoral systems, ideological cleavages, 
national and ethnic cleavages, religion and caste cum factional 
rivalries. These studies have focused on the various concepts of 
support for individual parties in the elections and how voters 
supported major parties.
intensive studies have argued that the influence of social, . 
ethnic and religious groups on the voting pattern was- n 
overestimated (Hurst, 1970). However, as a result of changes in 
the political system and the decline of one party system, 
political parties resorted to the division of society by reviving 
the vote banks through the arousal of primordial factors like 
caste and religion during 1989-91.
Seth (1975), suggested that the Indian voter manifests a 
relatively higher degree of party identification and evinces an 
appreciable amount of understanding of the general framework of
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the democratic polity and some degree of cognitive awareness of 
the immediate political surroundings. Weiner and Osgood (1975) 
studies have also described the way in which national electoral 
trends intersect with regional variations and the way in which 
specific categories of local constituencies are influenced by the 
state in which they are located9 . This was evident in states 
like AP, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu (TN) and Kerala. We have 
obtained similar findings in our study .
In a study on voting behaviour in the third general elections in 
two constituencies in Rajasthan, Varma and Bhambri (1967) 
assessing the campaign techniques and propaganda themes, revealed 
that there was a greater politico-electoral consciousness among 
rural than urban voters. They reported a 100% intention to vote 
by both the urban and the rural voters. In rural areas, party 
propaganda constituted the main source of political information 
for 92% of the voters, while newspapers were used by only a few. 
Religious meetings were sources of political information for a 
small 4% voters, caste meetings were a source for 30%, 
discussions among friends was a source for 47% and discussion 
within the family was a source for 15% of the voters. But in 
urban areas, newspapers were most sought after. In both areas, 
discussion with friends was more important than with the family. 
Sex did not alter substantially the sources of political 
information, but in general women voters depended more on 
propaganda sources and discussions with the family.
Varma and Bhambri's concerns relate closely to this study. Mass 
media were preferred by rural and urban voters. As against 15% 
in Varma's study who depended on discussions with the family, we 
found that nearly half our respondents depended on family as a 
source of political information. Varma's study gave an impression 
that caste meetings were important in voter behaviour. In
9 Weiner and Osgood's (1975) early studies focused primarily 
on princely and tribal constituencies which were presumed to have 
distinctive political characteristics in the regions in which 
tribes were located - their demographic distribution, levels of 
modernization and their relationship with state authority.
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contrast, many of our respondents did not agree that they were 
influenced either by caste or religious groups, though most 
campaigns were built around caste and religion.
Paul (1980) and Paul and Ahuja's (1991) analysis of the 1980, 
1989 and 1991 election campaigns were based on the public 
meetings of leaders from all over the country. Second, in 
analyzing the results of the 1980 elections they confirmed the 
electorate's preference to a one party stable government rather 
than a coalition government accused of non-performance. We find 
similar responses in our study where a majority of the voters 
preferred a one party government over a coalition.
Pathak (1977) , analyzing the electoral behaviour during the 
fourth general election in 1967, concluded that a high degree of 
exposure to campaigns, rising level of information and the belief 
in the efficacy of the electoral process are some of the main 
features of electoral behaviour in Gujarat.
Varma & Narain (1973), studying the 1967 general election in 
Rajasthan found that there was an increase in the readership of 
newspapers and consequent greater reliance on them as a medium 
of information. Further, the study found that most voters decide 
their party preferences during the period of elections to which 
mass media of communication have their small bit to contribute. 
Among the mass media of communication, it was the newspapers and 
among the interpersonal media of communication, friends and 
relations' had an edge over the other media of communication'.
Gupta (1985), in a study of Electoral Politics in India, 
analyzing the 1984 general elections came to a conclusion that 
the performance of the political parties whether in office or not 
in office greatly influenced the voting behaviour of the 
electorate. While he claimed that the 1984 result indicated a 
weakening of caste and communal factors in the Indian political 
system because of years of urbanization and modernization, 
especially in the LS elections, but they had not been totally
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eliminated at the local and regional level. However, the same 
cannot be said of the consequent 1989 and more importantly the 
1991 elections
Prasad (1979), concluded that in Bihar, political maturity was 
a result of greater awareness, involvement and judgement of the 
political process. His findings showed that a more modern (urban) 
environment, better education, higher income, significant caste 
and more frequent habit of political conversation led to greater 
participation. In our study we saw some similar trends. Only half 
the respondents were interested in politics and it was not a 
major topic of discussion, rating fourth after day-to-day matters 
of work, social problems and local gossip. However the influence 
of the interpersonal factors was still high in voting decisions.
Kaur (1989), in a study on 'Effects of Mass and Interpersonal 
Communication on New Voters in Hyderabad' found that newspapers 
were the main source of information on which 77% of the 
respondents depended. Men showed more political awareness 
compared to women and more than half the respondents were likely 
to vote for Cong.I.
Kar and Chaudary (1992), in a study on the electoral behaviour 
of industrial workers drawn from three factories in Haryana in 
the 1977 assembly elections concluded that industrial workers 
were substantially aware about political events. Political 
awareness was a factor for both, the amount and quality of 
participation in politics. Affiliation with reference groups had 
an impact on political behaviour. In analyzing campaign exposure, 
they found that 82.5% of the workers reported exposure to door- 
to-door canvassing, 60.9% received campaign material, 62.9% read 
newspapers concerning elections, and 88% listened to radio 
broadcasts for election news, 42.1% attended public meetings and 
25% joined processions organised by the political parties or 
candidates. In an interesting conclusion, their data revealed 
that a high level of campaign exposure was associated with a 
higher level of political awareness, but no such positive
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relationship was found between campaign exposure and voter 
turnout. Though the voting trends were higher in this targeted 
group, we found in our study that of the 70% who were approached 
by door-to-door campaigning, a third had a positive change in 
their voting behaviour.
SUMMARY
Literature on political behaviour has revealed a high level of 
political consciousness and independence in voters who have 
exhibited considerable discretion in their voting behaviour. 
Further, national electoral trends intersect with regional 
variations and elections to local constituencies are influenced 
by the state in which they are located.
It has also been established that mass media formed important 
sources of political information, especially for urban educated 
voters while the rural voters depended more on interpersonal 
channels. Newspapers were an important source of information and 
there was an high degree of exposure to campaigns.
It was observed that the overall voter turnout in the elections 
was between 50-60%. Since 1989 and 1991, efforts were made to 
increase the awareness of voters on the political process and 
increase political participation.
THE TENTH GENERAL ELECTIONS 1991
The tenth Lok Sabha election was marked by many new developments
tH.and disasters, resulting for the second time in history,^a hung 
parliament. Reports in the press described it as the most 
expensive, longest ever, socially and communally divisive, most 
violent and unpredictable. Academics, sociologists, communication 
scholars and politicians interpreted it as the most memorable 
election. The election introduced extensive use of opinion polls, 
computers, electronic media and well researched campaigns.
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The 1991 elections for 531 constituencies10 were held in May- 
June. The elections were scheduled in two phases. The first phase 
was on May 20 in 205 constituencies spread over eight states and 
four Union territories. The second phase was on June 12 and 15, 
after the May 23 and 26 polls were postponed due to the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21. Elections to the 
remaining 16 seats were held in a by-election in November 1991,
10Poll in six constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir had been 
postponed and six seats had been countermanded due to the death 
of candidates.
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when the Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao was elected from 
Nandyal constituency in AP.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES
During 1991, the number of political parties increased to 162, 
an increase of 46 since 1989, nine national11, 35 State and 118 
others. A record 8,953 candidates contested 531 seats that went 
to the polls (See Fig-2)12. Several known criminals, mafia dons 
and dacoits along with film and television stars, religious 
leaders, former princes, sportsmen and prostitutes had won 
tickets from major political parties. A record 5,646 independents 
contested of which only one could make it to the LS.
VOTER TURNOUT
Though the number of candidates and registered parties recorded 
a quantum increase, the voter turnout continued to average 
between 50-60% varying from as low as 54.7% in 1952 to a high at 
61.3% in 1967 and a record level of 64.1% in 1984. In 1991 
despite the use of extensive persuasive techniques by political 
parties and government, the voter turnout was only 51.13%.
(Fig- 2).
Cong.I with its allies again emerged as the single largest party 
with 227 members, 12 short of an absolute majority in a 
parliament. BJP through an extensive campaign won 119 seats and 
emerged as the largest opposition group. NF/JD were down to 56 
from 143 in 1989 and SJP was reduced from 54 to only five. The
1 1 • To gain national status, a party must poll 4% votes m
four states in the preceding LS election and a state party must
do so in the state.
12 There was a five fold increase in the number of 
candidates from a low of 3.1 per seat in 1957 to nearly 17 per 
seat in 1991. A noted increase of 44% over the last 1989 
elections. The steady rise in the national average in the 
candidates per constituency, is due to the rise in the number of 
independent candidates. There were over 5600 independent 
candidates in 1991,nearly 2000 over that of 1984 elections.
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assassination of Rajiv Gandhi had swung the pendulum in favour 
of Cong.I-1-0 as turnouts went up by six to seven percent m  
states, where the polling was held after the assassination, to 
achieve an overall success of 47.19%.There was not much change 
in AP.
POLL VIOLENCE
Elections were marked by poll violence and rigging. The 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in the middle of the campaign on 
21 May, 1991 at a campaign meeting at Sriperumbudur in TN left 
a trail of violence especially in AP. During the elections, five 
LS candidates, 21 assembly candidates and 350 other persons were 
killed in election related violence.
OPINION POLLS IN INDIAN ELECTIONS
Psephology, started later in India than in most developing 
countries, has become firmly established in the system with 
parties and candidates evaluating their support from the surveys. 
National, regional, local and exit polls formed a scientific 
means of predicting elections results. Opinion polls prior to the 
election had envisaged a marginal win for Cong.I with 310 seats, 
83 seats for BJP and a little over 30 seats for JD14. The 
support for BJP had doubled its share of the popular vote in the 
country and trebled in Uttar Pradesh. The India Today-MARG 
opinion poll, conducted between 7-10 May, 1991 forecast a hung 
Parliament with Cong.I winning 233 seats and BJP with 150 seats 
and about 78-130 seats to the NF and Left Front parties15. 
While in Britain the election campaigns report daily polls and 
trends, India has tyet to take off on that scale given a
15 Arun Kumar (1991) states that poll figures indicated a 
6.63% swing away from the Cong. I at the beginning of the 
elections but the pendulum swung in its favour after Rajiv 
Gandhi's assassination.
14 MRAS Burke Opinion Polls & The Hindu. Sunday 19 May,
1991.
15India Today-MARG Opinion Poll as reported in Statesman. 
New Delhi 18 May, 1991
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heterogenous population and the physical difficulty of reaching 
them. However, most leading newspapers and magazines had 
conducted opinion polls and also some conducted weekly polls18, 
thereby providing enormous information for predicting the 
election trends.
ELECTIONS ON NETWORK
The First Indian election on a network - was how the National 
Informatics Centre (NIC) described its massive arrangement for 
the 1991 LS elections. It was for the first time anywhere in the 
world a network of such large magnitude was attempted17. 
Through a satellite over the Indian Ocean, a giant earth station 
was installed in New Delhi and 450 computer terminals were 
connected to every district headquarters through NIC's network. 
A software package called 'Elecon', for computerised election 
analysis was connected to the Chief Election Commissioner's 
office enabling immediate communication through electronic mail, 
analysis of the elections results, data bases and the monitoring 
of alleged booth capturing and rigging18.
ISSUES IN THE ELECTIONS
In any country economic performance reflects the political 
stability which is manifested in the defeat of the government. 
The 1992 British elections was an exception when the 
Conservatives won an election despite deep recession. However,
18 The Week. Kottayam during April-May 1991 held weekly 
polls and regularly updated the data.
17The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 6 May, 1991.
18The system could mark out those booths that had polled 
more than 90% votes, and if a particular party secured 90% votes, 
it meant that it had cornered the booth that it had captured. 
This system also had the facility of printing the votes polled, 
percentage of polling, total voters and party positions, as well 
as cumulative totals depicting the party lead which was 
coordinated for analyzing the results on radio and TV.
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in a developing economy like India, economic disparities, 
inflation and escalating prices are a common feature which none 
of the governments had managed to set right. For the 36.9% of the 
people living below the poverty line, economic issues were of 
little consequence. Taxes matter little to the average voter 
under the poverty line. However, the issues of rising prices has 
always been part of Indian election campaigns. The famous 
electoral slogan of 'Garibi Hatao' (Eradicate Poverty) by Indira 
Gandhi had a great impact on the voters which led to her victory 
in the 1980 elections. Unlike the West, where economic issues 
become selling points of a campaign, in India, political 
campaigns are configured on the basis of religion, caste and 
other social problems, rather than the economy.
CASTE AND RELIGION IN THE 1991 ELECTIONS
A CULTURAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ? ^ ^
-IQCaste  ^ and religion which, described as 'Mandal-Mandir' by 
politicians during the 1991 elections played an important role 
in parliamentary politics. Electoral and communication strategies 
were built around concepts of caste and religion.
Traditionally India's cultural system had offered a fair degree 
of independence to its polity. There was relative disassociation 
between polity and culture and this difference enabled Indians 
to pursue political modernization without fundamentally tampering
------------------------------------  a
Singh & Vajpeyi.D. (1981) A caste is/^hereditary, 
endogamous group whose members claim to have a common origin and 
share certain common myths. The rules governing marriage, purity 
and pollution, eating and social interaction are governed and 
regulated by caste norms. Every Hindu is born in a caste and 
cannot move from one to another. Caste is hierarchically ranked 
in the order of the roles and functions performed by the persons. 
Brahmins (priests, scholars), Kshatriyas(rulers, warriors), 
Vaishyas (businessmen), and Shudras (menial workers). The 
strength of the caste system is illustrated by the fact that all 
religions which have taken roots on Indian soil have gradually 
taken on certain attributes of that system. Even Islam has not 
escaped segregation and Indian Muslims are also divided, but 
these divisions are peculiar to Islam.
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with their culture (Nuna, 1989). However, these deep rooted 
cultural differences in the system have led to upsurges in 
various divisive forms - separatist movements, caste rivalries, 
religious movements and communal riots which have threatened 
Indian democracy and integrity (Weiner, 1967) . Most scholars have 
attributed this to the political parties who play the game of 
divide and rule. During elections caste groups function as 
"political vote banks" to capture power by fair or unfair means. 
Myrdal (1964) believes that for this reason alone the local 
political bosses have a vested interest in preserving the social 
and economic status quo and exploiting it as a matrix for 
political action.
CASTE AND THE 1991 GENERAL ELECTIONS
India's traditional Hindu social system is woven around caste 
structures and caste identities. The caste system makes Hinduism 
a complete social and economic organization (Ansari, 1960) . The 
SCs and STs were the most underprivileged sections and efforts 
were made to uplift them through a policy of reservation of seats 
in the educational and employment sectors. Parliamentary and 
assembly seats are also reserved for representation in the 
national and state governments. Although a large number of socio­
economic variables were associated with voting behaviour, caste 
and religious affinities have received larger attention. Scholars 
have derived conflicting conclusions, but there was a general 
agreement that caste is a dominant variable affecting voting 
preferences- (Weiner & Osgood, 1975; Brass, 1985).
In 1990, caste became an overtly important issue in the political 
system when V.P. Singh opened the issue to pass legislation for 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report (MCR). The main 
proposition of MCR was the extension of reservation in government 
jobs for SCs and STs as well as Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and 
Communities. The MCR evoked passionate and extreme reactions with 
country-wide agitations, especially in northern India by upper 
caste students, who felt that they were being deprived of the 
already scarce job opportunities. There were also cases of self
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immolation: more than 159 people attempted suicide and 63
died20. The report was widely challenged in the courts by 
people from all over the country. A five judge bench of the 
Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Ranganath Mishra was 
constituted to hear the arguments of these petitioners and the 
legality of the report. It was reported one of the causes
that led to the downfall of the V.P.Singh government. During 1991 
elections, JD/NF made social equality their main election issue 
to gather support among the backward and minority communities.
P .V.Narasimha Rao, after becoming the Prime Minister, dealt a 
severe blow to the JD when he announced his governments7 s policy 
on reservations, accepting the recommendations of the MCR with 
a modification, by adding the economic criteria with a view to 
foil the challenge of anti-Mandal forces21.
RELIGION AND THE 1991 INDIAN ELECTIONS
Religion emerged as an important political issue that not only 
formed a means of mass mobilization to gain electoral support, 
but was extensively referred to in the election campaigns. BJP 
was successful in mobilising the Hindus through the all India 
'Rath Yathra7 (pilgrimage) and the promise of constructing the 
temple at 7 Ram Janmabhoomi claimed to be the birth place of Hindu 
deity Lord Rama, the site of the now demolished Babri Masjid, 
This provided a new identity to the emerging political 
personality of the party (See study of BJP election campaign in 
Chapter III).
The arousal of religious emotions was quite upbeat with the 
popular Hindu epics Ramayarta and Mahabharata serialised on TV. 
It has been widely reported that the use of religious symbols 
also had a tremendous effect on the female electorate to the
20 India Today.. 31 Oct 1990
21/On a Trail of Challenges7.Financial Express. Bombay, 29 
December, 1991.
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benefit of the BJP. BJP was the only party propagating the views 
of 'Shri Ram' whom Hindus worship and hold in high esteem.22
Religious references were widely incorporated in party 
advertisements, films, video and audio cassettes. The views and 
opinions of religious leaders from important Hindu and Muslim 
shrines were published in magazines22. Huge cutouts of leaders, 
especially NTR dressed in the form of Indian deities were 
displayed. Religious leaders campaigned for political parties. 
Film and TV stars who played mythological characters campaigned, 
contested and also won elections. The religious support helped 
BJP to become the second largest party with 119 seats. Therefore, 
caste and religious factors became important issues in the 
election.
SECTION II
MASS MEDIA IN INDIA AND THE 1991 GENERAL ELECTIONS
In the past decade very few countries have undergone the kind of 
communication transformation that India has24. Mass Media in 
India are said to have contributed to bridging social diversities 
by devising and using technology, expanding broadcasting (on 
radio and television) and by narrowcasting with videos and cable 
technology. Despite the low level of literacy, over 35,000 
newspapers are published all over the country. Radio and 
television reach 95.7% and 84% of the population respectively. 
In addition, interpersonal and group systems, folk media and
22The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 18 May, 1991.
221 22 The Week. Kotayyam, 21 April, 1991
24 In the 1980s there has been a massive expansion of 
television network. During 1987 one TV transmitter was installed 
every tenth day. From 183 TV transmitters in 1985 there are 540 
transmitters covering 84% of the population.
Within the last four years electronic companies through Cable TV 
and Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) have invaded the Indian 
market providing round the clock news and entertainment. MTV, 
CNN, BBC, CFI, TV-5, ATN, ZEE TV and STAR-TV are now household 
names in the urban segments of India, and are poised to enter the 
semi urban and rural areas.
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traditional forms of communication operate alongside modern 
media25.
The present section focuses on the growth of media in India and 
describes how communication technologies are gradually changing 
the country in several areas of development and at the same time 
effectively contributing to the electoral process. Indian 
election campaigns are a fascinating theatre featuring an immense 
variety of communication forms. Campaigns are influenced by 
plural aspects of the country, reflected in multiplicity of 
languages, illiteracy and economic activities.
The Indian press while privately owned, is not free of political 
pressures applied by government25, and social pressures from 
people of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds. The major 
problems that affect the print media relate to literacy, poverty 
and the linguistic diversity of its audience. Political news 
dominates the front pages of national, regional and local 
dailies.
Newspapers were extensively used by most national and regional 
parties for the political advertisements. We find that newspapers 
are sought after as the most important source of election 
information by the urban and rural electorate (See Chapter V).
Radio and television function under the Ministry of I & B with 
the objectives of information, education and entertainment. Radio 
broadcasting in India was started in 1927 by the British with two 
privately owned transmitters at Bombay and Calcutta, after which
25 The 'Song and Drama Division' and the 'Directorate of 
Field Publicity' under the Ministry of I & B uses folk and group 
communication media to project the policies and programmes of the 
government, social and developmental issues. India Year Book, 
1994.
25 Though the Press enjoys a fair degree of freedom, one 
cannot completely call it totally free. When we say the pressure 
from the government, we mean that press cannot be very critical 
of the government as it controls newsprint supply.
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the British government took over in 1930 and started operating 
under the name of Indian Broadcasting Service. This was changed 
to All India Radio (AIR) in 1936 and came to be known as 
"Akashvani" in 1957.
TV started in India in 1959, on an experimental basis as part of 
AIR and within three decades, it has emerged as a large network 
reaching 84% of the population. Indian TV sought to link the 
social and traditional forms of communication and to provide a 
framework for development programmes with the goal of providing 
a "people-oriented, problem-oriented and development-oriented TV 
in India" (Hanson & Narula, 1990).
In 1976, TV was delinked from AIR as an independent organization 
and was named Doordarshan (Distance viewing). TV ownership was 
low as even the monochrome sets are not «na easily affordable by 
many Indians. To enhance the viewership for development oriented 
and educational programmes, community television sets were 
provided by the government in the rural and semi-urban areas. 
Further, to cater to the requirements of the rural people and 
those in remote areas, Doordarshan started 'area specific 
programmes' from six states through the facility of Indian 
National Satellite (INSAT). With the availability of satellite 
transmission, regional language telecasts were started in several 
states. The second channel was introduced in Delhi in September 
1984, and was soon followed by Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, 
marking a three tier service of national, regional and local 
services.
A number of writers, including Chatterji (1987), Kumar (1981) and 
Acharya (1991) have provided a comprehensive, at times critical 
introduction to the history, politics and status of broadcasting 
in India. We restrict ourselves to the use of electronic media 
as sources of political communication through news and current 
affairs programmes and Political Election Broadcasts (PEB) during 
the elections.
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Both radio and television being state monopolies, broadcasting 
has been a highly centrally controlled operation under the 
Ministry of I & B. Broadcasting in India has often been accused 
of serving as a propaganda machine for the government and is 
considered a constant factor in the Indian political scene. 
Despite the rhetoric of autonomy (Kapoor, 1992) every single 
party (Cong.I and coalitions) that has controlled the Centre has 
succumbed to the temptation of using radio and television for 
their own political ends. This has been particularly manifest 
during the rule of Cong.I led governments (Thomas, 1993).
However, AIR and Doordarshan transcending the literacy barrier 
are used by the government for creating greater political 
awareness and to bring about social change. Since independence 
the use of radio for political broadcasts was often debated, but 
successive Congress governments had repeatedly declined to use 
electronic media for election purposes27.
In 1977, the year when the Janata Government came to power, a 
proposal put forward by the I & B Minister L.K.Advani on the need 
for election broadcasts on radio for each nationally recognised 
party was accepted. The Prime Minister Morarji Desai, at the 
centre and the chief ministers at the state level were given free 
time to broadcast their achievements and to discuss important 
issues. Leaders of opposition parties also got a chance to state 
their case. Each statement was recorded separately and secretly 
so that no party could have a chance to know what the others were 
saying and thus be able to rebut it2®.
Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs) were started in the 1977 
assembly elections and since 1980 in the LS elections. The 
national and state parties recognised by the EC are given fifteen
27 In the 1950s the government had offered time on radio for 
the political parties to read their manifestos but this was 
rejected by the opposition parties as being worse than useless.
28 Political Time Broadcasting: 'Sad shift in Official
Policies' The Times of India. Bombay 24 Nov 1989
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minutes of free time to broadcast their political strategy and 
appeal to the electorate twice on radio and once on TV. The dates 
for the order of the PEBs are assigned by drawing of lots. It is 
mandatory for all the parties to present their election speeches 
to AIR and Doordarshan well in advance to the Ministry of I & B. 
These broadcasts, unlike the PEBs and PPBs in Britain are 
regulated by a code of conduct formulated by the EC and they are 
subject to censorship (see Appendix - B).
Another development in the 1977 assembly elections was the use 
of electronic media to 'educate' the voters on the electoral 
process. These 'Voter Education Programmes' were devised by the 
government with the objective of increasing awareness among the 
electorate about the political process, both for greater 
political participation and to ensure free and fair elections. 
According to Assistant, Director, AIR, New Delhi, Bimla Bhalla, 
efforts were made during 1991 to have as many programmes and 
discussions with the people involved in the election process to
9 Qenhance awareness and increase political participation^. 
Voters were warned against aspects of rigging and booth 
capturing, violence and arson during elections. We have 
documented and reviewed some of the programmes in the pre­
election and those presented along with the election results.
Political advertising on TV is prohibited, though most parties 
as well as some senior civil servants would welcome political 
advertising as a healthy development, I & B ministry officials 
have dismissed the idea of introducing political advertising on 
the electronic media2 .^ Therefore radio and TV are 
restrictively used for the PEBs and the special election 
broadcasts.
Interview with the author with Mrs Bimla Bhalla, 
Assistant Director, AIR, New Delhi. 21 June, 1991
^Interview with Mahesh Prasad, Secretary, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India on 16 April, 
1991
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In India, despite the development of the national campaign, the 
traditional constituency level campaigning continues to be 
effective through the interpersonal channels. Public meetings, 
rallies and walkabouts along with street corner meetings, street 
plays and bandwagon techniques are effective in reaching large 
segmented groups. We find evidence from our study, that though 
mass media have contributed largely to the information and 
knowledge of the political process, the interpersonal channels 
continue to be the motivating factors (See Chapter VIII). The 
constituency campaigning is now supported and supplemented with 
the modern electronic forms by audio cassettes and video-on- 
wheels.
Videos are a distinctively Indian development lending an 
7entertainment culture' to political communication. They are 
particularly valuable given the physical difficulties of 
communication and also as narrowcasting media, they are better 
targeted and have a greater impact. The audio cassettes add to 
the election festivities (and noise pollution) and are used 
extensively for campaigning at the local levels (see Chapter VI) .
We next discuss the development and use of mass media and 
interpersonal channels by the government and political parties 
during the 1991 elections. In the following chapters we evaluate 
their impact as important sources of information and influence 
in voting behaviour.
THE ROLE OF PRESS AND THE 1991 ELECTIONS
India's newspaper industry is one of the largest in the world 
catering to heterogenous groups in diverse Indian languages. 
Newspapers are published in over 93 languages and dialects from 
the states and union territories and the steady growth in their 
number is an indication of the impact of the written word^1 . 
At the end of 1993 there were a total of 35,595 newspapers, 
including 3805 dailies and magazines registered with the
India Reference Annual 1994, Ministry of I & B, 
Government of India.
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Registrar of Newspapers in India. The Indian Press includes 42 
centenarians with the Gujarati daily 'Bombay Samachar'(Bombay 
News) being the oldest surviving newspaper.
The readership of newspapers is just over 21 per thousand. 
Vernacular newspapers all over the country trickle down to the 
villages aided by the system of 'community reading'-*2 . The 
Hindi newspapers enjoy high circulation and readership in the 
northern states, while in the southern states the regional papers 
have extensive readership. The largest number are published in 
Hindi (8924), followed by English (4627), Bengali (1885), Urdu 
(1795), Marathi (1337) and Telugu in AP ranks tenth (699)22.
A majority of newspapers are under individual ownership (61% in 
1984) . The Press Council safeguards freedom of the press, 
controls ethics of publications and aids improve the quality of 
newspapers and news agencies. The magazine boom in India in the 
past decade has contributed to wider readership of magazines 
catering to specific groups of people.
The role of the press in politics has become a focus of intense 
debate in the post-independence period and especially since the 
days of the Emergency24. The press has played an active role 
in political developments through investigative reporting and in- 
depth coverage of news and events.
During 1989 in the run up to the ninth LS elections, newspapers 
were in the forefront revealing corruption charges against the 
Cong.I. The Bofors Gun Deal unearthed by The Hindu from Madras
22 Through the system of community reading, one literate
villager reads the newspaper to several others in the morning or 
evening at the local tea shop or the community areas like
schools, temples or Panchayat offices.
22 India Reference Annual 1993. Ministry of I & B,
Government of India, 1994.
24 During 1975-77 Indira Gandhi had declared a state of 
'Emergency' in the country, when the opposition leaders were 
jailed and restrictions were imposed on the press.
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and subsequently covered by other newspapers and magazines 
contributed to the debacle of Cong.I under Rajiv Gandhi.
During elections, political news dominates the front pages in 
most Indian national, regional and local newspapers. Press plays 
a major role in the dissemination of political information 
through analysis, opinion polls35 commentaries, profiles of 
candidates, editorials and, of late political advertising.
POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS
^ince the 1980s, political advertising in the newspapers has 
become an important part of campaign strategies. Party 
advertisements were splashed all over the national, regional and 
local newspapers and periodicals in the country. Cong.I 
extensively used the newspapers during the 1984 and 1989 
elections, and in 1991 all major political^ parties were 
advertising in national and regional newspapers and magazines. 
These advertisements were notable for their size and the number 
of insertions in newspapers and periodicals. Apart from Cong.I 
and BJP which used the national and regional press, financial 
constraints restricted some parties like the JD and SJP. The 
regional parties, TDP, All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazagham 
(AIADMK) and Shiv Sena in Bombay have used the regional 
newspapers with higher reach in their targeted areas. Some 
political parties stated their strategies through their own 
newspapers and magazines.
There has been a steady rise in the amount of money spent on 
advertising. During 1991, the total amount spent on press 
advertising was estimated at £1,867,191 of which Cong.I alone 
spent nearly 60% of the total money (See Chapter V on the 
breakdown of money spent by parties on advertising in 1991).
35 The National and regional daily newspapers such as Times 
of India (Bombay) .The Hindu (Madras) .The Hindustan Times (N.Delhi) , 
Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad) conducted opinion polls either 
through their own research departments or hired the services of 
established research organisations for conducting surveys to 
monitor the electoral trends.
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Since the amount of money spent during the campaign was large in 
the Indian context, we have examined the exposure and impact of 
these advertisements on voters in the constituencies.
THE TELUGU PRESS AND POLITICS IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
The Telugu press has come to play a major role in the political 
system of AP. The success of NTR, the film star turned 
politician, was to some extent attributed to the media baron 
Ch.Ramoji Rao, publisher and editor of an influential Telugu 
newspaper, Eenadu (Today). The paper supported the TDP in 
'protecting the honour of the Telugus' as well as arousing the 
dominant upper caste Telugus (Kammas) to greater political 
participation. Strategic marketing efforts, with free copies 
distributed in remote villages in the state contributed to the 
high readership of the newspaper in general, and in converting 
the Cong.I support groups towards the regional party (TDP) in 
particular.
As seen in Table II. 1, Eenadu has the highest circulation of 
311,346^ three times more than the other Telugu newspapers. 
It is followed by Andhra Jyothi. Andhra Prabha published by the 
Indian Express Group of Newspapers and Udayam (Morning) are 
popular with a readership of less than a 100,000. Andhra Bhoomi 
published by the Deccan Chronicle group is a pro-Cong.I paper 
while Andhra Prabha of the Express group supports the opposition. 
Readership of English newspapers is restricted to the larger 
cities and towns including Hyderabad and its twin city, 
Secunderabad. Deccan Chronicle. The Hindu and Indian Express are 
the popular dailies. Lastly the Urdu Press with two major 
dailies; Siasat and Rahnuma-E-Deccan is restricted to the city 
of Hyderabad which has a large concentration of Muslim 
population.
During the 1991 election, the coverage given to national and 
state election trends was extensive in all Telugu and English
■^Indian News and Feature Alliance Year Book. (INFA) 1993
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newspapers. These were supported by daily editorials and well 
researched articles through opinion polls. All the newspapers 
profiled political developments in AP in the 42 LS constituencies 
on a regular basis and their candidates in the fray. Political 
advertisements of the national and regional parties were seen in 
the newspapers.
We have evaluated the readership of newspapers in general and 
during the elections in particular. Information regarding the 
interest in political news, and newspapers as a source of 
information and exposure to the political advertisements in 
newspapers was evaluated to find out the extent of their 
influence on voting behaviour (See Chapter V).
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TABLE II.l THE CIRCULATION OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN 
ANDHRA PRADESH
Newspaper Language All India Cir.in 
State
Hyderaba
d/
Secunder
abad
Deccan Chronicle. 
Secunderabad
English 68,587 68,362 62,469
The Hindu, Madras 
& 7 other 
centres^7
English 452,918 89,745 29,052
Indian
Express,Bombay & 
16 Centres'*®
English 284,449 52,557 18,535
Eenadu, Hyderabad 
& 5 Centres^*
Telugu 311,346 304,564 63,239
Andhra Jyothi, 
Hyderabad.
Telugu 151,765 147,857 21,222
Andhra Bhoomi 
S e cunde rabad
Telugu 5,531 5,512 2,352
Andhra Prabha 
Hyderabad
Telugu 64,357 60,261 3,106
Udayam, Hyderabad Telugu Not
Available
Siasat, Hyderabad Urdu 39,949 37,479 31,538
Source:INFA YEAR BOOK 1993
■*7 Hyderabad, Coimbatore, Gurgaoan, Visahkapatnam, Madurai, 
Bangalore and Thiruvanthapuram.
Hyderabad, Chandigarh, Baroda, Coimbatore, Kochi, Pune, 
Bangalore, Baroda, Ahmedabad, Madras, New Delhi, Madurai, 
Kozikode, Nagpur, Vizianagaram and Vijayawada.
Visahkapatnam, Vijayawada, Anantapur, Karimnagar and 
Raj ahmundry.
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TABLE 11.2 CIRCULATION OF TELUGU WEEKLIES OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
Weeklies All India 
cir
Circula 
tion in 
State
Circulation 
in Hyderabad 
/Secunderabad
Swati Sapara 
Vara Patrika 
Hyderabad
102,560 94,045 14,828
Andhra Bhoomi 
Sachitra Vara 
Patrika,
S e cunde rabad
88,529 82,655 18,780
Andhra Jyothi 
Sachitra Vara 
Patrika, 
Vijayawada
72,401 64,721 11,541
Jyothi
Chitra,
Vijaywada
50,111 44,554 6, 871
Sitara,
Hyderabad
41,504 36,291 6, 812
Source:INFA Year Book, 1993
THE PERIODICAL PRESS
The 1980s magazine boom has catered to every group of readers 
from children to adults. Readership increased with literacy. 
Alongside, the Sunday newspapers, with the introduction of colour 
supplements and extensive coverage of news and features compete 
with periodicals. Notwithstanding such trends, the regional 
periodical press still continues to be popular with over 22,000 
magazines of different periodicities published from all over the 
country^u.
During the 1991 elections, most magazines including the women's 
and children's magazines released election supplements. Some 
news magazines conducted opinion polls to gauge election trends
40 INFA Year Book 1993 and India Year Book. 1993
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and gave in-depth reviews on elections41. The business 
magazines gave their opinions on economic issues, women's 
magazines covered issues related to women and women candidates.
Party advertisements were published in select English and 
regional language publications. Cong.I used the services of 
Megacorp advertising agency for their campaign in periodicals. 
Their strategy was to take 1 to 4 insertions in each magazine. 
On the other hand, although the BJP advertised in several 
newspapers, India Today was the only periodical used. The 
strategy was to take double-spread or centre-spread 
advertisements to reach the educated urban electorate by 
attacking the Cong.I and projecting itself as a secular, rather 
than a communal party.
SJP concentrated on the regional press and the Sunday supplements 
but found it expensive to use the periodicals. TDP used some of 
the Telugu magazines. Since extensive information was 
disseminated through news and political advertising by the 
parties, we investigated their effectiveness and if respondents 
saw the advertisements and how far, if at all, they helped in 
their voting decisions (See Chapter V).
THE BROADCAST MEDIA 
ALL INDIA RADIO (AIR)
AIR covers 85% of the area and 95.7% of the population. Though 
radio listening has decreased in urban India with the advent of 
television, radio reigns supreme in rural India. Recent studies 
by ORG-NRS42, highlighted the emerging rural markets in which
41 See for example India Today (New Delhi) , The Week
(Kottayam), Sunday(Calcutta), Frontline (Madras), The issues 
between March- June 1991 covered election trends through opinion 
polls at all India and state levels.
42 ORG and NRS surveys indicate the readership and
listenership patterns of all the newspapers, radio and TV and
have identified radio as an important medium for rural
broadcasting and advertising.
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radio is a more sought after medium despite the expanding 
television network43.
NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES ON AIR
AIR catering to the diverse Indian audiences, is rated as the 
biggest news organisation of its kind in the world44 with 273 
news bulletins for over 37 hours duration per day in its Home, 
Regional and External services. The news broadcasts include 78 
bulletins in the Home services from New Delhi with an average 
duration of 11 hours. In the Regional Services 127 bulletins are 
broadcast daily in 72 languages and dialects for a duration of 
17 hours. The current affairs programmes include news reviews, 
commentaries, interviews, newsreels and eye witness accounts. 
During the parliamentary sessions, daily commentaries and weekly 
reviews in Hindi and English cover proceedings of both houses. 
Similarly, at the state level, reviews of state legislatures are 
broadcast from the state capitals in regional languages.
During the 1991 election, radio broadcasts covered election 
related programmes through a network of 11 programme originating 
centres. Radio and TV were extensively involved since the day 
elections were announced until the declaration of results. The 
pre-election programmes broadcast on radio and television, with 
the schedules and participants of programmes and the post 
election coverage are further discussed.
43 INFA Year Book, 1993
44 India: A Reference Annual 1994. Ministry of I & B, 
Government of India
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THE USE OF RADIO DURING 1991 ELECTIONS
THE PRE-ELECTION PROGRAMMES
The pre-election programmes informed voters on various issues as 
part of the voter education campaign. Through a series of 
programmes the electorate was systematically informed on 
developments in the election process. This was included in the 
regular news and current affairs programmes along with 
announcements and special election programmes.
In the first stage, the voters were informed on the need to check 
their name in the voting list and the action to be taken in case 
of omissions. The next round of information was on the polling 
dates, the traffic regulations and the security arrangements made 
for the conduct of polls. These were in the form of announcements 
in Hindi and Telugu in AP. Further, the subjects covered in 
programmes titled 'Talking About Elections' included 
understanding the importance of elections and the need to vote 
freely. This was done through discussions, dialogues, analysis 
and interviews with members of the election machinery - Chief 
Electoral Officers (CEOs), Police Chiefs in each state and also 
with the CEC at the national level. Voters were warned against 
malpractices and to refrain from accepting any incentives like 
transport, money or gifts in return for voting for a particular 
party.
Discussions were held with leading political commentators, 
analysts, political scientists and journalists. 'Question and 
answer sessions' on the election process in the form of a quiz 
were broadcast for the youth and first time voters. These 
programmes were independently scheduled or were part of the 
regular programme channels. In AP, these programmes were 
incorporated in the youth, women's, industrial workers and 
farmers programmes.
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PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS (PEBs)
The PEBs as discussed earlier are a permanent feature since the 
1977 elections. All recognised parties were allowed to broadcast 
twice on radio and once on television for 15 minutes at a time. 
The persons nominated for the broadcasts were chosen by the 
national or the state parties. The schedule of the political 
broadcasts was given wide publicity through press notes in all 
national and state newspapers and also through regular 
announcements on radio. We have added, to the schedule of PEBs 
on AIR, the names of the leaders or representative who recorded 
the election messages. These broadcasts were heard on Hyderabad 
'A' channel and were relayed simultaneously by other stations 
(See Appendix C).
The nationally recognised parties had four broadcasts on radio, 
two at the national level and two at the state level, thereby 
allowing the voters four opportunities to listen to the political 
broadcasts. There was only one broadcast on television by the 
national parties.
POST-ELECTION BROADCASTS
In the post election phase, during the announcement of the 
results, there were hourly news bulletins and one minute flashes 
in English and Hindi to announce the party positions. AIR had 175 
news bulletins in Hindi and English round-the-clock and also 
featured special programmes analyzing results as well as 
highlighting the different aspects of the emerging political 
scene. 16 commentaries discussed the general poll trends of which 
eight were from Delhi and eight from other parts of the country. 
These included panel discussions with academicians, journalists, 
political scientists and commentators.
Another important feature was the "Radio Conference" in which 
panellists from New Delhi's national studio discussed poll trends 
live with others from 13 AIR stations in state capitals. We 
investigated the exposure of voters to radio as a source of 
election information, opinion on the coverage given to election
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news and the impact it had in increasing awareness and 
influencing on voting behaviour (See Chapter V) . The use of 
television during elections follows next.
THE USE OF TELEVISION DURING THE 1991 ELECTIONS
In most western democracies much campaign time, energy and money 
is spent on 'Getting on TV' and campaigns are stage-managed for 
television. In India though TV is emerging as a powerful medium, 
but, being government controlled, it offers little to the 
electorate in terms of debates between the contesting parties or 
interrogation by the media personnel with politicians, but is 
geared to increase the voters awareness on the political process. 
The pre-poll programmes apart from the PEBs comprised of 
discussions, messages, skits, animation films, musical programmes 
and short, two-minute captioned announcements.
A content analysis of election programmes in the run-up to the 
elections gives an insight into the various national and regional 
programmes telecast which showed the government's effort in the 
conduct of elections. A programme schedule of national and 
regional programmes with the dates, content, duration and time 
of presentation including the regional election programmes on 
Hyderabad Doordarshan are discussed. The national and regional 
programmes are marked next to the title of the programmes. Most 
of the national telecasts were in Hindi or English while the 
regional ones were in Telugu with some in Urdu (See Appendix D) .
After the first phase of polls until 20 May, and the rescheduling 
of election dates, more election programmes were telecast between 
3 to 10 June 1991 before the second phase of elections. The post 
election programmes scheduled from 14-17 June discussed the 
trends in results at the national and regional level and 
continued till all the results were declared. We have classified 
the programmes and discussed some of the categories and the 
detailed list is in Appendix-D.
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THE PRE-POLL PROGRAMMES ON TELEVISION
ELECTION GUIDELINES
In the first phase of the elections, election guidelines were 
announced for candidates to file in their nominations. These were 
followed by the current affairs programmes detailing the rules 
for candidates, the availability of application forms and the 
last date for the submission of applications.
DISCUSSIONS
The discussion programmes were for a duration between 10-45 
minutes, at least twice a week between 7-19 May 1991. Overall, 
there were a total of 14 discussion programmes. The discussants 
included members from the election commission, police and other 
government officials involved in the electoral process as well 
as academics, poll analysts and journalists. The subjects taken 
up included various issues for the 1991 elections such as 
electoral process the rights of the voters, the issues before the 
people and the functioning of the administration during 
elections. The voters were briefed about the police arrangements 
to reduce crime and electoral offenses, especially in the 
communally sensitive areas.
A special programme by women on 'Women Voters and Our 
Responsibilities' was intended to clear some doubts on elections 
and women were urged to vote. The discussion on 'Violent 
Attitudes in Elections' covered the increased violence during 
polls - the topics included rigging, booth capturing and the 
killing of candidates during elections.
MESSAGES AND INTERVIEWS
The election messages were in the form of appeals by the CEO at 
the State level and interviews CEC at the national level. They 
sought to persuade people to exercise their vote freely. The CEC
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regularly briefed the press on the day to day developments in 
various states. 'Journalists in Conversation with T.N.Seshan, CEC 
focused on the problems before the electorate and measures taken 
in the conduct of poll.
Interviews were held with the Chief Secretary and the Director 
General of Police (DGP) at the state level to discuss the 
security arrangements for the safety of voters against violence 
and malpractice during the poll. Before the second round of 
polls, in a fifteen minutes message, the President appealed to 
the people to discharge their responsibilities as citizens and 
to cooperate with authorities in peacefully conducting the 
elections.
ELECTION SLOGANS
Election slogans were short messages on the 'Dos' and 'Dont's' 
of elections. These included information on the importance of the 
vote and the need for everyone over the age of 18 to exercise 
their franchise. These messages were generally between one to 
five minutes and formed part of regular programmes or were 
inserted as fillers in between programmes for women, farmers and 
youth.
SKITS AND PLAYS
An interesting mode of election communication was through short 
skits, plays and animation films in English, Urdu and Telugu. 
Eight such plays were shown during the election period and ranged 
from 12 to 50 minutes. The Telugu satire 'Bommal Atta' (Dolls 
Play) focused on the politicians and the voting attitudes of the 
electorate. A second play 'Elections Have Come' previewed the 
election scene and the expectations of the people. Two other 
plays 'Many dreams in Election' and 'Talk on Votes and Elections' 
incorporated messages on the meaning of elections and urged the 
people to vote freely, fearlessly and honestly.
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QUIZ PROGRAMMES
The quiz programmes on TV like ' Prashn Manch' (Question Time) and 
another 'Election 1991: Vote?' raised several questions for 40 
minutes per programme, the questions related to the political 
process and the past and present elections. There were only two 
such programmes during the election period.
PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS
The nationally recognised parties were allowed to have one 
fifteen minute PEB at the national level from Delhi and a 
regional broadcast from Hyderabad but the same was not allowed 
for the regional parties at the state level.
THE ELECTION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In the post-election phase, the results were telecast with an 
analysis of voting trends, through interviews and panel 
discussions with politicians, journalists, -academics and others. 
The trends were discussed at the national level in Hindi and 
English and in Telugu at the regional level.
Election results were announced through twenty special poll news 
bulletins and 15 election analysis programmes in a 46 hour (June 
16-18) non-stop telecast, until all the results were declared. 
The special coverage started from 12.45 pm. on 16 June, 1991 and 
continued till 10.30 pm on 18 June. The round-the-clock news 
bulletins in Hindi and English along with Election Analysis 
programmes comprised of interviews and panel discussions. These 
were interspersed with special entertainment programmes like the 
Hindi feature films, film songs, circus, comedy shows and popular 
serials. The entire analysis and coverage was coordinated in 
English and Hindi by the top Indian psephologists Prannoy Roy 
(English) and Vinod Dua (Hindi).
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SUMMARY
Indian mass media were geared to the conduct of elections. 
Extensive coverage was given to create greater awareness of the 
political process and increase voter participation. Despite the 
low level of literacy, newspapers are sought as major sources of 
information. Vernacular newspapers, especially the Telugu 
newspapers reach even the remote villages. During elections 
extensive coverage was given to political news. Newspapers gave 
in depth coverage to the campaigns and the electoral trends in 
states, regions and constituencies. Most national and regional 
newspapers carried party advertisements giving a wider coverage 
to specific party programmes.
The electronic media, radio and TV, overcoming the literacy 
barrier, broadcast several election programmes from the 
announcement of elections to the declaration of results. Specific 
programmes were directed to increase voter participation of women 
and youth. Efforts were made to reach audiences in the national 
and regional languages.
However, though these media have the reach and impact, there is 
no real political debate as the politicians are neither 
interviewed nor interrogated by political correspondents on 
issues and often, the discussions between the journalists and 
some civil servants, remain purely academic exercises. Despite 
the extensive coverage on the election in the electronic media, 
the government did not commission any evaluation study on the 
impact of these programmes. In our study, we have investigated 
the exposure and impact of these programmes and whether they 
helped in creating greater awareness and assisting the voter.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDIES OF SELECTED ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
In this chapter we examine selected party campaigns in the 1991 
general elections. We first study the background of the party, 
its ideology and organization. Second we give a structured 
analysis of the election strategies that were undertaken through 
the use of professional advertising agencies, discussing the 
modern and conventional techniques. The parties include: Cong.I, 
BJP, JD/NF, TDP and MIM. Last we evaluate the voter education 
campaign by the government.
SECTION I
STUDY OF THE CONGRESS. I ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Among the numerous parties that have populated India's landscape 
the longest lived and most dominant has been the Congress. 
Congress provided the core of India's dominant one party system 
during the late colonial and early post independence period.
The 1991 election was a major challenge for Cong. I and to the 
credibility of Rajiv Gandhi as its leader. The increasingly 
popular BJP was trying to establish itself as a nation-wide 
alternative to the Cong.I and challenging its secularism. After 
its humiliating defeat in the 1989 election, Cong. I policies were 
carefully and systematically planned and campaigns scrutinized. 
There was intensive introspection into the party organization and 
selection of candidates. A campaign committee comprising of nine 
members was formed to organize election strategies and select 
advertising agencies. Redifus'ion advertising agency which had 
handled the 1984 and 1989 campaigns was not one of the four 
chosen. The successful advertising agencies were: Clarion
Advertising Services which worked on the newspaper campaign;
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Megacorp Advertising handled the magazine campaign; Graphisads 
was involved in printing of posters and Basic Four worked on 
other campaign material.
The video and audio cassettes were made by private agencies and 
distributed throughout the country. Several mass and 
interpersonal channels of campaigning included newspapers, 
magazines, video films, audio cassettes, direct mail, posters, 
cardboard cutouts, public meetings and door-to-door campaigns.
Rajiv Gandhi oversaw each stage of planning the election strategy 
and also changed his personal style of campaigning. He had learnt 
from his mistakes and was claimed to be better equipped this time 
to achieve the desired results. The 'Sunday' magazine called him 
'The New Rajiv'1 . Rajiv was reported as no longer relying on the 
'coterie' of advisors, but used his own instincts and judgement 
to promote himself and the party to restore popular confidence. 
He toured the country meeting people, shunning securitymen, and 
unlike the last two attempts on his life, he could not escape the 
bomb explosion that killed him on 21 May, 1991.
Opinion polls conducted by the party and various publications 
gave Cong.I an edge over other parties especially after the 
failure of the coalition governments. Working with some degree 
of confidence based on the opinion polls, Cong.I was more 
optimistic about the elections2 .
1Sunday. Calcutta (5 May 1991) reviewed the change in the 
style and functioning of Rajiv Gandhi in past and before the 1991 
elections. In aspects of arrogance, accessibility, corruption, 
cynicism and shrewdness,it concluded that there was a remarkable 
change. Rajiv was seen as being more accessible to people without 
the circle of security men. He was travelling in open jeeps and 
mingling freely with crowds. There was greater interaction 
between him and the journalists, party workers and leaders.
2 The Intelligence Bureau (IB), gave Congress 240-260 seats. 
The Week-MODE survey published in The Week. Kottavam, Kerala. 21 
April and 28 April 1991, in their weekly ratings of political 
parties predicted 279 seats for Cong.I and updated it to 317 in 
the following week. India Today- MARG survey conducted by Prannoy 
Roy and showed Cong.I ahead of other parties. Most surveys also
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PRE ELECTORAL STRATEGIES OF CONG. I
Efforts were made by the party to bring about greater awareness 
amongst the contestants, party leaders, activists, opinion and 
community leaders about the party's election policies and 
programmes. Cong.I brought out an election booklet - 'Issues 
Before the Nation' to serve as a comprehensive guide to 
candidates and activists in preparing speeches and conducting the 
campaigns. Printed as a pocket sized edition, the booklet 
highlighted issues such as stability, economy, communalism, 
social justice, law and order and Cong.I's 52 point programme of 
action if voted to power. This was the first time an attempt like 
this was made for internal communication.
Cong.I also brought out a 4-page brochure called 'Zero Hour' 
which reflected upon various issues of the election describing 
the party views on a series of contemporary issues such as 
Terrorism, Criminalization of Politics, 'Election 1991- A non 
agenda for Nation Building' and 'Communalism - A new Vote Bank'. 
Over 70,000 printed mail shots were distributed all over the 
country. The mailing lists were drawn up from various sources 
like the members of political and social groups, civil servants, 
professionals, telephone books, businessmen and research 
organizations.
Before printing the manifesto, Rajiv Gandhi saw three drafts 
before giving the final approval. He believed that the manifesto 
should be a clear and precise document summing up the programmes 
of action. To increase the readership, manifestos were mailed to 
a select group of individuals to read and reflect on issues.
revealed Rajiv Gandhi would be the best suited prime minister-The 
Week, showed Rajiv Gandhi leading with 58%. The Times of India 
and The Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad, also revealed similar 
results.
Some of the astrologers, a few using computers, predicted Cong.I 
to be in a much better position to gain majority as the single 
largest party as reported by Mukund Padmanaban in his article, 
The Pollster and the 1991 Analysis. (Sunday. 5-11 May, 1991).
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PRE CAMPAIGN RESEARCH
Intensive research was conducted prior to the election campaign. 
The party commissioned MARG under Prannoy Roy to examine the 
party's position, voting trends and issues in the election. Its 
advertising agency, Clarion Advertising, conducted extensive 
research on election issues through in-depth interviews with 
different strata of society and voter expectations from the 
political system3 . Information from party leaders and workers 
at regional and local levels provided a general feedback.
A data bank was established on each issue of needs and 
expectations for the economy, communal harmony, party position, 
social justice, religion and caste. Research concluded that 
people were disillusioned and had lost trust in governments made 
up of alliances and coalitions. Irrespective of the strata of 
society, people were virtually living in a state of 'fear', 
especially in parts troubled by communal riots. People wanted a 
strong government that could provide stability, a future and 
security to the country. Based on these issues the Cong.I 
strategy was evolved to establish the need for stability of 
governance in the country. The election issues also included were 
the reintroduction of 'Panchayati Raj' (local self government) and 
'Nagarpalika bills' for decentralization of power, control of
3 Though there was no structured questionnaire based survey 
but extensive information was gathered through
a) In-depth interviews: With people from different strata of 
society including bureaucrats, professionals, unemployed youth, 
housewives, semiskilled workers, youth, businessmen and farmers. 
The interviews included getting information on aspects of the 
political systems, the major issues and how they were effecting 
them.
b) Small group discussions: These were conducted on leaders from 
social organizations and important decision makers. It enabled 
the agency to get the opinions and expectations on the political 
system and the expectations from the government organisations.
c) Desk Research: Research carried to review the past campaigns 
of the Cong.I the other parties in terms of the creative 
strategies and their effectiveness in creating the necessary 
impact. Opinion polls in the press were also being carefully 
monitored.
Interview with Probir Purokayastha, Vice President, Clarion 
Advertising Services, New Delhi on 11 June, 1991
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prices and the creation of 10 million new jobs. As a secular 
party, the emphasis was placed on a negotiated settlement of the 
Ayodhya issue and legislation for setting up a backward classes 
development commission.
VOTE CONGRESS-I FOR STABILITY
The main theme of the campaign was to popularize the concept of 
stability. The objective was to project Cong. I as the only stable 
party that had established governments which completed their five 
year term. Stability was defined as the 'platform for bringing 
about change, growth and development, justice for the poor and 
opportunity for the deprived'4 . Further, stability could bring 
about peaceful non-violent transformation and thereby, the 
respect of the world.
Stability was projected through ten important election issues to 
meet the need of different strata of the population: These
included:
1. Law and order, 2. Communal harmony, 3. Housing for the poor,
4. Autonomy for the Panchayati Raj, 5. Unemployment, 6. The need 
for a government that works, 7. Price rise, 8. Industrial Growth, 
9. Agricultural prosperity and 10. Social justice.
Through these issues emphasis was to be placed on the need to 
vote for Cong.I on three main grounds:
1. A government with the experience, capacity and capability to 
govern.
2. The non-performance of the alliance and coalition governments.
3. The party that can form a government on its own.
Ten different target groups representing these issues were 
selected. The aim was to keep the campaign simple and establish 
credibility by using real life situations and real life people
4 Source: The Congress.I Election Manifesto 1991, and
information from the interviews with advertising agency 
professionals of Clarion and Megacorp.
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with the name, age and status of the person, unlike the highly 
illustrative campaign of 1989.5
The press campaign, worked on the theme of stability. Different 
creative approaches were conceptualized for the newspaper and the 
magazine campaigns. In the newspaper campaign, the testimonial 
approach (Devlin, 1984) was used in which a cross section of 
people who represented the target segments testified their need 
to vote for Cong. I. In the magazine campaign, issues were 
indirectly focused through a 'Question and Answer' technique. The 
concept was to use children, a theme commonly used in political 
advertising to provoke an emotional response from voters0 . In 
recent years, children have been used for most commercial 
advertising to sell a wide variety of products and services and 
are described as the new emerging consumers and influencing 
agents in the family decision making process.
The same popular strategy for promoting the political party was 
adopted by Cong.I. The 'Child series' emphasised the issues 
through simple questions put forth by young children, with 
headlines also written in a child's hand writing. The visuals 
provided the environmental setting linked to the issues in 
question and answers projected the 'stability factor' with the 
Cong.I's solution to the problems. Another set of advertisements 
were developed in Hindi^giich were based on humorous idiomatic 
phrases and released instates of UP, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.
 ^According to Ved Paul, Chief Executive of Graphisads, 'At 
a time when the electorate is feeling quite disillusioned with 
all political parties, we have aimed to involve practically all 
levels of the society'. Interview on 13 June 1991.
® We find such evidence from political campaigns in US and 
Britain. For example, in the 1992 British general elections, in 
the Labour party's campaign telecast on the 'Jenifers's ear' the 
party used a young child to reflect on the pobr state of the 
National Health Service.
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THE STRATEGY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV GANDHI
After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the strategy was changed 
to use the tragedy to arouse sympathy to vote for Cong. I, so 
realizing the dream of Rajiv Gandhi. The assassination of Rajiv 
had left a trail of chaos in the country and despair in the 
Cong.I. Following which, there was a leadership crisis when 
Rajiv's wife Sonia Gandhi was nominated who refused to take up 
the position. After days of negotiations, P .V.Narasimha Rao was 
elected as the new leader. The polls were postponed by three 
weeks and electioneering began after a ten day period of national 
mourning.
Cong.I relaunched the campaign for the remaining elections with 
the themes of 'Stability with Secularism' and 'Vote Cong.I to 
realize the dream of Rajiv Gandhi through press advertisements, 
posters and a video film. The funeral, telecast all over the 
country had already evoked a sympathy wave that helped the Cong. I 
to increase its number of seats especially in the southern 
states, but it could not get an overall majority. We discuss 
below the advertising campaigns before and after the 
assassination and the final results.
The Newspaper Advertising Campaign
For the newspaper campaign, ten issue advertisements were 
developed with an opening and a closing advertisement. These 
advertisements were translated into various Indian languages as 
regional and local newspapers were used to reach the electorate. 
The first advertisement in the newspapers set the election theme, 
'We Want Stability First', was the headline, as quoted by Rajiv 
Gandhi. The copy summarily brought forth the consequences of 
unstable governments that led to communal disharmony, rising 
prices, terrorism, separatist movements and violence in the 
country. Cong.I with its experience and policies could bring 
about Stability and tackle the issues. The second to the eleventh 
advertisements emphasised the issues.
90
The first of the issue advertisements through the headline-'I 
want Stability. I want my children safe' drew attention to the 
law and order situation. It was represented by a young housewife 
for whom stability could provide safety and security for her 
young children.
The second advertisement - 'I want Stability. I want my family's 
life and property to be secure', is declared by a Muslim tailor 
recalling the grievous tragedies in the 15 months of misrule by 
inexperienced leaders, arguing that only a stable government 
could bring about communal harmony and thereby safety and 
security.
The third advertisement was directed towards the Cong.I policy 
of providing housing schemes like the 'Indira Awas Yojana' (Indira 
Housing Scheme) for rural and poorer sections. 'I want Stability. 
I want a house for my family' is stated by an agricultural farmer 
who trusts Cong.I to realize the dream of many agricultural 
workers to own a house.
The fourth advertisement -'I want Stability. I want Panchayat.I 
want Autonomy'.stated by a sixty year old Sarpanch(village 
leader) focused on the re-introduction of Panchayati Raj(Local 
Self Government) and the Nagarpalika amendment bills which were 
not passed by the Rajya Sabha7. These schemes were envisaged 
when Cong.I was in power for decentralizing power and 
strengthening democracy at the grassroots. This advertisement was 
extensively published in the regional and the local papers to 
reach the rural areas.
The fifth advertisement related to unemployment and was targeted 
at the younger generation and the educated unemployed. 'I want
7 The Cong.I during 1988 had initiated the bills to provide 
constitutional status for the Panchayati Raj institutions in the 
rural areas and Nagarpalikas in the urban areas of the country. 
It was an endeavour to strengthen democracy at the grassroots 
level. The Bill after being passed in the LS was rejected by the 
combined opposition in the RS.
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Stability. I want Work. I want a future.' expressed by a young 
graduate emphasised the implementation of two employment schemes- 
'Jawahar Rozgar Yojana'(Jawahar Employment scheme) and 'Nehru 
Rozgar Yojana'(Nehru Employment Scheme) which would generate up 
to 10 million new jobs every year.
The sixth advertisement focused on the failure of two successive 
coalition governments and Cong.I as the only national party that 
was representative of the entire country. 'I want Stability. I 
want a government that works. The man explains the poor existence 
of the nation in which governments fell like houses of cards. He 
hopes to vote Cong.I as it was the only party that could govern 
and had a national presence.
The seventh advertisement focused on inflation. Price rise has 
almost always been an issue in Indian elections.'I want
Stability. My family budget cannot afford this price rise'. A 
middle class housewife so laments on spiralling prices,
especially in the past 15 months and her difficulty in coping 
with basic necessities to feed and clothe her family.
The eighth advertisement raised questions of failing economy and 
the need for rapid industrial growth. 'I want Stability. I want 
my business to grow' is stated by a small businessman whose 
business had suffered in the last few months due to the 
floundering economy as a result of government neglect.
The ninth advertisement on agricultural prosperity was linked to 
the scarcity and rising prices of fuel, especially after the Gulf 
war. 'I want diesel for my pump, and a fair price for my crops' . 
This advertisement brought forth the plight of farmers who were 
affected by the shortage of fuel for the working of their
agricultural pumps and tractors. He hopes that it could be 
rectified by a stable government for agricultural prosperity.
The tenth advertisement brought into focus the need for equality 
irrespective of caste, class or economic status. 'I want
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Stability. I want my son to go to college' . This is stated by an 
office peon representing the aspirations of the people who are 
denied the opportunities to progress on grounds of caste, class 
and poverty. The peon craves for social justice and foresees the 
dream of sending his son to college, only if there was a stable 
government like Cong.I.
The concluding advertisement of the first phase summarised the 
entire theme of the campaign on Stability First. For building a 
Great India and a Great Future'. Reviewing the concept of 
stability as against issues, the last advertisement visually 
focused on the Cong.I symbol of 'hand' superimposed against the 
masses similar to the first which had a photograph of Rajiv 
Gandhi. It recaps the 15 months rule of the non-congress parties 
leading the country to near disaster. Factors of casteism, 
communalism, rising prices and inflation had left the country 
weak and unstable. Therefore there was a need to first establish 
a stable government which could carry on the work and rebuild the 
damage caused by the coalition governments.
The final Cong.I pledge centred on its historical past during the 
freedom struggle and its present mission to rebuild the country, 
fight against divisive forces like casteism, communalism, check 
rising prices, work against unemployment and poverty to lead 
India towards growth and progress.
THE CAMPAIGN AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV GANDHI
The post assassination campaign comprised of press 
advertisements, a video film and posters that focused on the life 
of Rajiv Gandhi and his contribution to the country. Three press 
advertisements built around on theme of realizing the dream of 
Rajiv Gandhi. While the visuals differed, the advertisements had 
the same headline and copy.
The first advertisement emphasised the sacrifice of Indira Gandhi 
and Rajiv Gandhi, both assassinated within a short span of seven
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years. The second visual showed Rajiv Gandhi mingling with the 
crowds during his election rallies as the man of the masses in 
a photograph taken just before his death. The third visual was 
the cortege of Rajiv Gandhi being taken for cremation. The 
picture brings out the sad memories of the assassination and the 
scenes thereafter. The funeral seen by the nation on TV and read 
about in newspapers and periodicals all over the country evoked 
memories of the tragedy and the silent mourning of the family. 
The electorate was urged to vote for Cong.I to fulfil the dream 
of Rajiv Gandhi through the slogan - Vote to fulfil Rajiv's 
dream- Vote Congress (I) , which replaced the earlier one of Vote 
Stability - Vote Congress (I).
THE MAGAZINE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN
The campaign was directed to the urban and semi urban voters. 
Efforts were made to build the 'Stability factor' around four 
major issues of the ten that were used in the newspaper campaign:
1. Unemployment, 2. Law and order, 3. Communal harmony, 4. 
Concept of General Elections held every five years.
The first advertisement tackled the issue of unemployment through 
the headline - Chacha (Uncle) , have you found a job ? An 
important election promise, the Cong.I stated that they would 
create new employment schemes to provide 100 million jobs before 
the year 2000.
The second advertisement was linked to the issue of Law and Order 
in the country. Amma (Mother), Why can't I go to school today ? 
The advertisement emphasised the need for stability to ensure 
safety bereft of riots and violence, more worrying especially for 
the children going to school.
The third advertisement dealt with the Mandir-Masjid issue. 'Amma 
What is the difference between Mandir and Masjid? The question 
gave emphasis to the secular nature of the Cong. I which 
professed the need for equality of religions, unlike the other 
parties. The child's expression was aimed to help people stop and
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rethink more deeply about the underlying factors that lead to 
communal riots in the country.
The fourth advertisement emphasised the sanctity of popular 
mandate and preserving the tradition of holding general elections 
being held every five years. The headline Bapu (Father), but you 
said that elections are held every five year ?, an expression by 
a 9-10 year old boy exemplified the need to vote Cong.I as the 
only party that had completed five years term every time it was 
voted to power in contrast to non-Cong.I governments, that did 
not last more than three years, leading to the mid-term 
elections.
THE MEDIA STRATEGY
Media strategy was worked out to reach the various target groups 
and was scheduled between 8-26 May 1991. According to ORG, Cong. I 
spent Rs. 55 million (£ 1,102,607) on press advertisements, five 
times more than the BJP. Emphasis was given to the vernacular and 
local media. The criteria for selection of newspapers were: l.The 
newspaper should possibly originate from the constituency or from 
a nearby area, 2. The newspaper should have a certain minimum 
circulation, depending on the place of origin and other factors,
3. It should be a daily, 4. The strength or weakness of the party 
in that particular constituency, 5. Whether the newspaper was pro 
or anti Cong.I.
400 publications were selected from the official publications 
lists of the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) and the Indian 
Newspapers Society (INS) . A number of non registered publications 
which reached large segments of target groups were also selected. 
15% were English dailies and 85% were in regional languages. The 
advertisements were translated into 17 languages and were 
generally half page in size. On an average, there was one 
advertisement every alternate day in major cities and towns. Only 
40 publications carried all twelve advertisements. In other 
publications there were six advertisements i.e. the opening and
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the closing advertisements and four issue advertisements relating 
to law and order, economy, the government that works and communal 
harmony. Some of the advertisements relating to agricultural and 
rural sectors were scheduled in the small town publications.
Magazines were selected based on similar criteria as of 
newspapers. The periodicals comprised of weeklies, fortnightlies 
and monthlies. Due to the limited time available, the strategy 
was to use all four advertisements in each issue of the magazine 
selected. Therefore four full page advertisements were 
interspersed in each issue.
THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
Cong.I brought out two comprehensive video films, one before and 
another after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. These films were 
made in Hindi and translated into various regional languages. The 
objectives of the video films were:
1. To inform people about the importance of elections.
2. To project policies and programmes of the party in terms of
issues.
3. To portray the leadership qualities of Rajiv Gandhi.
4. To popularize their symbol of "Hand7.
5. To give a historical perspective on the experience and
capability of Cong.I through its philosophy and 
achievements in the past.
6. To make people realize the results of 15 months of
'Misrule7 by non-Cong.I parties and renew their trust in 
Cong.I8.
In the video films, importance was given to project Rajiv Gandhi 
as the only leader with the capacity to lead the country. Rajiv 
Gandhi was seen moving in the villages and public meetings with 
his wife, talking to people, listening to their grievances, 
cuddling young children, sharing meals and visiting places of 
worship. The views of a cross section of people and a few leaders
8 Interview with Anand Sharma, Cong.I Spokesperson MP. 13 
June, 1991.
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endorsing his leadership qualities were added to reinforce his 
qualities inherited from his grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru and 
mother Indira Gandhi.
The issues and programmes were presented in a TV news format by 
a popular TV newsreader to attract the viewers attention and add 
credibility. People were told about the forthcoming elections, 
their rights and duties to make a choice from the stated facts. 
Similar to the press campaign, various sections of the people 
were taken to express their views. The policies of Cong.I were 
put across by important leaders- P .V.Narasimha Rao on the 
Panchayati Raj and the Nagarpalika bills, Vasant Sathe and Farooq 
Abdullah on communal harmony and religious tolerance, Margaret 
Alva on the issue of Ayodhya temple and Anand Sharma on the 
provision of jobs for the unemployed.
Traditional entertainment forms such as 'nautanki' (a form of 
folk theatre) , mime and folk songs were incorporated in the 
video films to urge voters to support Cong. I. The themes were 
built around stories with songs, dialogues and dances. After the 
complete information and entertainment package on the history, 
policies, programmes, image building of the party and leaders, 
the concluding parts attacked leaders of combined opposition 
parties.
Senior leaders like V.P.Singh, Chandrashekhar, Devi Lai and NTR 
were compared to hungry wolves. The song exemplified how their 
lust for power had divided and destroyed the nation leaving the 
people in distress and poverty. On the issue of rising prices, 
a comparison was made between the poor hungry people and the 
leaders enjoying sumptuous meals. The film concludes with a brief 
review of the party and its leader, urging people to join hands 
with Cong.I to strengthen the party in providing a stable 
government.
Along with video films, audio cassettes added the festive 
dimension to the election messages. The Cong.I cassettes included
97
speeches of the leaders, bhajans (religious songs), ghazals 
(lyrical) and political songs. Songs were composed and sung by 
famous singers like Mahendra Kapoor and Parvati Khan. Set to 
tunes of popular Hindi films, these songs were highly popular. 
The political songs sung by pop singer Parvati Khan, were used 
to reach youth. Set to Western and Indian tunes, the cassette 
comprised of several songs to project the symbol of the hand, 
provide a stable government, jobs for unemployed and communal 
harmony. The songs sought to persuade people to support Rajiv 
Gandhi and through his leadership hope for love, togetherness, 
peace and stability.
One of the songs encouraged women to go and vote for the Cong.I. 
In a narrative style, it brought out the problems of women 
enmeshed in household chores who did not have time or knew the 
importance of their vote. In a story format, the woman tells how 
she went to vote for the 'hand' to make the Cong. I win after 
dealing with family members and household chores.
Video and audio cassettes formed an integral part of the election 
campaign. Videos were either screened through the VOWs or through 
television and Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs) that were 
available with the local leaders or hired for the purpose. These 
films were shown at least once in a particular area or a village 
and sometimes four to five times depending on the population or 
weakness of the party in a particular constituency. To inform and 
collect people at such shows, party workers announced through 
loud speakers from three-wheeler rickshaws and auto rickshaws or 
went from house-to-house to summon people. Video films also 
formed a part of the public meetings and election rallies and 
were shown either before or after the speeches.
PUBLIC MEETINGS
Until his assassination, Rajiv Gandhi was the main national 
campaigner for the Cong.I. He toured the country holding six to 
seven meetings a day sometimes covering two to three states at 
a time. Rajiv Gandhi was flying his own aircraft and moving
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around from place to place until May 21 when he was assassinated 
at one of his election meetings at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu. 
After his assassination, Narasimha Rao and three senior leaders- 
N.D Tiwari, Arjun Singh and Sharad Pawar campaigned in the 
remaining 300 constituencies before the polls on June 12 and 15.
DOOR - TO - DOOR - CAMPAIGNS
Cong. I as a national party was well organised with an experienced 
network of workers who regularly monitored the campaign through 
door-to-door calls and small group discussions. Walkabouts were 
organized in almost all towns and villages for the candidates and 
leaders to meet the electorate.
POSTERS AND OTHER OUTDOOR MEDIA
The party brought out several posters before and after the 
assassination. The posters emphasised the policies of the party, 
portrayed Rajiv Gandhi as the leader and displayed the party 
symbol. In the constituencies, the name of the candidate and his 
photograph was included in the posters. Posters were printed in 
English, Hindi and local languages. Apart from posters, huge 
cutouts of Rajiv Gandhi were displayed at strategic locations in 
most towns and cities. The general message was 'Vote stability- 
Vote Congress 'I' and the symbol of 'hand' was prominently 
displayed.
Caps, key chains, stickers, badges, bindis and shawls were 
distributed for boosting party morale and were sources of 
incentives for some people to vote for the party. Sonia Gandhi 
and her daughter Priyanka Gandhi, while campaigning for Rajiv 
Gandhi in his constituency distributed bindis and sweets to women 
for supporting the Cong.I. The stickers, badges and key chains 
either displayed the symbol of the 'hand' or had a picture of 
Raj iv Gandhi.
WALL WRITING
Major sites on walls were 'reserved' in advance by Cong.I even 
before the names of candidates were announced. Slogans and
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symbols were painted all over the walls in cities, towns and 
villages. Slogan wars on walls were common during elections.
E LE C TIO N  A N A L Y S IS
Cong.I won 227 seats, the highest number in the LS, but 12 short 
of an overall majority to form government. Its vote share dropped 
to 37.57%, its second lowest since 1952 (See Fig-III-1) . The 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi helped Cong.I to return to power. 
While the Cong.I vote in the first phase of polls was 32.9%, it 
had gained only 50 of the 196 seats contested with a success rate 
of 25.51%. In the second phase it increased to 40.65%. A 7.75% 
swing in the post assassination phase helped Cong.I to win 177 
seats with a success rate of 62.11%. In AP, with the sympathy 
wave, Cong.I emerged winner with 24 of 42 seats and a vote share 
of 45.85%. It gained 20 of the 23 seats from the second phase of 
the elections.
FIGURE III.l CONG.I: THE PARTY PERFORMANCE
(1952-1991)
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SUMMARY
During the 1991 elections, Rajiv Gandhi systematically organized 
the campaign strategy. Extensive research conducted prior to the 
polls gave Cong.I an edge over other parties, after the failure 
of the minority governments.The campaign was built around the 
theme of 'Stability' which could be obtained only through an 
experienced party like Cong.I. Four advertising agencies were 
involved in the planning and execution of the campaign.
A multi media campaign using the mass and conventional forms was 
planned to reach the maximum number of voters. Cong.I spent the 
maximum money for their all India campaign. Rajiv Gandhi toured 
the country addressing many constituencies, until his 
assassination at one such meeting on 21 May, 1991.
The party altered the campaign to capitalize on the sympathy 
factor emphasising the need to vote Cong. I to realize Rajiv 
Gandhi's dream. The campaign throughout, made extensive use of 
national and regional newspapers and periodicals. The other forms 
used were; direct mail, video and audio cassettes, public 
meetings and door-to-door campaigns.
The sympathy wave altered the fortunes of Cong.I in the second 
phase of elections as the success rate went up to 62.11% from 
25.51% in the pre-assassination phase. Cong. I contested 481 seats 
and won 227, an increase of 30 seats from 1989, and formed the 
government with P.V. Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister. We have 
evaluated the impact of the campaign in three of our 
constituencies.
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SECTION II
STUDY OF THE BJP ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP)
INTRODUCTION
The (BJP) campaign was striking compared to Cong.I. By a 
combination of ideology, religion and high drama, mingling 
conventional and modern techniques, the BJP attempted to catch 
the Hindu imagination with a militant mix of religion and 
politics.
During the 1991 elections, BJP made every effort to assume a 
national status. The party aimed to dislodge Cong.I and to occupy 
the seat of power in Delhi. Drifting out from the alliances and 
coalitions and with a firm base in the popularity acquired 
through the 'Hindutva'^ Campaign', the religio-political 
combine attempted to establish a unique nationwide political 
identity. Efforts were made to increase the party network from 
northern states to the entire country. L.K.Advani, the BJP leader 
campaigned with a firm determination to induce the Hindu mind 
towards building the temple at Ayodhya. Religion came to play a 
significant role in the identity perception of an overwhelming 
majority of the citizens10.
It was reported that the BJP campaign along with its support 
groups, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (World Hindu 
Organization), the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS) (National 
Volunteer Organization) and the Bajrang Dal, surpassed all other
 ^ 'Hindutva' was described as 'Rashtriyatya'(Nationalism). 
It was the RSS that had influenced and inspired the ideology of 
'Nationalism' in the Jana Sangh.'Hindutva' was described as the 
idealogy of the upper caste middle class Indians who had uprooted 
themselves from their traditions seduced by the promises offered 
by modernization of India. However Basu et all (1993), use this 
term not in the sense of Hinduism, but to indicate the 
contemporary communal organizations and movements that used this 
banner to mobilize the Hindus. Chaturvedi & Chaturvedi (1991) 
have described it as aggressive force of Hinduism.
10 Hari Jaisingh, Indian Express 8 May, 1991.
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parties in terms of intensity, reach and range. Never before had 
any party campaigned so competitively on a national scale and so 
close on the heels of the Cong.I11.
BJP emerged as the second largest party gaining 119 seats, 22% 
of the 521 LS seats contested from 449 constituencies. The 
party's rise to national politics as an alternative to Cong. I was 
a major development in India's history of competitive 
politics12.
A BACKGROUND
The BJS, later transformed into the BJP was founded in 1951 with 
the aim of rebuilding India on the basis of 'Bharatiya Samskriti 
and Maryada' (Indian Culture and Rectitude). The most powerful 
influence in BJS, at both the ideological and organizational 
level was the RSS, founded by Dr.Hedgewar in 1925 (Puri, 1980).
The electoral contest between the BJS and Congress began since 
the first elections in 1952. As election succeeded election, 
Congress party retained its grip of power12. The party's 
strength continued to be concentrated in the Hindi speaking 
states especially Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, union territory 
of Delhi (now a state) and the Hindu majority cities of Punjab
11 Report of the ORG on' a study conducted on 890 selected 
voters from 20 constituencies and reported in the press. Deccan 
Chronicle Hyderabad,13 June, 1991.
12 'As far as Indian polity is concerned, the most 
significant development arising from the 1991 polls was not the 
return of Cong. I to power at the Centre, but the emergence of BJP 
as the main alternative to the Cong. I in many parts of the 
country' wrote S.Viswam in Deccan Chronicle, Hyderabad, 11 June, 
1991.
12 Butler, Lahiri & Roy detail the political performance 
of BJS from the first Delhi Municipal Committee elections when 
Jana Sangh had won seven (14%) seats as against 42 (84%) of the 
Congress. But the interesting aspect was that the Jana Sangh had 
25% of the total votes polled as against the 33% of the Congress. 
In the years to come though the Jana Sangh was the lone 
challenger to the Congress, and however powerful the challenge 
was, Congress had always stood to gain.
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and areasy^which. the RSS has already established a firm base of 
support in the 1940s. In the mid - seventies it merged with the 
Janata Party in 1977, which later split in 1979. Following the 
collapse of Janata rule in 1979, the BJS leaders regrouped to 
form the BJP under the leadership of A.B.Vajpayee.
The Hindu Nationalist parties which were attempting to win power 
constitutionally failed to become a major force in politics in 
post-independent India. What made BJS different and more 
dangerous was that it brought into the political arena its 
burning vision of an India which, having returned to its roots, 
would be transformed into an organic Hindu nation. (Graham, 
1990) . Many Hindus, and particularly those in the northern 
states, saw themselves as a political community, but they 
believed that Congress Party rather than any of the Hindu 
nationalist parties could appeal to a great majority of Hindus, 
irrespective of their caste, sect or region. In 1980, BJP was 
represented by 17 members in the LS and in 1984 it was reduced 
to two when Cong.I swept the polls in a historic win for Rajiv 
Gandhi.
The period between 1984-1989 witnessed an uninterrupted growth 
of BJP. Support for Cong.I was gradually depleting with charges 
of corruption, mismanagement, communal crisis, violence and 
failing economy, while the BJP was gaining momentum. Another 
important development and an indirect means of support for the 
BJP was the growing religious awareness among the people through 
the Indian mythological epic ' Ramayana' serialised on TV. The BJP 
was quick to gauge the religious awakening of the people and it 
claimed that it was the only party to champion cause for Hindu 
unification and for building the Ram temple at Ayodhya14. 
Several mass movements were organised to build national support 
for the party.
14The Times of India. 'On the Campaign Trail. 13 November,
1989.
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The proximate political reasons which have caused the underlying 
tensions to emerge and led to the rise of Hindu nationalism are: 
an ideological and organizational decay of the Congress party, 
the rise of separatist nationalism in Punjab and Kashmir, 
political attempts at a large scale mobilization of lower Hindu 
castes and awkward turns in Muslim politics in the 1980s' 
Varshney (1992) .
MASS MOVEMENTS AND THE 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN STRATEGY 
BJP started their campaign after withdrawing support to the 
V.P.Singh government in 1990. BJP leaders had set new milestones 
for themselves in establishing a separate identity. The campaign 
had already begun, through the mass movements associated with the 
'Hindutva' campaign.
The 1991 election strategy was aimed to project their ideology 
and policies, attack Cong.I and persuade people to vote BJP to 
bring in 'Ram Rajya. The manifesto exemplified the main issues 
which were broadly classified as; a) clean political system b) 
economic growth and social justice, c) a vibrant social order, 
and d) world fraternity1 .^ The BJP stressed itself as a well
i ftorganized party with ideological superiority .
The party called on members of society with particular emphasis 
on the educated - the professionals, government civil servants 
and particularly the youth to join and support the party. Many
15 The BJP Election Manifesto, 1991.
1  ^Apter in The Politics of Modernization (1965) explains 
that 'Government is seen as a main source of development. As 
theoretically explained, the democratic political system is 
sustained not so much by the ideological structure of parties 
competing for power, but by commitment of parties to the values, 
rules and the norms that the system envisages. Contextually, 
ideology assumes a crucial role in building up the polity and 
society and most of them are linked to socio-economic 
development. The change is oriented towards achievement of 
development. Hence it is here that the ideology of socialism 
acquires a meaningful reality.
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of them including army generals, civil servants and 
industrialists joined the party17.
THE 'HINDUTVA' CAMPAIGN
Even before the elections were announced, BJP set about the task 
of establishing its ideological superiority on the 'Hindutva' 
platform. 'Hindutva' was interpreted as nationalism against the 
narrower sectarian concept of 'Hinduism' . Nationalism was to be 
projected as an alternative to the separatist messages of 
casteism and 'Pseudo secularism'1®. As a cadre based party it 
too had & an enthusiastic band of party workers to reach people 
at the grassroots level. The party adopted the techniques of mass 
mobilization through several formal and informal channels. Some 
of these, as discussed below were highly successful in harnessing 
the Hindu sentiment, not possible without communalizing the 
Indian society.
THE MASS MOVEMENTS
Several traditional/non western communication approaches were 
deployed by the BJP to develop a Hindu unity and a political 
identity. The techniques of mass movements in the wake of the 
'Mandir Nirman' (construction of the Rama Temple) especially in 
northern states were unprecedented in Indian history. In a study 
conducted on the techniques of mass mobilization in the city of 
Agra, it was concluded that these well organized methods were 
able to provoke the Hindus, and had converted some of the staunch 
Cong.I families (Chaturvedi & Chaturvedi, 1991). We discuss some 
of these movements.
1. Rath Yatra of L.K.Advani- The famous 'Rath Yatra' (Pilgrimage 
on a chariot (van) in October 1990 was the starting point of a 
long and sustained campaign. L.K.Advani covered 11,000 kms from
17 The Newstime Hyderabad. 24 May, 1991.
18 Pseudo secularism, as was coined by the BJP for Cong. I 
whose policies which they claimed contradicted the nature of 
secularism.
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Somnath in Gujarat to New Delhi, arousing Hindu sentiments for 
preserving their cultural heritage and identity. By undertaking 
a campaign when the religious fervour was heightened (by the 
popular TV serial 'Ramayana'. he created an unprecedented Hindu 
consolidation.. Though the successful Yatra had ended with the 
arrest of L.K.Advani, he had gained tremendous popularity. 
'Ayodhya Senapati'(Ayodhya's soldier), 'Rashtra purush' (Man of 
the nation) and 'Ram Bhakt' (Rama's devotee) were the encomiums 
earned.
2. The Ramshilanyas Poojan - (The sacred bricks collected for the 
construction of the Ram temple at Ayodhya). The 'Ramshilanyas 
Poojan' was organized by VHP and RSS. The objective was to 
collect bricks from individuals and collective donors from all 
over India towards the construction of the Ram temple. A 
sandalwood model of the proposed temple was put on display in 
Delhi. Photographs appeared in newspapers, posters, diaries and 
cards were made to impress upon the brick donors the magnitude 
of the task. Hindus were motivated to join the processions that 
were being organised in different parts of the country.
On 9 November, 1989 at the stroke of nine in the morning, amidst 
blowing of conch shells, chants of 'Jai Shri Ram' and 'Jai Ram' 
reaching the crescendo, Swami Paramahamsa Ramananandacharya dug 
out a few inches of soil near the planned site for the temple. 
Mahant Awaidyanath declared that it was not only the foundation 
for Ramjanmabhoomi temple, but a step for Hindu Rashtra to be 
established in the near future.
3. The Ghanta Gharial movement - Ghanta is referred to the 'Bell' 
and 'Gharial' is a metal disc which is beaten with a sandalwood 
stick. Both these form an integral part of the Hindu pooja 
(Ritual prayers). The mode of operation was that, a particular 
date and time was announced in the newspapers and Hindu families 
would climb on their terraces and ring the bells and beat the 
metal discs as a show of solidarity.
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4. The Mashaal Movement- Similar to the Ghanta-Gharial movement, 
people were asked to hold the 'Mashaals' (Lighted Torches) atop 
their houses on a particular day and time. It was found that 
though these movements had appeared to be spontaneous for many, 
it was actually through a very organized system. The concepts 
trickled down from the 'Pracharaks'(heads of groups) to the 
'Vibhag Pracharaks' (area heads), to Karyawahis (workers) who in 
their Shakas (areas) had helped popularize the concepts. From the 
Shakas the ideas percolated into the 'Mohollas' (localities) and 
the masses.
5. The Sadhu Sairanelan - A Sadhu Sammelan (Meeting of Hindu 
Ascetics) was organised in New Delhi on 2-4 April, 1991 to 
discuss the 'Ram Janmabhoomi' (the birth place of Rama) issue and 
the strategies the religious communities would undertake to 
support the BJP. It was attended by over l,000 «&dhus (Holy men) 
and Sadhavis (Holy Women) from all over India. These holy men and 
women had also extensively campaigned for the BJP. According to 
K.R. Malkani, Vice President of the BJP, 'A sadhu is the best 
political worker'. He travels long miles, meets scores of people 
and can subsist on almost no food or clothing. Above all, he will 
not emerge as a rival politician. Unfortunately this was only 
partially true. In the 1991 election, a number of Sadhus and 
sadhavis contested the elections. At the conclusion of the two 
day meeting the sadhus intensely appealed to Hindus on the need
to vote for the BJP on the following criteria.
a. Every Hindu should rise to liberate and reconstruct the 
three temples allegedly flattened by Muslim invaders in 
Ayodhya, Mathura and Varnasi.
b. Every Hindu should use his vote to destroy the oppressors 
of Hindus, the Chief Minister of UP, Mulayam Singh Yadav
and the gang of three, V.P.Singh, Rajiv Gandhi and
Chandrashekhar who caved in to Muslim pressure and stalled 
the reclamation of the Ayodhya temple.
c. The only way to herald 'Ram Rajya' was to vote for the BJP.
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6. The VHP Rally in New Delhi- The VHP rally in New Delhi on 4
April 1991 was a massive demonstration to revive the Ram
€/
Janmabhoomi issue to complement the poll strategies. Religious
and political heads included the Shankaracharyas (Heads of
Religious Groups) and the Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh,
Haryana and Rajasthan. Over 300,000 people including 10,000
religious heads attended of which 8,000 had toured the length and
breadth of the country to mobilize BJP support1^ . It was
9 nclaimed as the biggest upsurge m  post Independent India' . 
The rally was named as the Saffron Revolution by India Today. VHP 
workers had urged the people through posters and word of mouth 
to come and witness the rally.
Another successful public relations exercise was the distribution 
of food packets. Empty packets were distributed to households all 
over Delhi and the people were urged to fill the packets with 
food for the 'Ram Bhakts' (Devotees of Ram). About two million 
food packets were distributed to people gathered at the rally.
7. The Jan Jagran-Campaign - The all India 'Jan Jagran' 
(Awakening of the masses) campaign was launched by four BJP 
leaders simultaneously from the north, south, east and west of 
India. It started on 24 March 1991 and culminated in Delhi on 
April- ^991. Advani began the campaign from West Bengal's 
Bijoygchrh Maidan, the same spot from where the late founder 
president of the BJS, Dr. S . P .Mukerjee, had started the first Lok 
Sabha election campaign. Murli Manohar^Joshi, started off from 
Kanya Kumari in the south, Sikander Bl^ akt from Dwaraka (Gujarat) 
in the west, and Suraj Bhan from Jammu and Kashmir in the north.
'The Show of Strength', The Week. Kottayam, 14 April, 
1991 and 'Flexing its Muscles', India Today. 30 April, 1991.
2®'The Saffron Revolution' India Today. 30 April, 1991. 
Saffron is the colour for the Hindus. Religious heads, holy men 
and women often wear saffron robes.
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These mass mobilization programmes had a tremendous impact on the 
Hindus. The Ram Janmabhoomi issue had become a political and 
cultural issue. The campaigns had succeeded in uniting, even if 
for a short while, a deeply fragmented Hindu society. The need 
for Hindu unity was made even stronger by comparison with other 
religions. It was reported that - 'If in the name of religion the 
Muslims can unite, the Sikhs can unite then why not the 
Hindus'21. Significant support was gained from the women whose 
voting patterns had changed from earlier elections. Despite 
diversities in the name of Hinduism, Hindu unity and Nationalism, 
the 'Ram' banner had managed to unite the women in its name. The 
female members of the electorate were visibly affected by the Ram 
to the advantage of BJP. It was reported from UP and Bihar that 
women had decided to vote for the 'Ram Party' in the wake of the 
religious mobilisation. Women were exerting a separate electoral 
identity and judgement, different from their husbands' and 
families who had earlier not only influenced their electoral 
judgement but dictated it. 'Jahan pati wahan' (Where the husband 
says, only there) was replaced by 'Jahan Ram wahan' (Where there 
is Ram, only there)22.
During the 1991 elections, The BJP made an outright attempt to 
ride on Hindu militancy sweeping the country and the religious 
fervour that was built over the Ram janmabhoomi issue. The 
election was to be a referendum on the objectives of secularism.
THE 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The 1991 campaign was aimed at giving a national character to the 
party and hence position itself as a party addressing itself to 
national rather than communal issues. The party used the services 
of R.K.Swamy/BBDO Advertising Pvt.Ltd. for its press campaign, 
the video cassettes were made by Jain Studios and other agencies 
were involved in the printing of campaign material.
21 'Rama Rides Again', The Week. Kottayam, 14 May, 1991.
22 The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 21 May, 1991
110
The objectives of the campaign were to exemplify the concepts of 
RAM, ROTI and INSAAF (discussed later), which the party was 
determined to implement in the country. Through the goals, they 
had set for themselves, the party tried to bring about 'Ram 
Rajya' , defined as an ideal rule where there was freedom from 
fear, hunger and injustice'23. It was also echoed to Mahatma 
Gandhi's dream of bringing about Ram Rajya after the expulsion 
of the British. It was argued that Gandhi's concept of Ram Rajya 
was not based on religion, but a state in which the people lived 
a life of self-reliance, truth and justice.
The Slogan created by the BJP was,
Lets go for Ram Rajya 
Lets go with the BJP 
Apart from the main objective to destabilize the Cong.I in its 
attempt for acquiring national status, the other issues included; 
scrapping Article 370 of the constitution which accords Jammu and 
Kashmir a different status compared to other states in the 
country, to focus on the separatist movements in Assam, Punjab, 
and Kashmir and reiterate their policy on Ayodhya. The Ayodhya 
issue was regarded as a symbol of their struggle to restore the 
rich cultural heritage of India.
RAM- The concept of 'Ram' was now being defined as 'Freedom from 
fear' and a symbol of integration without the barriers of caste, 
class or religion. It was projected as a means of liberating the 
country from the acute law and order situation, terrorism and 
communal riots. Ram was being projected as 'Maryada Purshotamm' 
(Ideal man) who had believed in one man, one wife, one culture. 
ROTI- (Bread) Roti was being defined as 'Freedom from want' . This 
related to the economic aspect. Political instability had 
resulted in economic instability witnessed in rising prices, 
inflation and increasing unemployment.
INSAAF- (Justice) Insaaf was defined as 'Freedom from 
discrimination, despair and frustration, to focus BJP as a 
secular party.
23 'The Week'. Kottayam, Kerala 14 April, 1991.
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Further the campaign was aimed to build up the leadership 
e qualities and dedicated team of workers and leaders like Atal 
1 Bjihari Vajpayee, L.K.Advani, Dr.Murli Manohar Joshi and Vijaya 
Raje Scindia and to motivate people to give BJP a chance to 
rule. It was argued that just as other parties were voted to 
power and had failed, the BJP too should be given a chance to 
rule. After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, BJP claimed that 
it was the only national party that could provide stability.
VHP supported the cause of Hindu unity and the construction of 
the temple at Ayodhya. Their advertisements also aimed at 
arousing the Hindus to unite and vote for the BJP. Apart from the 
national campaign, different strategies were adopted in states 
to give importance to the local issues of those areas^4 .
After the assassination, the fear of the nation wide 'sympathy 
wave' that would swing the voters to Cong. I as in 1984 after the 
assassination led most parties to review their electoral 
strategies. The BJP, after a two day national meeting of leaders 
in Delhi, called for a rejection of the cult of bullets and 
Advani urged the party workers to go with a 'killer instinct',
9 ccontending that political circumstances favoured the BJP^ .
The campaign was relaunched through press advertisements, posters 
and a video film as well as election meetings to counteract the 
expected sympathy wave. In AP, the campaign stressed the 
'Congress Goondaism' (Cong.I vandalism) in conjunction with the 
other political parties whose properties and election material 
were destroyed.
24 In New Delhi, stress was laid on problems like the ration 
card system, electricity, water, transport, security and law and 
order. In Punjab (Where the elections was postponed on grounds 
of acute law and order situations), emphasis was placed on 
bringing back peace and normalcy and arrest those involved in the 
riots, and in Assam the problems of infiltration and of the 
universities were taken up with measures identified for the same.
25 The Hindu. Madras, 26 May, 1991.
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THE PRESS CAMPAIGN
The press campaign was directed at the literate and influential 
masses.
A seven advertisement press campaign was planned:
1. The first three advertisements focused on main election themes 
Of RAM, ROTI AND INSAAF.
2. The next three advertisements attacked Cong.I and other 
parties on charges of instability, corruption and the alleged 
unhealthy alliances and coalitions.
3. The final advertisement reinforced the party's ideals, its 
policies and promises to bring in 'Ram Rajya'.
THE PRESS ADVERTISEMENTS
The opening advertisement 'Enough is Enough' reviewed the level 
of tolerance caused by malfunctioning of successive governments 
for over forty years, and the need to bring about change through 
the headline. Enough is Enough, 'You have tried the rest and paid 
the price'
An unusually long educative copy reflected upon specific issues 
to project BJP in comparison with Cong. I and NF. While the Cong. I 
was charged with policy irregularities, dynastic rule, corruption 
and rise in separatist movements in some states, the NF was said 
to have left the country in peril. The BJP should now be given 
a chance to rule.
The second advertisement 'Freedom from fear' focused on one of 
the major themes of the campaign through the headline. 'Freedom 
is indivisible, if we want to enjoy it, we must extend it to 
every one whether they are rich or poor whether they agree with 
us or not, no matter what their religion or belief' - L.K.Advani. 
The advertisement exemplified such policies and characteristics 
of BJP as integrity, mature leadership and dedicated cadres to 
provide stability in the country.
The third advertisement focused on the concept of 'Freedom from 
want' through the headline, 'The true quality of a nation's
113
freedom is the quality of life of its people'- Dr.Murli Manohar 
Joshi (BJP president).
This quote focused on the need to uplift the economic conditions 
of the people, at least to meet the basic necessities of food, 
clothing and shelter. BJP stressed its strategies to bring in a 
new economic and political culture to create a democratic 
economy.
The following three advertisements attacked the Cong.I. 
•'Unstable policies, unstable parties , unstable governments...
Can we tolerate this growing threat to national stability ? 
'Instability, Thy name is Congress'.
The fourth advertisement as in the above headline exemplified the 
inconsistencies of Cong.I rule which was characterised more by 
instability than stability. Among instances cited were, the 
frequent changing of chief ministers in states of AP and 
Karnataka and also the withdrawal of support to the 
Chandrashekhar ministry on flimsy grounds. It urged people to 
give BJP a chance to bring about a stable polity, a stable 
government and a stable nation.
The fifth advertisement focused on the charges of corruption 
against the Cong.I.
Bofors, HDW, Dynasty and Nepotism
'Can we allow the dishonest leaders to loot us any longer ? 
'Betrayal thy name is Congress'
The advertisement accused Cong. I of corruption and dynastic rule, 
during which the power and prestige of the great institutions 
like parliament, the army and judiciary were repeatedly eroded 
and the press was threatened.
The sixth advertisement focused on the coalitions of parties. 
C o n g (I)+Muslim league+AIADMK+Janata Dal(G)+Kerala
Congress+RPI....
Janata Dal+TDP+DMK+AGP+CPI+CPI (M) +Shahabuddin....
Can we trust Opportunistic coalitions any longer?
Opportunism thy name is Congress
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The advertisement referred to the failure of coalitions and 
alliances of the Cong. I and JD to remain in power. Though BJP was 
part of such alliances and coalitions in the past, it now 
projected itself as a party without alliances or coalitions to
provide a one party stable government.
The last advertisement appealed to the people to vote for BJP to
bring in Ram Rajya in anticipation of a good life which had
always eluded them by the repeated failures of earlier 
governments through the headline.
Ram Rajya is your birthright
Ram Rajya is within reach.
THE MEDIA STRATEGY
Though the party contested 459 seats all over the country, the 
campaign was concentrated in northern and western India, 
especially in the states of UP, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan 
and Gujarat. Advertising in the southern states of AP, Karnataka, 
Kerala and TN was comparatively less. At the regional level, 
advertisements were released by the state and local units 
focusing on local issues and candidates.
The media strategy was planned to reach the electorate through 
the English and vernacular newspapers. The advertisements were 
scheduled from 2-18 May 1991 in the first phase of the polling. 
After the assassination, four advertisements were released from 
the 8-12 June 1991. About thirty to forty national and regional 
dailies were selected. An 'alternate schedule' ensured that an 
advertisement appeared every other day in the newspapers during 
the campaign. The last advertisement was released extensively all 
over the country in all the selected publications.'India Today' 
was the only magazine used by the BJP. Their strategy was to take 
double and centre spreads in each of the issues during the 
campaign period.
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HOARDINGS AND POSTERS
Hoardings, posters, leaflets and stickers were extensively used 
by BJP. The hoardings, in first person, urged the people to make 
a determined decision to vote and vote for the BJP for the 
restoration of the cultural identity. For Example:
a. 'I won't let them destroy my culture,
I will vote. I'll vote BJP'
b. I'm a Nationalist. I will vote BJP'
c. 'This time the BJP'
POSTERS
Four different types of posters were designed at the national 
level, but many states printed their own posters. Posters 
compared BJP with the other political parties especially the 
Cong.I on the basis of pseudo secularism, stability and the need 
to liberate the country from the Cong. I culture. Some of the 
poster captions were,
a.Liberate India from the clutches of the Congress Culture- of 
nepotism, corruption, dynastic rule and defections
b. Let the elections be a choice between Nationalism and Pseudo 
secularism.
The comparative copy divided into equal parts enumerated the six 
main issues of BJPs electoral strategy as opposed to that of the 
Congress2 .^
c.'Stability is not one family rule'27
2  ^ The issues were 1. Repealing of Article 370, 2. Change 
in the reservation policy to remove the concept of reservation 
based on religion, 3.Setting up of a Human Rights Commission 
instead of the Minorities Commission, 4. The formation of a 
uniform civil code as against the personal laws, 5. Development 
of an efficient police force, and 6. The promise to build the 
temple at Ram Janmabhoomi unlike the pseudo secular campaign of 
Cong.I to deny the temple at the site.
27 The instability of the Congress was substantiated by six 
main points.
1.Support of the 54 MP government and toppling ministries.
2.Frequent change of chief ministers in various states.
3.Shuffling portfolios.
4.Immature leadership of Raj iv Gandhi.
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THE AUDIO CASSETTES
Audio cassettes comprising of songs, bhajans (devotional songs) 
and speeches of religious and political leaders were extensively- 
used. Political songs highlighted the policies of the party, 
attacked Cong.I, projected the images of leaders and popularized 
the symbol. The recorded speeches of religious leaders like 
Sadhvi Rithambara were most popular.
VIDEO CASSETTES
BJP released three election video cassettes during the first 
phase of the election campaign and one after the assassination. 
The video films, in several parts highlighted the policies and 
programmes, personalities of leaders and popularised the symbol 
of the 'lotus'. Religious references were extensively used to 
popularize leaders and the symbol. Advani was projected as the 
prime ministerial candidate riding atop his famous chariot or van 
with a Sudarshan Chakra (weapon of Lord Rama) in his hand. He was 
shown visiting various places of pilgrimage and performing 
religious ceremonies. The songs accompanying the visuals 
glorified Advani as a true nationalist, who would unite India and 
bring peace. People could look forward to a nation where there 
would be equality without discrimination on basis of caste, 
religion or class.
While the audio cassettes played throughout the day from the 
campaign booths and from the houses of party workers, the video 
cassettes were being extensively shown in every village and town 
of the country. A fleet of 191 vans from Jain studios in New 
Delhi (Also see chapter VI) were used to spread the BJP message. 
Dr.J.K.Jain of Jain Studios who pioneered the video revolution 
in electioneering in India is a BJP supporter and was responsible 
for making the BJP video films.
5.Soft policies encouraging separatist movements in Punjab and 
Kashmir.
6.Taking support from those people who were discarded by other 
parties.
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PUBLIC MEETINGS
Unlike Cong.I whose main campaigner was Rajiv Gandhi, BJP had at 
, least four major leaders; L.K. Advani, Dr.Murali Manohar Joshi, 
Atal B^hari Vajpayee and Vijaya Raje Scindia. Apart from leaders, 
the party also had the support of the religious leaders who held 
well attended public rallies. It was the first time in any Indian 
general election campaign that religious heads had openly 
supported and actively campaigned for BJP during the elections.
A particularly popular campaigner was Sadh^vi Rithambara, a fiery 
orator who travelled all over the country seeking Hindu 
solidarity and mobilizing them to unite and work towards the 
construction of the temple at Ayodhya. The party also held 
election rallies and processions with some TV and film stars. In 
Gujarat, a young six year old boy, Kranti Hindwani campaigned by 
reciting couplets from Indian epics and poems of Vajpayee. 
Deepika, the TV personality playing the role of 'Sita' in the 
popular TV serial 'Ramayana' actively campaigned in the Baroda 
constituency and won her election.
CONVENTIONAL FORMS OF MEDIA USED
Several well organised street plays, dramas, music programmes, 
street corner meetings, walkabouts, dharna sammelans (protest 
meetings) projected the party policies.
Street Plays - Street plays organized by the local party workers 
projected the BJP strategies while ridiculing Cong.I and its 
issues.
Musical Programmes - In some states especially in Gujarat, music 
programmes were organized by the BJP with singers and music 
directors from the film world to propagate the policies of BJP. 
Dharna Sammelans - Dharna Sammelans were organized especially in 
AP, to protest against Cong.I workers who had allegedly gone on 
a rampage destroying BJP properties and election material and 
also physically assaulting party workers.
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Other Promotional strategies - Stickers, caps, badges, 
photographs of Lord Rama, key chains, T-shirts and flags were 
distributed to remind the people to vote for the BJP.
POLL ANALYSIS
BJP was the biggest gainer with 119 seats in the elections and 
a vote share of 20.95%, 9.4 percentage points more than the 1989 
elections and 33 more seats (Fig III.2) . BJP not only emerged as
the second largest party after Cong.I but also gained a majority
/,
in assembly elections in UPi , the largest and politically pivotal 
Indian state. Though the main gains came from the northern 
states, it made inroads into the southern states. In AP, though 
the party contested 41 seats, it won only one, but its vote share 
increased from 1.97% to 9.64%. In Karnataka its vote share 
increased from 2.55% to 28.07% and in West* Bengal it increased 
from 1.67% to 11.67%.
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SUMMARY 
1991 and AFTER
The BJP during the 1991 elections had made every effort to assume 
national status. Drifting away from alliances and coalitions, it 
aimed to establish its own political identity and emerge as a 
national alternative to the Cong.I. It had gained vast support 
through the religio - political movements. The party contested 
459 of the 521 seats that went to the polls.
The campaign was well organised with the support of VHP and RSS. 
The 'Hindutva' campaign with several mass mobilization techniques 
helped the party to gain large support. Later in the run up to 
the elections, it claimed to be secular rather than communal. The 
advertising campaign through national and regional newspapers 
attacked Cong.I. and projected the party ideology, organization 
and its policies.
The 'Hindutva' campaign consolidated a large following among the 
rural and conservative segments besides women. It also converted 
some hitherto staunch Cong.I supporters. Second, the 
organizational and ideological superiority of BJP had brought in 
support from the more secular, educated and influential strata 
such as the bureaucrats, army generals and industrialists.
In 1991, the party not only doubled its vote share from 11.49% 
in 1989 to 20.95%, but also made inroads in to the southern 
states. Though it did not win many seats, it increased its vote 
share. The popularity of BJP was claimed as the "Saffron 
selSa' (Kumar, 1991). Within two years, this success took a plunge 
after the demolition of the Babri-Masjid in Ayodhya on 6 
December, 1992. This demolition led to communal riots all over 
India, and also in parts of England and Canada, during which 
temples and mosques were destroyed. BJP and VHP leaders including 
Advani were arrested. The Cong. I government in New Delhi 
immediately dissolved the governments in four BJP governed 
states, UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh (HP) . 
A year later in the assembly elections held in these states, BJP
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lost the majority in Madhya Pradesh, HP, UP and Rajasthan despite 
an aggressive campaign referring to the demolition as the 
'largest national movement' in history. Columnist Inderjit 
Badhwar called it a 'Saffron Setback'2®. Not only w& zsfi the 
electorate moved away from extremism but the performance of 
Cong.I government had strengthened its political base at the 
centre. Therefore with the new developments, the electoral 
fortunes of BJP resting on narrow ideological concepts of 
'Hindutva' could rise only if there was again a breakdown in the 
face of a government's poor performance and rampant corruption.
® He believes that certain common factors could be 
responsible for this change. In the rural areas particularly, 
there was a noticeable swing away from extremism on account of 
three elements: a late dawning but increasing common sense
perception that Ram should not be exploited for political 
purposes, a gradual fear that the violence that rocked Bombay was 
counterproductive to economic betterment and jobs; and fear that 
communal rioting ultimately strengthens what the villages despise 
most: the local police force. India Today. 15 December, 1993.
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SECTION III
STUDY OF THE JANATA DAL /NATIONAL FRONT ELECTION CAMPAIGN
THE NATIONAL FRONT - A MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The NF was formed when V.P.Singh, a senior leader and upright 
Finance Minister in the Rajiv Gandhi cabinet, resigned from the 
cabinet and started a crusade against Rajiv Gandhi and Cong.I. 
In the run up to the 1989 elections, V.P.Singh united the 
opposition parties in a systematic manner2 .^ It was for the 
second time that the opposition parties united against Cong.I.
The election scene in 1989 was more favourable to the combined 
opposition than to Cong.I, as corruption charges in the 'Bofors 
Gun Deal' had acquired widespread publicity through leading 
newspapers and periodicals3^. Compared to a large scale 
multimedia advertising campaign by Cong.I, financial constraints 
restricted the JD/NF campaign. It concentrated on an intensive 
poster campaign along with mass rallies, public meetings and 
election tours of the party leaders. Election publicity and 
campaign slogans attacked Cong.I and Rajiv Gandhi. Though the 
opposition parties had no newspaper campaign, they gained
2  ^At first, the Janata Party, Lok Dal(A), Lok Dal(B) and 
others joined to form the Lok Dal. It was obviously felt that the 
Congress foothold could be removed only if the Non-Congress 
(generally referred to as 'Opposition parties' as the Congress 
has been the ruling party winning eight of the ten LS elections) 
came together.The next step was the formation of the National 
Front against the Congress. Parties like the CPI, CPI (M) , 
Congress (S) , regional parties like the Telugu Desam, DMK, AGP and 
other small parties agreed to come together on a common platform 
to defeat the Congress. Finally, the NF came to an agreement with 
the BJP on sharing of seats. The aim was to ensure that every 
constituency had only one opposition candidate facing the 
Congress. This adjustment of seats was total in some states like 
Rajasthan and Gujarat, partial in states of Madhya Pradesh and 
Orissa but in Maharashtra and UP there was virtually no 
adjustment.
3<^ The Hindu. Madras. A popular daily published 
investigative reports on the Bofors Gun Deals which became the 
main election issue in 1989.
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publicity, through a parody on the Cong.I campaign by Indian 
Express31. It led to a historic win in the 1989 LS elections. 
Singh was sworn in as the Prime Minister on 2 December, 1989 
leading the JD with 143 parliamentary seats. People supported him 
in the hope of change and reform.
However, within eleven months the country suffered several 
political and cultural uprisings. The MCR on job reservation for 
the BCs led to widespread student agitation. In the northern 
states including New Delhi, students took extreme steps of self 
immolation and suicide. About 159 attempted suicide and 63 died 
in protest against the implementation of the report32.
Eventually, with the BJP withdrawing support, the government was 
forced to resign. The party split when the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Devi Lai and the leader of the Lok Dal,
Chandrasekhar gathered enough support to cross the anti- 
defection33 barrier and formed the Janata Dal (Socialist). 
Later it was named Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP). V.P.Singh 
stepped down as the Prime Minister on 9 November, 1990. At a 
critical stage, Chandrasjfelihr, leader of the newly formed JD(S) 
was sworn in as the Prime Minister, with the outside support of 
the Cong.I.
The failure of the combined opposition government for the second 
time, left the voters betrayed by the system and again the Cong. I 
had scored a margin and let people believe that, coalition 
governments made up of parties with diverse ideologies and
31 Indian Express is one of the largest circulated 
newspapers of the country with 16 editions. During the election, 
it published rejoinders to the Cong.I advertisements.
32 Pyres of Protest, India Today 31 October,1990.
33 The Anti Defection Bill was passed in 1987 to prevent 
elected representatives from frequently changing parties. By this 
enactment, only if one third or more representatives of a party 
walk out can they form another party.
124
programmes were unable to cooperate and work towards common 
economic and social reforms.
In 1991, the NF tried to resurrect its position, this time with 
a strategy directed at a coalition of the poor, the backward and 
the minorities. The process undoubtedly consolidated Muslims and 
BCs, but the party lost support from the middle classes34. The 
party could win only 53 seats, a poor third after Cong. I and BJP. 
We evaluate the electoral strategies of JD/NF and the changes 
that had taken place in the different segments of the electorate, 
especially among the Muslims, BCs and middle class voters.
THE 1991 ELECTIONS : A MOVE TOWARDS SOCIAL EQUITY
In 1991, JD's policy was to eradicate social injustices and 
economic disparities in the system of governance. The aim was to 
fight against the caste system, the root cause of divisiveness 
and instability in the country. V. P. Singh saw this as an 
excellent opportunity to mobilize the traditional vote banks with 
the message of social justice. JD traced its ideology to Mahatma 
Gandhi's campaign against untouchability. According to a senior 
party leader Jaipal Reddy, 'When Mahatma Gandhi tried to improve 
the lot of the untouchables, some orthodox elements objected that
34 In strict sociological terms, it is difficult to define 
the Indian middle class. Unlike in the West, where the 
hierarchical status in the society is determined by wealth and 
income, in India the lower income but upper caste origins qualify 
for the place in the middle class. Also the neo-rich among the 
middle class in the rural and semi-urban areas qualify the status 
of the middle class. Then there is a very large segment drawn 
from the scheduled and other backward castes who have entered the 
white collared market. In the Indian context they too describe 
themselves as middle class because they are not engaged in manual 
labour. According to a study conducted by the Bombay Chambers 
of Commerce, some 125 to 150 million of the country's population 
represents one of the largest middle class consumer market. This 
means that there are over 25 million middle class families and 
50 million voters. There has been a 90% increase in the average 
urban family incomes in India from 1983-88 and this has been a 
result of the increase in income per member as the women joining 
the work force has increased.
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it would upset social equilibrium and generate tensions. But what 
Gandhiji was trying to do was to purge out society of its 
inherited ills'35 .
Therefore the main objective of the campaign was to create 
greater awareness to bring about social equity. As expressed by 
Singh in an interview with The Week magazine, 'It is not Mandal 
alone, this time the issue is clearly and definitely equity - 
political equity, social equity, economic equity, 
decentralization of powers, federal structure, labour 
participation in the management, fair prices for the farmers and 
resources to the rural sectors'36.
The other objectives outlined by the party were to gain broad 
based support by including women, mobilize Muslims along with the 
other minorities, attack other parties as communal and 
opportunistic, popularize special programmes for youth, women, 
children, minorities and the economically backward sections and 
implement schemes to improve the lives of farmers, artisans and 
the landless labour37.
According to the party manifesto, there was a need for a fresh 
mandate to complete the tasks that remained unfulfilled as a 
result of the NF government having had to go out of office while 
defending and upholding the principles of secularism and social 
justice.' In 1991, V.P.Singh literally turned into a messiah of 
the marginalised masses. He went on a Bharat Yatra (all India 
tour) in an attempt to propagate his plans for the implementation 
of the MCR.
With the commitment to the BCs, the party formulated a system 
of reservation in the selection of candidates as a conscious
35Interview with Jaipal Reddy, Spokesperson, Janata Dal, New 
Delhi on 19 April, 1991
36The Week. Kottayam April 2, 1992.
37 National Front Election Manifesto, 1991.
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attempt to bring about basic changes in the social composition 
in parliament. For the first time in history, about 60% of the 
party tickets were given to BCs. This reservation was defined in 
terms of the composition of the population. 60% of the seats were 
to be reserved for the 85% of the population including the 
backward and rural classes and 40% seats to the 15% forward caste 
population. Singh widened his base by inclusion of women in the 
Mandal bracket and promised 5% reservation for the poor and 
economically backward among the upper castes.
As the dominant party, JD contested 309 seats, its partners 
another 220 seats. In 1989, Singh, united the opposition parties 
together to form the NF. In 1991 again JD forged an alliance with 
the Left party governments in Kerala and West Bengal and other 
regional parties to prove their viability and stability of 
coalition politics.
The pre-election profile for the JD/NF was discouraging. Singh's 
popularity had declined; the low ratings in opinion polls 
revealed that the party had lost ground and some polls also 
suggested that the JD would be routed 33. The number of seats 
forecast by the pollsters for NF-Left ranged from 78-115. 
Psephologist Dr. Bhalla predicted JD's results to be disastrous 
and the party not getting more than 30-40 seats39. JD leaders 
reacted sharply to these results. Jaipal Reddy questioned MARG's 
motives. He called pollsters as tricksters and drew parallels 
between psephology and astrology. Poll surveys, he claimed were 
heavily loaded in favour of the urban upper classes. George 
Fernandes, another leader, threatened to sue the pollsters and 
take action against newspapers that published biased versions of 
election results49.
33 MRAS-Burke Survey predicted a complete collapse of JD.
Sunday. Calcutta, 11 May, 1991.
39 The Hindu-MARG Opinion poll.The Hindu, Madras, 19 May,
1991.
49 Deccan Chronicle Hyderabad, 6 June, 1991.
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The Publicity Committee was headed by Rajmohan Gandhi, a noted 
journalist and grandson of Mahatma Gandhi. In 1989 he contested 
against Rajiv Gandhi from Amethi. The party did not have a high 
budget multi-media campaign unlike the Cong.I or the BJP. Party 
spokesperson Jaipal Reddy dismissed the need for any mass media 
advertising campaign as the target groups were the rural and semi 
urban segments, the campaign concentrated on interpersonal forms 
like rallies, public meetings and door-to-door canvassing. For 
the urban and literate masses the party brought out brochures on 
such issues as women, MCR and Ram Janmabhoomi41.
THE STRATEGY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION
After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the NF-Left alliance 
tried to present itself as the only party that could provide the 
needed stability in the country. Jaipal Reddy argued that by 
destabilising the Chandrashekhar government, Cong. I had deprived 
itself of the stability plank. With the set objectives, the party 
leaders were on a campaign trail using various techniques for 
mobilising support and cultivating vote banks. Public meetings 
were the most important means of communicating.
PARTY ORGANISATION
Unlike Cong. I and BJP, NF did not have any grassroots 
organisation, and hence the strategy was to make use of the Left 
and other regional parties to garner votes. Even after V.P.Singh 
became the Prime Minister, limited time prevented efforts to 
build the party's organisational structure. During the elections, 
the party worked through ad-hoc bodies, with the result that in 
many constituencies, the party had no district or block level 
committees.
PUBLIC MEETINGS
The campaign concentrated on public meeting that were held by 
Singh and other leaders. In 1989, Singh's election meetings had 
drawn large crowds and support wherever he went. Large numbers
41 Interview with Jaipal Reddy, Spokesperson, JD. 19 April,
1991.
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from the middle and upper classes, elites, women and others 
gathered to cheer and support him. In the 1991 election, there 
was a change in the image of the party leader. In 1991 
V.P.Singh's popularity had disappeared. He was sometimes greeted 
with great fervour and sometimes with abuse. In one of his 
election meetings at Navsarai in Gujarat a prominent portrait of 
his had a garland of slippers and he was greeted with slogans of 
'V.P.Singh wapas jao'(Go back V.P. Singh). In his Fatehpur 
constituency, the campaign was dull and the people listened to 
him passively. It was reported that the enthusiastic, shouting 
and jostling crowds of media persons and workers who ran amuck 
chasing his motorcade of cars were no more present42.
MOBILIZATION OF VOTE BANKS £-
In 1991, India was divided into heterogenous sections of vote
A
banks such as Hindu (Further classified) votes, Muslim votes, 
Women votes and Harijan votes. JD's objective of social justice 
and equity extended to Muslims and Harijan who formed the lower 
strata of the society to make inroads in the otherwise Cong. I 
monopoly over the Muslim and Harijan votes. The policy of 
reservation had helped the party to consolidate, to some extent, 
the vote banks of the Backward castes, Harijans and Muslims, but 
lost the support of the middle classes.
THE JANATA DAL AND THE MUSLIM VOTE BANK
Indian Muslims comprise 11.3% of the population and the 
proportion of Muslim votes is large enough to critically alter 
the results in slightly less than half the Parliamentary 
constituencies42. Therefore winning support of 'Muslim Vote 
Banks' was imperative to ensure substantive wins in the 
elections. Since Independence, Muslims had supported Cong.I as 
a secular party and enjoyed the privileges as a minority 
community. Since 1989, with the proposal for the implementation
42 The Hindustan Times. New Delhi. 8 May, 1991
42 The Observer of Business and Politics. Bombay 12 May,
1991.
of the MCR and the BJP instigating the Hindus, communal riots had 
led to cleavages in the support groups.
During the election, NF sought support of the Muslims. After a 
series of discussions and negotiations between the JD leaders 
headed by V.P.Singh, and Muslim participants, the JD leaders 
agreed to provide several concessions to the Muslims, including 
enough representation to the minorities especially Muslims in all 
the advisory boards relating to unemployment and financial 
institutions, non interference with the Muslim personal law 
(Shariat) , implementation of the Guj^fral Committee 
recommendations linking Urdu with job opportunities, establish 
minority financial corporations and preserve the minority run 
institutions.
After an appraisal of the list of candidates, the influential 
Imam, Syed Abdullah Bukhari of Delhi's Jama Masjid issued a five 
page 'Fatwa' (Appeal/Declaration) to the Muslims to support the 
JD. Through the Fatwa44, the Imam appealed to all the Muslims 
to vote for the JD candidates in all constituencies and in their 
absence support the Left or JD's friendly alliance parties. Along 
with the support of Imam Bukhari, other Muslim organisations like 
the Islamic Council of India, consisting of religious leaders and 
ulemas (priests) and the Quami Mushwarat Committee, a largely 
politically active group also committed their support. There were 
mixed responses to the 'Fatwa'. Singh was highly criticised for 
yielding to the demands and meek submission to the Muslim
44 In the Fatwa, the Imam criticised the 40 years of 
Congress rule for not catering to the needs of the minorities and 
hailed the sincere efforts made by the V.P.Singh government. He 
further exemplified that the NF government had worked for the 
betterment of the suffering, including Muslims. It had provided 
a sense of security to the minorities, showed respect for them 
by preserving the mosques, increased the compensation to the 
victims of communal riots, declared the Prophet's birthday as 
a national holiday and lastly V.P.Singh had sacrificed his 
government for secular values.
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leaders. Hindustan Times, a popular newspaper called it as the 
'Crowning Tragedy of V.P.Singh 45 .
However, the trend of support was evidently seen in a poll survey 
conducted a week prior to the elections by ORG for the Indian 
Express group of newspapers4 .^ It revealed that Muslims felt 
betrayed by Cong.I which had obtained 45% of the Muslim vote in 
the 198 9 general elections and the party had not improved its 
image amongst them. Though a high rate of unemployment, 
communalism and high cost of living were rated as the major 
national problems for Muslim voters, the main election issue, as 
stated by 59% of the respondents was Mandir - Masjid. 43% voted 
stability, 36% were for social justice and 23% stated corruption. 
The strategy of social equity and justice marked a shift in the 
support by the Harijans and the backward communities for the JD 
and the alliance parties.
THE HARIJAN VOTE BANK
For the first time in 1991 the Cong. I h< Id over the Harijan 
(^larlier referred to as the untouchable^ 1’ Saai Athe
lowest strata of the Indian caste system^and now being
referred to as Dalits) vote bank was broken. These poor and 
downtrodden constitute a significant vote bank. Over the years 
Harijans had supported Congress. In 1977 (the elections after the 
'Emergency period of 1975-76), ^nd even in 1989, Harijans voted 
the Congress. But since then disenchantment had set in and
JD emerged as a strong contender with the strategy for the
45 Crowning Tragedy of V.P.Singh, The Observer of Business 
and Politics 3 May, 1991. It noted, 'This pathetic submission to 
the Imam over the question of his very doubtful support will go 
down as the crowning tragedy of V.P.Singh's political career. 
This easy compromise with obscurantism and opportunism from 
within the Muslim community lays bare the hollowness of his 
concern for their good.
A CL
The poll was conducted on 3011 respondents by 12 research 
executives and 36 interviewers.lt analyzed the Voting Perceptions 
of Muslims in 10 districts of UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, Haryana and 
New Delhi between 11-15 May, 1991.
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upliftment of the BCs, even displacing the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP), that had been the main supporter of the Backward and the 
Harijan communities. Kanshi Ram, leader of the BSP called JD its 
'biggest enemy' in trying 'to divide and mislead the poor and the 
downtrodden through hollow slogans of restructuring society' . At 
a political rally at the Boat Club in New Delhi, Kanshi Ram 
reiterated the need for social change and economic emancipation 
as the only way to improve the backward communities and undertook 
a 100 day cross-country mass awareness drive on the 'movement for 
social change and economic emancipation'47. However, the JD's 
message of reservation and social equity was far reaching.
JD leaders were convinced that they had the most powerful message 
for the country. They brought out statistics to confirm their 
unbeatable combination by making a pitch for the SCs, BCs, STs^ 
the minorities and the economically weaker sections.
However^ during the elections, except in Bihar, the JD/NF were 
unable to get i any significant votes. The numerical strength 
of these classes was highest in Bihar, comprising nearly 40% 
of the population. The popularity of the Chief Minister Laloo 
Prasad Yadav had overpowered all other groups during the 
elections, resulting in JD securing the maximum seats in Bihar 
but was nearly routed in all other states.
THE MIDDLE CLASS VOTE BANK
A reverse trend in the support for JD was seen by the middle 
classes during the 1991^^.|ctions. In 1989, a very large segment 
of the middle class convinced that V.P. Singh represented
the true and capable non dynastic alternative to Rajiv Gandhi and 
the Cong.I to integrate diverse opposition forces. But in 1991 
they had retracted their support. According to political 
commentators and opinion polls, a section of the middle-class had 
moved closer to the BJP, while a smaller segment had comqback 
to the Cong.I.
47The Statesman. Calcutta, 8 May, 1991.
The middle classes grew after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 
1980. She had initiated the process of liberalisation later taken 
up by Rajiv Gandhi. The Cong.I addressed its manifesto to this 
class with policies of liberalisation and privatisation. It was 
assumed that a section this class would prefer 'Stability'. 
Hence, it was not far off the block when a section of the middle 
class had come back into the Congress fold to protect its 
position economically.
A section of the middle class, with roots in the traditional 
Brahmanical mode of life, had always been conservative in their 
attitudes. Being anti Cong.I this class was opposed to Mahatma 
Gandhi, Nehru and later Rajiv Gandhi. With the overall economic 
expansion and general growth of the middle class, the BJP had 
been able to root itself more firmly in this section and it was 
not surprising that the opinion polls of this section were 
showing a swing in favour of the BJP.
The third category is of the neo-rich OBCs in the rural areas, 
particularly in the north. While the middle-caste middle class 
had identified their aspirations with V.P.Singh, it was not clear 
whether they would vote as one block. Therefore the middle class 
vote was split in three ways.
Going by the size of the middle classes and its larger influence 
over the socio political attitudes in the society, it came to 
play a decisive role in the political system. To win back the 
middle and the upper classes who were otherwise alienated, Singh 
included the economic backwardness into the framework of the 
equity issue. By setting the national agenda on the issue of 
equality and sheer numbers, they believed that the force of the 
issue could not be ignored. V.P.Singh referred to the Mandai^as 
a historical process which could not be stopped and the process
A O
of integrating and uniting had to continue .
Newstime. Hyderabad. 15 May, 1991.
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/THE POLL ANALYSIS
The strength of JD slid from 143 in 1989 to 56 in 1991. With its
pledge for reservations it polled 23.6 million, or 8.78% of the
votes. There was a drop of 6.06 percentage points, (From 17.66%
in 1989 to 11.6% in 1991) in the party's popularity which
nosedived in 13 states and four union territories, but gained in
five states. Two thirds of the seats won were from the states of
Bihar (28), UP(22) and Orissa(6). In Bihar, the Chief Minister
Laloo Prasad Yadav and V.P.Singh counted 15 more seats with the
allies. The fragmentation of the JD in 1991 helped the BJP to
4  Qoccupy the centre stage of opposition politics in 1991^ .
FIFURE III.3 JD/NF PARTY PERFORMANCE (1977-1991)
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SUMMARY
In the 1989 elections, the NF was the frontrunner to an electoral 
victory and in 1991 barely eighteen months later it ended up an 
insignificant third. In^l991 elections, V.P.Singh started with 
confidence with the Mandal issue, undeterred by the fall oJ^NF 
government. The campaigns focused on their commitment to the BCs 
and minorities to provide the much needed stability for the 
country. Many factors led to the party failing at the polls.
In 1989, the electorate irrespective of caste, religion or social 
structure was united in its support for non-Cong.I parties. In 
1991, the electorate was categorised into various vote banks from 
which JD gained from the Muslims and the BCs, but with the middle 
classes there was a reverse trend. Though the message was 
powerful, it was not able to regain power.
Unlike the BJP and Cong. I, NF lacked the finances for a large 
scale campaign to spread their electoral messages. Second, it had 
also lost the support of the media, an important factor in public 
opinion.
Reviewing the election losses, JD/NF leaders were subjected to 
heavy criticism for the inept handling of the Mandal issue during 
the election. The National Executive of the party reviewed the 
failure and resolved to intensify their commitment for the cause 
of social justice. According to Jaipal Reddy, JD was determined 
to make up for the losses by intensifying its commitment to 
secularism, social justice and implementation of all the aspects 
of the MCR50.
c 0
Cracks m  JD over Mandal. Deccan Chronicle, Hyderabad,
30 June, 1991.
SECTION IV
STUDY OF TELUGU DESAM PARTY ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The TDP for a period between 1983-89 was a major political force 
in AP under the leadership of film personality turned politician 
Nandamuri Tarakarama Rao (NTR). During the 1991 elections, TDP 
emerged as the major support group for the NF, with NTR as the 
Chairman. At the same time the party tried to regain power in the 
state on the alleged failure of Cong. I government. In this 
section we discuss the rise of NTR as ’ * a major force in 
regional politics of AP, and the techniques used by TDP during 
the election campaign.
NTR AND THE REGIONAL POLITICS OF ANDHRA PRADESH:
As one of the most successful film personalities of Telugu films, 
NTRs popularity spanned over three decades. He had played a 
variety of roles; romantic, tragic and mythological, all of which 
had endeared him to the crowds. As a politician, he started the 
TDP in 1982, and in the following 1983 assembly elections was 
sworn in as the Chief Minister of AP. Through a well orchestrated 
strategy with the support of media baron Ch.Ramoji Rao of the 
Ushodaya Publications and the arousal of the upper caste
Kamma community, he mobilized and motivated people across caste 
and class barriers on issues of preserving the spirit, self 
esteem and honour of the Telugus while accusing Cong.I on 
charges of muscle power, corruption and misrule.
NTR had brought in an awakening among the people. He coined a 
new slogan 'Samajame devalyam prajawade devudu, (Society is my 
temple, People my Gods) which became as great a hit as 'Garibi 
Hatao' of Indira Gandhi51.
NTR's popularity grew with the masses with the introduction of 
special schemes for the poor like the Rs.2.00 (£0.04) per
51The Hindustan Times. New Delhi 12 May 1991
kilogram of rice, distribution of clothes for the poor and the 
increase in pension for the aged, which were well publicised and 
won him votes. During his six year rule, NTR brought in major 
reforms in the administration at the village and district levels.
As chief minister he promised to serve the state by taking only 
Re.1.00 (£.02) as a token salary, which far outweighed the huge 
expenses incurred by the government for building and maintaining 
his houses within and outside the city. During his tenure as the 
chief minister, several stories of his working schedules and
reduced his credibility as the chief minister. In tt 
elections, TDP was defeated in the state assembly, and in the 
parliamentary elections, their majority was reduced from 30 to 
only two.
In 1991, the TDP was on a comeback trail. NTR toured the state 
in his Chaitanya Ratham (election caravan) urging people to 
support TDP and throw out the Cong.I5 .^ A political drama 
unfolded in AP exemplifying the extent to which leaders and 
parties go to woo the electorate. After the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi, the state witnessed wide spread violence and 
destruction of properties of TDP and other parties, allegedly by 
the Cong.I miscreants. NTR went on an indefinite silent hunger 
strike to protest against the violence and demanded compensation 
for the affected victims. It was seen as a gimmick by the Cong. I, 
to counteract the sympathy that would arise for Cong.I. An 
editorial stated ' NTR is notorious for indulging in gimmicks and 
stunts. He wins not by great arguments or principles and 
ideology, but by his style and histrionics'5 .^
The 1991 results clearly revealed two diverse trends in the 
fortunes of TDP and Cong. I. In the elections held before the
52 'n t r Campaign Tour', Financial Express. Bombay. 9 May,
eccentric ways were . common/ :—  . ‘ . The populist
1991
5  ^Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad. 26 June, 1991.
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assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, TDP and its allies of NF won 13 
of the 17 seats. Its allies CPI and CPM gained one seat each 
achieving a success rate of 71.43%. and in the second phase, they 
were completely overshadowed by the Cong.I which won 20 of the 
24 seats. It was claimed that the sympathy factor did the 
trick 54.
THE PARTY IDEOLOGY, ISSUES AND ORGANISATION
TDP does not have any particular political ideology through which 
it functions, but the emphasis was mainly placed on the need ' to 
save the honour, self respect and esteem of the Telugus'. Even 
after winning the state elections in 1983, the party did not 
develop any clear cut policies on any issues. Anti-Congressism 
was the hallmark of NTR's politics55. Though NTR brought in 
several changes in the administration, the changes were not 
systematic and the erratic schemes were not conducive to build 
the party on an ideological base.
During elections, the party functioned through a four tier 
decentralised system : the village committees, Mandals, district 
committees and the state executive. The network of office bearers 
at all these levels, elected every two years were intensely 
involved in the election campaign. Regular feed back was 
monitored in order to gauge the public reactions towards the 
party. The party contested 34 of the 42 seats and left the others 
to its allies, CPI, CPM, and JD.
THE 1991 CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
As the party was in coalition with NF, the issues were two fold - 
the national and local. National issues stressed the 
implementation of the MCR and to oppose the BJP's Mandir-Masjid 
issue. In AP, TN and other south Indian states the system of 
reservation for the BCs and Scheduled Castes (SCs) was already 
existent and nearly 40% of places are reserved in the government
54The Hindu. Madras, 17 May, 1991
55The Hindustan Times. New Delhi 12 May, 1991.
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and educational institutions,^the Mandal appeal had little power 
in AP in contrast to the northern states. Hence, the campaign 
stressed local issues and attacked Cong.I on issues such as - the 
poor performance of government, charges of corruption, frequent 
changing of chief ministers in the state and communal riots that 
had worsened the law and order situation. The campaign strategy 
was to highlight the achievements of the TDP and failures of 
Cong.I with statistics to support.
The TDP's election campaign is discussed in two phases, 
strategies before and after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. 
The pre assassination campaign was planned to redirect and 
convince the voters on the capacity and integrity of TDP compared 
to the Cong. I and to develop a positive image which had been 
reduced due to party failures.
A multi-media approach through the various mass and interpersonal 
channels were used with NTR as the star campaigner55. 
Innovative methods were developed by the party to woo the masses. 
Newspapers, posters, hoardings, and audio cassettes were used 
along with documentary, commercial and video films for 
publicising the TDP message. The main streets in AP had huge cut­
outs of NTR in the guise of Indian gods and mythological 
characters he portrayed on the silver screen.
PUBLIC MEETINGS
NTR launched the TDP campaign attacking the Cong.I and the 
Chandrashekhar government at a public meeting at Annaparthy 25 
km from Rajamundhry in East Godavari district. He blamed Cong.I 
for engineering defections and dethroning minority governments 
at the centre. NTR called the 1991 elections an acid test between
55Interview with N. Chandrababu Naidu, second son-in-law of
NTR, Secretary and spokesperson for TDP.
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the TDP's 'progressive' policies and the anti-national measures 
of Cong.I government in the state^7.
During electioneering, the charisma of 67 year old NTR continued 
to enamour the masses. It was reported that no single AP leader 
could match his super star gimmicks and skill in oratory and his
C  Q
direct approach developed a big rapport with the electorate^ . 
In his election speeches, NTR ridiculed the stability plank of 
the Cong.I as the most destabilising factor, resulting in 
chaos in the state, communal riots and loss of lives. NTR accused 
the Cong.I for reducing value based politics to money and muscle 
power which he claimed were the main causes of TDP defeat in 
198959.
FILMS AS MEDIUM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Films were an important form of election communication for the 
TDP. Feature, documentary and video films were used to reach the 
urban and rural masses. Banking on his popularity as a film star, 
feature films were used as election techniques to influence the 
voters. One such much publicised film was ' Bhrahmarishi 
Vishwamitra'. The story of the life, teachings and divine power 
of the great sage who created a 'Trishanku Swargam' (Special 
Heaven)60.
To counter attack NTR, Cong.I made two films 'Kaliyuga
’ *v
Vishwamitra' (Present day Vishamitra) and 'GandipetaA*
Rahasyam'(Gandipeta, the area where NTR lived Rahasyam meaning
57The Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad, 15 May, 1991.
The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 17 June, 1991.
59 Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad. 15 June, 1991.
The film released before the elections was aimed to 
project the cause of equality, but NTR emphatically stated that 
it was only a reminder of Indian tradition emphasising the need 
for a casteless society without any disparities. Interview with 
NTR by Ashok Das in The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 12 May, 1991.
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the secret/inside story) . Both these movies showed the 
irregularities when NTR was Chief Minister. A popular pro Cong.I 
actor Krishna appealed to the masses to throw NTR out of power.
DOCUMENTARY FILMS
TDP was the only party that used ten to fifteen minute 
documentaries exemplifying the qualities of the leader and the 
achievements made by the party during 1983-89. About 300 prints 
were shown in selected cinemas along with feature films all over 
the state.
VIDEO-ON-WHEELS
NTR put a fleet of 23 VOWS called the 'Vishwamitra Prachara 
Rathams' to spread the TDP message. The exterior of these vans 
displayed huge hoardings of NTR as Lord Krishna blowing the conch 
shell and NTRs son Balkrishna, an actor himself as Harishchandra 
(the embodiment of truth) . Cultural troupes accompanied each van, 
the video and audio equipment showing the clips of the movies and 
songs, the strategy being, 'first to entertain and then to 
inform'. The party also released four to five audio cassettes of 
NTR's speeches and party songs, highlighting the characteristics 
and achievements of the party.
TDP not only used video films for promoting the image of the 
party but also used them for exposing the destruction allegedly 
caused by the Cong. I miscreants after the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi.
POSTERS AND CUT-OUTS
Posters of NTR and the symbol of the 'Bicycle' were widely 
displayed on walls and kiosks. Apart from the posters, large 
cardboard cutouts of NTR were found in major cities. TDP was one 
of the pioneers in the introduction and use of these cutouts 
which had become controversial in the 1989 elections when the 
party had put up large cutouts of NTR in the guise of gods.
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Earlier NTR's election to the assembly was challenged on the 
basis of his huge cutouts in the guise of gods. Cong. I complained 
to the EC against NTR and TDP for violating the code of conduct, 
by appealing to the religious sentiments, which was an act of 
corrupt practice under section 123 of the Representation of the 
People's Act and asked for their removal. However, the Supreme 
Court verdict held that the use of such cutouts did not amount 
to a corrupt practice and the petition was dismissed**1 . This 
enabled other political parties and campaign managers to 
incorporate religious references in their political campaigns 
especially in the audio-visual media. In 1991 most political 
parties, especially the BJP used religious references in the 
election campaign in mobilising the electorate.
DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNS
The network of party workers were continuously involved in door- 
to-door campaigning at the village and district levels. The party 
workers were directed to persuade voters and maintain a regular 
feedback. At the end of the first phase of campaigning, the party 
through its informal feed back systems was confident of gaining 
30 to 35 seats*’2 . It was felt that the party would regain the 
support of the masses and NTR hoped to win back the 30 seats as
The verdict stated that 'reference to the Prophet or 
other religious heads or deities or their qualities and their 
deeds did not necessarily mean an appeal has been made to the 
religious sentiments of the electorate. According to the 
judgement, Section 123 was not intended to prevent appeals on the 
picturesque or metaphorical language that drew analogies from 
mythology, religion or folk lore. When most of the voters are 
illiterate, the candidate or his agent can attract and enthuse 
the audience or drive home a point only by parables, similes and 
metaphors drawn particularly from the religious lore which most 
people understand and appreciate. However a distinction must be 
made between canvassing on grounds of religion and seeking votes 
on graphic or picturesque language and with analogies drawn from 
religious lore'.
62 Interview with N .Chandrababu Naidu, Spokesperson for TDP. 
Also. Financial Express. Bombay, 12 May, 1991.
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it had in 19846^ . However, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
changed the fortunes of TDP.
AP AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV GANDHI
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi led to a spate of violence, 
arson and destruction of property throughout AP. The Indian army 
was called in to control the situation. Mobs resorted to arson 
and looting with curfew being imposed in many towns64. It was 
alleged that Cong.I supporters through a planned strategy 
attacked specified targets including supporters, properties and 
campaign material of non Cong.I parties. These included cinema 
houses (three cinemas of NTR himself were burnt down), business 
establishments, factories, vehicles, party offices and houses.
The party representatives of CPI, CPM and JD along with TDP 
submitted a memorandum to the Governor demanding the resignation 
of the state government for its failure to curb the violence, a 
judicial enquiry by a Supreme Court judge and compensation for 
looted property. The memorandum stated that 'Hyderabad and many 
towns became the targets of violence as the attacks were incited 
and engineered by Cong.I in collusion with the anti-social 
elements as none of the Cong.I leaders were either attacked or 
their properties destroyed. The most condemnable aspect of the 
devastation was that while attacking minorities and vulnerable 
sections, the miscreants purposely destroyed flags, flag posts, 
cutouts, posters and banners displayed by the opposition 
parties' 65.
A video film (another political use of video film) showed the 
extent of destruction of property and attacks on leaders. 
Doctors, lawyers and many injured women supported their case.
6  ^ The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 12 May, 1991.
CA , . . .
a Reports m  Deccan Chronicle. Newstime and The Hindu. 23 
May, 1991
65_Official Probe into AP violence. The Hindu. Hyderabad, 
30 May, 1991.
Jaipal Reddy, spokesperson for the JD, said that 'property worth 
Rs.300 million (£150,000) was destroyed by the well orchestrated 
gang that sprang into its well directed operation within three 
hours of the death of Rajiv Gandhi'66. The non-response from 
the Cong.I government in power led to an indefinite hunger strike 
by NTR.
NTR ON INDEFINITE HUNGER STRIKE
A political drama unfolded when 67 year old NTR started an 
indefinite 'Mauna Vratam' (Silent Hunger Strike) from 30 May, 
1991. Dressed in his saffron attire and sitting on a deer skin, 
an earthen pot of water and a desk, NTR communicated with people 
through written notes. V.P.Singh and other prominent NF leaders 
visited him to show their solidarity. While Eenadu and Newstime 
supported NTR, the Cong.I supported newspapers delighted in 
reporting the incident as a political manoeuvre on how NTR was 
secretly having coconut water, chicken soup and 'Electral' (an 
energizer). Cong.I accused NTR of trying to acquire political 
mileage and to get compensation for his theatres and 
property67.
After six days of hunger strike, the ruling Cong.I government, 
fearing his failing health ordered him to be moved to the 
hospital through a court order on a case of 'Attempted suicide'. 
Police forcibly moved him to the hospital and much against his 
will, he was injected with glucose66. Within hours after he 
left the hospital he climbed atop his 'Chaitanya Ratham' and 
resumed electioneering in his fasting attire for the second phase 
of the election campaign. The saffron clad, bare chested NTR with 
an overgrown beard addressed impromptu meetings demanding justice 
from people. A video film exposed the destruction caused by the 
violence.
66 As expressed in the video film made by TDP before the 
second round of elections.
67 The Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad, 27 May, 1991 
66 The Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad 5 June 1991.
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VIDEO FILM IN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ELECTIONS
The video film showed areas of AP where extensive damage was 
caused to people and property. During the alleged planned 
attacks, women and children were not spared, as women crying with 
bandages on their hands and heads accused Cong.I men who pulled 
them out of their houses, beat them up and snatched their neck 
chains. Doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers and party workers of BJP, 
TDP and Communist parties were personally attacked. A CPM leader 
alleged that the houses of leaders were broken into and household 
goods such as TVs, VCRs, scooters and cycles were destroyed 
despite the women's pleas.
The film justified NTR's fast to protest against such atrocities, 
projecting him as a saviour of the poor and to demand justice. 
Citing the failure of the Cong.I, the film urged the people to 
vote for TDP. NTR and the party leaders were confident of winning 
at least 30 seats, and claimed not to be perturbed by the 
sympathy wave citing the 1984 LS elections, when the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi did not effect the TDP gains.
ELECTION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In the first phase there was a marked swing towards TDP. Cong.I 
was routed in the four coastal districts of East and West 
Godavari, Krishna and Guntur districts, where elections were held 
on 20 May, 1991. The TDP executive felt that the real verdict of 
the party was in its favour as it won 12 of the 17 seats (Fig 
III.3) and its allies CPI and CPM had won one seat each. In the
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second phase, TDP could not stand the sympathy wave for the 
Cong.I and won only one seat in the second phase.
TABLE III.1 PARTY POSITION IN 1989 AND 1991
Political
Pkrty
No of 
seats 
contest 
ed in 
1991
Seats 
won in 
1989
%Vote
share
1989
Seats
won
in
1991
% of
vote
share
in
1991
Success 
Rate in 
1991
Cong.I 41 39 51.0 24 45 . 83 58 .45
TDP 34 2 34 .45 13 33 .22 35 .29
BJP 40 - 1 . 97 1 9 . 64 8.4
CPI 3 - 1 . 96 1 2 .11 33.33
CPM 2 _ 2 .40 1 2 .57 50.0
MIM 1 - 1 1.76 100.00
1991.
As in table III.l, In 1991, TDP contesting 34 of the 41 seats 
polled 33.22% of the votes. In 1989 the party had won only two 
seats of the 33 that it contested but polled 34.45% of votes.
FIGURE. III.4 TDP: PARTY PERFORMANCE
1991)
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Source: Arun Kumar (1991) The Tenth Round - Story of. Indian 
Elections. PTI.
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TDP General Secretary Chandrababu Naidu accused Cong.I of 
indulging in booth capturing and rigging supervised by the 
Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and ministers. He 
charged Cong.I of colluding with the administration and the 
police. Repoll was ordered in many polling stations in AP.
SUMMARY
In the 1991 elections the TDP tried to regain its image and power 
by focusing on the national and regional issues. The campaign 
stressed the party's achievements and attacked the alleged poor 
functioning of Cong.I government in the state. The party used 
films and techniques of mass and traditional forms to influence 
the electorate. NTR astride his publicity van, braved the heat 
of summer and toured the state urging the people to support the 
party. Even after a six day fast, he continued to hold election 
meetings for the second phase of polls.
The audio-visual media, especially films; feature, documentary 
and video, were extensively used by the party to entertain first 
and inform later. The network of campaign workers were monitored 
to get a regular feedback. The party was confident of reasserting 
their power in the state. By increasing their strength from two 
to 13, TDP had regained some of their image and popularity with 
the people, but could not withstand the sympathy wave for Cong. I. 
Once again the Andhra electorate had shown solidarity with the 
Cong.I.
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SECTION V
STUDY OF THE MAJLIS - ITTEHADUL MUSLIMEEN (MIM) ELECTION CAMPAIGN
MIM (League for the unity of Muslims) symbolises the 
traditionalist urban political identity of Muslims in Hyderabad. 
It is a classic example of exclusive Muslim politics in India 
confined to the urban pockets of the 400 year old city of 
Hyderabad (Khan, 1979). Since its formation in 1957, the party 
has played a significant role in a largely Congress dominated 
state.
In the present section we give a perspective on MIM and the 
Muslim politics of Hyderabad, which has continued to nurture 
insecurities felt by the minorities, especially Muslims for long 
term political gains. We evaluate the techniques used by the 
party to mobilize support during elections through an undisputed 
leadership of the party which has had negligible dissidence.
HYDERABAD- A SOCIOLOGICAL SETTING
Until recently Hyderabad, capital of the former princely state 
exhibited communal tolerance. However, in the past decade 
cultural, religious, social and economic factors besides 
political manoeuvring have led to frequent communal riots, making 
it one of the most communally sensitive constituencies in the 
state.
Hyderabad is the largest parliamentary constituency in AP with 
more than 1.9 million voters, dominated by Muslims. In Hyderabad 
this majority assumes exceptional significance as the Muslims are 
highly politicised and thus command a decisive position in terms 
of electoral fortunes in the parliamentary constituency. Within 
the ecological framework, the electoral support comes from a 
critical Muslim electorate concentrated in the old city around 
Charminar, south of Hyderabad. There is greater congestion, lack 
of industrial infrastructure, and are less benefitted in terms 
of civic amenities.
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This setting coordinates with religious loyalty as there is 
little interaction between the communities, and now a communal 
colour is given to any national or local event. This has led to 
regular communal riots in the city, and Hyderabad along with 
other cities with large Muslim populations like Meerut, Aligarh 
and Lucknow has been constantly fected by communal crisis which 
has reduced its earlier characteristic of communal tolerance. In 
December 1990, Hyderabad witnessed one of the worst communal 
riots and during the 1991 elections there was intense communal 
tension with heavy police patrols in the old city and adjoining 
areas.
ORIGINS OF THE MIM PARTY
MIM originated as the Majlis-e Ittehadul-e-Baimul Muslimeen that 
was formed to maintain unity among the different Muslim sects. 
It was formally organised by religious leaders in the 1930s under 
the leadership of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung. Later, it assumed 
political dimensions, demanding the creation of an independent 
Hyderabad State to maintain the sovereignty and dignity of the 
Nizam, advise the government and preserve the political interests 
of the Muslim community. But these objectives were not realised. 
With the death of Bahadur Yar Jung in 1944, the leadership was 
taken up by Kasim Rizvi, a passionate leader who organised the 
anti Hindu 'Razakars', a paramilitary wing of the Majlis. The 
excesses of the 'Razakar movement' during which several Hindus 
were executed, le d to 'Police Action' ordered by the Indian 
Government to control law and order in the state until the Nizam 
surrendered to the Indian Government on 12 September, 1948. 
Leaders including Rizvi were arrested and this militant phase led 
to a near eclipse of the Majlis from the political arena for nine 
years. Until 1957, Muslims were in . disarray, their political 
behaviour in the 1952 and 1957 elections was anti - Congress, with 
support for Congress only in the absence of a Muslim candidate.
In 1957, Kasim Rizvi was released and before his departure to 
Pakistan he nominated Abdul Waheed Owaisi, a prominent local 
advocate as his successor. A learned man, well versed in Islamic
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history, Owaisi rejenuvated the organisation through religious 
meetings in mosques (Islamic Fairs), urging the constitutional 
need for Muslims to participate in politics while remaining 
peaceful and united. Efforts were made to stabilize the economic 
position and get a fair share of employment. In 1958, the party 
developed a new constitution, as the 'Majlis-Ittehadul- 
Muslimeem'(MIM), to improve the conditions of Muslims. It entered 
into the political framework in order to realize the social, 
political, religious and economic objectives by establishing 
itself as a communal political force.
Over the years, the party has shown concern for the need of 
reservation of seats for the Muslims in public institutions and 
provide a definite status for the Urdu language. Importance is 
given for the development of Muslim women whose support for the 
MIM has been high. Efforts are made to bring the minorities into 
the mainstream of Indian social system, who, the party claims 
have long been neglected since Independence.^9
THE LEADERSHIP
The history of the revived Majlis from 1957 onwards has been 
dominated by the political life and fortunes of the Owaisi 
family, who have developed and nurtured the party for over four 
decades. The leadership of the party has had a considerable 
effect on the organization, development and sustenance of Muslim 
politics in Hyderabad along with the favourable sociological 
setting within which it functions. Moulvi Abdul Waheed Owaisi as 
the first president made his office the command centre and 
discouraged defections and rivals. In March 1958 he passed on the 
Presidentship to his son, Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi who has since 
been in command of the party.
69 Interview with MIM leader Salahuddin Owaisi, Hyderabad, 
20 June, 1991.
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Owaisi, an overpowering personality, over six feet tall is called 
as 'Salar'(Leader), and is considered a popular 
philanthropist7®. The party under his leadership has undertaken 
several schemes to help the Muslim communities at the local 
level. It has prioritized education as a primary need for the 
development of Muslims and through Trusts run several educational 
institutions including a medical and engineering college.
There has not been any noteworthy internal crisis or dissidence 
among members. No new leader has been produced, and Owaisi has 
emerged as the messiah of the Hyderabad Muslims, whose faith in 
him and the party has remained undiminished. In the Ayodhya-Babri 
Masjid controversy Owaisi was appointed as the chairman of the 
Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) to counter attack the BJP 
mission of building the temple at Ayodhya. During the election 
campaign the BJP had taken up j. this issue to attack the MIM.
Owaisi had never lost an election, from his first electoral 
victory for the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) , in 1960 
he has controlled the local politics of Hyderabad. He was the MLA 
for five consecutive terms before being elected to the LS in 
1984. In three successive LS elections he has defeated candidates 
from the major political parties; Cong. I, TDP and in the 1991 
election he defeated the BJP candidate Baddam Bal Reddy by a 
narrow margin of 4.01% votes.
PARTY IDEOLOGY AND ELECTION STRATEGY
The party has no definite ideology but draws its inspiration from 
the Quoranic injunctions proclaiming Muslims as pioneers for the 
establishment of a just and pious society (Khan, 1979) . Efforts 
are directed towards the preservation of Islam under unfavourable 
conditions in India. The party has constantly related itself 
towards the development of the minorities for their 
constitutional rights and the non interference of Congress in 
their personal laws.
7® Interview with Dr.M.A.Ahmed, Director, Darul Muarif, 
Osmania Unuversity, Trustee, Darulsalam Education Trust.
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The party not only appealed to Muslims but also the Harijans, as 
the party had long served their development in the poorer 
localities of Hyderabad. The three Mayors, nominated by the MIM 
after the Municipal elections were Harijans. This has helped in 
neutralizing the religious sentiments and obtaining the support 
from the Harijans. Owaisi criticised the Brahmin dominated rule 
in the country and though he supported V.P.Singh on the MCR on 
reservation, MIM did not have any alliances nor did it support 
any other party.
During elections MIM attacked Cong.I, blaming it as a corrupt
party, responsible for the unstable economic and social
conditions of the country, and was now projecting the need for
stability of the country. Campaign issues related to everyday
affairs like law and order, rising prices and day to day problems
of light, water, electricity and shortage of food71. Stress was
laid on the need to rectify the decreasing minority
representation of the Muslims in many organisations and bring
about proportional representation in the government and other
. r/iwrJUff
sectors. As the percentage of Muslinr uad reduced from 30 at the 
time of independence to only 1.5. Now there was a growing feeling 
of insecurity with the rise of BJP and an even greater need for 
Muslim representation in the government72.
ORGANISATION OF THE PARTY DURING ELECTIONS
A unique and important feature of MIM is the organizational 
network and decentralised functioning with a single leadership 
of Owaisi at the apex. The network starts at the level of the 
election booths. The LS constituency is divided into seven 
assembly segments, each assembly segment comprising of ten or 
more wards which are subdivided into localities. The polling 
stations are identified in the localities with 1000-1500 voters. 
Members are recruited from these localities and elections are 
conducted to appoint a president, secretary and treasurer. These
71 Financial Express. Bombay, 9 May, 1991.
72 Interview with Owaisi. 20 June, 1991.
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units called 'Primaries' are responsible for working with the 
people in the localities - making voters lists and mobilising 
support for the party through house-to-house contacts.
The Primaries are again represented in the wards, and similar 
elections take place for the office bearers. The elected 
presidents of the wards are represented to the Central Executive 
which works under the leadership of Owaisi. Several leaders act 
as functionaries of the party, but none have been recognised in 
the leadership hierarchy. This enables the party to function in 
a highly decentralised manner with efficient feedback systems. 
Organisational functions in the MIM circles assume importance 
only during elections when the office bearers are called to 
mobilize the electorate in the absence of sophisticated campaign 
machinery.
THE 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The MIM campaign was geared towards the mobilization of support 
through the system of mass contact - public meetings, rallies and 
leader walkabouts. As an independent party, it claimed that lack 
of funds was an inhibiting factor in using any new 
technologies7-*.
Efforts were made to arouse the religious sentiments and the 
privileges of the minority communities of the communally 
polarised groups of Hindus and Muslims. Attack and counter attack 
strategies were adopted by BJP and MIM. While the BJP 
concentrated on the need for building the temple at Ayodhya and 
the uniform civil code, MIM stressed the local issues, the need 
for the development of the minorities in the city. The BJP 
alleged that the minorities were pampered by the government 
especially in the laws of marriage and children, to which the MIM 
had retaliated that the laws were common for all except for the 
personal law that they followed in certain matters only.
7-*Interview with Owaisi on 20 June, 1991.
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The MIM campaign urged Muslims to select its nominee to solve 
their problems with the community services rendered by the party. 
Owaisi cautioned the people of a conspiracy to defeat him as he 
was also the chairman of the BMAC. Through rational and emotional 
appeals Owaisi was projected as the 'Son of the soil' to restore 
the composite culture of Hyderabad. Owaisi stressed the need for 
industrial and economic development at the grassroots, as the 
country was not geared towards the development of poor and under 
privileged who continued to live without water, electricity, 
housing and educational facilities.
PUBLIC MEETINGS
As the main campaigner, Owaisi found public meetings the best 
means of interacting with people for acquiring support, 
maintaining rapport and close coordination with people. It was 
also effective as a large sections of the target groups were 
illiterate and the Urdu newspapers reached a small percent of the 
target electorate.
The campaign schedule during the election period, comprised of 
daily feedback sessions on the trends of support from the 
representatives of the constituencies held at the party office 
between 10.00 am and 1.00 pm. Issues depended on the problems, 
both general and specific that needed to be clarified. 
Thereafter, in the afternoons and evenings, Owaisi addressed 
seven to eight public meetings in various areas some along with 
the MLAs belonging to the party. This routine was followed 
between 21 April and 17 May, 1991 until three days before the 
election on 20 May 1991. Along with election meetings, walkabouts 
were organised in those areas which needed intensive campaigning.
OUTDOOR MEDIA
While Owaisi stressed the need to establish rapport with the 
people; the newspaper advertisements, campaign material like the 
posters, pamphlets, audio cassettes and symbol displays were 
published and prepared by party well wishers and activists who
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collected donations and spent money on these promotional 
activities. MIM symbol of 'scales' was extensively displayed in 
the old city of Hyderabad and neighbouring areas. The symbols 
were illuminated or decorated with tinsel. Along with posters and 
symbol displays, over 20 feet large cutouts of Owaisi were 
displayed near Charminar and at other strategic locations in the 
city.
Another way of reaching the masses was the Bandwagon technique 
of campaigning. Dozens of cars with the party flags and loud 
speakers crisscrossed every street and locality of the 
constituency informing the people of the election date and urging 
them to vote for the party. The cassettes with speeches of the 
party leaders added to the electioneering in the old city.
DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNS
The party depended on the support of a network of workers who 
campaigned vigorously and urged the people, especially women to 
show solidarity with the Muslim community as the growing 
popularity of the BJP was a threat to their community. This 
system of campaigning was successful. Despite the conservative 
attitude of a majority of the Muslim women, there was a large 
voter turnout of 46%.
THE ELECTION ANALYSIS
In the 1991 elections, though there were four major parties: 
Cong.I, BJP, MIM and TDP, the challenge was between the BJP and 
the MIM. Both parties played the communal card from which the MIM 
emerged victorious. In 1991, Hyderabad recorded the largest voter 
turnout in the country with 77.12%. However the elections in the 
constituency were marred by alleged impersonation, rigging and 
violence. Repoll was ordered in many polling stations74. The 
results were withheld as about 200 booths had recorded more than
74 Deccan Chronicle. Hyderabad, 22 May, 1991.
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90% polling 7^ . BJP alleged that MIM was involved in large 
scale rigging and impersonation when four polling stations had 
recorded 100% voting and in 181 booths there was over 90% 
voting7^ .
However, despite the irregularities and the alleged rigging, the 
MIM candidate, Owaisi was declared the winner by 45,314 votes 
after the result was withheld for three days. Though Owaisi 
retained his parliamentary seat, the party had lost its 
stronghold in the city with BJP counteracting on religious 
grounds polarising the electorate who gained large support from 
the Hindus, especially the Marwaris, the business communities. 
The communal fires, ignited during the elections between the BJP 
and the MIM would go a long way in shaping the future political 
scene in Hyderabad.
SUMMARY
MIM, as an independent party, with religious leanings has 
dominated the urban politics of the capital city of Hyderabad in 
AP. The large concentration of the Muslim population from an 
erstwhile princely state of the Nizam, along with the economic 
and cultural factors and undisputed leadership contributed to its 
success as a major political force. It is an example of the three 
systems of political polarisation that can be observed in the 
state of AP. It has survived with the regional politics of the 
TDP and those of Congress.
These issues that the party projected were local, every day 
problems rather than raise national issues relating to Mandal or
75 It was found that in booth No.16 of Yakatpura 
constituency nearly 102% votes were cast, in Booth No, 145 of 
Charminar assembly where a total number of voters were 739, votes 
cast were 745, in Booth No. 68 the number of voters were 760 and 
the votes polled were 796, Booth No.141 votes polled were 649 as 
against the 638 voters and in Yakutpura it was observed that a 
fifth class girl was voting.
7  ^ Newstime. Hyderabad. 20 May, 1991 and Deccan Chronicle
Hyderabad, 20 May, 1991.
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Mandir. The issues nearer home became more relevant to the local 
communities. The party concentrated on interpersonal and group 
forms such as public meetings, walkabouts and rallies. The 
network of party activists working at the primary units mobilized 
the electorate through door-to-door campaigns. Posters, symbol 
displays and wall writings added to the festivities of the 
election scene. Moreover an effective organisation was essential 
for a small independent party to withstand the onslaught of the 
high powered campaign of the BJP.
Both the MIM and the BJP were reported to have indulged in 
widespread rigging which resulted in over 90% voting in many 
polling booths. Therefore, Hyderabad being a communally sensitive 
constituency, two communally oriented groups (Allah versus Ram) 
clashed in a closely contested electoral battle from which MIM 
emerged victorious, but with a small majority, the stiff 
opposition by the BJP would be threat to the political fortunes 
of the party in the next elections.
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SECTION VI
THE VOTER EDUCATION CAMPAIGN BY THE GOVERNMENT
Political communication became all pervasive during the 1991 
elections, when the government also launched a multi-media 
campaign to educate voters in the conduct of a ' free and fair 
poll'. Unlike most democracies, a campaign run by the government 
for creating political awareness was unique to India. The 
objectives of the campaign were to create greater awareness about 
the political process and increase voter participation. Further, 
emphasis was placed on the need for voters to exercise their 
franchise as citizens without being induced by any incentives 
from the political parties77.
The main organizations involved in the election process at the 
national and state level were, the Ministry of I & B, the Press 
Information Bureaus (PIBs), Information and Public Relations 
Departments at the national and state levels, the EC and the 
National Informatics Centre (NIC). All these were interlinked 
through a network to update on the developments and changes 
during the period of elections. The major information channels 
were the government controlled AIR and Doordarshan, films and 
posters. The EC issued advertisements in several national and 
regional newspapers, which highlighted several major points like: 
What is a corrupt practice during elections ? What is an 
electoral offence ? What is breach of official duty ?
ROLE OF THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER(CEC) AND CHIEF ELECTORAL 
OFFICERS (CEO)
Apart from the campaign, the CEC T.N.Seshan was regularly 
briefing the media on the latest developments on the electoral 
front in order to keep the public well informed about the changes 
in the conduct of elections. The role of CEC came under heavy
77 Interviews with CEC, T.N. Seshan, Mahesh Prasad, 
Secretary I & B Govt of India. Bimla Bhalla, Asst. Station 
Director, AIR, New Delhi. 20 & 21 April, 1991.
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criticism by the BJP and the other parties after the postponement 
of polls in Punjab and also during the second phase of the 
polling after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.
AIR AND DOORDARSHAN
Radio and TV were used extensively to inform and educate the 
voters. In Chapter II, we have discussed in detail the various 
election related programmes which included the PEB by the 
political parties at the national and the state levels and the 
voter education programmes. These special election broadcasts 
were divided into various categories which related to the stages 
of the election process. In the pre-election phase the programmes 
informed voters of the election dates, the need for registering 
as voters and the place to register. These were followed by 
information on the arrangements made on the polling day, the 
police arrangements for the polling days and measures taken for 
the safety of the polling booths and voters.
The other election programmes included discussions, interviews, 
question and answer sessions in the form of quizzes and 
commentaries. The general discussions held twice a week were 
between politicians, senior government officials like the Chief 
Secretary and DGP, journalists, academics and students. 
Interviews were held with the CEOs of the states and CEC at the 
national level. The electronic media were geared to the 
announcement of results through several news bulletins in 
English, Hindi and the regional languages in each state.
POSTERS
Posters were printed on three main issues; the need to vote as 
a citizen; second, to refrain from accepting any inducement 
whether in cash, kind or transport provided by the candidates to 
vote for particular parties, and third, to vote without fear for 
the party of their choice.
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The first poster with the headline, 'Your vote elects your 
government, Vote and strengthen your democracy' focused on two 
main issues: the importance of voting in a democracy and
motivated people to actually vote. The average level of voting 
during the LS and Assembly elections in the past was between 40- 
50%, and a large section of the urban and rural voters did not 
vote in the elections.
The second poster with the headline 'Do not accept any 
inducement, including transport provided by the candidate' warned 
voters not to accept the incentives provided by the political 
parties. During the elections, it was a common practice for 
political parties to take voters, especially those from the rural 
and semi urban areas in trucks, jeeps and other forms of 
transport to the polling station to vote for their party. This 
may be in addition to some kind of incentives in cash or kind 
(see Chapter VIII on public meetings).
The third poster headlined 'Vote without Fear' stressed the need 
for electors to vote without being deterred by external forces 
or threats from political parties. This was mainly to alleviate 
the fear of the expected violence during elections which had 
prevented many people from voting. This is not an uncommon 
practice that restrains many persons from voting. Despite such 
assurances, during the 1991 elections there were over 350 cases 
of elections related violence including murders, kidnapping and 
riots. These posters translated into local languages were 
displayed at all government offices, Mandals, Panchayat offices, 
community centres and other important and strategic locations in 
the cities, towns and villages.
FILMS
Government information departments made three films on elections 
to create greater awareness among the voters on the election 
process and clear some of the perceived misunderstandings of the
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electorate7®. The films were based on themes had titles like 
'You said it', 'Your choice', 'Duty bound' and 'Self Respect.' 
These 16 mm films were shown in the state Mandal headquarters, 
cinemas and in the village panchayats.
Despite the efforts made by political parties and government to 
increase voter participation the voter turnout in the country was 
only 51%, the second lowest since the first general election. 
This low turnout was also attributed to the hot weather 
conditions. For the first time elections were held in the summer.
SUMMARY
The objective of the government campaign was to educate the 
voters by providing details of the political process through very 
basic information from the schedule of the elections, the dates 
and the need for registration to information on political 
parties. It also sought to clear certain doubts and reduce the 
expected fears of violence during elections. Through posters and 
advertisements, the electors were persuaded to exercise their 
franchise without being influenced by political parties who gave 
incentives in cash or kind. Efforts were made to help people in 
their decision to vote through information on the mass media 
channels of radio and television, press, posters and films. The 
impact of these media in terms of recall and usefulness in 
decision making have been studied in later chapters.
7®Interview with one of the electoral officers of the 
government who did not want to be identified.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS, ATTITUDES TO THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS AND ACCESS TO MEDIA
Demographic conditions play an important role in not only 
characterizing the social life and behaviour of the individual 
but also in forming critical variables in communication and 
voting behaviour studies (Sir^ ijsjcar, 1965; Weiner, 1968; Varma & 
Narain, 1973; Eldersveld and Ahmed, 1975; Weiner, 1977; Morris 
Jones 1978,1987; Kar & Chaudary, 1992; Vakil, 1994).
Research in the field of voting behaviour conducted in the 
assembly and parliamentary constituencies has considered the 
support to a particular party with a number of socio-economic 
factors. These factors have included primordial influences, such 
as family and kinship, caste and community and the general 
factors of age, sex, education, class, income and rural-urban 
composition. In the last 30 years valuable research has been 
completed by various scholars on Indian voting behaviour.
During the 1991 elections, caste and religion were regarded by 
commentators as particularly important. Political parties 
selected candidates with this in view and incorporated caste and 
religious factors in the election campaigns. In this chapter, we 
report the political interest and attitudes to the political 
process with access and exposure to political communications in 
light of the Socio-Economic-Status (SES) of our respondents.
The chapter is divided into three parts: first, we analyze the 
SES of the electorate in terms of urbanisation, age, sex, 
education, occupation, income, household size, caste and 
religion. Second, we examine the political interest, awareness 
of current events and electoral process, attitudes to the 
political parties, leaders and government. Finally, we report the
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access and frequency of exposure to the media of communication 
and a brief review of the channels likely to be sought by the 
individuals for election information.
SECTION I
SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
THE SAMPLE ELECTORATE
As seen in Table IV.1, 42.9% of the sample electorate were from 
Hyderabad, an urban-rural constituency, 31.2% from Secunderabad, 
an urban constituency and 25.9%, from Nagarkurnool a totally 
rural constituency. The response rate in Hyderabad was much 
higher among the urban than the rural segments of the 
constituency.
TABLE IV. 1 CONSTITUENCY WISE DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONDENTS.
Constituency Number Percentage
Secunderabad 361 31.2
Hyderabad 495 42.9
Nagarkurnool 299 25.9
Total 1155 100.0
URBAN - RURAL DISTRIBUTION
Over 70% of Indians live in rural areas. Rural societies unlike 
urban are characterized by primary group control, personalization 
of relationships, dominance of traditions and conservatism. There 
is less occupational diversity and high group cohesiveness. Urban 
and rural areas also differ in education and media exposure and 
party communication techniques take account of this in forming 
their electoral strategies.
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TABLE IV.2 U R B A N - R U R A L  D I S T R I B U T I O N  BY
CONSTITUENCIES
Distrib
-ution
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool Total
N o,o N N % N %
Urban 361 100 463 93.8 - - 824 71.3
Rural - - 32 6.2 299 100 331 28.7
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100 1155 100
Table IV.2 shows 71.3% of respondents were from urban and 2 8.7% 
were from rural areas. Nagarkurnool was entirely rural and 
although Hyderabad had three rural assembly constituencies, the 
response rate was only 6.2% rendering the sample effectively 
urban. In Nagarkurnool, the delay in voting after the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi disrupted our schedule as 
interviewers were unable to complete the work due to their 
regular commitments. The urban bias in our overall sample could 
not be rectified as the data was not available from the Election 
Commission of India (see letter in Appendix - A).
GENDER WISE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS
TABLE IV. 3 GENDER WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS
Sex Actual Sample Weighted Sample
N O,'o N o .
Male 622 71.3 649 56.2
Female 250 28.7 506 43.8
Total 872 100 1155 100
Like most Indian studies on voting behaviour, the responses to 
our study was biased in favour of males. In our original sample, 
71.3% were men and 28.7% were women. In order to make the results 
more representative and avoid the obvious bias in the attitudes 
and opinions, we weighted according to the official voter turnout
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by the constituencies1 . Therefore the final weighted sample 
comprised of 1155 respondents; 56.2% men and 43.8% women. All 
subsequent tables are calculated on this weighted sample unless 
otherwise indicated.
AGE OF THE RESPONDENTS
Age may be important in terms of experience and maturity of 
judgement. The relationships between age and political behaviour 
have revealed that one becomes more conservative, politically 
more active and partisan with increase in age (Narain & Varma, 
1978; Butler & Stokes 1969; Ambedkar, 1992).
TABLE IV.4 AGE WISE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS
Age Group Number Percentage
18-25 278 24.0
26-35 440 38.2
36-45 225 19 .4
46-55 133 11.5
56-65 61 5.3
66 + 18 1.6
Total 1155
* 0
100
As table IV.4 indicates, over 80% of the sample were between 18- 
45 years, being born in the post-independent India. A quarter 
were young voters aged 18-25 years, over a third 38.2% were 26-35 
years and 19.4% were in the age group of 36-45 years. Only 18% 
were over 46 years. Though age did not vary with the sources of
1 Source: The Report of the Tenth General Election to the 
House of People 1991. (Statistical). Election Commission of 
India. New Delhi. In the three constituencies, the percentage of 
men voters was higher than women. In Secunderabad, 62.6% were 
males and 37.4% females, in Hyderabad 53.9% were male and 46.1% 
were female and in Nagarkurnool there were 52.2% males and 47.8% 
females.
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election information sought, we found that a higher percentage 
of those over 55 years of age voted for Cong. I (see Chapter IX) .
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
It has been argued that there is no need for formal education for 
either contesting the election or for participating as a voter. 
A voter may be illiterate, but can be made politically aware with 
campaign and propaganda as well as socialization media (Varma & 
Narain 1973) . However education is one of the key agents of 
socialization and it promotes political awareness and exposure 
to the mass media especially the print forms.
TABLE IV.5 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS
Educational level* Number % Cumulative %
Uneducated 101 8.8 8.8
Primary 128 11.0 19.8
Secondary 154 13 .3 33 .1
Intermediate 242 21.0 54 .1
Graduation 364 31.5 85.6
Post Graduation 136 11.7 97 .3
Technical 27 2.4 99.9
Others 3 0.3 100
Total 1155 100
N.B.* Primary-1-5, Secondary-10, Intermediate 11 and 12 or Pre­
university. Graduation- Undergraduate degree as B.A., B.Sc or 
B . Com.
Table IV. 5 shows a high percentage of educated persons compared 
to the literacy rate in AP at 44%. Nearly 54% were educated till 
the high school level, 31.5% were graduates and 11.7% were post 
graduates and less than 10% were uneducated.
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TABLE IV. 6 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS BY
CONSTITUENCIES
Education Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N % N % N O,“o
Uneducated 15 4.0 30 6.1 56 18.7
Primary 45 12 .5 44 8.8 39 13.0
Secondary 56 15 .6 45 9.1 53 17 . 8
Intermediate 59 16.5 112 22 .6 71 23 .8
Graduate 136 37.6 164 33 .2 64 21.3
Post
Graduation
42 11.6 84 16.9 10 3.3
Technical 8 2.2 15 3.1 4 1.4
Others - - 1 0.2 2 0.7
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
In Hyderabad and Secunderabad more than half the respondents were 
graduates or postgraduates compared to a quarter in Nagarkurnool. 
In Nagarkurnool nearly a fifth (18.7%) were uneducated compared 
to 4% in Secunderabad and 6.1% in Hyderabad. The highest percent 
(23.8%) in Nagarkurnool were educated up to the Intermediate 
level. There was not much difference by gender in the educational 
backgrounds. Interestingly the percentage of women postgraduates, 
(13.1%) was higher compared to men (10.5%). However, the overall 
literacy rate in AP is 44.1% for men and 33.71% for women. It was 
observed that educated persons were more ready to respond to the 
survey.
Though Varma & Narain (1973) have argued that literacy may not 
really be important in determining voting behaviour in developing 
countries, Prasad and Kini (1978) found that more educated 
persons are politically better informed and efficacious than 
people with limited or no education. In a democracy it does not 
follow that the less educated are less fit to vote, but it may 
have an indirect effect, in terms of access to some political 
communications in view of low purchasing power.
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In our study, we find it significant to relate literacy to using 
newspapers as a source of election information (see Chapter V). 
The rise of literacy has increased the number and readership of 
newspapers through which information reaches the villages2 . In 
this rather urban biased study 85% of respondents either read 
newspapers or were 'read to'. Educational status was also taken 
into account for exposure to political campaigns. BJP, for 
example, had directed their press campaign at the educated 
intellectual electorate2 .
OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND
Occupation is an index of an individual's social standing. Some 
earlier studies on voting behaviour have found a level of high 
political awareness, intention to vote for a political party, 
collective and partisan political behaviour in certain 
occupations (Kar & Chaudary, 1992). Father's occupation was also 
a factor in voting behaviour (Mehta, 1973) . As shown in Table
IV.7, 26.1% of the respondents were working in government and 
20.4% in the private sector. 18.9% were housewives. 9.9% were 
unemployed and 9.9% were students. Less than 10% were 
agricultural workers of which more than half were from 
Nagarkurnool. Occupation did not make any difference to the 
overall voting behaviour in the urban or rural respondents.
7 ■* For example, in the 1989 elections, corruption was the 
main issue for the Cong. I defeat. It was reported that the 
information through newspapers had reached remote villages as 
reported in the article titled 'Bofors Brightens Political 
Campaigns', Newstime. Hyderabad. 7 Nov, 1989.
2 Interview with Mr.S.Ravindran, Director, R .K .Swamy/BBDO 
Advertising Associates Pvt.Ltd.Delhi. The agency handled the BJP 
campaign.
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TABLE IV.7 OCCUPATION OF THE RESPONDENTS
Occupation Number Percentage
Unemployed 114 9.9
Student 115 9.9
Government 301 26.1
Private sector 236 20.4
Housewife 218 18.9
Agriculture 105 9.1
Retired 36 3.1
Others 30 2.6
Total 1155 100
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The income of a person will be an indication of the social and 
occupational status and influence that the individual or the 
family as a whole can exert. In our study, income becomes a 
criterion for the access and to some extent the frequency of 
exposure to media in the form of subscription to a newspaper and 
ownership of radio, television and video.
TABLE IV. 8 DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Income Group per month Total
- N %
Less than Rs.250 (£5) 77 6.7
Rs.250-500 (£5-10) 94 8.1
Rs.501-1000 (£10-20) 122 10.5
Rs.1001-2000 (£20-40) 279 24.1
Rs.2001-3000 (£40-60) 246 21.3
Rs.3001-4000 (£60-80) 189 16.4
Rs.4001-5000 (£80- 100) 59 5.1
Rs .5001+ (£100 + ) 48 4.2
No Answer 41 3.6
Total 1155 100
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As table IV. 8 indicates, about one quarter, 25.3% of the 
respondents fell in the three poorest sections below the Rs.1000 
income bracket. 16.4% earned between Rs.3000 to Rs.4000 (£80) and 
less than 10% earned Rs.5000 and above. 12.2% of rural 
respondents were earning below Rs.250(£5) a month, and 32% earned 
less than Rs.500 (£10). Low levels of income were found in
Nagarkurnool which could be attributed to the income generated 
from the occupations as well as the dependency on agriculture 
which is again dependent on the monsoons.
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
Household size is not in itself a determinant of voting 
behaviour, but the influence of the family was a major source of 
primary political socialization (Nuna, 1989) . In Nagarkurnool we 
found that families identified themselves as 'Congress7, 'BJP' 
or 'Communists families' as they have supported these parties for 
generations. Some women pointed to other similar families in the 
neighbourhood who supported certain parties. This system was more 
prevalent in rural India with joint family structures.
TABLE IV. 9 NUMBER OF ADULTS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
No of Adults in 
households
Number Percentage
1 63 5.5
2 490 42 .4
3 160 13.8
4 197 17 .1
5 114 9.8
6 63 5.4
7 31 2.6
8 17 1.5
No answer 20 1.9
TOTAL 1155 100
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TABLE IV. 10 NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLDS
No of Children 
in the Household
Number Percentage
None 222 19 .2
One 187 16 .2
Two 319 27.6
Three 215 18.6
Four 129 11.2
Five 36 3.1
Six 22 1.9
Seven 7 0.6
Eight or more 5 0.5
No Answer 13 1.1
Total 1155 100
The size of the respondents households generally indicated 
nuclear families. As shown in table IV.9 and IV.10, nearly half 
(42.4%), comprised of two adults and 30.9% comprised of 3-4 
adults. Less than ten percent (9.5%) of the households comprised 
of more than five adults, which could be inclusive of families 
with grown up children or joint families. Similarly, while a 
fifth, mostly those comprising of young voters (19.2%) did not 
have any children, a majority of 62.4% had one to three children 
generally deviating away from the joint family system. 14.3% 
households comprised 4 - 5  children (11.2% had four and 3.1% had 
five children) and a small 3% had more than six children which 
could be indicative of the joint family structures.
However, despite the gradual decline of the joint family system, 
greater urbanization and increased level of education, families 
continued to be important sources of information and influenced 
voting behaviour (see Chapter VIII).
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RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND
Religious diversity is characteristic of Indian society. The 
contemporary political process has set in a new agenda for a 
major political discourse on the nature and content of 
secularism. Secularism was one of the major issues on which the 
1991 elections were fought. We found that political parties 
mobilized different sections for their support. Among our 
constituencies, Hyderabad in particular was communally sensitive 
and marked by communal riots. The electoral contest in Hyderabad 
between BJP and MIM was supported by the Hindus and Muslims 
respectively. We have correlated religion with voting behaviour 
(see Chapter-IX).
TABLE IV. 11 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGION
Religion Number Percentage
Hinduism 929 80.4
Islam 108 9.3
Sikhism 14 1.2
Christianity 93 8.0
Others 11 1.0
Total 1155 100
Table IV.11 shows an overwhelming 80.4% of Hindus, a near
the country's average percentage, 9.3% were
re Christian (country's average • .5%). This was
A.
because in Secunderabad constituency a polling booth area which 
was surveyed had a larger concentration of Christian households. 
Similarly, in the Hyderabad constituency, there was a larger 
concentration of Hindus in the areas where our survey was 
conducted. There are visible pockets of localities with 
concentration of Hindus and Muslims in Hyderabad and Christian 
communities in Secunderabad. Hindus were an obvious majority in 
all the three constituencies, while among the Muslims a majority 
of 56.4% were from Hyderabad. Hyderabad comprised of 73% Hindus, 
12.3% Muslims, 11.9% Christians, 1.1% Sikhs and 1.7% of other
|  ( / j r . a i  n  i  ■ •  i
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religions. In Nagarkurnool, 85.5% were Hindus, 7.4% Muslims, 2.1% 
Sikhs and 4.6% Christians and 0.4% others.
Religion was a significant aspect of voter behaviour. A fifth 
(21%) of the respondents considered consulting religious leaders 
as important in making their voting decisions (see Chapter VIII) . 
In terms of final voter behaviour, contrary to expectations, 13% 
of Muslims had voted for BJP and 1.8% Hindus voted for MIM (See 
Chapter IX).
CASTE
Caste determines the voting pattern and the creation of vote 
banks. Caste had become an important election issue after the NF 
government's plan to implement the MCR. We investigated 
respondents castes, broadly categorised as Forward Castes (FCs), 
BCs, SCs and STs. We further examined the respondents views on 
caste as part of the social system and if it was a factor for 
voting in the parliamentary elections and if it influenced voting 
behaviour. We presumed that it would be a delicate question to 
ask the respondents' caste. However it was found that most 
respondents readily answered.
TABLE IV. 12 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPON1DENTS BY CASTE
Caste N Percentage
Forward Caste 614 53.2
Backward Caste 278 24.1
Scheduled Caste 140 12 .1
Scheduled Tribe 21 1.8
No answer 102 8.8
Total 1155 100
As seen in table IV.12, more than half (53.2%) were from FCs. 
About a quarter 24.1% were the BCs and 12.1% were the SCs Less 
than two percent (1.8%) belonged to the STs. A fifth of the 
respondents (21.8%) considered caste as an important factor in 
their voting decisions (See Chapter IX) . An important aspect on
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the influence of caste was that 16% of the SCs voted for MIM in 
Hyderabad. Less than 10% did not reveal their castes.
SUMMARY
There is a definite change in the / profile of an average
Indian voter. A gender bias is common in most Indian studies with 
more number of male responses when households are surveyed. Most 
of the respondents were in the ages between 18-45 being born in 
post independent India and nearly a fifth of the respondents (in 
the age group between 46-65 years) were part of at least eight 
general elections. The educational level of the respondents was 
generally higher than the average though the least uneducated 
(4%) were from urban Secunderabad and the highest (18.7%) were 
from rural Nagarkurnool. A high number of post graduates in our 
sample indicated an increase in the educational level of the 
Indian women.
The household size indicates a shift from the joint to the 
nuclear family structure as observed in urban households compared 
to the rural households. Nearly half the respondents earned up 
to Rs 2,000 (£40) per month, income was a criterion for
subscription of a newspaper and ownership of radio, TV or video, 
majority of over 80% were Hindus and more than half (53.2%) 
claimed to be from the FCs. In the next part we give the extent 
of interest in politics, general awareness of current events, 
attitudes towards government and politicians.
/
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SECTION II
POLITICAL INTEREST, GENERAL AWARENESS AND ATTITUDES TO 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICIANS
Through a series of questions we examined the respondents' level 
of political interest, awareness of current events as well as the 
attitudes towards leaders and functioning of the government. 
First, we evaluate the level of interest in politics. Second, we 
record the general awareness of certain current events. Last, we 
assess the respondents' opinions on leaders and government.
POLITICAL INTEREST
TABLE IV. 13 LEVELS OF INTEREST IN POLITICS
Attitude variable Number Percentage
Not at all interested 233 20.2
Somewhat interested 559 48 .4
Interested if it concerns me 166 14 .4
Very interested 140 12 .1
Don't Know 32 2.8
No answer 25 2.1
Total 1155 100
The respondents were asked to indicate their level of interest 
in politics on the question: How interested are you in politics 
and the political developments in the country ? Interest in 
politics was at a medium level with nearly half (48.4%) of the 
respondents being somewhat interested. 12.1% stated that they 
were very interested and 14.4% were contingently interested. 
There were significant differences between men and women.
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TABLE IV. 14 GENDER WISE INTEREST IN POLITICS
Attitude variable Men Women
N o.*o N o*o
Very interested 113 17 .5 25 4.9
Not at all 
interested
97 14.9 137 27.1
Somewhat
interested
338 52 .1 222 43 .9
Interested when it 
concerns me
89 13.7 78 15 .4
Don't Know/No 
answer
12 1.8 44 8.7
Total 649 100 506 100
The level of interest between men and women varied as seen in 
table IV.14, three times more men (17.5%) compared to 4.9% women 
were very interested in politics, with over a quarter (27.1%) of 
the women not at all interested. More than half (52.1%) men and 
43% women were somewhat interested. Next we asked the respondents 
the frequency with which they discussed politics. A similar 
question was also asked as part of interpersonal forms of 
communication and group behaviour - if the respondents discussed 
politics when they got together with social groups (see chapter 
VIII) .
TABLE IV. 15 FREQUENCY WITH WHICH POLITICS WERE DISCUSSED
Attitude variable Number Percentage
Daily 109 9.4
Often 261 22.6
Once in while 493 42.7
Never 239 20.7
No answer 53 4.6
Total 1155 100
Politics was not a favourite topic of discussion for more than 
two thirds of the sample with a majority of 42.7% respondents who
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discussed politics occasionally. As seen in table IV.15, about 
a third (32%) of the respondents discussed politics more 
frequently (9.4% discussed daily and 22.6% discussed often). 
About a fifth, 20.7% did not discuss politics. Political 
discussions were rated fourth after day to day matters, social 
problems and gossip during group interpersonal meetings (Chapter 
VIII) .
GENERAL AWARENESS OF CURRENT EVENTS
We investigated the respondents' awareness of some current Indian 
events, many of which were given vast coverage in the media. The 
six events listed were:
1. Communal riots in Hyderabad in December 1990. Hyderabad 
along with the other Indian cities like Meerut and Aligarh 
with large Muslim populations had witnessed one of the 
worst communal riots since Independence. Consequently, the 
Cong.I Chief Minister, Dr.M.Chenna Reddy was replaced for 
failing to curb the riots in the city.
2. The second statement was the change in Chief Minister that
followed the communal riots.
3. The third statement related to the sinking of a Buddha
statue in the Hussain Sagar lake at Hyderabad. A major
publicised and criticised programme of the TDP government
was the installation of statues of prominent leaders in the 
city. This project was to install a 40 feet statue of 
Buddha in the middle of the lake. However^ on its way to 
the site, the statue slipped from the bar- ge and sank into 
the lake. The news was widely reported and people had come 
from all over the state to see it.
4. The fourth statement was on awareness of the problem of 
naxalites in AP. In certain districts, naxalite groups were 
active in anti-social activities. They were in the news for 
kidnapping political leaders and for several crimes.
5. The fifth question related to the issue of Ayodhya Babri 
Masjid (Temple-Mosque) dispute.
6. The final statement was on the agitation following the MCR 
on the reservation of jobs.
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TABLE IV. 16 THE LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF CURRENT EVENTS
Political issues Know a lot Know a 
amount
fair Unheard of No
answer
N o,o N % N % N %
Communal riots in AP 458 39.6 564 48.9 49 4.2 84 7.3
Replacement of Dr.Chenna Reddy, CM of AP 468 40.4 564 48.8 73 6.4 50 4.4
Fall of Buddha statue in Hussain Sagar 520 45.1 490 42 .4 99 8.5 46 4.0
There is Naxalism in some AP districts 445 38.6 559 48.4 100 8.6 51 4.4
The Babri Masjid - Ayodhya temple issue 592 51.4 504 43.7 31 2 .4 28 2.5
Job reservation for the backward classes 481 41.6 464 40.2 123 10 .7 87 7.5
*The respondents were asked to mark their level of awareness on
these statements as 'unheard of', 'know a fair amount' and 'know 
a lot'.
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As shown in Table IV.16 there was a high level of awareness of 
current events in all three constituencies as well as between men 
and women. Nearly 80-90% of respondents either knew a lot or a 
fair amount about each of the issues. The most well known issue 
was that of Ayodhya - Babri masjid, where 51.4% knew a lot and 
43.7% knew a fair amount. The reservation of jobs for the BCs was 
known to 80% respondents.
We scored the level of awareness of these current events. A score 
of 1-3 was given to each answer and the total was calculated as 
low, medium and high. The score below nine was low, 10-14 was 
medium and 15-18 was regarded as high. As seen in table IV.17, 
nearly 90% of the respondents secured medium to high scores and 
showed a high awareness of current events. Only 10% had low 
score. We next examined the respondents' attitudes towards 
leaders and the functioning of government.
TABLE IV. 17 THE SCORES ON GENERAL AWARENESS OF CURRENT EVENTS
Score N %
below 9 126 10.9
10-14 532 46.1
15-18 497 43 .0
Total 1155 100
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE LEADERS AND THE GOVERNMENT
Press reports indicated the disappointment and loss of trust in 
the political leaders and the functioning of the government4 . 
Earlier election studies have shown that the Indian electorate 
was well versed with the political manoeuvring of the leaders and 
have showed their approval or disapproval by the power of the 
vote (Lai, 1990). Within the political process, we evaluated the 
respondents' attitudes in terms of their faith and trust in 
politicians and government which would relate to their interest
4 Financial Express. Bombay, 12 May, 1991; The Hindustan 
Times. New Delhi 12 May, 1991, Observer of Business and Politics. 
10 May, 1991; India Today. New Delhi, 15 May, 1991.
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in elections. Among our respondents some did not find any of the parties worth voting for. The 
respondents were given four statements on a scale with levels of agreement or disagreement as shown 
in table IV.18.
TABLE IV. 18 RESPONDENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT
Attitude variable Strongly
agree
Tend to 
agree
No opinion Tend to 
disagree
Strongly
disagree
N % N % N 'o N % N %
Leaders are committed to 
the development of the 
country
169 14.6 205 17.7 103 8.9 282 24.4 396 34.4
I have confidence and 
trust in the leaders
97 8.4 220 19.1 106 9.2 344 29.8 388 33 .5
Leaders do not know and 
understand my problem
348 30.1 294 25.5 131 11.3 201 17.4 181 15.7
I am not satisfied with 
the way the present 
government works
336 29 .1 292 25.3 132 11.5 193 16.6 202 17 .5
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The respondents' attitudes generally showed a sense of 
disillusionment with leaders and the working of the government. One 
third (14.6% strongly agreed and 17.7% tended to agree) had faith 
in the leaders being committed to the development of the country. 
More than half (34.4% strongly disagreed and 24% tended to 
disagree) did not find the leaders committed to the development of 
the country.
Regarding confidence and trust in leaders, little more than a 
quarter (8.4% strongly agreed and 19.1% tended to agree) had 
confidence and trust in the leaders but the remaining two thirds 
63.4% (with 33.5% strongly) did not trust or have confidence in the 
leaders.
In terms of leaders understanding peoples problems, more than half, 
(30.1% strongly agreed and 25.5% tended to agree) respondents 
stated that leaders didn't understand their problems. On the other 
hand a third stated that leaders knew and understood their 
problems. Again over half 55.4% (29.1% strongly agreed and 25.3% 
tended to agree) were not at all satisfied with the functioning of 
the government. A third expressed their faith in the government 
from which a fifth (17.5%) were satisfied with the government.
Overall, More than two thirds of the respondents did not have a 
positive attitude towards the leaders and were not satisfied with 
the functioning of the government while the other one third 
believed that leaders were committed to the development of the 
country and were satisfied with the working of the government.
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ATTITUDES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS
With the repeated failure of the coalition governments, opinion 
polls indicated the likelihood of another hung parliament and lack 
of interest among the voters in the 1991 elections. We asked the 
respondents how far they cared about elections results and the kind 
of government to be formed.
TABLE IV. 19 CONSTITUENCY WISE ATTITUDE TO OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS:
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
Care a lot 100 27.7 108 21.8 71 23 .7
Somewhat care 135 37.4 248 50.1 88 29.4
Do not care 96 26.6 85 17.2 96 32.3
Don't know 23 6.4 20 4.0 21 6.9
No answer 7 1.9 34 6.9 23 7.7
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
TABLE IV.20 GENDER WISE ATTITUDE TO THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS
Attitude variable Men Women Total
N % N %
Care a lot 181 28.0 98 19.3 279 24.2
Somewhat care 273 42 .1 197 39.0 470 40.7
Do not care 149 23 .0 129 15 .4 278 24.0
Don't know 19 2.8 45 8.9 64 5.5
No answer 27 4.1 37 7.4 64 5.5
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
As seen in table IV.20, Over two thirds (64.9%) of the respondents 
cared which party won the elections. Among these 24.2% cared a lot 
and 40.7% somewhat cared. In Hyderabad, the closely contested 
election generated tremendous voter interest and could be the 
reason for 71.9% who cared on the outcome of the election. 
Interestingly, the highest percentage (32.3%) of rural Nagarkurnool
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respondents did not care about the outcome of the elections 
compared to 17.2% in Hyderabad and a quarter (26.6%) in 
Secunderabad. Overall 70% men and 58% women cared about the 
election results.
Therefore, contrary to press reports on the disinterest among 
voters, we found that though the degree of interest in politics was 
low and over two thirds of the respondents were not satisfied with 
the leaders and the government, there was a high level of interest 
during elections as two thirds (64.9%) of the respondents cared in 
varying degrees on the outcome of the elections and nearly 77% had 
also voted (See Chapter VII). A sizeable quarter (24%) of the 
respondents did not care while the other 11% had no opinion or 
chose not to answer.
THE NEED FOR A ONE PARTY MAJORITY
As discussed earlier, the repeated failure of the non-congress 
coalition governments first in 1977 and then in 1989-91 by two 
minority coalition governments had disillusioned the voters as to 
the capability of the diverse parties. This had indirectly 
strengthened the support for Cong.I, the only party which had 
national standing. In 1991 elections, BJP made every effort to gain 
national status and contested independently as an alternate party 
to Cong.I. We investigated the respondents' opinions on a one party 
majority or coalition governments. Respondents were asked to select 
the statements that came closest to their own views on the 
formation of the government after the elections.
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TABLE IV.21 RESPONDENTS OPINION ON ONE PARTY GOVERNMENT
Attitude variable Number Percentage
One party should gain a 
majority and form a 
government
776 67.1
A clear majority may not be 
necessary but the party with 
the highest number of seats 
should form the government.
124 10.7
There need not be a majority 
but some parties can form a 
coalition government
152 13 .1
Don't Know 103 9.1
Total 1155 100
As seen in the table IV. 21, more than two thirds (67.1%) of 
respondents preferred a one party government and this was felt in 
all the three constituencies. However, 13.1% preferred the 
formation of a coalition government by a merger of the parties 
without a majority. A tenth (10.7%) opined that the party that won 
the highest number of seats, if not a majority could form the 
government. These statements reflect a clear understanding of the 
electoral system, taking into cognisance of earlier failures of 
coalition governments. A majority of the respondents preferred a 
one party majority. In the following section we give the access and 
frequency of media exposure and the sources of information during 
the elections.
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SECTION III
ACCESS AND FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE TO MEDIA
Access to the media is assessed in terms of respondents subscribing 
to a newspaper, owning a radio, television or video and the 
frequency of exposure. This is evaluated from Table IV.22, IV.23 
and IV.24.
TABLE IV.22 THE RESPONDENTS ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
Media Yes No No answer
N % N % N *©
Subscribe to 
newspapers
738 63 .9 413 35.7 4 0.4
Own radio 1047 90.6 104 9.0 4 0.4
Own
television
853 73.8 301 26.1 1 0.1
Own video 186 16.1 943 81.6 26 2.3
TABLE IV. 23 ACCESS TO MEDIA IN THE THREE CONSTITUENCIES
Media Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkumool
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Newspapers 255 106 344 151 139 160
o,
“o 70.6% 29.4% 69.5% 30.5% 46.5% 53 .5%
Radio 340 21 454 41 253 46
'o 94.2% 5.8% 91.7% 8.3% 84.6% 15 .4%
Television 321 40 378 117 153 146
'o 88.2% 11.0% 76.4% 23 .6% 51.3% 48 .7%
Videos 86 275 84 411 16 283
% 23 .9% 76.8% 17.0% 83% 5.4% 94.6%
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TABLE IV.24 FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE TO THE MASS MEDIA
SECTION I
Sometimes 2-4 days a week, Regularly 5-7 days a week.
Media Never Sometimes Regular]Ly
N O* N % N o,'o
Read newspapers 168 14 .5 234 20.3 753 65.2
Read magazines 313 27.1 457 39.5 385 33 .4
Listen to radio 91 7.9 435 37.7 628 54.4
Watch TV 163 14 .1 257 22 .3 735 63.6
SECTION II
Sometimes - Once a fortnight, Regularly - at least once a week 
or more.
Media Never Sometimes Regularly
N % N % N "0
Watch video 558 50.9 411 35.6 156 13 .3
Watch Cinemas 221 19.2 733 63 .4 201 17.4
ACCESS AND READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS
As seen in table IV.22, newspapers were subscribed to by nearly two 
thirds (63.9%) of the respondents. Income was a determinant in the 
subscription of a newspaper. Among those earning below Rs.500 
(£12) , less than 10% subscribed to a newspaper while 50% in the 
income between Rs. 1000-Rs. 2000 (£20-£40) and more than 90% over the 
income of Rs.4000 (£80) subscribed to a newspaper. 70% urban
respondents in Secunderabad subscribed to the newspapers compared 
to 46% rural respondents in Nagarkurnool. Subscription was not a 
determinant of readership as over 85% of the respondents read a 
newspaper or were being 'read to' . Being 'read to' generally means 
that newspapers are read by some literate persons and others gather 
around them, listen and discuss the news or pick up information at 
casual meetings.
186
Newspapers were read regularly by 65.2% respondents, sometimes by 
20.3% and 14.5% did not read newspapers. Magazines were read by 
three quarters of the respondents and one third (33.4%) read them 
regularly.
ACCESS AND FREQUENCY OF RADIO LISTENERSHIP
90.6% of households owned a radio. Even in rural areas radio 
ownership was high because of the low cost transistors. Over 60% of 
the households in the lowest income group, Rs.250 (£5) per month 
possessed a radio. Over 90% of the households in Secunderabad and 
Hyderabad owned radios compared to 84.6% in Nagarkurnool. Radio 
listening was high. Only 7.9% never listened while 54.4% heard the 
radio regularly and 37.7% sometimes. The regularity of listening to 
radio was third after newspaper reading (65.2%) and watching 
television (63.6%).
ACCESS AND FREQUENCY OF TELEVISION VIEWERSHIP
Television was owned by 73.8% of the respondents. This, on an 
average, was quite high compared to the average TV ownership in the 
country given the low income levels. 50% of respondents earning 
less than Rs.1000 (£20) did not own TV sets. Nearly 85% of the
households over this income group owned TV sets. The ownership of 
TV was high in urban compared to rural constituencies. In 
Secunderabad, 88.2% of the respondents owned TVs compared to 51.3% 
in Nagarkurnool.
Even though TV was not owned, it was seen by 85.9% of the 
respondents. In the rural areas, it is watched in the community 
centres, in the houses of the local leaders or in the neighbourhood 
- whoever possessed a TV. Similarly, in the poorer sections of the 
urban areas, television is watched in the homes of employers or 
neighbours. Television was regularly watched by 63.6% of 
respondents, About 14.1% did not watch and 22.3% watched sometimes.
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As the ownership of television was high in urban compared to rural 
constituencies, the viewership of television was dependent on the 
ownership as was clearly evidenced by higher frequency of exposure 
in Secunderabad compared to Nagarkurnool. About 30.8% of rural 
respondents did not watch TV compared to less than 10% of the 
urban. Similarly double the percentage, 63.3% watched TV regularly 
in urban areas compared to 30% in rural areas.
As seen in table IV.23, in the three constituencies there were 
differences in the frequency of TV viewing by the maximum number of 
respondents from the Secunderabad constituency.
ACCESS AND EXPOSURE TO VIDEOS
VCRs and Video Cassettes Players (VCP) have yet to penetrate the 
Indian market. Only 16.1% of the respondents had access to videos. 
Due to high cost they are confined to higher income groups in the 
urban areas. Only five respondents from the rural areas in our 
sample possessed a video. Over half (50.9%) the respondents had 
never watched videos. A third (35.6%) had watched them sometimes 
and 13.5% watched regularly. However the ownership of videos was 
not a criterion for election communication through the videos. VOWs 
were extensively used during the elections as a popular form of 
political advertising for the diverse Indian audiences.
CINEMA VIEWING
With the increasing reach of TV, cinema viewing is claimed to have 
been reduced. However, we find that nearly 80% of respondents went 
to the movies. Film and film based programmes are popular and 
highly rated both on radio and television as concluded in the 
following chapter.
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THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION SOUGHT DURING ELECTIONS
In view of the extensive media coverage and the interpersonal forms 
used for disseminating election information, we examined the 
sources of information sought by respondents for election 
information. In the following chapters we have discussed in detail 
each of these media and the extent to which they helped in the 
voting decisions.
TABLE IV.25 SOURCES OF MASS MEDIA AND INTERPERSONAL FORMS SOUGHT
FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Sources lot Somewhat Not at all Don't know
% % 0^*© o,"S
Newspapers 34.3 47.1 12 .7 5.9
Radio 22 .4 58.4 14.1 5.1
Television 28.2 50.5 14.3 7.0
Posters 8.7 47 .9 35.5 7.9
Handbills 5.6 34.9 43 .4 16.1
Public meetings 6.6 27.3 56.1 10.0
Family 22 .5 47.1 23 .8 5.2
Local leaders 7.5 27.3 55.0 10.2
Friends & 
neighbours
16.6 54 .3 23 .8 5.3
Mass media of newspapers, radio and television were extensively 
sought as important sources of election information by nearly 85% 
of the respondents. As observed in table IV.25, 34.3% depended a 
lot on newspapers, 28.2% depended on TV and 22.4% on radio. Nearly 
half of them, depended to some extent on these .media for election 
information. Printed literature like posters and handbills were 
somewhat sought by about half the respondents.
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Among the interpersonal forms; discussions with family was to be 
sought a lot by 22.5%, and somewhat by 47.1% of the respondents. 
Discussions with social groups like friends and peighbours were 
rated second, a lot by 16.6%, and somewhat by 54.3%. 7.5% depended 
a lot and 27.3% depended somewhat on local leaders for election 
information. 6.6% depended a lot election meetings and 27.3% of the 
respondents were likely to attend public meetings for election 
information.
SUMMARY
Though the respondents did not show a high level of interest in 
politics, we found that they were generally well informed about the 
political system of the country. About half the respondents were 
interested in politics but it was not a much discussed topic by 
nearly two thirds of the respondents. Their opinions on leaders and 
government reflected their disillusionment and loss of faith in 
them, yet they were interested in the elections and sought various 
media for election information. Though the respondents expressed 
their dismay at the leaders and the government, over two thirds 
(64.9%) cared about the outcome of the elections and the formation 
of government. While nearly a quarter (24%) did not care who won 
the elections, 80.8% of the respondents were likely voters and 
therefore cared about the result of the elections. A large majority 
of them preferred a one party government to a coalition government.
Access and exposure to the mass media was high as ours was a fairly 
urban educated sample and mass media were sought for election 
information along with discussions with family, friends and local 
leaders. In the following chapter we discuss the exposure and 
impact of the mass media.
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CHAPTER V
THE USES AND IMPACT OF MASS MEDIA DURING THE 1991 ELECTIONS
In this chapter we analyze respondents access to and readership of 
newspapers and magazines, listening to radio and watching
television. We include the interest in the coverage of political
news and the extent of influence of election news and political 
advertisements in newspapers and magazines. Similarly, for the 
electronic media, we evaluate the exposure to and influence of 
election programmes and PEBs on the voting behaviour of 
respondents.
SECTION I
THE USES AND IMPACT OF NEWSPAPERS
In Chapter IV, we outlined the access to and frequency of newspaper 
readership. Of the total 1155 respondents, 63.9% subscribed to a
newspaper: In Secunderabad 70.6%, in Hyderabad 69.5%, and in
Nagarkurnool less than half (46.5%) subscribed to newspapers. A 
higher percentage of urban when compared with rural respondents 
subscribed to a newspaper. Readership among the respondents was 
high. 85% either read newspapers or were being 'read to'. This 
pattern of diffusion from 'one to many' is common in smaller towns 
and villages and was observed by the researcher during the course 
of field work. On the whole, in the three constituencies, over 
three quarters of the respondents were reading newspapers.
Readership was highest in Hyderabad with 85.5% followed by 84.1% in 
Secunderabad. In Nagarkurnool, though only 46.5% actually 
subscribed to newspapers, the readership was high at 77.2% 
accounting for those to whom newspapers were read.
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TABLE V.l EDUCATION AND THE READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS
Educational level Read Newspapers Do not read
N % N %
Uneducated 18 17.8 83 82 .2
Primary 80 62.5 48 37 .5
Secondary 127 82.5 27 17 .5
Intermediate 228 94.2 14 5.8
Graduation 336 92.3 28 7.7
Post Graduation 132 97.1 4 2.9
Technical 27 100 - _
Others 3 100 - -
Total 956 202
Table V.l. shows that the regularity of newspaper readership tends 
to be related to the level of education. However, among the 
educated 7.7% graduates and 2.9% post graduates did not read 
newspapers. On the other hand, 17.8% of the uneducated and 62.5% of 
those educated up to the primary level were readers or listeners of 
newspapers.
TABLE V.2 THE READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS BY GENDER
Frequency Male Female
N % N %
Never 66 10.1 102 20.2
Sometimes 122 18.9 112 22 .1
Regularly 461 71.0 292 57.7
Total 649 100 506 100
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From the gender stand point, almost 90% men and 80% women read or 
have newspapers read to them. Men (71%) are more regular readers 
than women (57.7%). While there is no significant difference 
between men (18.9%) and women (22.1%) occasional readers, double 
the number of women (20.2%) compared with men (10%. 1) do not read 
newspapers. 71% men and 57.7 % women are regular readers (Table
V.2) .
NEWSPAPERS READ BY THE RESPONDENTS
Telugu newspapers were most popular in the three constituencies and 
had a high readership. English newspapers followed next and only a 
small segment read Urdu dailies. Extensive coverage was given to 
elections in newspapers and Cong.I, BJP, TDP and other parties had 
used the Telugu press for their advertising campaigns. Respondents 
were asked to name the newspapers they generally read. 
Interestingly, many respondents marked more than three newspapers. 
A number of respondents when asked informally revealed that more 
newspapers were read by them only during important occasions, 
elections among them.
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TABLE V. 3 NEWSPAPERS READ BY RESPONDENTS
S.No. NEWSPAPERS YES NO
N % N o
1. Eenadu (Telugu) 551 47.7 604 52.3
2. Andhra Jyothi 
(Telugu)
268 23 .2 887 76.8
3. Udayam (Telugu) 271 23 .5 886 76.5
4. Andhra Prabha 
(Telugu)
216 18 .7 939 81.3
5. Deccan Chronicle 
(English)
422 36.5 733 63 .5
6. The Hindu (English) 229 19.9 926 80.1
7 . Indian Express 
(English)
199 17.2 956 82.8
8. Newstime (English) 110 9.5 1045 90.5
9. Siasat (Urdu) 74 6.4 1081 93.6
10 . Rahnuma-e-Deccan 
(Urdu)
28 2.4 1127 97.5
11. Others 29 2.5 1126 97.5
Table V.3, shows the largest circulated Telugu daily, Eenadu had 
the highest readership of 47.7% among the respondents, followed by 
Andhra Jvothi (23.2%) and Udayam (26.5%).
Among English newspapers, the maximum number of respondents (36.5%) 
read Deccan Chronicle. This paper, published from Hyderabad, 
Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam, is considered to be a local paper 
with three fourths of its circulation in Hyderabad and 
Secunderabad. The Hindu, read by 19.9%, and Indian Express read by 
17.2% are the two nationally oriented English dailies with editions 
published from Hyderabad as well as several other centres. 
Newstime, the English newspaper published.by the Eenadu group is 
read by less than 10% of the respondents and appeared to be not as
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popular as its Telugu counterpart. Cong.I and BJP had extensively 
advertised in most of these English newspapers.
Of the Urdu newspapers, Siasat. was read by 6.4% of respondents 
while Rahnuma- E- Deccan was read by 2.4%. The readership of Urdu 
newspapers was restricted to the urban areas of Hyderabad. The 
leader of MIM, Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi had stated that because of 
low readership (due to low literacy), newspapers were not part of 
his media strategy in reaching the electorate1 . About 2.5% of the 
respondents also read newspapers other than those listed. These 
included The Times of India. The Hindustan Times, a Tamil and a 
Kannada daily.
INTEREST IN POLITICS AND ATTITUDE TO THE COVERAGE GIVEN TO 
POLITICAL NEWS IN NEWSPAPERS
As discussed in Chapter II, elections had increased the coverage 
given to the political developments in newspapers. We therefore 
investigated the respondents interest in such news before and 
during the elections.
INTEREST IN POLITICAL NEWS IN GENERAL AND DURING ELECTIONS 
TABLE V.4 INTEREST IN POLITICAL NEWS BEFORE AND
DURING THE ELECTIONS
Period Very
Interested
Somewhat
interested
Not at all 
interested
Don't know
N o,o N % N 0, N q.'o
Pre
Election
190 16 .4 606 52 .5 215 18.6 144 12 .5
During and 
after the 
elections
288 24.9 645 55.9 171 14.8 51 4.4
1 Interview with Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi by the author on 20 
June, 1991.
195
During the pre-election phase, over half (52.5%), the respondents 
were somewhat interested in political news, while 16.4% were very 
interested. Interest in political news began picking up during the 
elections. Very interested response increased from 16.4% to 24.9% 
and somewhat interested from 52.5% to 55.9%. A little over 80% 
displayed interest in political news. Significantly, two thirds of 
the respondents who were not sure and 3.8% of non-interested also 
appear to have started taking interest in political news during 
and after the elections (Table V.4).
TABLE V.5 GENDER WISE INTEREST IN ELECTION NEWS IN 
THE NEWSPAPERS
Interest in 
Political news 
during elections
Men Women
N % N *0
Not at all 57 8.8 114 22 .6
Somewhat
Interested
362 55.7 283 55.9
Very Interested 210 32 .3 78 15 .4
Don't Know 20 3.2 31 6.1
Total 649 100 506 100
During the elections the level of interest in political news had 
increased. More than half of both men and women displayed some 
interest in political news during elections. Women (55.9%) crossed 
men (55.7%) by a fraction here. However, in the very interested 
category, we found double the number of men (32.3%) against women 
(15.4%). The gap increases substantially in the 'not at all' 
category. Nearly two thirds of the women (22.6%) against one third 
men (8.8%) were not at all interested in political news during 
elections.
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COVERAGE GIVEN TO POLITICAL NEWS
On the coverage given to political news in pewspapers we examined 
the attitude to the coverage given to politcal news and later the 
election news. ^
TABLE V. 6 ATTITUDE TO COVERAGE GIVEN TO POLITICAL
NEWS BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTIONS
Attitude to 
coverage
Too much Adequate Too little No answer/ 
Don't Know
N % N o.o N % N %
Coverage 
given to 
Political 
news
169 14 .6 565 48.9 99 8.6 322 27.9
Coverage 
given to 
Election 
news
178 15 .4 638 55.2 60 5.2 279 24.2
Regarding the coverage given to election news, over half (55.2%) of 
the respondents found the coverage in newspapers to be adequate. On 
the other hand 15.4% found the coverage to be excessive, virtually 
the same as in the first round. Though the coverage in newspapers 
was extensive, only 5.2% of the respondents found it to be too 
little. In comparison, during elections, there was a decrease in 
the number of respondents from 8.6% to 5.2% who found the coverage 
too little, showing a three percentage point increase in the 
satisfaction level among the very interested. The' interest and 
attitude to information were linked. Most of the respondents who 
were very or somewhat interested found the coverage adequate or too 
little, while those not interested found the coverage too much.
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NEWSPAPERS AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
In the first wave, we enquired about the sources of information 
sought for election information and the extent of use of each 
medium on a scale ranging from a lot through a fair amount or not 
at all. Earlier studies by Varma & Narain (1978), Kaur (1989 and 
Kar & Choudary (1992) found that newspapers were most sought after 
for election news. In our study too we found that newspapers were 
an important source of election information in the urban and rural 
areas. Earlier, we found that more than one third (34.3%), the 
highest in the entire sample,^ depended a lot on newspapers and 
47.5% a fair amount with differnces in the constituencies and among
Amen and women.
TABLE V.7 NEWSPAPERS AS SOURCE OF ELECTION
INFORMATION IN THE CONSTITUENCIES
Constituency A Lot A fair 
amount
Not at all No opinion
N "o N o,*0 N % N o.'o
Secunderabad 163 45 .2 138 38.2 43 11.9 17 4.7
Hyderabad 189 38.2 232 46.9 52 10.5 22 4.4
Nagarkurnool 44 14.7 174 58.2 52 17 .4 29 9.7
As seen in table V.7, in the urban constituency of Secunderabad 
nearly half (45.2%) depended a lot, followed by 38.2% in Hyderabad 
while less than half of these (14.8%) in rural Nagarkurnool 
depended a lot on newspapers. A reverse trend was seen in the fair 
amount category. 58.2% in Nagarkurnool, 46.9% in Hyderabad and 
38.2% in Secunderabad depended a fair amount on Newspapers.
Women were less dependent on newspapers for information than men. 
The highest percentage (27.6%) of women said that they would depend 
a little on newspapers while the highest percentage of 41.8% men 
said that they would depend a lot on newspapers for election 
information. Nearly a fifth of women, (18.8%) did not intend to
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look at the newspapers compared with 8.7% men. In the second phase 
we asked if the information regarding parties and candidates they 
sought from newspapers had helped them in the decision-making 
process.
DID THE COVERAGE GIVEN TO ELECTION NEWS IN NEWSPAPERS HELP IN THE 
DECISION TO VOTE ?
After evaluating the opinions on interest and coverage given to 
election information, we investigated if newspapers had helped the 
respondents in their voting behaviour. In Chapter. IX, we have given 
the effects of media in terms of knowledge gain, change in 
attitudes to political parties and voting behaviour. Here we 
analyze the use and influence of the media in the decision making 
process.
TABLE V.8 NEWSPAPERS AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION 
INFORMATION AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY 
HELPED IN THE DECISION TO VOTE
Variable A lot A fair 
amount
Not at all No opinion
N "o N % N O,-O N %
Newspapers as 
source of 
election 
information
396 34.3 544 47.1 147 12 .7 68 5.9
Did
newspapers 
help in 
voting 
decision ?
204 17 .7 577 50.0 152 13 .2 222 19.1
As in Table V.8, for those one third respondents (34.3%) who 
claimed newspapers to be a source of election information, only 
half (17.7%) appear to have been helped 'a lot' in their decision
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to vote. The response appears to be almost balanced in the 'fair
amount category' (47.1% and 50%) and 'not at all' (12.7% and
13.2%) categories. However, the gap widens in the 'no opinion'
category where the figures are 5.9% and 19.1%. The maximum shift is
from the 'a lot' category that adds up to 19% offering no opinion
about newspapers helping in their decision to vote.
TABLE V. 9 MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE HELPED BY 
NEWSPAPERS IN THEIR DECISION TO VOTE
Variable Men Women Total
N O**o N O,o N o,“O
A lot 127 20.3 “ 77 16.3 204 17.7
A fair amount 360 57.5 217 46.6
\
577 50.0
Not at all 78 12 .5 74 15.9 152 13 .2
No opinion 84 9.7 138 21.2 222 19 .1
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
More men (77.8%) than women (62.9%) were influenced by newspapers 
in their decision to vote. As in Table V.9, 20.3% men and 16.3% 
women were influenced 'a lot' and approximately around half of them 
(over half of the men 57.5%) and little less than half women 
(46.6%) were influenced a fair amount. Conversely, 12.5% men and 
15.9% women were not at all influenced by newspapers in their 
decision to vote. Double the number of women (21.2%) when compared 
with men (9.7%) had no opinion. Earlier we found that readership of 
newspapers had also increased during the elections.
POLITICAL ADVERTISING
THE DIRECTORATE OF ADVERTISING AND VISUAL PUBLICITY (DAVP)
The DAVP is the biggest advertising agency through which the state 
and the central governments publicity is carried out. Through 
multi-media campaigns, DAVP functions to inform, educate and 
motivate people on matters of national concern. It releases over 
20,000 advertisements a year in newspapers and journals on behalf
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of the government in almost all the Indian languages. Several 
campaigns have been conducted on important socio-economic themes 
such as national integration, communal harmony, health and family 
welfare, environment, conservation of energy, upliftment of weaker 
sections of society and removal of social and economic evils. 
Revenues from government advertisements enable the survival of a 
number of small and medium newspapers. During elections, DAVP in 
coordination with the government agencies including the EC ran a 
multi-media publicity campaign among voters to exercise their 
franchise as a right.
EXPOSURE TO GOVERNMENT ADVERTISEMENTS
In the first phase of the survey, we examined the respondents' 
exposure to government advertising which could be a forerunner to 
establish the readership of advertisements and understanding of the 
party advertisements that were to follow during the elections. In 
the post election survey we investigated the exposure to party 
advertisements and how far they had helped in voting decisions. In 
the first survey, there were two questions on whether the 
government advertisements were seen and how they were evaluated. 
More than half answered in the affirmative
TABLE V.10 RESPONDENTS OPINION ON GOVERNMENT 
ADVERTISEMENTS
Attitude variable Number Percentage
Very Informative 145 12 .6
Somewhat Informative 325 28.2
Not at all informative 106 9.1
Do not remember 76 6.6
Don't Know 133 11.5
No Answer 370 32 .0
Total 1155 100
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Among those who saw the advertisements as in Table V.10, 12.6% 
found them very informative and 28.2% somewhat informative. We 
presume that respondents were not very clear about the term 
'government advertisements' and generally assumed them to include 
any advertisements. However in the post election survey, more 
reliable information was obtained on the political party 
advertisements, the respondents' opinions on the advertisements as 
informative, interesting or persuasive and how far they helped them 
in the voting decision.
PARTY POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS IN NEWSPAPERS
ORG estimated that the national and regional parties spent a total 
of Rs.84 million (£1,680,443)2 on press advertisements. In Table 
V.ll, using ORG data we detail the amounts spent by the parties in 
newspaper campaigns all over the country. Almost all the parties 
had released advertisements in newspapers. Cong.I (59.1%) was the 
biggest spender. Its nearest rival, the BJP (19.2%) spent one third 
the amount on advertising. JD stood fourth among spenders (3.2%) 
below AIADMK, a regional party which spent double the amount (6.5%) 
than JD, a national party. TDP spent a meagre 0.11%. However though 
there is an indication of what most parties spent during the 
elections, we find that the amount spent by the communist parties, 
CPI and CPM are not mentioned. We found that these parties spent a 
small amount (included in others-category) and most publicity 
efforts were made by the party to release printed literature and 
through interpersonal forms like large and small group meetings.
With such large amounts of money spent on party advertisements in 
Indian terms we examined the exposure and impact of these 
advertisements on our sample electorate.
2 Source: Operations Research Group, Content Analysis of
Political Advertisements in the 1991 general elections.
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TABLE V.ll THE AMOUNTS SPENT BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
PRESS ADVERTISING IN 1991
Political Party Amount Spent £* Percentage |
Cong.I 992,346 59.1
BJP 324,232 19.29
AIADMK 110,058 6.55
JD 54,427 3 .24
Samajwadi Janata Party 
(SJP)
51,486 3 .04
Janata Dal(Gujarat) 36,824 2.19
BJP/Shiv Sena 32,734 1.94
Independents 18,898 1.13
DMK 16,460 0.98
AIADMK & Cong.I 10,672 0.64
Others** 8,980 0.53
Akali Dal (Badal) 3, 711 0.23
Gomantak National Front 3,572 0.21
Akali Dal (Mann) 3,438 0.20
AISSF 2,312 0.14
Shiv Sena 2,292 0.13
TDP 1,984 0.11
Janata Pksha 1, 412 0.08
Haryana Vikas Manch 1, 172 0.07
Maharashtravadi Gomantak 
Party
1, 127 0.06
Assom Gana Parishad 813 0.04
S.V.Dal 428 0.03
Congress (S) 353 0.02
Shiromani Akali Dal 332 0.02
Tripura Peoples's Front 148 0.01
RSPI(M) 126 0.01
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 106 0.01
TOTAL £ 1,680,443 100
*Conversion rate £1.00 = Rs.50
** The parties that spent less than £100 on press advertising.
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THE EXPOSURE TO PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS IN NEWSPAPERS
We first examined the respondents exposure to the advertisements of 
the political parties and later investigated their impact in terms 
of recall of the advertisements, whether they were informative, 
interesting and persuasive and finally, the extent to which 
respondents were influenced in their voting decisions.
TABLE V. 12 GENDER WISE PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS IN
NEWSPAPERS
Gender Party
advert i sement s 
seen
Not seen Don't
know/No
answer
Men 397 61.2 165 25 .4 87 13 .4
Women 234 46.2 158 31.2 114 22 .5
Total 631 54.6 323 28.0 201 17.4
As shown in table V.12, over half (54.6%) had seen the party 
advertisements in newspapers. Political advertising as such had 
gained a high degree of awareness among the electorate since 1984 
In 1989, the highly illustrated full and half page Cong.I 
advertisements with their controversies, criticisms and parodies 
had caught the attention of most readers. About two thirds men 
(61.2%) and nearly half the women (46.2%) had seen the 
advertisements of political parties.
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TABLE V. 13 THE POLITICAL PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS SEEN BY 
RESPONDENTS
Political
Party
Ads seen Not seen No Answer
Cong.I 517 44.7% 634 55% 4 0.3
BJP 386 33 .4% 764 66.2% 5 0.4
TDP 354
o\o
Oro 788 68.3% 13 1.0
JD 67 5.8% 1083 93.8% 5 0.4
MIM 38 3.3% 1111 96.3 6 0.5
Others 43 3.7% 1112 96.3 - -
As observed in table V.13, nearly half, (44.7%) of the respondents 
had seen Cong. I advertisements, followed by those of BJP with 33.4% 
and TDP advertisements seen by 30.6%. However there was a small 
response to other parties. For the MIM the response was low as the 
party gave importance to interpersonal forms and had minimal press 
advertising.
THE RESPONDENTS' REACTIONS TO CONTENT OF POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS
We recorded the respondents' opinion on the advertisements in terms 
of them being informative, interesting and persuasive, and finally 
if they influenced the respondents voting behaviour. Informative - 
to find the extent to which the respondent felt that advertisements 
gave them enough information about the party; interesting - the 
extent to which the respondent was interested to read and 
understand the advertisement; and last persuasive - whether the 
respondent found the appeals persuasive enough for a positive 
response. Responses to each political party have been separately 
analyzed as there were several multiple responses.
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TABLE V. 14 THE RESPONDENTS' REACTIONS TO POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS
Political
Party
Informative Interesting Persuasive
Total N 0,"o N o,"o N %
Cong.I 517 207 40.0 220 42.6 82 15.8
TDP 354 92 26.0 164 46.3 62 17.5
BJP 386 90 23 .3 111 45.9 89 23 .0
JD 67 35 52.2 22 32.8 3 4.5
MIM 38 11 29.0 13 34.2 3 7.9
others 43 11 25.5 15 34.9 7 16.3
NOTE:The percentages are taken from those who saw the 
advertisements as in table V.13 and not all the respondents.
Cong.I Advertisements
From the table V.13, of all those who had come across party 
advertisements the maximum number (44.7%) had seen the Cong-I 
advertisements in newspapers. As seen in table V.14, of those who 
had seen the Cong-I advertisements, 40% found them informative and 
42.6% found then interesting. Only 15.8% found them persuasive. The 
high frequency of publication and large sizes of the Cong.I 
advertisements had caught the attention of the readers and could 
persuade 15.8%.
BJP Advertisements
A third (33.4%) of the respondents came across BJP advertisements. 
Of those who saw them, nearly half (45.9%) found them interesting. 
23.3% found them informative and an equal percentage (23%) found 
them persuasive. The BJP press advertisements as discussed mainly 
attacked the Cong.I and persuaded the people to give them a chance 
to govern as all other parties had failed.
JD/NF Advertisements
Only 5.8% of all those who had come across party advertisements 
could notice JD advertisements. Of these over half (52.2%) found
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them informative, nearly one third (32.8%) informative but only a 
minuscule (4.5%) persuasive.
TDP advertisements
Nearly a third (30.6%) who saw the party advertisements noticed the 
TDP advertisements. Over a quarter (26%) of those who had seen the 
TDP advertisements found them informative. Nearly half (46.3%) 
found them interesting and 17.5%, the highest percentage found them 
persuasive.
MIM advertisements
The least number (3.3%) of all those who had seen the 
advertisements of the political parties saw the MIM advertisements 
in the newspapers. Of them 29% claimed that they were informative, 
a third (34.2%) said that they were interesting and 7.9% said that 
they were persuasive.
Advertisements of Other Parties
Advertisements of other parties were seen by 3.7% among those who 
had seen the advertisements of political parties. A third (25.6%) 
found them informative, less than half (34.9%) interesting and 
16.3% persuasive. The low recall of other party advertisements 
could in part be attributed to the limited finances and restricted 
use of newspapers.
Big spenders got better noticed. Cong I (44.7%) led the others 
followed by BJP (33.4%), TDP (30.6%), JD (5.8%), other parties 
(3.7%) and MIM (3.3%). The JD/NF advertisements were found to be 
most informative at stated by half (52.2%) the respondents who saw 
them. This was followed by Cong.I (40%), MIM (29%), TDP (26%) and 
BJP (23.3%) advertisements. One third to half the respondents found 
these party advertisements to be interesting; TDP (46.3%), BJP 
(45.9%), Cong.I (42.6%), MIM (34.2%) and JD (32.8%).
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None of the party advertisements could cross the 25% mark on 
persuasiveness. BJP (23%) advertisements led the field, followed by 
other parties (16.3%), TDP (17.5%), Cong.I (15.8%), MIM (7.9%) and 
JD(4.5%). As this was the first study that evaluated the impact of 
political advertising in India, there was no precedent for 
comparison. The results of this study would, therefore lead the 
field for subsequent campaign studies.
THE IMPACT OF PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS IN INFLUENCING VOTING DECISIONS
A lot of money was spent by political parties for advertising in 
newspapers. Here, we evaluate the impact of political advertising 
in terms of converting voters or at least as a source of motivation 
to vote for a given party. The impact of advertising can be 
assessed in terms of creating awareness, interest and in persuading 
prospects to take a particular course of action.
TABLE V. 15 THE EXTENT OF INFLUENCE OF PARTY 
ADVERTISEMENTS
Variable N %
A lot 53 4.6
Somewhat 318 27.5
Not at all 282 to
Don't Know 447 38.7
No Answer 55 4.8
Total 1155 100
Over a quarter (27.5%) of the respondents were somewhat influenced 
by political party advertisements in newspapers and a little less 
than this number (24.4%) claimed that these advertisements had no 
influence on them at all. Only 4.6% of the respondents reported 
that they were influenced a lot by party advertisements. However, 
the largest chunk of responses (43.5%) are found in the don't know 
/no answer categories.
208
TABLE V. 16 CONSTITUENCY WISE IMPACT OF POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS
Constituency A Lot Somew]hat Not at all No opinion
N % N *0 N "o N O,
Secunderabad 22 6.3 108 30.0 83 23.0 148 40.9
Hyderabad 20 4.0 143 28.9 130 26.3 202 40.8
Nagarkurnool 11 3.7 67 22.4 69 23 .1 152 50.8
As seen in table V.16, half of the respondents in rural 
Nagarkarnool (50.8%) had no opinion to offer about advertisements 
of political parties. Such was the response of 40.8% of the 
respondents in Hyderabad and 40.9% in Secunderabad. But advertising 
campaigns in newspapers had some impact on 30% of the respondents 
in Secunderabad, on 28.9% in Hyderabad and on 22.4% in 
Nagarkurnool. Political advertising campaigns appear to have made 
a lot of impact on less than 10% of the voters in all the three 
constituencies. It could, therefore be concluded that a third 
(36.1%) of the respondents in Secunderabad, 32.9% in Hyderabad and 
26.1% in Nagarkurnool felt in various degrees the impact of 
advertisements of political parties.
Though more than half the respondents who had seen the 
advertisements found them informative, interesting and persuasive 
in degrees, the campaigns had a very low effect at the highest 
level as less than 5% (4.6%) stated that they were highly
influenced by the advertisements. There was more positive approach 
as 27.5% were somewhat influenced by the advertisements. A fourth 
(24.4%) were not influenced. 5.4% men were motivated compared to 
3.6% women and nearly the same number of men and women were 
somewhat motivated. In the constituencies, as in Table V.16, 
advertisements helped a lot for 6.1% of respondents in urban 
Secunderabad compared to about 4% in Hyderabad and 3.7% in 
Nagarkurnool. Therefore it could be concluded that the newspapers 
campaigns had an impact on 36% in Secunderabad, 32% in Hyderabad 
and 26% in Nagarkurnool.
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SECTION II
THE USES AND IMPACT OF THE PERIODICAL PRESS
In the first phase, we surveyed the readership of magazines and the 
kinds of magazines generally read. In the second phase we asked the 
respondents about exposure to party advertisements and investigated 
their effectiveness in terms of exposure, and how far if at all 
they helped them in their voting decisions.
TABLE V. 17 THE FREQUENCY OF MAGAZINE READERSHIP
Frequency Number Percentage
Regularly 385 33.3
Sometimes 457 39.6
Never 313 27.1
Total 1155 100
As seen in table V.17, one third (33.3%) of the respondents are 
regular magazine readers and over a third (39.6%) read magazines 
sometimes. Therefore, close to three quarters (72.9%) of the 
respondents read magazines, while a little more than a quarter 
27.1% do not read magazines.
TABLE V. 18 THE NUMBER OF MAGAZINES READ
The number of magazines read Number %
Four or more 9 0.8
Three 459 39.7
Two 193 16.7
One 93 8.1
None 313 27.1
No answer 88 7.6
Total 1155 100
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As shown in table V.18, over a third (39.7%) of the respondents 
read three magazines. 16.7% read two and half this number (8.1%) 
read only one magazine. Only 0.8% read four or more magazines. 7.6% 
chose not to answer the question.
In the kinds of magazines, the Sunday supplements of Telugu and 
English newspapers were the magazines mentioned by most 
respondents. In a general analysis, the number of magazines named 
amounted to more than a hundred including weeklies, fortnightlies 
with some mentioning reading annuals and year books. Among those 
magazines which had over 50 to 100 readers comprised of news 
magazines which were more popular than the others. The generally 
mentioned ones were India Today. The Week. Sunday. and The 
Illustrated Weekly of India which has since ceased publication. 
Among all the periodicals the most read magazine was India Today 
followed by Sunday. a weekly news magazine published from Calcutta 
and The Week published from Kottayam in Kerala**.
Among the Telugu magazines, Swati was most popular magazine 
followed by the Sunday supplements4 of the Telugu newspapers. 
Other magazines mentioned included - Sitara. Saritha. Manorama and 
Vanitha Jvothi. As most political parties, especially the Cong.I 
had used magazines, we examined the exposure to and impact of 
advertisements in the magazines.
■* Among other magazines Frontline the news magazine published 
from Madras was read by 11 respondents. Sports magazines like 
Sports star and Sports week were read by 20 respondents. The 
general knowledge and current affairs magazine 'Competition Success 
Review" was read by 22 respondents and Science Digest read by 11. 
Film magazines like Stardust. Movie and Cine Blitz were together 
read by 26 respondents. Women's magazines. Femina and Women's Era 
were read by 22 respondents. Other magazines read by less than ten 
respondents ranged from business magazines to professional 
journals.
4 In the Sunday supplements of daily newspapers, Andhra 
Sachitra Vara Patrika was read by 40 respondents followed by 
Andhra Jyothi with 38 and Andhra Prabha by 35.
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EXPOSURE TO AND IMPACT OF PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE PERIODICALS 
PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS SEEN IN MAGAZINES
TABLE V. 19 PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS
Attitude variable N %
Yes 445 38.5
No 649 56.2
Don't remember 36 3.1
No Answer 25 2.2
Total 1155 100
More than a third, (38.5%) had recalled seeing the advertisements 
of political parties in the magazines, while more than half of the 
respondents were either non-readers and/or did not read the 
magazines in which the party advertisements were published. 
Moreover, as found earlier a majority of by respondents read the 
Sunday supplements of newspapers.
POLITICAL PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS IN MAGAZINES
TABLE V.20 PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS SEEN IN MAGAZINES
Political
Party
Ads seen Not seen Do not 
remember
No Answer
N % N % N % N %
Cong. I 272 23 .5 154 13.3 22 1.9 707 61.2%
BJP 189 16 .4 123 10.6 13 1.1 830 71.8%
JD 38 3.3 36 3.1 9 0.8 1072 92.8%
TDP 34 2.9 40 3.5 5 0.4 1076 93 .2%
SJP 17 1.4 31 2.7 1 0.1 1106 95.8
Others 11 1.0 37 3.2 8 0.7 1099 95.2
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The recall of Cong. I advertisements was the highest. As seen in 
table V.20, 23.5% of the respondents had seen Cong.I advertisements 
in magazines followed by 16.4% who had seen BJP advertisements. 
Just over 3% of the respondents had seen JD (3.3%) and TDP (2.9%) 
advertisements while only 1.4% had claimed to have seen SJP 
advertisements. Between 60 - 95% of the respondents had either not 
seen, did not remember or had no answer about seeing party 
advertisements in magazines.
TABLE V.21 EXTENT TO WHICH MAGAZINE ADVERTISEMENTS
HELPED IN VOTING DECISION
Attitude variable Number Percentage
A lot 70 6.1
Somewhat 195 16.9
Not at all 143 12 .4
No opinion 699 60.5
No answer 48 4.2
Total 1155 100
As observed in table V.21, party advertisements in magazines helped 
only 6.1% of the respondents in their decision to vote and to some 
extent for 16.9% while 12.4% were not at all helped. The remaining 
respondents did not answer or had no opinion.
SUMMARY
With over 35,000 newspapers and magazines being published in the 
country, the readership of newspapers and magazines was high with 
many reading upto four magazines. Respondents listed as many as 100 
periodicals with different periodicities. The Sunday supplements of 
newspapers, especially those of the Telugu newspapers, were as 
popular as magazines. Among the periodicals, news magazines were 
popular. ' India Today7 was the most read English magazine and Swati 
in Telugu.
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Magazines were not a popular medium for political advertising and 
most of the political parties used the daily newspapers, except for 
BJP and Cong.I which used selected English and regional language 
magazines. BJP only used India Today with centre and double spreads 
for better impact while Cong.I used over 400 English and vernacular 
magazines, selecting many nationally circulated English news 
magazines, film and general interest magazines and two or three 
regional magazines with three or four insertions for greater 
visibility.
Over a third (38.5%) of the respondents had come across 
advertisements of political parties in the magazines. Less than a 
quarter (23.9%) respondents came across Cong.I advertisements while 
16.4% had seen the BJP advertisements. JD and TDP advertisements 
were seen by about 3.3% and 2.9% of the respondents. Political 
party advertisements had helped only 6.1% and somewhat for 16.9%. 
in their decision to vote. Interestingly, around three quarters 
(72.9%) of the respondents read magazines, 33.3% regularly and 
39.6% sometimes. What is more 39.7% read three magazines, 16.7% 
read two and 8.1% read one. Though, less than a quarter (23%) were 
helped by magazines in their voting behaviour, there was a positive 
attitude developing towards political advertisements and most 
respondents did not brush away the prospect of seeing political 
advertisements in the press, even though it could be relatively 
restricted to the more educated sections.
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SECTION III
THE USES AND IMPACT OF ELECTION PROGRAMMES ON RADIO 
RADIO LISTENERSHIP
The Ministry of I & B, Government of India claims that radio 
reaches 97% of the population. Wide spread ownership of low cost 
transistor sets is often cited to support this claim. Radios were 
owned by 90.6% of the respondents and 92.1% listened to the radio. 
The average frequency of listening was high. There was not much 
difference on the basis of education, sex or constituencies, but 
the frequency of listenership varied in the urban and rural 
sectors.
TABLE V.22 LOCATION AND LISTENERSHIP OF RADIO
Attitude
variable
Urban Rural
N % N %
Never 65 7.9 27 8.2
Sometimes 344 41.7 91 27 .5
Regularly 415 50.4 213 64.3
Total 824 100 331 100
FREQUENCY OF LISTENERSHIP
We categorised the frequency of listening as; regularly meaning 
five to seven days a week, sometimes as two to four days a week and 
never meaning not hearing at all. As seen in table V.22, about two 
thirds (64.3%) of the rural respondents were regular listeners of 
radio compared to half (50.4%) of their urban counterparts. More 
than a third, 41.7% of the urban compared to 27.5% rural 
respondents listened sometimes. The frequency of listening was high 
at the regular or sometimes level with people listening nearly 
everyday. Less than 10% of urban (7.9%) and rural (8.2%) 
respondents did not listen to radio. These figures do prove that 
radio is a popular medium of mass communication in India. Education
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did not make much difference to listenership, unlike in the case of 
newspapers.
RADIO PROGRAMMES LISTENED TO BY THE RESPONDENTS
The kind of programmes heard on radio were evaluated in order to 
get an indication of the frequency of listenership to news and 
current affairs which generally covered election and political 
news.
TABLE V.23 FREQUENCY OF LISTENERSHIP TO RADIO 
PROGRAMMES
Programme
Content
Regularly Sometimes Never No Answer
N % N % N % N %
News 576 49.9 313 27.1 249 21.5 17 1.5
Current
Affairs
156 13 .5 395 34.2 568 49 .2 36 3.1
Discussions 117 10.1 382 33 .1 588 50.9 68 5.9
Film Based 437 37.8 421 36.5 273 23.6 24 2.1
Dramas, 
Plays
166 14 .4 468 40 .5 486 42 .1 35 3.0
Educational
Programmes
129 11.2 348 30.1 634 54.9 44 3.8
Others 17 1.4 111 9.7 738 63.9 289 25.0
From the table V.23, it is clear that news on radio was very 
popular: half the respondents (49.9%) listened regularly and over 
a quarter (27.1%) listened sometimes, with an overall 77% 
respondents tuning to the radio for news. This was confirmed by 
Bimla Bhalla, Assistant Director, AIR, who stated that there was a 
very high listenership to news on radio generally and especially 
during elections. Even the afternoon news bulletins were well 
received by audiences. Although AIR does not conduct any systematic
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research, they get a regular feedback through letters from the 
audiences^. Second, this high listenership could also in part be 
attributed to the number of newscasts in various languages catering 
to various segments of the audiences.
Current affairs programmes such as news analysis, commentaries and 
discussions that were broadcast twice weekly had limited 
listenership, 13.5% were listening regularly and over one third 
(34.2%) sometimes. It was observed that better educated men were 
more inclined to listen than women as against all other groups. 
However, we found that the election related programmes broadcast 
during the current affairs programmes were heard by over a quarter 
of the respondents as further detailed in table V.25.
After the news, entertainment programmes like the film based 
programmes were most listened to by three quarters (74.3%) of the 
respondents. Over half (54.6%) of the respondents listened to radio 
dramas and plays. Educational programmes which have been given high 
priority in the programme structure of the electronic media for 
supplementing school and adult-literacy programmes were heard by 
11.2% regularly, sometimes by 30.1% and not heard by over half 
(54.9%) the respondents. Therefore, in analyzing the use of radio 
by different segments, we could conclude that radio serves more as 
a medium for information and entertainment and less as an 
educational medium.
EXPOSURE AND IMPACT OF RADIO DURING ELECTIONS 
RADIO AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
Among the mass media of newspapers, radio and television on which 
respondents depended for election information, 80.8% stated that 
they would depend on radio for election information.
5Interview with Bimla Bhalla, Asst. Director, All India Radio, 
New Delhi, 20 April, 1991.
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TABLE V.24 RADIO AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude variable N %
A Lot 259 22.4
A Fair amount 674 58.4
Not at all 163 14.1
No opinion/ No answer 59 5.1
Total 1155 100
As seen in table V.24, 80.8% of the respondents tend to depend on
radio as a source of election information. Close to a quarter
(22.4%) a great deal and over half (58.4%) a fair amount. This 
again proves that a majority depend on radio for election 
information. There was not much difference between of men and 
women. In the constituencies, the highest number (30.6%) in
Secunderabad depended 'a lot' on radio followed by 21.9% in
Nagarkurnool and 18.4% in Hyderabad. In the rural constituency of 
Nagarkurnool, we found that the 84% of the respondents who were 
listening to radio depended on it for information about the 
elections compared to the other two constituencies. We further 
investigated the extent to which respondents heard the election 
related programmes on radio and how they found the coverage given 
to election related broadcasts.
RADIO LISTENERSHIP DURING THE 1991 CAMPAIGN
In the second phase, we found out about the extent of exposure to 
the election related programmes, party election broadcasts and news 
on radio, and if the election programmes discussed earlier had an 
impact in terms of increasing their awareness and influencing 
voting behaviour.
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THE FREQUENCY OF LISTENERSHIP TO NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS 
PROGRAMMES DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.
In the second phase the listenership increased marginally for the 
news and current affairs programmes. 20.6% listened regularly and 
35.3% heard sometimes, but 44.1% did not listen at all. We then 
investigated the specific types of election related programmes 
heard during the campaign period.
TABLE V.25 THE LISTENERSHIP OF ELECTION RELATED 
PROGRAMMES
Election Programmes Yes No Don't Know
N % N % N 'o
Discussions on 
Elections
511 44.2 577 50.0 67 5.8
Election
announcements for 
Voter education
516 44.7 573 49.6 66 5.7
Messages of CEO/CEC 296 25.6 728 63 .1 131 11.3
Quiz programmes on 
elections
281 24.3 770 66.7 104 9.0
Messages of DGP 263 22 .8 803 69.5 89 7.7
From the table V.25, discussions, election announcements and 
election related programmes over the radio were heard by over 40% 
of the respondents. The regular discussions in the current affairs 
programmes as well as those incorporated in the feature and special 
audience programmes were heard by 44.2% of respondents. The 
election messages in the form of slogans and announcements 
broadcast in Telugu, Urdu and English on main radio stations as 
well as part of other programmes were heard by 44.7%. The election 
messages of the CEC and the CEO (25.6%) and the DGP (22.8%) were 
heard by a quarter of the respondents.
The higher percentage in the 'not listened' and 'don't know' 
category could be in part attributed to low level of interest in
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politics and also to the lack of awareness of programme schedules 
that are listed very briefly in newspapers which again is a 
limiting factor for the illiterate. Unlike the Radio Times or the 
TV Times in Britain, there is no publication that gives the full 
details of programme schedules and hence it could be a case of hit 
or miss. Lastly, there is a low response to current affairs 
programmes in general and many respondents in the three 
constituencies appeared to use radio more as an entertainment 
medium. AIR does not have any scientific methods by which programme 
ratings are conducted regularly to monitor the listenership of the 
programmes by which one could compare the present data with the 
listed figures. We next evaluate the PEB's.
PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS (PEBs)
The respondents were asked if they heard the PEBs. Nearly half the 
respondents (46%), had heard election broadcasts. As seen in the 
table V.26, in all the three constituencies the PEBs were heard by 
a near equal percentage of respondents, 47.6% in Secunderabad, 
46.3%, in Hyderabad and 44.5% in Nagarkurnool.
TABLE V.26 PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS BY RADIO HEARD IN 
CONSTITUENCIES
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N o,*0 N % N %
Yes 172 47.6 229 46.3 130 44 .5
No 147 40 .7 234 47 .3 160 53 .5
Do not 
remember
29 8.0 29 5.8 6 2.0
No answer 13 3.6 3 0.6 3 1.0
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
This was regarded as a good response by AIR staff at Hyderabad who 
felt that the PEBs were generally heard by the public, but were not 
sure of the extent to which they were heard as they did not have
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any methods of finding the actual listenership of these programmes. 
As many respondents claimed to have heard the political party 
election broadcasts, it was found worthwhile to investigate which 
party broadcasts they heard.
TABLE V.27 LISTENERSHIP TO THE PARTY ELECTIONS BROADCASTS
Party
Election
Broadcasts
Yes No No Answer
N % N % N %
Cong.I 372 32.2 773 66.9 10 0.9
BJP 347 30.0 803 69.5 5 0.5
JD/NF 166 14 .4 981 84.9 8 0.7
SJP 80 6.9 1067 92 .4 8 0.6
TDP 169 14.6 979 84.8 7 0.6
CPM 50 4.3. 1099 95.2 6 0.5
CPI 32 2.8 1114 96.6 7 0.6
The Cong.I and BJP broadcasts were the highest recalled PEBs with 
about a third of the respondents. As seen in table V.27, 32.2% of 
the respondents had heard the Cong.I broadcast by Rajiv Gandhi and 
a near equal, 30% heard L.K.Advani's BJP party election broadcast. 
Over 14% heard the PEBs of TDP and JD. The response to PEBs of 
Communist parties was poor (4.3% CPM, 2.8% CPI). The rise of the 
BJP independently as against the JD/NF of which it was a part in 
the 1989 elections was evident from the responses, while the 
popularity of JD/ NF, which had until recently been in the 
government appeared to have reduced. The broadcast was heard by 
only half of those who heard the BJP's and the Cong.I broadcasts. 
The PEBs of regional TDP, which had only two broadcasts unlike the 
national parties which had four, were heard by 14.6%, nearly the 
same as that of its alliance group, the JD/NF.
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THE FREQUENCY OF LISTENING TO NEWS ON RADIO DURING ELECTIONS 
Respondents were asked the extent to which they heard news 
broadcasts on radio during the election period. News was heard by 
nearly three fourths, with nearly a half listening sometimes to 
regularly. There were multiple responses to those hearing the 
Telugu, Hindi and English news.
TABLE V.28 RADIO NEWS LISTENED TO DURING THE ELECTIONS
Radio News Regularly Sometimes Never
N % N % N %
Telugu News 340 29.4 456 39.5 359 31.1
Hindi News 164 14 .2 340 29 .4 651 56.4
English News 216 18.7 326 28.2 613 53 .1
As seen in table V.28, Over two thirds (68.9%) of the respondents 
heard the Telugu news bulletins during the elections. Over a 
quarter (29.4%) heard these regularly and over one third (39.5%) 
sometimes. Less than half the respondents listened to news 
bulletins during the election period in English (46.9%) and Hindi 
(43.6%). News in English (18.7%) was heard by more respondents 
regularly than Hindi (14.2%). While over half the respondents did 
not listen to Hindi (56.4%) and English (53.1%) news bulletins less 
than a third (31.1%) did not listen to Telugu news bulletins.
TABLE V.29 ATTITUDE TO THE COVERAGE OF ELECTION NEWS ON RADIO
Attitude variable N %
Very Good 81 7.0
Adequate 547 47 .4
Not at all good 127 11. 0
No Opinion 298 to in 00
No Answer 102 8.8
Total 1155 100
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As table V.29 indicates, more than half respondents found the 
coverage given to election news as very good or adequate. Nearly 
half (47.4%) the respondents found the coverage adequate, 7% found 
it very good, a quarter (25.8%) had no opinion and 8.8% had no 
answer.
TABLE V.30 THE EXTENT TO WHICH ELECTION PROGRAMMES HELPED IN
VOTING DECISION
Attitude Variable N
A lot 53 4.6
A Fair Amount 621 53 .8
Not at all 268 23 .2
Don't Know 148 12.8
No Answer 65 5.6
Total 1155 100
As seen in table V.30, overall radio helped 58.4% of the 
respondents in their decision to vote. While over half (53.8%) of 
the respondents were helped a fair amount, 4.6% were helped a lot.
SUMMARY
91.8% of rural and 92.1% of urban respondents listen to radio. 77% 
listen to the news. Telugu news was heard by 68.9% of the 
respondents followed by 46.9% who heard English news and 43.6% who 
listened to Hindi news. 74.3% listened to entertainment programmes, 
47.7% to current affairs programmes and 43.2% to discussions. Four 
fifths (80.8%) of the respondents depend on radio for election 
information. Election related broadcasts on radio were heard by
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22.8%-44.7% of the respondents during the 1991 elections. About 30% 
of the respondents heard PEBs of Cong. I and BJP and less than half 
that number heard those of TDP & JD. Over half of the respondents 
(54.4%) found coverage of election news on radio satisfactory and 
significantly, over half of them (53.8%) were helped a fair amount 
and 4.6% a lot by radio in their decision to vote. In the 
constituencies the impact of radio was highest in Nagarkurnool. 
8.8% said that radio programmes helped a lot. In Secunderabad radio 
helped a lot for 4% and a fair amount for 27.8% and Hyderabad only 
2.5% found the radio programmes very useful and 16.4% found them 
fairly useful.
SECTION IV
THE USES AND IMPACT OF ELECTION PROGRAMMES ON TELEVISION
Television reaches 84.2% of the population covering an area of 
62.9%. It is emerging as the most popular medium with its facility 
of sight and sound overcoming the illiteracy barrier. Several 
factors have contributed to this increase in the last three decades 
since its inception in 1959, with the rapid development of 
infrastructure at a pace of more than one new transmitter a day in 
1984 amounting to 540 transmitters. Low cost black and white 
television sets have increased the ownership in urban households. 
National statistics claim a high ownership of TV sets with nearly 
half the urban households where income is over Rs.4000 (£80) per 
month owning a TV set. With an estimated 2,738,000 domestic TVs, AP 
has the second largest ownership of TV sets in the south after TN. 
Television was owned by nearly three fourths (73.8%) of the 
respondents in this sample.
A study conducted nationally by ORG revealed a high viewership of 
television programmes, especially in the evenings. As shown in the 
table V.31 below, at the national level, 11% regularly watched the 
morning programmes, 45% watched in the afternoons and 52% watched
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in the evenings. One third (38%) in the mornings, 24% in the 
afternoons and 28% in the evenings-watch TV occasionally.
TABLE V.31 ALL INDIA PATTERN OF TELEVISION VIEWERSHIP DURING 
TRANSMISSIONS
Variable Morning % Afternoon % Evenings %
Regular 11 45 52
Occasional 38 24 28
Less Often 12 17 8
percentages
All figures in
RESPONDENTS PATTERN OF TELEVISION VIEWERSHIP
TABLE V.32 FREQUENCY OF WATCHING TELEVISION AMONG RESPONDENTS
Variable N %
Regularly 735 63 .6
Sometimes 257 22 .3
Never 163 14 .1
Total 1155 100
Among our respondents, 85.9% claimed that they watched television. 
Nearly two thirds, 63.6%, of respondents watch TV regularly and 
less than a quarter (22.3%) watch it sometimes. 14.1% did not 
watch TV. The regularity of watching TV at 63.6% was nearly the 
same as newspaper reading at 65.2%.(table V.32)
TABLE V.33 VIEWERSHIP OF TELEVISION IN THE CONSTITUENCIES
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N % N % N %
Regularly 293 81.2 307 62.0 134 44.8
Sometimes 52 14 .4 118 23.8 88 29.4
Never 16 4.4 70 14 .2 77 25.8
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
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95.6% in Secunderabad, 85.8% in Hyderabad and 74.2% in Nagarkurnool 
watch TV. 81.2% of the Secunderabad respondents watch TV regularly 
while 62% in Hyderabad and 44.8% in Nagarkurnool do so. Around a 
quarter of the respondents in Nagarkurnool (29.4%) and Hyderabad 
(23.8%) and 14.4% of their counterparts in Secunderabad watch TV 
sometimes (table V.33).
VIEWERSHIP OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMES
What were the kinds of programmes generally watched on TV. 
Programmes were classified into categories in general terms and the 
frequency of viewing was sought for each category. Some of the 
programmes are presented at regular periodicities as weekly, 
fortnightly or monthly therefore the regularity of watching does 
not mean everyday but whenever the programmes were telecast.
TABLE V.34 PROGRAMMES GENERALLY WATCHED ON TELEVISION
TV Programmes Regu]Larly Sometimes Never No Answer
N % N o.0 N o,o N o,"o
News 728 63 .0 223 19.3 191 16.5 13 l.i
Current
Affairs
2 80 24.2 448 38.8 396 34.3 31 2.7
Film based 563 48.8 337 29.2 238 20.6 16 1.4
Dramas/ Plays 441 38.2 423 36.6 272 23.5 19 1.6
Agricultural
Programmes*
103 8.9 360 31.2 564 56.6 38 3.3
Educational
programmes
127 11.0 443 38.4 549 47.5 36 3.1
Others 548 47.4 432 37.4 125 10.8 50 4.4
of the urban bias in the sample.
low in part because
The choice of programmes watched by respondents on television were 
similar to those heard on radio. As seen from table V.34, an
226
overwhelming four fifths (82.3%) of the respondents watched the 
news, around two thirds (63.0%) watched regularly and close to one 
fifths (19.3%) sometimes.
Over three quarters (78%) of the respondents watched films and 
film-based programmes, with nearly half (48.8%) being regular 
viewers and 29.2% occasional viewers. The dramas, generally 
serialised on TV followed third with nearly 74.8% with one fifths 
seeing them sometimes and the rest regularly.
The response to Current Affairs was comparatively low. The Current 
Affairs programmes comprise 6.4% of the national network output and 
7.5% of regional telecasts. Close to two third (63%) watched the 
current affairs programmes, a quarter (24.2%) watched regularly and 
38.8% watched sometimes. 28.9% men and 18.3% women watched the 
current affairs programmes and 39.7% women did not watch the 
current affairs compared to 30% men. The remaining, 37.7% men and 
40.2% women watched them sometimes.
Agricultural programmes were least viewed. More than half (56.6%) 
of the respondents did not see them at all. Of those who do watch 
31.2% do so sometimes and only 8.9% do so regularly. The viewership 
of the agricultural programmes was higher in the rural segments 
where 15% watched them regularly and 31% watched them sometimes. 
Around half 49.4% watched educational programmes, but only 11% 
watched them regularly. Educational programmes generally targeted 
at youth are telecast in the mornings and late afternoons were seen 
regularly by 11% and sometimes by 38.4% of the respondents.
The frequency of viewership confirms the habit of television 
viewing, as most programmes are watched sometimes or regularly, 
some more frequently than the others. This may be attributed in 
part to the fact, that in most homes TV is switched on at the 
beginning of the transmission and switched off at the end of the 
telecasts. Karan (1990) found that unlike cinema, TV does not
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attract a captive audience and is watched along with performing 
other household activities in India.
EXPOSURE TO NEWSCASTS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES ON TELEVISION 
Doordarshan has three news bulletins on the national network; one 
each in the morning, afternoon and evening in Hindi and English. 
The regional news is telecast once in the evenings in Telugu in AP 
for about 15 minutes. The national news telecasts on Doordarshan 
started from New Delhi in 1982 at 8.40 pm in Hindi and at 9.30 pm 
in English for a duration of 20 minutes each. The morning news 
bulletins in English and Hindi were telecast after Doordarshan 
started the morning transmission in February 1987. The afternoon 
programmes started on 26 January 1989 include short news bulletins 
in English and Hindi. The regional Telugu news, titled 
'Vartalu'(News) is broadcast for 15 minutes at 7.30 pm. In total, 
there are three newscasts each in English and Hindi and one in 
Telugu in the evenings. Overall news comprises 16.3% of the 
coverage on the national network and 9.9% of the regional network.
We examined the exposure to news and current affairs programmes at 
the first stage and respondents were later tested on their exposure 
during the election period as vast coverage was given to poll 
information comprising of news, election analysis and discussions.
TABLE V.35 EXPOSURE TO NEWSCASTS ON TELEVISION DURING CAMPAIGN 
PERIOD
News Regularly Sometimes Never No Answer
N % N % N % N %
Telugu news 583 50.5 286 24.8 249 21.5 37 3.2
Hindi news 462
oo
321 27.8 333 28.8 39 3.4
English
news
453 39.2 290 25.1 370 32.0 42 3.7
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As seen in table V.35, Telugu news bulletins were watched regularly 
by half (50.5%) of the respondents while 40% watched English and 
39.2% watched Hindi news bulletins regularly. Overall Telugu news 
was watched by 75% of respondents as it was the mother tongue of 
nearly the same percent, and second, being local news, the interest 
level was also high. A similar trend was seen in the high 
readership of Telugu newspapers and the local English newspaper 
Deccan Chronicle7.
THE CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES WATCHED BY RESPONDENTS
These programmes comprise of Parliament news reviews in Hindi and 
English which are telecast after the regular evening news bulletin 
on the national network transmission on the days when parliament 
meets. Issues of national interest are dealt with in detail in 
programmes like Focus and Aai Kal. Other programmes relate to a 
general round up of national and world events such as, The world 
this week. We examined the viewership of some of the current 
affairs programmes that were telecast regularly in English, Telugu 
and Hindi to get a perspective on the general interest programmes 
and the political programmes. Many of election programmes were part 
of these current affairs programmes.
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The frequency of viewing current affairs programmes was lower when 
compared to newscasts. Earlier we found that about a quarter 
(24.2%) of the respondents watched them regularly and 38.8% 
sometimes, but one third (34.3%) did not watch any of the current 
affairs programmes (table V.34). Some of the current affairs 
programmes had a good viewership as seen in table V.36.
TABLE V.36 VIEWERSHIP OF CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES
Current Affairs 
programmes
Regularly Sometimes Never
N o.*0 N O.o N Q,"O
The world this week 403 34.9 293 25 .4 459 39.7
Parliament news 165 14.3 395 34.2 595 51.5
Sansad samachar 
(Parliament news in 
Hindi)
107 9.3 376 32 .5 672 58.2
Focus 104 9.0 325 28.1 726 62.9
Saakshi (Witness) 371 32.1 288 25.0 496 42.9
Aaj Kal (Current 
Affairs)
108 9.3 309 26.8 738 63 .9
Among those who watched current affairs programmes, The World this 
week an English programme reviewing world events presented by a 
noted psephologist Prannoy Roy was regularly watched by a third 
(34.9%) and sometimes watched by 25.4% of the respondents. It is 
one of the few programmes that comprehensively cover the national 
and international news events, sports and entertainment. Saakshi 
(Witness) , a programme covering general events was regularly 
watched by 32.1% and sometimes by a quarter (25%) of the 
respondents. Parliament news in English was watched by 14.3% but 
the same in Hindi (Sansad samachar) was the one of the least viewed 
programmes along with Focus and the Hindi current affairs 
programmes Aai kal(Today and Tomorrow) watched by less than 10% of 
the respondents. Parliament news and Focus programmes that are
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telecast immediately after the news were rated low with more than 
half respondents not watching them at all.
It can be seen from the Table V.36, between 39.7% and 62.9% of the 
respondents did not see most of the current affairs programmes. 
Respondents were interested in news in general but appear little 
interested in getting more detailed information. Therefore it was 
doubtful if the election related programmes scheduled in the 
current affairs programmes would be watched. We further examine TV 
as a source of election information and its impact on voting 
behaviour.
TELEVISION AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR ELECTION NEWS
Focusing on the extensive'coverage on elections that was planned 
for radio and TV to educate voters, we asked the respondents if 
television was a source of election information. Since the general 
exposure to television was high and news was rated the highest in 
terms of viewership in all the three languages, television appeared 
potentially as an important source of information.
As seen in table V.37, over a quarter (2 8.2%) of the respondents 
depended a lot on television for election information, this was 
only next to a third (34.3%) who depended a lot on newspapers while 
a fifth (22.4%) of the respondents depended a lot on radio.
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TABLE V.37 GENDER WISE DEPENDENCY ON TV FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
N % N O,*o N *o
A lot 217 33 .5 109 21.5 326 28.2
A fair amount 312 48.0 272 53 .6 583 50.5
Not at all 89 13 .7 76 15.0 165 14.3
No opinion 31 4.8 50 9.9 81 7.0
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
More men (33.5%) than women (21.5%), depended a lot on TV for 
election information. As observed in table V.37, half the women 
depended on television for election information. It could be argued 
that the figure of nearly 78.7% being dependent on television at 
varying degrees was high when compared to the level of viewership. 
It clearly indicated that all those watching television depended on 
it as a source of information. Moreover there was a low level of 
interest in the current affairs and political programmes, seen by 
only a quarter of the respondents. Such exaggerated responses are 
not uncommon in most surveys despite efforts made by the researcher 
to get as accurate data as possible. However, the same data was 
checked in the second phase to find the use and attitudes towards 
the election coverage during the campaign.
In the second phase of the survey, we examined the viewership of 
television with an emphasis on exposure to election related 
programmes. A new development since 1989 and 1991 elections was 
round the clock news bulletins during the declaration of results. 
As discussed earlier, These were accompanied by news analysis, 
voting trends, discussions and interviews.
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THE VIEWERSHIP OF TELEVISION DURING ELECTIONS
EXPOSURE TO VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAMMES
We investigated the exposure to election related programmes both at 
national and state level during the six weeks period, 1 May, 1991 
to 19 June, 1991, until the election results were declared. 
Television was the most popular medium with over 75% respondents 
regularly watching TV.
TABLE V. 38 THE FREQUENCY OF WATCHING NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS
PROGRAMMES
Attitude variable N %
Regularly 437 37.8
Sometimes 552 47.8
Never 161 14.0
No Answer 5 0.4
Total 1155 100
Table V.38 shows an even spread in the viewership of news and 
current affairs programmes. Over a third (37.8%) of the respondents 
watched regularly and close to half (47.8%) watched sometimes. We 
further asked if they watched the specific election programmes as 
discussed earlier.
THE VIEWERSHIP OF ELECTION RELATED PROGRAMMES
The listed programmes in question were: the discussion programmes, 
question and answer programmes (Quiz), voter education programmes 
and the talks, interviews with the CEC, DGP, CEO and other 
officials. The table V.39 gives the viewership of these
programmes.
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TABLE V.39 SHOWING THE VIEWERSHIP OF ELECTION RELATED PROGRAMMES
ON TELEVISION.
Election Programmes Yes No No Answer
N "o N O N g^*o
Election Discussions 655 56.7 479 41.5 21 1.8
Election Quiz 432 37.4 715 61.9 8 0.7
Election Announcements 585 50.6 558 48 .4 12 1.0
CEC/CEO 430 37.2 714 61.8 11 1.0
DISCUSSIONS
Election discussions rated highest. More than half (56.7%) of the 
respondents had seen them either in English, Telugu and Hindi/Urdu 
on the national or regional broadcasts, some of which were part of 
the regular current affairs programmes and some were included in 
special programmes in Telugu and Urdu^. A maximum number of 
election related programmes were in the form of discussions.
ELECTION QUIZZES
There was a comparatively low viewership for election quiz 
programmes which were the question and answer sessions directed at 
youth and new voters. These were seen by more than a third (37.4%) 
of the respondents. The low viewership could be partly because 
there were few telecasts and these were telecast late in the 
evening between 10.30-11.00 pm.
ELECTION ANNOUNCEMENTS
Discussion programmes were followed by election announcements and 
were seen by half (50.6%) of the respondents. These were extensive, 
comprising of information on the rules and election guidelines for 
candidates to actually showing the voter how to vote in the
^In the Urdu programme ' Aniuman' and ' Elections our 
Responsibility7 were important discussion programmes which focused 
on the individuals responsibility to vote as citizens.
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elections. These two minute spots were shown frequently as 
announcements, animation films and 'pictures with captions.'
ELECTION MESSAGES AND TALKS WITH OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE CONDUCT 
OF ELECTIONS
As discussed earlier, extensive information was provided through 
messages and interviews with the CEC, CEO and DGP. These interviews 
were telecast on prime time on the national and regional networks 
and were seen by over a third (37.2%) of the respondents. 
T.N.Seshan, the CEC was embroiled in controversy over not only the 
rules governing elections but also on the postponement of the 
Punjab poll and on the dates for the second round of polls after 
the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The CEC was briefing the media 
daily on poll developments and changes in the electoral process. 
There was a wide coverage given to his briefings in the press, 
radio and TV. This was a new development in the Indian election 
scene.
PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS
We next enquired if the respondents had seen the PEBs of the 
various political parties on television. These PEB's were telecast 
once in the prime time slot between 8.45 pm to 9.00 pm and 9.15 pm 
before the news for which the viewership was generally high. It was 
found that viewership of PEB's was high as nearly 68.2% of the 
respondents had seen them. Many respondents were able to recall the 
names of political parties,
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TABLE V.40 PEBs SEEN BY THE RESPONDENTS
Political Party Yes NO
N % N %
Cong.I 595 51.5 560 48.5
BJP 531 46.0 624 54.0
JD 312 27.0 843 73 .0
SJP 215 18.6 940 81.4
CPI 103 8.9 1052 91.1
CPM 73 6.3 1082 93 .7
As seen in Table V.40, the PEB of the late Cong.I leader, Rajiv 
Gandhi was seen by over half (51.5%) of the respondents followed by 
46% who saw the BJP telecast of L.K Advani while the JD election 
telecast by V.P.Singh was seen by a little over a quarter (27%). 
Former Prime Minister Chandrashekhar' s speech for the SJP was seen 
by 18.6%, while those of CPI and CPM were seen by less than 10% of 
the respondents. The recall of the PEBs could in part be attributed 
to the popularity and the ease of recognising leaders such as Rajiv 
Gandhi, L.K.Advani, V.P.Singh and Chandrashekhar, three of whom 
were former prime ministers. We further asked their opinion on the 
content and coverage given on TV.
OPINION ON THE COVERAGE GIVEN TO ELECTIONS ON TELEVISION
TABLE V.41 OPINION THE CONTENT OF ELECTION INFORMATION ON 
TELEVISION
Attitude variable Frequency Percentage
Very good 402 34.8
Good 404 35.0
Not very good 81 7.0
Not at all good 44 3.8
No Opinion 224 19 .4
Total 1155 100
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As seen in table V.41., over two third (69.8%) found the content of 
election information on television programmes good. A third (34.8%) 
found the content of programmes very good while an equal number 
(35%) found the content good. Nearly a fifth had no opinion. Only 
a very small percentage of 3.8% were not at all satisfied with the 
coverage. Most of the respondents gave similar opinion on the 
coverage given to election information on radio.
TABLE V.42 COVERAGE GIVEN TO ELECTION PROGRAMMES ON
TELEVISION
Attitude variable N o.
Too much 109 9.4
Adequate 664 57.5
Too Little 79 6.8
Don't Know 303 26.2
Total 1155 100
More than half (57.5%) of the respondents reported that the 
coverage given to election programmes on TV was adequate. While 
9.4% found the election programmes on television excessive, 6.8% 
found them inadequate, and a quarter (26.2%) had no opinion. Given 
the above factors did TV help them in their voting decisions.
DID THE COVERAGE Of ELECTIONS HELP IN THE DECISION TO VOTE
In order to relate specific data we divided the question into the 
programmes that focused on elections such as,* news and current 
affairs/discussions, voter education programmes and PEBs.
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TABLE V.43 ELECTION PROGRAMMES THAT HELPED THE VOTERS IN THEIR 
DECISION MAKING
Attitude
variable
News and 
Current Affairs
Voter
Education
Programmes
Party
Election
Broadcasts
N % N "o N "o
A Lot 138 11.9 42 3.6 66 5.7
A Fair Amount 295 25.5 255 22 .1 343 29.7
Not very much 290 25.1 304 26.3 203 17.6
Not at all 234 20.3 254 22 .0 259 22.4
Don't Know 198 17.1 300 26.0 284 24.6
From the three tables V.41-43, several interesting facts relating 
to exposure, attitudes to content and coverage of election 
information and the extent to which the election related programmes 
helped the respondents in the final voting behaviour can be 
inferred.
As in table V.43, news and current affairs programmes helped the 
most: 11.9% said that these programmes helped a lot and 25.5% said 
a fair amount taking the overall figure to 37.4%.
The voter education programmes had a low response in terms of 
impact. They helped a lot for 3.6% and a fair amount for more than 
a fifth (22.1%). Close to three quarters (74.3%) were not 
particularly affected. 26% were either not sure or did not find 
them helpful at all (22%) and (26.3%) found them helpful to a very 
small degree.
PEBs drew very contrasting results between the exposure and impact. 
Though 70% had seen the PEBs only 5.7% stated that these leader 
telecasts had helped them a lot, 29.7% said a fair amount. The 
others were either not sure and a fifth (22.4%) were not at all
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affected. In Secunderabad 7.3% found the PEBs to be very helpful 
compared to 6% in Hyderabad and 3.4% in Nagarkurnool.
However, one third agreed that the programmes had helped them a 
fair amount. From varying degrees from a lot to a fair amount, 
television programmes were being positively used by one third of 
the respondents in making up their minds for casting their vote.
TELEVISION WAS MOST SOUGHT AFTER DURING THE DECLARATION OF RESULTS
In the 1989 and 1991 general elections, the election results on 
television were extensively covered by noted psephologists, Prannoy 
Roy and Vinod Dua, commentating in English and Hindi respectively. 
The round-the-clock coverage was interspersed with discussions, 
analysis and interviews with the politicians, academics and media 
persons through an all India link with National Informatics Centre 
Network.
Considering the vast coverage given to elections in the mass media, 
we assessed which media was most sought after for obtaining the 
election results. An overwhelming 90% of the respondents named 
Cong. I as the party that had won the majority in the election. 
Though respondents marked various sources from which they obtained 
the election results, television was rated highest. 62%, came to 
know the results from TV a figure far ahead of those who came to 
know from newspapers (12%) and radio (14%) . A small percentage had 
come to know through other sources like the local leaders (5%), 
government offices (4.4%) and (2.6%) from other government sources.
SUMMARY
During the 1991 elections, the electronic media of radio and 
television were extensively used for greater awareness of the 
political process at the pre and post election stages. The voter 
education programmes covered every aspect of the electoral process
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including guidelines to candidates, voter registration, poll 
arrangements. They also showed them how to vote on the ballot 
paper. These were in the form of short announcements, discussion 
programmes, interviews, skits and animation films. Election news 
was covered in the newscasts and current affairs programmes in the 
national and regional networks.
Television in India with its extensive reach and ability of audio 
and video presentation, overcoming the barrier of literacy was 
emerging as an important channel of communication with diverse 
audiences. We found that the general viewership of TV was high with 
two thirds (63.6%) of the respondents watching TV every day of the 
week and about a quarter (22.3)% watching occasionally.
In most western democracies television is the focus of all election 
campaigning and forms the main channel of information about 
elections and sets the agenda for the elections. In India the 
system is not quite the same. First, TV in India is government 
controlled. Second it was a late entrant and is soon becoming a 
channel of information and education in the electoral process.
The voter educational programmes were seen by about half the 
respondents who saw many of the listed programmes. The PEBs were 
seen by an overwhelming 70% of the respondents with the maximum 
having seen the Cong.I and the BJP telecasts. Though there was a 
high viewership of the election related programmes and most of them 
were satisfied with the coverage given to election information, 
they helped a third of respondents and that too mostly a fair 
amount in making their voting decision.
The news in all the three languages was heard by over 50% of the 
respondents though Telugu news telecast once a day was watched more 
than the English and Hindi news telecasts three times a day. The 
current affairs programmes were less popular except the English 
programme, The world this week seen by a third of the respondents.
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The round-the-clock coverage during the declaration of election 
results, through analysis and interviews was well received and 
appreciated by the people. Three fourths of the respondents of the 
present study rated the coverage of election results on TV as 
excellent or good and TV scored over other media as an excellent 
source of election information.
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CHAPTER VI
THE USES AND IMPACT OF OTHER ELECTRONIC MEDIA DURING ELECTIONS
In this chapter, we discuss the use and impact of the alternative 
forms of electronic media - the video cassettes, audio cassettes 
and films that have been claimed to be the most effective forms Of 
reaching diverse Indian audiences1. In the case studies we found 
that almost all parties had used videos as part of their campaign 
strategies with some candidates making personal video cassettes. We 
emphasize the importance of feature and video films and audio 
cassettes as narrowcasting media, their use and applicability for 
information, education and entertainment and as techniques of 
political communication. Finally we report the findings from our 
survey on the impact of these- electronic forms in aiding voting 
decisions.
Cinema had been a major chronicler of social change reflecting the 
changing ways of Indian life. It was the only means of mass 
entertainment until television changed the social context of home 
entertainment. Hartman, Patil and Dighe (1990) found that 
entertainment media played a major role in helping to promote 
receptiveness to new values and an openness to change. More 
importantly, for the rural and illiterate audiences, the moving 
images reaching through the mobile cinemas were the only source of 
information and entertainment.
1 As stated by Dr. J.K Jain of Jain Studios,New Delhi, pioneer 
in making political video films in India and the spokespersons of 
political parties.
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SECTION I
VIDEO CASSETTES AS 'NARROWCASTING MEDIA'
One of the promises of the New Electronic Media (NEM) is their 
ability to personalize mass communication by differentiating 
audiences through a system of 'narrowcasting'(Paley & Moffett, 
1984). Unlike broadcasting, (narrowcasting is the process of 
targeting specific messages to specific audiences through mass 
communication technology^ In a diverse and heterogenous country 
like India, (video technology^ has, in principle, vast uses and 
applicability; it is not only being used for leisure time 
entertainment at home but also serving educational and 
informational needs. ;o become an important form of
VIDEOS FOR EDUCATION, INFORMATION AND HOME ENTERTAINMENT
Unlike TV, where black and white sets have to some extent reached 
the lower income groups, the high cost of videos inhibited the 
penetration of videos in the general market. However, videos have 
become popular among the upper classes for home entertainment, 
mainly for watching feature films. Video libraries, with the latest 
Indian and foreign films have mushroomed in the upper class urban 
areas, along with video parlours set up in residential and 
commercial centres for watching feature films at discounted rates.
With the popularity of the videos, newspaper groups initiated the 
production of video magazines which covered news events, film 
gossip and business information. 'Newstrack' the news video from 
the publishers of India Today (Living Media India Pvt. Ltd.) was 
the first news and current events video and continues to be popular 
in India and abroad. Several others like 'Eyewitness' produced by 
The Hindustan Times and 'Observer News Channel' and business videos 
for specialised audiences are popular, but the movie videos have 
the highest circulation.
election communicatio]
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Understanding the potential of videos for narrowcasting 
information, the Government of India has also initiated several 
educational and information programmes which are screened through 
videos. Videos are also being used to facilitate both formal and 
informal education in schools and other institutions2 . Another 
interesting trend has been the use of video cassettes in temples 
involving taped religious ceremonies shown particularly at festival 
times. Within India and abroad, video cassettes are being used to 
spread the messages of religious leaders and the opportunity to 
view participants engaging in religious discourse, /with the 
multipurpose use of videos, it was not long before they were 
incorporated into election campaigns 3
[videos are part of a 'high tech' communication revolution taking 
place in IndiaJ While in most democracies, television is the most 
powerful medium of influence especially in US and Britain, in India 
television being government controlled does not allow any kind of 
real political debate. [Realising the effectiveness of the audio­
visual medium and in an effort to compete with the state controlled 
radio and TV, political parties have developed audio cassettes and 
the Video-on-Wheels (VOWs) J  [vOWs have become the most diverse 
political hard sell 7j [Through the use of traditional and folk forms 
in an information and entertainment format, videos have been a 
distinctive Indian development and have contributed to the 
development of 'Entertainment culture' for political election 
campaigns. 22
2 Formal education programmes are produced and financed by the 
University Grants Commission to supplement the overall educational 
curriculum. Non formal education has focused on social and 
development education like traffic education, road safety, railway 
information and airport guides. Development education programmes 
have focused on family planning programmes, prevention of diseases, 
environment concerns and home safety. Corporate videos are 
extensively increasing product identification and increasing the 
outreach. Videos are also being used for the promotion of tourism 
in the country.
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THE VIDEO-ON-WHEELS
jvOWs are vans with huge 300 inch screens mounted at the rearTj^hese 
vans are fitted with sophisticated equipment, top of the line 
stereo systems, generators and projection systems which can throw 
up an image for an audience of over 5,000 at a timeT^ (jhese video 
vans go from village to village and on an average there are five to 
seven shows dailyf)The party workers, through announcements using 
the bandwagon technique gather people from two to three villages 
and show the election films. Videos are also a means of informative 
entertainment during public meetings and rallies. Screened before 
the arrival of political leaders (who invariably arrive late for 
the meetings) they help in keeping the audiences from drifting 
away.J
The leaders and parties also have their own multi-purpose election 
vans called by various names like Vishwamitra Prachara Rathams 
(Publicity vans), Ram Raths, Vijay Raths and Shaheen.[During the 
1991 elections NTR put a fleet of 23 VOWS, one for each district in 
AP to spread the TDP message^.Cultural troupes accompanied each 
van. The video and audio equipment showed clips of NTR movies and 
songs, the strategy being, first to entertain and then to inform 
and persuade.
[videos have been the natural outcome of the impact that cinema 
exerts on Indian life f] India is the largest producer of films3 . 
Films are popular sources of information, education and 
entertainment and have vast reach, especially through the mobile 
cinemas. The production of films matches the demand as cinema 
viewing is highly popular among all levels of the population. Film
3 Over 800 feature films and 3000 short films are produced 
every year. Source:India Reference Annual 1994, Ministry of I & B, 
Government of India.
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music, songs and film related programmes have been most popular on 
radio and television4 .
^Films were first used during the 1971 elections in New Delhi where 
a one minute film was made by Jan Sangh and screened in the New 
Delhi theatres 3£uain in 1984 the Cong. I used a twenty five minute 
film on Indira Gandhi titled 'Maa'(mother). About 5000 prints of 
the film were distributed all over the country (Agarwal, 1989)^ The 
assassination of the popular leader evoked an emotional response 
from the viewers. After sobbing over her death, the people were 
treated to janother film on Rajiv Gandhi 'Amethi Ka Suraj (Sun of 
Amethi-3 Amethi is a constituency in UP which Rajiv Gandhi 
represented) which presented him as the successor who would take 
over from his mother5 . The people of India accepted the new leader 
and gave Cong.I and Rajiv Gandhi an overwhelming victory in the 
1984 elections.
(The successful use of films for elections in the 1984 elections set 
the trend for the use of films through the videosJ^The format of 
the films has changed, from the documentary biographies of leaders 
to popular entertainment oriented filmsT^The moving cinemas and 16 
mm projectors have also been replaced by the VOWs.(-This technique 
of using films for political purposes, called 'political campaign 
films' on VOWs reach audiences all over the country.3.
4 In the Programmes Composition of National Network on 
Doordarshan, 24.6% of the programmes, the highest percentage 
comprises of film based programmes. Source: Television in India 
(Statistical) 1992.
5 The film depicted Indira Gandhi as a fond mother recalling 
many good qualities of her elder son - his resolve, patience, 
capacity for caring, small incidents from his childhood. The 
qualities that he inherited form his grandfather, father and Indira 
Gandhi herself. The last part of the film showed Rajiv Gandhi in an 
interview, answering questions about the issues, his hopes, dreams 
and plans of action for the country.
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POLITICAL VIDEO FILMS AND THE 1991 INDIAN ELECTIONS 
^Political video films are a distinct and unique way of reaching a 
diverse and often illiterate population^](vOWs reach where the mass 
media do nothin 1987/ videos were used in the Haryana assembly 
elections, which it was claimed helped the non Congress parties 
win**. Pioneered by Dr.J.K.Jain, a medical doctor, of Jain Studios 
in New Delhi who claims videos to be the best tool of election 
campaigning in India. According to him, videos have the reach, 
punch and the programmatic stress. As they are targeted to the 
'audiences *Tocated in different regions and presented) [in local 
languages and dialects^] they form an excellent means of reaching
. 7the vast and varied audiences' .
T^he video trends caught on in the 1989 general elections. There was 
an extensive usage of the new media - audio and video cassettes. 
Video technology played a prominent role in the opposition parties 
1989 campaign and particularly that of BJP^ Jain Studios rented out 
75 video vans to the BJP and in 1991 the number increased to 108 
(Manuel, 1993) . fBy 1991 videos became standard features of election 
campaigns in India^) The Cong. I, BJP, JD, SJP and the Communist 
parties were all in the fray to demonstrate their election 
frontiers with some of them releasing as many as four or five 
different cassettes with different themes. Translated into several 
languages these videos reached voters all over the country.£since 
political videos were not restricted by any censorship body, videos 
allowed the parties to compete with each other in mudslinging 
matches.^
Though the cost of making, duplicating and screening are high, its 
impact was claimed to be much greater when compared to the print 
media which reach a small segment of the literate voters, with the
** As claimed in the promotion film of Jain Studios and the 
leaders of the Haryana assembly.
7 Interview with Dr.J.K. Jain in New Delhi, 12 June, 1991.
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result that most political parties now put their money 
disproportionately into videos®.
CONTENT OF THE VIDEO FILMS
Political videos offered variety and flexibility to the election 
messages:Csongs, style, theme, music, dance and drama^i These films 
were accentuated with shots of harmonious village life, rustic 
artisans happily engrossed in their work, the leaders meeting 
people, holding babies, walking through the dust laden villages and 
towns listening to the grievances of the citizens.
r* . .
'Political parties used the news and entertainment formats m  the 
presentation, but the entertainment format was prevalent in most 
videos .3 information included party policies, achievements and 
future programmes along with speeches and interviews with the 
leaders and supporters.3 Songs and dances accompanied the 
information package. |5olk forms like folk music, theatre and dances 
using rural instruments were incorporated^ [Historical and religious 
themesjwere extensively used in the political videos.
Political video films were of two kinds;- (^Theme films'J and
T""1 . . -1/Personality f i l m s T h e m e  films mainly focused on the achievements 
of the parties, their policies and future programmes. Personality 
films were similar to the election bio-pics of leaders like Neil 
Kinnock in the 1987 British elections and John Major's 'The 
Journey' in the 1992 elections made for PEBs in Britain. Unlike 
these TV bio-pics, in India they were included in the videos. The 
characteristics of leaders were enumerated through music and songs. 
_However, most of the films incorporated both these aspects in 
different parts in a single filmf] Almost all video films had 
personality sketches of the leaders included in them. Another
8 As stated by party spokespersons; Anand Sharma of Cong.I, 
New Delhi and Kishen Reddy of BJP, Hyderabad)
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fT . ..important aspect m  the videos was the publicity for election 
symbols/) The lyrics of songs highlighted the historical or 
mythological references and people were urged to vote for the 
symbol9 .
All the national political parties brought out a minimum of two 
video cassettes in the first phase of the elecions. Cong.I, BJP, JD 
and TDP brought out new video cassettes for the second phase of the 
elections after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Cong.I, BJP, SJP 
and TDP had used their political videos in the villages and towns 
of AP. The TDP video projected the alleged atrocities committed by 
the Congressmen in the aftermath of the assassination to counteract 
the sympathy wave that would affect the political fortunes of the 
party. The Cong.I video film made after the assassination traced 
the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi to his untimely end with shots of 
his assassination and the funeral that followed in order to 
persuade the electorate to vote for Cong. I to realize the dreams of 
the departed leader.
Political video films had brought in the entertainment culture^) but 
did they achieve the claimed magic ? In our survey we evaluated the 
exposure and the impact of these video films and have placed 
emphasis in the (iural constituency of NagarkurnoolJ In the first 
phase of the survey we assessed the access to videos generally, and 
in the second we questioned the respondents on whether they saw the 
political videos.
9 The Cong. I symbol of 'Hand' was referred to as an 
experienced one and people were urged to join hands with the 'Hand' 
and strengthen the Cong.I and Rajiv Gandhi, similarly the BJP 
symbol of the lotus was projected to bring prosperity wherever it 
would bloom.
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THE EXPOSURE TO ELECTION VIDEOS
ACCESS TO VIDEOS
Due to high cost, VCRS and VCPs are not within the reach of the 
average Indian and the viewership of videos is still low. As 
outlined in Chapter IV, in our sample, videos were not accessible 
to 81.6% of the respondents. In terms of viewership, it was found 
that half the respondents (50.9%) had never watched videos, 35.6% 
sometimes and only 13.3% watched regularly.
Ownership of course was not a criterion for watching political 
videos. Unlike other media, we did not ask the respondents if they 
depended on videos for election information as it was not a regular 
means of gaining information, the questions relating to election 
videos were asked in the second phase of the survey.
TABLE VI. 1 VIEWERSHIP OF ELECTION VIDEOS IN URBAN AND 
RURAL AREAS
Location Yes No
N o"o N %
Urban 122 14.8 702 85.2
Rural 103 31.1 228 68.9
Total 225 19.5 930 80.5
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TABLE VI. 2 ELECTION VIDEOS SEEN IN THREE
CONSTITUENCIES
Constituencies Yes No
N 0^ N O**o
Secunderabad 47 13.0 314 87.0
Hyderabad 84 17.0 411 83 .0
Nagarkurnool 94 31.4 205 68.6
Total/Ave % 225 19.5 930 80.5
As observed in Table VI.1, about a fifth of the sample (19.5%) of 
the entire sample had been exposed to political video films. In the 
urban sections 14.8% had seen the videos while in the rural 
constituencies double the percentage, 31.1% had seen the election 
videos of political parties. By constituency, the pattern of 
viewership was as claimed, higher exposure in the rural 
constituencies. We found that nearly a third (31.4%) of the 
respondents in Nagarkurnool had seen the political videos compared 
to 13% in Secunderabad and 17% in Hyderabad. More than two thirds 
of the rural and four fifths of the urban respondents were unaware 
of the election videos.
TABLE VI.3 PARTY VIDEOS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS IN URBAN 
- RURAL AREAS
Party Urban Rural Total
N % N “O N o.o
Cong. I 67 8.1 59 17 . 8 127 11.0
BJP 98 11.9 74 22.3 174 15.1
TDP 35 4.2 62
t"00rH 101 8.7
JD 14 1.7 1 0.3 15 1.3
Among the political party videos, a majority of 15.1% of 
respondents saw the BJP videos, followed by 11% who saw Cong.I and
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even less 8.7% saw the TDP video films. It was interesting to note 
the rise of the BJP in AP. From a virtually non existent party in 
the state, it had gained vast popularity and prominence. As seen in 
table VI.3, in both rural and urban areas, BJP videos were seen 
more than others. More than a fifth (22.3%) of the rural and 11.9% 
of urban respondents had seen the BJP videos. Double the rural 
respondents (17.8%) compared to the 8.1% urban respondents saw the 
Cong. I videos, but a larger margin was seen in the TDP videos. Four 
times more rural (18.7%) respondents saw the TDP videos compared to 
4.2% urban respondents. The respondents were asked if the video 
cassettes helped them in their voting decision.
IMPACT OF THE VIDEOS ON VOTING DECISION
TABLE VI.4 EXTENT TO WHICH VIDEOS HELPED IN VOTING
DECISIONS
Attitude variable Number Percentage
A lot 48 4.2
A fair amount 181 15.7
Not very much 91 7.9
Not at all 270 23 .3
Don't Know/No Answer 565 48.9
Total 1155 100
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TABLE VI.5 INFLUENCE OF VIDEOS ON URBAN AND RURAL
RESPONDENTS
Attitude variable Urban Rural
N o,*o N %
A Lot 23 2.8 25 7.6
A fair amount 106 12.8 75 22 .6
Not very much 54 6.6 37 11.2
Not at all 234 28.4 36 10.9
Don't Know/No answer 407 49 .4 158 47 .7
Total 824 100 331 100
A sizeable chunk of nearly half (48.9%) (49.4% urban and 47.7%
rural respondents) were unsure about videos influencing voting 
decision. As in Table VI.4 and VI.5, only 4.2% reported that videos 
helped a lot, 15.7% said a fair amount, 7.9% were not influenced 
much while nearly a quarter 23.4% were not at all influenced. 
Overall, videos appear not to have significantly aided voting 
decision. While there was not much of a difference between urban 
(49.4%) and rural (47.7%) in the don't know category, response 
patterns in other categories show that videos have had 
significantly greater impact on voting decisions of rural 
respondents. While 2.8% urban respondents reported 'a lot', there 
were 7.6% rural respondents who joined them. In the 'a fair amount' 
category, there were 22.7% rural against 12.9% urban respondents. 
In the 'not at all' category there were only 10.9% rural 
respondents against a significant 28.4% urban respondents.
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SECTION II
AUDIO CASSETTES AS 'NARROWCASTING MEDIA'
Audio cassettes were another electronic development as an 
alternative to the government controlled radio. [The audio cassettes 
of speeches and songs as secondary form of election campaigning 
from loud speakers atop buildings, electric poles, vehicles and 
trees added to the election festivities and the cacophony. In 
India, it is common practice to have songs and music during 
religious festivals, weddings and social occasions. It is difficult 
for one not to hear these audio cassettes because of their high 
volume and continuous play.
Audio cassettes mainly comprised of speeches and songs. [~The 
speeches were those of party leaders and candidates that were 
generally [recorded during public meetings QjThese were edited, 
copied, sometimes translated and distributed all over the country^. 
£part from these, the speeches of religious leaders especially 
those of the firebrand Sadhvi Rithambara were used to gain support 
for the BJP.J
{The party songs highlighted the characteristics of the party and 
leaders, the symbol, the strategies and the programmes of the 
partyJ'fhey included patriotic and devotional songs and also pop 
songs with western music D  Most of the songs were [parodies of 
popular film tunes! and a number of popular musicians and singers 
from the film world wrote, composed the music and sang the lyrics.
^Almost all political parties made audio cassettes’!].The party songs 
offered a wide variety: Cong. I used pop singer Parvati Khan to woo 
the younger elite generation while BJP used folk and devotional 
songs to glorify the party and the symbol. The JD cassette produced 
by a popular Hindi film star Raj Babbar, had parodies of familiar 
film songs and quawallis (songs in Urdu) . TDP cassettes had a 
variety of party and film songs from NTR's movies and his speeches.
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'The audio cassettes were extensively copied and distributed all 
over the country.) Copies numbered between 5,000 to 50,000. Some 
audio cassettes were also played from homes and commercial centres 
of party supporters.^In some places these songs were accompanied by 
street plays and folk theatre fj We have reviewed some of the 
contents of the audio cassettes of the political parties in the 
case studies. In the survey we investigated the exposure to these 
cassettes and whether they helped in voting decisions.
AUDIO CASSETTES HEARD BY THE RESPONDENTS
(The audio cassettes were heard by nearly half (45.4%) , of the
respondentsTj^ slightly [higher by the rural (46.1%) than the urban
(45.1%) respondentsT)[A third of the respondents were able to recall
the names of the political parties whose audio cassettes they had 
• -\
heard .
TABLE VI. 6 PARTY AUDIO CASSETTES HEARD BY THE 
RESPONDENTS
Political Party Yes* No
N O N %
Cong.I 410 35.5 745 64 .5
BJP 459 39.7 696 60.3
TDP 380 32.9 775 67 .1
MIM 126 10.9 1029 89.1
JD 77 6.7 1078 93 .3
SJP 26 2.3 1129 97.7
♦Includes multiple answers
As seen in the above table VI. 6, respondents had heard the audio 
cassettes of more than one party. Over a third of the respondents 
heard the audio cassettes of BJP. Cong.I and TDP. The BJP audios 
were heard by the largest number (39.7%) of respondents, followed 
by Cong.I (35.5%) and TDP (32.9%). A significant 10.9% heard the
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MIM audios. BJP had made the maximum number (about five to seven) 
of audio cassettes using the speeches of leaders like L.K.Advani, 
A.B.Vajpayee and Murli Manohar Joshi, as well as the speeches of 
religious leaders. These were translated into various languages and 
distributed extensively. Similarly, the Cong.I which had released 
four audio cassettes of Rajiv Gandhi's speeches and party songs. A 
small percentage of less than ten had heard the SJP and JD audios 
whose advertising in the state was limited as the TDP was in 
alliance with NF and the SJP was virtually non existent. Again the 
listenership to audio cassettes was mainly incidental as one hears 
of them at home, (when played on loud speakers in the street) or in 
the market place.
TABLE VI. 7 THE IMPACT OF AUDIO CASSETTES ON URBAN AND
RURAL RESPONDENTS
Attitude
Variable
Urban Rural Total
N % N O,*o N o,■©
A Lot 21 2.5 29 8.8 50 4.3
A fair 
amount
169 20.5 46 13 .9 215 18.6
Not very 
much
182 22.1 74 23.4 256 22 .2
Not at all 205 24.9 78 23 .6 283 24 .5
Don't Know 135 16 .4 43 13.0 178 15.4
No answer 112 13 .6 61 18 .4 173 14.9
Total 824 100 331 100 1155 100
Though audio tapes were heard by 41.4% as part of the urban and 
rural campaign strategies, they had a partial influence on the 
voters. This could be in part attributed to the fact that listening 
to the audio cassettes was incidental and people did not listen to 
them with complete attention or interest and hence the level of 
influence was low as evidenced by three fourths of the respondents.
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As seen in table VI.7, 4.3% said that audio cassettes helped them 
a lot and a fair amount for 18.6% of the respondents. About a fifth 
(22.5%) did not find these helpful. More than two thirds of the 
rural respondents (8.8%) found the audios very useful compared to 
only 2.5% of the urban respondents. On the other hand audios helped 
20.5% urban respondents a fair amount compared to 13.9% rural 
respondents.
Overall, less than a quarter of the respondents viewed the videos 
of any political party. Even in the total rural constituency of 
Nagarkurnool there was very poor exposure. However the impact 
depended on exposure. It was high among those who had seen the 
videos. Of these two media, audio cassettes were found to be very 
useful to a fifth of those who heard, while the videos had helped 
most of the respondents who saw them. Therefore, these audio visual 
media, using the information and entertainment format were popular 
and were effective, given the fact that they reached the audiences. 
We next evaluate the role of films for political communication.
SECTION III
FEATURE FILMS FOR POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
In India, films are a major source of entertainment and are claimed 
to be the best vote catchers1®. In recent years a number of film 
and TV stars, similar to those in the West have gained entry into 
politics and have provided glamour to the portals of state 
assemblies and parliament, [in India, as film stars entered the 
political arena, films became an important medium of political 
communication: documentary, feature and video films started being 
used for communicating electoral strategies7JFilm stars have gained 
access into the political arena and converted their popularity at 
the box office into votes in the ballot boxes. Feature films were
-1-® The Hindu. Hyderabad, 11 May, 1991.
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used during election campaigns and film and television stars 
campaigned extensively during the 1991 elections.
IJilms have become the sources of political propaganda especially 
with the rise in the number of films making political commentaries 
and satiresT] Until recently the movies in Kerala and TN dominated 
such themes, but in recent years Hindi and Telugu films have 
reflected similar themes. In the southern states of Tamil Nadu and 
AP, film stars have acquired their popular image through the roles 
they portrayed in films.
FILMS AND POLITICS
(The merging of films and politics can be traced to south Indian 
films as early as the 1950s in Tamil Nadu where parties and 
movements converted films into propaganda forms by inserting 
political ideologies, symbols and allegoriesSeveral scholars, 
Hardgrave (1965 and 1975), Barnett (1976) and Sivathamby (1981) 
(Pentane, 1992) have studied cinema connections in Dravidian 
politics.
[tn India, film stars entered politics in 1977 with the formation of 
the 'National Party' by a noted Hindi film star Dev Anand. He 
unsuccessfully contested the 1977 elections and the party also 
faded away. However, in the south, in TN, M .G .Ramachandran (MGR) 
was the first matinee idol to build a steady support for himself 
through his mass popularity and similarly in later years NTR 
emerged successful in Ap T^
Star appeal at election time can be partly attributed to the 
cynical appraisal that the illiterate masses derive their only 
entertainment from the hugely captivating Indian film industry, and 
are incapable of distinguishing between the talents required for an 
actor and a politician. Further, cynicism would suggest that there 
is little difference, with regard to AP and TN as it has been found
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that the masses literally identified the actors with the roles they 
played (Dickey, 1993).
During the 1991 election, the success of film and television stars 
as candidates proved to some extent that the popularity gained 
through films and TV could not be a springboard to parliament but 
also depended on the popularity of the party they represented. It 
was evidenced when Deepika Chikhila and Arvind Trivedi, the 'Sita' 
and 'Ravana' (the Demon God) from the tele-serial 'Ramavana' with 
the popular support for the BJP in the Gujarat won the elections 
from constituencies in the state. Deepika was elected from Baroda 
while Trivedi won from Sabarkantha defeating Mahatma Gandhi's 
grandson Rajmohan Gandhi of JD. A reverse trend was seen in AP when 
three popular Cong.I stars lost the elections.
[Films have also contributed significantly to 'personality 
politics'J [rhe political 'personality' in this formulation is 
someone who inspires votes not because of political record, stand 
on issues or even communal affiliation, but because of the 
popularity based on personal attractiveness, family background or 
physical features and also the roles enacted as in the case of MGR 
and NTR/jMGR ruled Tamil Nadu for over a decade. After his death 
the leadership was taken up by Jayalalitha, the present Chief 
Minister, also a former film star. In AP, NTR the film hero turned 
politician ruled as the Chief Minister for over five years.
THE USE OF FILM STARS AND FILMS FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT
In TN the strategy was to use stars, first as campaigners and later 
as candidates. This was evidenced by MGR, who first campaigned for 
the party and later gained popularity through the 'political roles' 
that he portrayed, which finally led him into politics and he 
continued to dominate the political scene until his death in 1987. 
Through films, the ideals he suggested and espoused could be 
achieved only through a leader like MGR and 'eventually people
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began to think the leader whom they wanted was not somebody like 
MGR but MGR himself7 (Sivathamby, 1981). In 1977 during the state 
elections, he won a majority and became the chief minister. In AP, 
NTR followed MGR to establish himself as a successful politician. 
The rise of NTR could be traced to his multi-faceted film 
performances, especially the mythological roles that he played and 
his use of films for election campaigns.
THE RISE OF NTR AND THE ROLE OF FILMS IN ANDHRA PRADESH
NTR entered politics when he formed the TDP in 1982 . He followed in 
the same lines as MGR and claimed MGR as his elder brother (Elder 
& Schmittehenner, 1985). NTR through his popularity aroused the 
people of AP to support the TDP and within two years became the 
chief minister.
According to NTR, ' Films are a medium of the peoples' art and it is 
the peoples' medium. It is the most powerful medium that has been 
invented by man. It can be utilized in a variety of ways to 
educate, entertain, enlighten, instruct and elevate people'11. 
The voter identification with NTR - the politician, was with his 
screen personage especially in rural Andhra. NTR's identification 
with the mythological characters had been a major factor in his 
sweeping the polls. He had played virtually every mythological 
character, from Rama to Duryodhana and to Ravana, the demon king in 
the epic Ramayana. Elder and Schmittehenner (1985) state that NTR 
is thought to have actually acquired the virtues of the gods in the 
process of portraying them. It was widely known that NTR was 
worshipped as god as people in large numbers performed religious 
rituals in front of him. Even after taking over as the chief 
minister, NTR continued to be associated with films. His 
mythological roles have been extremely successful in gaining
11Speech at the inauguration of Festival of Indian Panorama 
Films 1985 at Hyderabad, 16 August 1985. Speeches of NTR, Chief 
Minister of Andhra Pradesh. Vol.III. Published by Government of 
Andhra Pradesh.
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popularity. During the 1989-91 elections, TDP continued to use 
films for political communication, with the strategy being first 
entertain and then inform.
POLITICAL FILMS: CONTENT AND IMPACT
[in AP, films and film stars have made the state.a political film 
industry where the politicians used film actors and films for 
political propaganda^ [Films have been used in various ways: to 
project and glorify leaders, raise issues and allegations against 
political parties and leaders and to open up new issues. Films 
became the focus of political battlesT]
[Feature films were extensively used for political communicationJ 
While TDP released films on the exploitations of the Cong. I, the 
Cong. I released two films that criticised NTR and his policies. The 
first of these films 'Kaliyuga Vishwamitra (present day 
Vishwamitra) was a parody to NTR's 'Bhrahmarishi Vishwamitra'. The 
second 'Gandipeta Rahasyam' (Rahasyam meaning the inside story of 
Gandipeta, the TDP headquarters) revealed the irregularities and 
misuse of power by the NTR government. Another popular pro-Cong.I 
actor Krishna appealed to the masses to throw NTR out of power. The 
Cong.I claimed with pride that both these films were highly 
successful and the best way to popularize the misdeeds of NTR and 
win back their lost ground12.
During the 1991 elections, there was a cinematic battle for 
support. A 22 minute film called 'Chaitanya Ratham' in which NTR's 
son Balkrishna, traced the birth of TDP and enumerated the 
achievements of the party was extensively -screened through the 
VOWs. The screening of NTRs 'Brahmarishi Vishwamitra' was the 
highlight of TDPs publicity drive. TDP not only used films as part
12 Interview with Cong.I spokesperson,K. Keshav Rao in 
Hyderabad, 13 June, 1991.
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of the video campaign but also used documentary films1  ^ shown in 
cinema houses in AP.
The popularity of stars portraying religious characters assumed 
greater significance as actors and actresses of the television 
serials Ramayana and Mahabharatha. campaigned for the parties. In 
Baroda, thousands gathered to see the 'reel life Sita' who stood 
for the elections. For TV actress, Deepika Chikhila a large tribal 
population of the constituency 'worshipped her as Sita'. Though 
these may be superficial mythological references, one cannot ignore 
the cultural factors that have influenced the developments in the 
Indian social and political systems. However, star popularity and 
image helped gain access into the political arena but was not the 
only criteria for winning elections. It was also dependent on the 
parties that the stars represented and the overall popular support 
for the parties.
STAR RALLIES AND STAR CANDIDATES
Politicians have used the popular image of film stars as candidates 
and for campaigning during elections. However, the popularity of 
the film stars has been misused to a large extent when political 
parties bereft of popular candidates turned to using film and 
television stars whom they considered safe candidates to battle 
against senior politicians, [jn 1984 Amitabh Bachchan, the most 
popular Hindi film superstar and a friend of Rajiv Gandhi, 
contested and won the Allahabad constituency in UP defeating 
A.B.Vajpayee, a veteran BJP leader. In 1991, Rajesh Khanna another 
popular Hindi film actor represented Cong.I against BJP leader L.K 
Advani in New Delhi in a closely contested electionA Since all the
The documentaries projected NTR as an able and great leader 
and saviour of the poor. It highlighted the various development 
schemes especially the Rs.2 (£0.4) per kilogram rice scheme and the 
distribution of low cost clothes that were implemented while NTR 
was in government.
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parties roped in film stars, one could not point to any single 
party.
In 1991, eleven film and TV stars were candidates for the 
parliament elections and four contested from the state assemblies. 
In AP, the major arena for star wars, three popular stars were in 
the electoral fray. Jamuna, the sitting MP from Rajamundry, 
Krishnam Raju from Narsapur and Krishna from Eluru. However, star 
popularity did not help them win parliamentary seats and some of 
them failed to regain their seats won in the earlier elections.
Two of the three candidates nominated by the BJP won the elections 
both from Gujarat where BJP won more than three fourths of the 
parliamentary seats. In Mahrashtra, Cong.I was able to retain only 
one seat, that of Sunil Dutt from Bombay-north west who won the 
seat for the third time (He has recently resigned as MP after the 
bombings and outbreak of communal violence in Bombay). Rajesh 
Khanna lost by a mere 1589 votes to L.K.Advani in New Delhi.
In the south the glamour of the film world failed to win three 
seats for Cong.I in AP. Therefore, the success acquired through 
films was not enough to gain political support, but was also in 
part dependent on the popularity of the party in the constituency 
or state they represented, as evidenced by the support for BJP in 
Gujarat and the reverse in AP.
SUMMARY
The content and use of audio-visual media have given a cultural 
dimension to the political system in the country. A lot of emphasis 
was placed on the use of audio and video cassettes by all political 
parties as alternatives to the government controlled radio and 
television. Though audio and video cassettes were regarded as 
powerful media by all political parties and videos were claimed to 
be the major source of political mobilization, in the present study 
it was quite the contrary to the expectations in terms of reach and
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exposure. However, in future if videos, as predicted, are to be the 
medium for the people towards political enlightenment (and 
manipulation), it would require the skill of the voters to 
differentiate between the values, claims and characteristics of 
each party and not to be carried away by emotional symbolism and 
persuasive appeals which have been used in abundance by the 
political parties to swing the voters favourably towards electoral 
victories.
The role of films and film stars have been analyzed at two levels; 
one, the impact that cinema (the moving image on the illiterate and 
rural masses) exerts on the social life of the individuals, second, 
the roles played by the stars have had a greater effect in the 
building up of the image, mostly associated with roles. This may be 
more importantly seen in the actors who have had a longer stay in 
politics like MGR and NTR and gained popularity from the uneducated 
and poorer sections who form a large segment of the electorate.
However, we find that though much is reported in the press on the 
film stars turning to politics, we find that a mere 2% of the 
candidates were from the cinema world. However a lot of importance 
is given because of the media coverage given to such personalities. 
However, we find that the popularity acquired from films alone 
could not sustain the political fortunes of many candidates. The 
1991 results revealed that film stars as candidates could not win 
seats on their star popularity alone, but were also dependent on 
the party that they represented. The popularity of star politicians 
was sustained at the regional level in TN and AP. Only if a star 
politician could rise above regional representation, then it could 
be possible for India to expect a Ronald Reagan as the prime 
minister of the country.
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CHAPTER VII
THE USES AND IMPACT OF OUTDOOR FORMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Posters, banners, wall writings and symbol displays are an 
indication of imminent elections in India. They form an essential 
part of reminder media along with mass and other electronic forms 
of campaigning. In the present chapter, we evaluate the uses of 
various forms of outdoor media; posters, handbills, wall writings, 
symbol displays and cardboard cutouts as sources of communication 
and report the findings from our survey on the voters' perceptions 
and dependence on these media.
SECTION I
USE OF PRINTED LITERATURE AS SOURCES OF INFORMATION,
EDUCATION AND MOTIVATION
The importance of printed literature can be gauged by its 
successful use by government for creating awareness of the national 
programmes. The Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity 
(DAVP) under the Ministry of I & B, launches multi - media 
publicity campaigns to inform, educate and motivate people to 
participate in national programmes for development1 . The publicity 
is through radio and TV, exhibitions and other print and outdoor 
forms like posters, wall paintings, hoardings, cinema slides, 
kiosks, bus/ train/ tramcar panels, tin stencils and stickers.
During the elections, DAVP had launched an advertising campaign to 
promote greater awareness of the electoral process. As discussed in 
Chapter III, Section V, apart from the electronic media, the 
government campaign in 1991 comprised of three posters that aimed
1 India Year Book 1993, Ministry of I & B, Government of 
India.
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at educating voters on the electoral process. These included 
persuading voters to exercise their franchise as Indian citizens, 
cautioning them against being led away by vote seekers and 
encouraging them to vote freely without being swayed by incentives 
like transport, money or gifts offered by political parties. These 
posters were displayed at all government offices, schools and 
community centres. We discuss the various outdoor media that were 
used by political parties during the 1991 elections.
SECTION II 
POSTERS
Posters formed an important part of election communication to 
communicate short messages with colourful visuals. They generally 
highlighted important issues and characteristics of the party and 
helped in the recognition of leaders, candidates and party symbols 
- essential for party identification. They also formed the cheapest 
and easiest means of reaching larger audiences on a limited budget. 
Posters offered a greater flexibility as they were translated into 
various languages and printed at regional offices or state units. 
The sizes of posters varied; from 2' X 2' to 8' X 10' which were 
put up in spaces erected for movie posters.
Party election posters reached remote villages and were pasted on 
walls, bus stops, kiosks, schools, government offices, shops, party 
offices and also at the homes of party supporters. The viewing of 
these posters is done while passing through the streets and it is 
not uncommon to find people stopping and gazing at posters. They 
were generally seen and understood by the literate and the 
semiliterate. A question by the researcher to an illiterate woman 
on the issue of understanding a BJP poster pasted on her house wall 
in a village revealed that her ten year old school-going son read 
and explained and she in turn passed the message on.
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PARTY POSTERS USED DURING THE 1991 GENERAL ELECTIONS
In 1991, all political parties invested extensively in posters. The 
content varied from the display of the party symbol accompanying 
the slogan to the party's programmes and promises. Cong.I brought 
out five to six posters highlighting its strategy of 'Stability'. 
After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, they ran a poster campaign 
with visuals of the late Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to arouse 
sympathy. Three posters with the slogan of 'Maa Bete ka yeh 
Balidaan, Yaad kare Hindustan' (Let the country remember the 
sacrifice of the mother and son) urged the voters to vote for 
Cong.I to realize the dreams of Rajiv Gandhi. These were translated 
into several languages and released all over the country.
The BJP posters were varied, the party printed posters tailored to 
national, regional and constituency levels. As earlier discussed, 
there were large life size posters of party leaders. L.K.Advani, 
Murli Manohar Joshi and A.B.Vajpayee at party offices. Smaller 
posters had visuals of party leaders and slogans for ushering in 
'Ram Rajya' into the country. SJP printed four posters which 
highlighted their six point programme and carried the visuals of 
the party leaders, Devi Lai and Chandrashekar.
In a general survey of the constituencies under study, we found 
that in Nagarkurnool there were several BJP, TDP and Cong. I 
posters. Posters of saffron clad NTR with the symbol of the cycle 
were found along strategic locations in cities, towns and villages. 
In Secunderabad, BJP posters outnumbered the JD/NF and Cong.I 
posters. In Hyderabad, BJP and MIM posters were displayed on street 
lamps, mosques, temples and grocery shops. MIM invested extensively 
in posters, visuals of Salahuddin Owaisi and the MIM symbol covered 
entire walls. We investigated voters' perceptions on party posters 
and the extent to which voters' would look at them as sources of 
election communication.
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POSTERS AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
In the first phase we asked the respondents if they would look at 
posters during elections. Later, we compared the impact of these 
reminder media used by political parties for election information. 
As seen in table VII.1, about one fifth (21.6%) of the respondents 
sought posters for election information (8.7% stated a lot and 
12.9% a fair amount) . More than a third (35.5%) of the respondents 
were not inclined to look at them or had no opinion and 35% said 
that they would look a little at the posters (table VII.1).
TABLE VI1.1 MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE LIKELY TO LOOK AT
ELECTION POSTERS
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
A lot 79 12 .2 22 4.4 101 8.7
A fair amount 88 13 .6 61 12 .1 149 12 .9
A little 249 38.4 155 30.6 404 35.0
Not at all 199 30.6 211 41.8 410 35 .5
No opinion 34 5.2 57 11.1 91 7.9
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
More men than women were inclined to look at posters; 12.2% men and 
4.4% women depended a lot on posters, though there was less 
difference between men and women at the average level of fair 
amount and a little. On the whole, more than half (52.9%) women and 
a third (35.8%) men were not likely to look at posters at all or 
had no opinion.
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TABLE VI1.2 CONSTITUENCY WISE DEPENDENCE ON POSTERS
FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
A lot 37 10.2 46 9.3 18 6.1
A fair amount 39 10.8 66 13.3 44 14.8
A little 124 34.3 183 37.0 97 32.5
Not at all 140 38.6 150 30.4 121 40.3
No opinion 21 6.1 50 9.9 19 6.3
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
About half the respondents from each constituency were likely to 
look at posters in varying degrees. 10.2%, the highest number of 
respondents from urban Secunderabad were inclined to look a lot at 
posters followed closely by those in Hyderabad with 9.3% and 6.1% 
in Nagarkurnool. 14.8% of the respondents in Nagarkurnool said they 
would look a fair amount and 32.5% a little.
POSTERS RECALLED BY RESPONDENTS
In the second wave we investigated if the respondents had seen the 
party posters and could name the parties. An overwhelming 80.3% 
respondents replied in the positive. As seen in table VII.3, there 
was a high response in all the three constituencies with 82.9% 
having seen the posters in Secunderabad. Posters did not catch the 
attention of about a fifth or less number of the respondents in all 
the three constituencies. Many of the respondents could recall the 
posters of political parties that they had seen.
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TABLE VI1.3 PARTY POSTERS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS IN THE
CONSTITUENCIES
Cons t i tuency Yes No No Answer
Secunderabad 299 82.9 55 15 .2 7 1.9
Hyderabad 393 79.4 99 20.0 3 0.6
Nagarkurnool 236 78.9 57 19.1 6 2.0
Total/Ave % 928 80.3 211 18.3 16 1.4
TABLE VII.4 PAR'][*Y POSTERS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS
Political
Party
Yes No
N % N
Cong. I 751 65.0 404 35.0
BJP 798 69.3 357 30.7
TDP 691 60.0 464 40.0
MIM 419 36.3 736 63.7
JD 192 16.6 963 83.4
SJP 95 8.2 1060 91.8
As seen in table VII.4, about two thirds (69.3%) of the respondents 
saw the BJP posters followed by 65% who saw the Cong.I.posters. 
TDP posters were seen by 60% and MIM by 36.3%. BJP, from a near 
non-existent party in the state had made its presence in a very 
competitive way with Cong.I and TDP. MIMs posters concentrated in 
Hyderabad had a good response mainly from the constituency.
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TABLE VI1.5 THE EXTENT TO WHICH POSTERS REMINDED 
VOTERS ABOUT PARTIES
Attitude variable Number Percentage
A Lot 104 9.1
Somewhat 557 00
Not at all 436 38.1
No answer 58 4.2
Total 1155 100
As seen in table VII.5, More than half (57.7%) of respondents were
reminded about parties from posters. However, only 9.1% were 
reminded a lot. Significantly, 38.1% were not at all reminded. 
Interestingly a sum of 'somewhat' and 'not at all' of 86.7% does 
not speak highly of party posters. On the other hand the sum of ' a 
lot' and 'somewhat' amounting to 57.7%, represents the need and use 
of such campaign material.
SECTION III
CAMPAIGN LITERATURE- HANDBILLS AND LEAFLETS
Leafleteering forms a cheap and effective form of election 
communication. The distribution of campaign literature like 
handbills, leaflets, appeals and printed letters are part of 
political, industrial, university or college election campaigns.
/■
During general elections, with the increase in the number of 
political parties and growth in population there has been an 
increase in the number of persons actually receiving the campaign 
material. Eldersveld and Ahmed (1978), in their study reported that 
46% had received campaign literature and in 1977 Kar and Chaudary 
(1992) reported that 60.9% of the voters under study had received 
election material.
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In 1991, thousands of leaflets were distributed at the national, 
regional and local levels during public meetings, door to-door 
campaigns, from election stalls, at traffic intersections and some 
were pasted on walls. The printed literature ranged from single 
pieces of paper to well documented long brochures. The contents 
highlighted the policies and achievements of parties as well as 
their future programmes with facts and figures, sometimes in 
comparison with other parties. Though most of these were formatted 
on general issues, some were more personalised in the form of 
letters addressed as 'Dear friend or Dear voter......
Siriskar (1973) states that these campaign materials which inform 
voters about the candidates qualities and party programmes seek to 
influence the more articulate and educated sections of voters. 
However, observing the extensive distribution of these campaign 
materials at public places, to the educated or the uneducated, we 
found that parties did not consider it important that people should 
actually read them and it was enough if people looked at them, 
recognised the symbol and knew which party had made an effort to 
give them. Hence, it was not surprising that all parties 
distributed campaign literature extensively in urban and rural 
areas even though there was a great deal of wastage. Moreover, 
parties over years of electioneering believe that voters have come 
to expect such information and it was inevitable that despite using 
other forms, parties should continue to use them.
As there was a virtual saturation in the distribution of campaign 
material, we first investigated the extent to which voters depended 
on handbills as sources of information, and if they helped them in 
their electoral behaviour. It was found that 40.5% respondents were 
positively inclined towards looking at handbills - 5.6% depended a 
lot, 7.3% a fair amount and 27.6% a little. More men, (45%), than 
women (35%) were likely to look at campaign literature (Table 
VII.6)
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TABLE VI 1.6 MEN AND WOMEN WHO WOULD LOOK AT HANDBILLS
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
A lot 36 5.6 29 5.7 65 5.6
A fair amount 64 9.9 20 4.0 84 7.3
A little 191 29.5 128 25.3 319 27.6
Not at all 268 41.1 234 46.2 502 43 .5
No opinion 90 13.9 95 18.8 185 16.0
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
TABLE VI 1.7 CONSTITUENCY WISE DEPENDENCE ON HANDBILLS 
FOR ELECTION INFORMATION.
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
A lot 12 3.3 26 5.3 27 8.9
A fair amount 32 9.0 33 6.7 19 6.4
A little 83 23 .1 168 33.9 68 22 .9
Not at all 181 50.1 178 35.8 142 47 . 6
No opinion 53 14.5 90 18.3 43 14 .2
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
As indicated in table VII.7, in the constituencies, more 
respondents (8.9%) from Nagarkurnool depended a lot on handbills 
than those from Hyderabad (5.3%) and Secunderabad (3.3%), quite the 
reverse in terms of education with the latter constituencies having 
more literate people than the former. This held true as party 
workers stated that education was not a criterion for reading 
leaflets, it was just enough to look at symbols and recognise the 
party that had distributed them. It clearly established that voters 
were well aware of campaign material that was distributed by 
political parties and more than 40% of them looked at the 
literature that was distributed.
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DID HANDBILLS HELP DURING ELECTIONS
TABLE VI 1.8 THE EXTENT TO WHICH HANDBILLS HELPED IN 
THE ELECTION
Attitude variable N %
A Lot 55 4.8
Somewhat 445 38.5
Not at all 608 52 .6
No Answer 47 4.1
Total 1155 100
There was an overall low response to the impact of campaign 
material. As indicated in table VII.8, 4.8% found them very useful 
and 38.5% found them somewhat useful in their decision making while 
more than half (52.6%) did not find them useful at all or may have 
not received them. Therefore, though parties distributed these 
extensively, it appears that the use of such material was a wWe 
further look at wall writings as another form of outdoor political 
communication.
SECTION IV 
WALL WRITINGS
During elections walls are covered with election graffiti. Wall 
writings form an important source of publicity in remote villages 
and are used by government and other advertisers for advertising a 
wide range of products from hair oils, tooth pastes, cooking oil to 
those of banks and government messages, especially those of family 
planning and social issues. It is common to see the graffiti in 
cities and villages while passing in buses and trains.
During elections there is hectic 'wall writing' activity. Reports 
in newspapers stated how some political parties had reserved wall 
spaces as soon as the elections were announced. The party would 
later place the name of candidates with the symbol or slogans.
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Symbols were generally stencilled or crudely painted. Most of the 
messages on walls simply read as 'Vote for (name of the party). or 
'Vote for. . . (name of the symbol) along with the reminder of the 
polling date.
Some interesting and amusing slogans appeared on the walls which 
formed an arena for wordy duels of attacks and counter attacks 
between parties. Some newspapers reported that there was a 'slogan 
war' that went up on the walls2 . There were also protests and 
coercion between parties and public in connection with using walls 
for writing slogans, pasting posters and other graffiti. In an 
article 'Writing on the wall' by Viju James, it was stated that 
there were no set limits on the battering that a state, a city or 
the people are subject to during elections'. Wall writings continue 
to remain much after the elections, as there is no rule or 
condition, where the damage caused to walls by the graffiti are to 
be cleared by parties or candidates who used them2 .
Our interviews with leaders revealed that though posters and wall 
writings did destroy the aesthetic value of the country, it was 
important for the uneducated and poorer sections of voters on the 
street for whom this may be the only source of political 
information and secondly it was an important form of daily reminder 
media.
In the three constituencies under study, we found that walls were 
prominently painted with symbols and slogans of Cong.I 'hand', 
BJP's 'lotus', TDP's 'cycle' and the JD's 'wheel'. In Hyderabad, 
some walls were completely covered with graffiti and posters. After
2 Slogan War, The Hindu. Madras, 14 May, 1991
2 'The Writing on the Wall, The Times of India. Bombay, 3 
March, 1990. An example of the lasting nature of the campaigning 
undertaken nearly two decades ago was found in Bombay, when wall 
writings of the 1971 elections and the posters of H.R.Gokhale and 
Shanti Patel from Bombay North west had still remained.
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posters, wall writings were the second most important form of 
reminder media about the elections as in table VII.9, 8.2% stated 
that wall writings had reminded them a lot and 40.6% were somewhat 
reminded. 46.8% were not affected while 4.2% did not have any 
opinion.
TABLE VI 1.9 EXTENT TO WHICH THE OUTDOOR MEDIA HELPED 
DURING ELECTION
Media A lot Somewhat Not at all No Answer
N % N % N % N %
Posters 104 9.1 557 48.6 436 38.1 58 4.2
Leaflets/
Handbills
55 4.8 445 38.5 608 52 .6 47 4.1
Wall
Writings
95 8.2 469 40.6 541 46.8 50 4.2
Cardboard
cutouts
65 5.6 431 37.3 615 53.3 44 3.8
Symbol
displays
88 7.6 537 46.5 485 42.0 45 3.9
SECTION V 
PARTY SYMBOLS
Symbols have been, and may still be important in Indian elections 
with largely illiterate voters identifying parties with symbols 
rather than candidates. Politicians are aware of this and hence 
fight for particular symbols (Kumar,1991). All parties and 
candidates are allotted a symbol by the EC of India and election 
campaigns are planned to give wide publicity to associate parties 
and candidates with symbols. We discuss the importance of symbols, 
kinds of symbols, their publicity during elections and report the 
extent to which respondents were able to recognize party symbols.
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SYMBOL ALLOCATION BY ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
The EC allots symbols to all parties and independent candidates. 
Since the first general election in 1951 - 1952, except for the CPI 
which retained its symbol of 'Ears of corn and sickle', most party 
symbols have changed with splits in the parties. The Congress 
symbol of a 'Pair of bullocks' , for over two decades was changed to 
'Cow and calf' in 1971 and in 1978 was replaced by the 'Hand' which 
has since remained. The BJP symbol changed from the 'Lamp' of the 
BJS to 'lotus' in 1980. The JP formed by the mergence of four major 
opposition parties won the election in 1977 on the 'Chakra Haidar' 
(farmer carrying a plough within a wheel) symbol. The NF formed in 
1989 won the election defeating the Cong. I on the symbol of the 
'Wheel'.
After the split of the NF coalition in 1990, JD led by V.P.Singh 
retained the 'wheel' which had won them the 1989 elections. The 
break-away SJP was given the symbol of 'A woman carrying a pot on 
her head'. However, it chose to contest the elections on the old 
Janata Party symbol of 'Chakra Haidar', after Subrahmaniam Swamy, 
former SJP minister and a professional lawyer won the EC 
recognition to use the symbol to represent the party. TDP in AP was 
represented by a 'Bicycle', and MIM used the symbol of the 
'Scales' .
THE KINDS OF SYMBOLS
In the past decade there has been a modernization in the kinds of 
symbols. Earlier symbols had rural connotations and were identified 
with the large rural and agricultural population. Most parties had 
rural and agricultural connotations such as, a pair of bullocks, 
corn and sickle, the farmer and plough, hammer and sickle and 
others like the charka (wheel) being used individually or as woman 
spinning the charka. Animal and bird symbols were also popular with 
the elephant, lion, horse etc. used as symbols. Modern symbols 
included telephones, scooters, watches and televisions.
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During 1989 and 1991 elections a variety of symbols were given to 
candidates and parties. Some symbols were interesting and amusing 
ranging from animals, eatables, cosmetics to hardware and home 
appliances. These included pressure cooker, gas cylinder, kettle, 
ceiling fan and bicycle. In addition, the new symbols included a 
balloon, ladies purse, camel, cock, eagle, cupboard, axe, belt, 
black board, bat, candle, brick and a women carrying a basket on 
her head. Parties and candidates used various techniques to 
publicize these symbols through mass, outdoor and other channels.
PUBLICITY OF SYMBOLS BY POLITICAL PARTIES
Political parties and independent candidates gave wide publicity to 
the symbols. Symbols were associated with religious, cultural and 
everyday concepts to connote symbolic meanings. Symbols were 
incorporated in all the advertisements, glorified through songs in 
audio and video cassettes and prominently placed on posters, wall 
writings, displays, flags, stickers, badges, caps, T-Shirts, etc.
Cong. I's symbol of the 'hand' was to reflect the superiority of the 
party as 'an experienced hand' , the hand which would protect/shield 
people against all problems. Voters were urged to join hands with 
the Cong.I's 'hand' on which it was claimed India's future was 
written' to make a strong and stable government in India4 .
BJP sought religious connotations with their symbol. The lotus 
flower was associated with deities and the ritual of using flowers 
during ceremonies. The 'Lotus' in full bloom was said to bring 
about happiness and peace in the country. At some BJP meetings, 
lotus flowers were distributed to the audiences.
4 These were highlighted in political songs and were also the 
views of the party candidates and supporters as gathered at 
election meetings and during interviews.
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In 1989, The JD symbol of 'chakra'(wheel), was interpreted as the 
'wheel of fortune' for the party and 'Kaal Chakra'(wheel of doom) 
and 'Sudarshan Chakra' (the weapon of Lord Krishna) to bring doom 
to Cong. I. The references held good till the party won the election 
in 1989 but its fortunes declined in the 1991 elections. SJP 
attempted to revive their popularity on the old Janata Party symbol 
of 'a farmer carrying a plough within the wheel' . As the party had 
oriented their strategy to grassroots development at the rural 
level, the symbol matched their strategy.
TDP symbol of the 'Bicycle', the common man's form of transport, 
was promoted through displays of real cycles, and in many places 
they were also illuminated. MIM had one of the most significant 
symbol display campaigns in Hyderabad. These included posters, 
decorated scales, cardboard and illuminated displays. The walls in 
the constituencies were covered with paintings and posters of the 
symbol.
Symbols were constantly referred to during election meetings by 
leaders and candidates. At one of the BJP meetings that we 
attended, the candidate constantly urged electors to vote for the 
symbol rather than him as the candidate. Symbols were also tattooed 
on hands and shoulders of supporters. The voters were also shown 
how to place their stamp on the symbol on the ballot paper through 
video films. With such intense and extensive efforts by political 
parties in publicizing the symbols, we investigated if voters 
recognized the symbols of some of the major parties.
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RECOGNITION OF ELECTION SYMBOLS
TABLE VI1.10 THE ELECTION SYMBOLS RECOGNISED BY
THE RESPONDENTS
Party Symbol Yes No No Answer
N % N % N O.*0
TDP 1089 94.3 48 4.1 18 1.6
Cong. I 1131 98.1 19 1.7 5 0.4
JD 899 77.9 253 21.9 3 0.3
MIM 885 76.7 267 23.1 3 0.3
BJP 1008 87.4 143 12 .4 5 0.3
CPM 661 57.3 489 39.9 4 0.4
SJP 687 59.6 461 39.9 7 0.5
CPI 613 53 .1 515 44.6 27 2.4
Respondents showed a fairly high level of awareness in recognising 
the symbols in all the constituencies. As seen in table VII. 10, 
Cong.I symbol of the 'Hand' was recognised by 98.1%, followed by 
the TDP symbol of the 'Bicycle' recognised by 94.3%. The JD symbol 
of the 'Wheel' that was very popular in the 1989 elections was 
recognised by 77.9% and the BJP symbol of the 'Lotus' flower by 
87.4%. In Hyderabad 95% recognised the MIM symbol compared to 
about 40% in Nagarkurnool.
The SJP symbol of the 'farmer with a plough', though discontinued 
for many years and though the party did not have a large publicity 
drive in the state, it was well recognised. It was interesting to 
note that many respondents named it as the earlier Janata Party. 
One could associate this as a clever tactic of the party to refresh 
the voters memory on the use of a popular symbol.
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DID SYMBOL DISPLAYS HELP IN REMINDING ABOUT THE ELECTION
We further asked the respondents if symbol displays reminded them 
about the party to vote for during the election. As shown in table 
VII.9, about 7.6% of the respondents said that symbols reminded 
them a lot and 46.5% were somewhat reminded but 42.1% were not 
affected. Symbols rated second (46.5%) after the posters in the 
somewhat helped category as stated by 48.6% respondents. They rated 
third at 7.6% in the 'helped a lot' category preceded by posters 
with 9.0% and wall writings with 8.2%.
SECTION VI
CUTOUTS OF LEADERS AND CANDIDATES
While western media is devising new methods of election campaigning 
and exploiting the electronic forms of communication, developing 
countries like India are devising new techniques of visual as well 
as electronic forms to reach the diverse electorate. Their effort 
to increase the visibility of leaders has resulted in the use of 
life size presentation of huge cardboard cutouts of party leaders 
and candidates.
The use of cutouts are a recent development in Indian elections. 
These huge 20'-30' imposing cutouts of leaders and candidates 
constantly remind and appeal to the voters. Earlier consumer 
products like soft drinks and tooth pastes were advertised in forms 
of large cardboard cutouts, but now the same are being used by 
political parties.
During the 1984 elections, Cong.I had first used large cutouts of 
the blood splattered body of Indira Gandhi to arouse sympathy. 
However, these cutouts came into prominence during 1989 elections 
when NTR's cutouts in the form of various religious deities were 
erected at all important junctions and cross roads in AP and Delhi. 
In the 1991 elections, leaders appeared in several guises at 
different locations in the cities and major towns. Cong.I put up
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huge cut outs of Rajiv Gandhi, while those of L.K.Advani and 
A.B.Vajpayee represented the BJP.
The use of cutouts was restricted to major cities and towns due to 
their high cost. Party persons estimated the cost of each cutout to 
range from Rs.50,000 to Rs.90,000 (£1000 to £1800) depending on the 
size. Though most party workers failed to establish the usefulness 
of such expensive investments, they observed that they were 
somewhat useful in creating the 'election atmosphere' to remind 
voters to vote for their parties^. One BJP member observed that 
these cutouts helped in recognition of leaders especially in the 
last two elections. The days of the Nehru-Gandhi family, who were 
easily recognised were over, but the other leaders needed this 
publicity for recognition especially with the rise in multiparty 
system and more than two leaders competing for the prime 
ministerial position. Moreover, it was believed that cutouts 
projected a personal appeal for support from the leaders 
themselves^.
In our constituencies, the cutouts of Rajiv Gandhi, L.K.Advani, and 
NTR were prominently displayed in Secunderabad and Hyderabad while 
those of Owaisi were found in Hyderabad. We asked the respondents 
if these were useful in their decision to vote. As in table VII.9, 
5.6% of the respondents were reminded a lot and 37.3% somewhat. 
Over half, 53.3% were not affected.
5 Interviews of the author with the spokespersons of Cong.I, 
TDP and BJP.
® Authors interviews with members and supporters of Congress-
I, MIM and BJP.
SUMMARY
Posters along with leaflets and folders were important components 
of the multimedia publicity campaigns of the government by the DAVP 
for publicising various government schemes. During elections, the 
DAVP used posters along with radio and television as part of the 
government voter education programme.
Party posters formed an effective low cost reminder medium and 
reached remote rural areas. With little effort the message was read 
and understood by the semi-literate. Handbills formed sources of 
political communication supplementing public meetings and door-to- 
door campaigns.
We examined the extent to which these outdoor media reminded 
respondents of the party to vote. In the first phase nearly three 
quarters of the respondents did not mark them as sources of 
information. These findings helped us to establish the importance 
attached to these media which are otherwise labelled as a nuisance, 
and tampering with the environment by their excessive use. 10% of 
the respondents were reminded a lot by these media. However, they 
rated high at the medium level of 'somewhat helped' by nearly half 
the respondents. Posters were rated the highest in the somewhat 
category by nearly half (48.6%) of the respondents. Posters were 
closely followed by the symbol displays and wall writings.
Even after the introduction of large scale advertising campaigns 
through print and electronic forms, these mainly outdoor forms were 
extensively used and had to some extent reminded nearly half the 
respondents. Indian audiences are still accustomed to look at these 
media during elections, despite criticism of their effectiveness 
and use.
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CHAPTER VIII 
INTERPERSONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
INTRODUCTION
In India, along with the use of the mass media, electronic and 
outdoor forms of cmapaigning discussed so far, the conventional 
forms of mass contact such as public meetings, rallies and 
elections tours of candidates and leaders continued to be important 
techniques of reaching the electorate. Given the massive crowds 
that turn up at these election meetings, we would term these forms 
of electoral persuasion as Mass Interpersonal Channels (MIC) 
affecting political behaviour. Second, in the literature on 
political communication and behaviour, importance is given to the 
influence of family, friends, neighbours and local leaders in the 
voting process categorised as Internal Interpersonal Channels 
(IIC).
This chapter is divided into three parts; first we examine the 
importance of MICs and evaluate their credibility in the light of 
reports in press, the opinions of leaders and party spokespersons, 
and finally report voters' perceptions of public meetings, their 
dependence on public meetings for election information and 
effectiveness in voting decisions. In the second part we examine 
the influence of IICs. In the third part, we investigate certain 
individual perceptions of respondents on the factors that 
influenced their own voting behaviour and that of their community. 
We conclude with a comparative note on these interpersonal forms 
that formed important sources of information and persuasion on 
voting behaviour.
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SECTION I
MASS INTERPERSONAL CHANNELS 
PUBLIC MEETINGS
Public meetings (PMs) have been a popular conventional form of 
election campaigning in India. Since the first general election in 
1951-1952, election campaigns have been characterised by PMs, 
processions, posters, wall writings and handbills (Mehta, 1971). As 
the oldest forms of election campaigning they are still considered 
to be very effective in influencing the electorate according to 
leaders and spokespersons of various political parties1. PMs are 
regulated by the EC on the criteria for maintenance of law and 
order, to avoid political clashes and disturbance to normal life. 
The detailed factors governing such meetings are given in 
Appendix-F.
Given the socio-economic structure, and limited use of mass media 
compounded with low literacy levels and deficient transportation 
systems, the major means of reaching the electorate was through 
interpersonal channels. The face-to-face, one-to-few channels 
during the freedom struggle and the pre-independence era, changed 
to larger meetings and gradually led to mass public meetings. 
Indira Gandhi, in one of her interviews, on the lack of use of 
electronic media during elections, stated that her votes did not 
come from the media, but through her meetings with the masses 
(Eapen, 1991).
In the Indian election studies, it was found that most campaign 
coverage was reported on what the leaders said during the public 
meetings and rallies and electoral trends were based on the content 
of speeches of political leaders, size of gatherings and reactions 
of crowds at public meetings (Mirchandani, 1977; Paul, 1984, 1989;
■^Interviews with party spokespersons of Cong. I, BJP, JD and
SJP
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Ahuja & Paul, 1991) . Party leaders were accompanied by an entourage 
of journalists and photographers who reported on campaign speeches 
along with interviews with leaders while on the campaign trail.
Therefore, in the past as well as in the present, election 
campaigns are analyzed and presented in the newspapers and 
electronic media based on campaign meetings of party leaders and 
candidates. During elections, PMs give the electorate an 
opportunity to see and listen to leaders, evaluate their strengths 
and weaknesses and develop a positive or negative attitude without 
relying on any other intermediate sources. Second, the turnout at 
these rallies helps parties to estimate their popularity and the 
support they can expect during elections. Third, these meetings 
give an opportunity to the leaders to improve their rapport with 
the masses, clarify queries raised by the people, persuade voters 
and also to get a feedback. Since the last two elections, the 
speeches made by leaders at PMs were recorded and made into audio 
cassettes and some were incorporated in video cassettes.
PMs are characterised by all India tours of party leaders 
crisscrossing the country. Moreover, these become significant as 
most candidates depend upon the popularity of their leaders for 
boosting the campaign, often leading to the entire campaign 
strategy being dependent on the performance of one or a few 
leaders. During the 1991 elections, apart from leaders and 
candidates, PMs were addressed by religious leaders, family members 
of the candidates, popular film and television stars, retired civil 
servants and leading party supporters.
PMs OF POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE 1991 ELECTIONS
Leaders used every mode of travel to cover the entire country or 
state while the VOWs spread the messages through the villages. 
Rajiv Gandhi was the sole national campaigner for Cong. I, until his 
assassination on 21 May, 1991. He reportedly toured 250 
constituencies spread across UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra,
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Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, TN and the North Eastern 
states. After his assassination, senior Cong.I leaders 
P .V.Narasimha Rao, N.D.Tiwari, Arjun Singh and Sharad Pawar 
campaigned in over 300 constituencies where elections were to be 
held on 12 and 14 June. BJP's strategy was to have at least one 
senior leader from among Murli Manohar Joshi, L.K.Advani, 
A.B.Vajpayee or Rajmata Scindia to address a PM in a constituency 
at least once during the campaign period.
In AP, NTR as Chairman of the NF addressed meetings all over the 
state from atop his campaign vehicle 'Chaitanya Ratham'. In 
Hyderabad, MIM leader Owaisi had based his entire campaign strategy 
on PMs. He addressed three or four meetings daily during the 
election period. This was possible for MIM as it was a local party 
and could concentrate its efforts within the vicinity of Hyderabad 
making it easier for the leader to continuously interact with the 
people.
Another development in the 1991 campaigns was the PMs addressed by 
religious men and women. Shahi Imam called on the Indian Muslims to 
vote for JD/NF and Sadhvi Rithambara of VHP actively campaigned for 
BJP. Her meetings all over the country drew large crowds and some 
of her audio cassettes were widely circulated. In Delhi, the VHP, 
organised a massive Saadhu Sammelan (Congregation of the Hindu 
ascetics) where over 3000 holy men gathered from all over India. 
The leaders called upon the Hindus to support the BJP.
A young sixth standard student, Kranthi Hindwani campaigned for BJP 
in Gujarat. He mesmerised the crowds with his compelling recitation
of the Hindu epics and couplets from Vajpayee's poems. Every BJP
• ■ ocandidate in Gujarat wanted him to campaign m  his constituency .
o
* India Today. 30 April, 1991 and Eye Witness - Election 
Special, May 1991, Video cassette brought out by The Hindustan 
Times. New Delhi.
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In order to reach the electorate, every mode of travel, from 
aeroplanes and helicopters to bicycles and camels were used. India 
Today called it the 'Age of the Jet setters' . In 1991 the star 
campaigners resembled political jet setters, being airborne for at 
least 4-5 hours each day, hopping from one constituency to another 
in the frantic race against time to get them to their electoral 
destinations3 .
ELECTION RALLIES/PROCESSIONS
In the election processions, candidates accompanied by national or 
local party leaders moved around the main roads in jeeps followed 
by party workers and supporters carrying flags, distributing 
handbills and shouting slogans. Such processions moved from door- 
to-door and some times ended up with street receptions for 
candidates. Streets were decorated with flags, posters and arches 
with welcome signs to greet the candidates. At such processions, 
supporters generally garlanded the leaders and sometimes arranged 
food and drinks.
Political parties believed that processions were important in 
projecting the popularity of the leaders who believed in 'power' 
and 'show of strength' through such activities. EC of India 
regulates political processions during elections through a set of 
rules (See Appendix - F) . Similarly, in rural areas these 
processions take the form of walkabouts where leaders and 
candidates travel on foot (Padyatras) in the villages greeting 
people and listening to their grievances, sometimes giving instant 
solutions and making promises.
3 The three major parties - Cong.I, BJP and JD hired private 
aircrafts and helicopters to enable their star campaigners to cover 
maximum ground. In this way, eight aeroplanes and nine helicopters 
were said to have been used by the leaders, some at an hourly rate 
of Rs.10,000 (£200).India Today. 31 May, 1991.
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The most colourful rallies were those of film and television stars 
who addressed PMs and participated in election processions. BJP 
processions were colourful with religious connotations. In Gujarat, 
Deepika Chikila was paraded through the streets dressed as 
'Sita'(the role she played in the TV serial Ramayana. L.K.Advani 
was shown atop the vehicle with 'bow and arrow' or with the
Sudarshan Chakra - the weapon of the Hindu God, Krishna. Also 
draped around him was a shawl printed with Rama all over. 
Therefore, these PMs, rallies and processions not only continued 
but also became more colourful and attracted large attention. They 
also came under criticism in the press as a farcical and
exploitative activity.
ARE PUBLIC MEETINGS A FARCE ?
In recent years it was argued that people have understood the farce 
of mass gatherings where people were gathered through hired men 
with incentives of cash or kind and were herded like cattle in 
trucks and transported to and from the site of the meetings. Free 
meals and cash lure the crowds to such meetings (Kumar, 1991). In 
1991 some public meetings were cancelled due to lack of support One 
such was a meeting of the former Prime Minister Chandrashekhar at 
Hyderabad which the researcher was to attend was cancelled because 
the local leaders did not manage to collect enough crowds.
Reviewing such trends, Kumar (1991) comments:
Though the large gathering of loud speakers, music and 
other fanfare tends to create the impression of a 'mela'
(fair) for the villagers, the real message gets diffused. 
Politicians and especially the big bosses, believe that 
the jamboree impresses the people by creating an 
impression of awe, power and popularity of the leader.
By now the masses know very well that such gatherings are 
organised through hired middle men who bring hired 
audiences in hired trucks. In fact the extravagance and 
deceit involved in creating such an illusion of 
popularity is more likely to create revulsion than awe.
On the other hand the small gatherings addressed by the 
local leaders and elders can create an atmosphere of 
intimacy and trust and the messages also have a greater 
credibility.
Though similar instances have been reported, one cannot completely 
rule out the popularity and effectiveness of these PMs, especially 
those addressed by party leaders which draw large crowds and have 
formed an important and credible source of election information. 
Our study showed several interesting aspects of the importance 
given to PMs, in terms of the intention of respondents to attend 
public meetings as well as their dependence on them making this 
MIC, an indispensable form of election communication.
RESPONDENT'S OPINION ON PUBLIC MEETINGS
In the first phase, we investigated the extent to which respondents 
depended on public meetings as a source of information and whether 
they were likely to attend the PMs of parties. In the second phase, 
we enquired if they attended the meetings and how far the meetings 
helped them in their decision making process.
TABLE VIII. 1 MEN AND WOMEN WHO INTENDED TO ATTEND
PUBLIC MEETINGS
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
Yes 186 28.7 51 10 .1 237 20.5
No 389 59.9 388 76.7 777 67.3
Not yet 
decided
47 7.2 31 6.1 78 6.7
Don't Know/No 
Answer
27 4.2 36 7.1 63 5.5
Total
649 100 506 100 1155 100
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TABLE VI11.2 RESPONDENTS IN CONSTITUENCIES LIKELY
TO ATTEND PMs
Constituency Yes No Not yet 
decided
Don't 
know/NA
N % N o. N % N %
Secunderabad 53 14.7 282 78.1 16 4.5 10 2.7
Hyderabad 78 15.8 362 73 .1 27 5.4 28 5.7
Nagarkurnool 106 35.4 133 44.5 35 11.7 25 8.4
As shown in table VIII. 1, two thirds (67.3%) of the respondents had 
no intention to attend PMs. They included 59.9% men and 76.7% 
women. Only one fifth (20.5%) said they intended to attend such 
meetings. Men (28.7%) outnumbered women (10.1%). Women showed 
little interest in PMs as was evidenced by their intention to 
attend them. 6.7% had not decided to attend PMs and 5.5% had no 
definite answer.
The rural - urban difference is quite noticeable in table VIII.2. 
While 35.4% of rural Nagarkurnool respondents were likely to attend 
PMs, less than half their counterparts in Hyderabad (15.8%) and 
Secunderabad (14.7%) were likely to do so. While about three 
fourths of urban respondents (Hyderabad 73.1% and Secunderabad 
(78.1%) said that they were not likely to attend PMs, less than 
half their rural (Nagarkurnool 44.5%) counterparts said so. Rural 
Nagarkurnool (11.7%) had more than double the number of those who 
had not yet decided when compared, with urban Hyderabad (5.4%) and 
Secunderabad (4.5%).
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PMs AS SOURCES OF ELECTION INFORMATION
TABLE VI11.3 GENDER WISE DEPENDENCE ON PMs FOR
ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
N % N %
A lot 58 8.9 18 3.7 76 6.6
A fair amount 241 37.1 74 14 .6 315 27.3
Not at all 299 46.0 349 69.0 648 56.1
No opinion 51 8.0 65 12 .7 116 10.0
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
As shown in table VI11.3, over half (56.1%) of the respondents did 
not depend on PMs as source of election information. Women (69%) 
outnumber men (46%) by over 20% here. Only 6.6% of the respondents 
depend a lot on PMs for election information. This includes about 
two thirds men (8.9%) and over one third (3.7%) women. Over a 
quarter (27.3%) who depend a fair amount on PMs for election 
information include over double men (37.1%) than women (14.6%) . 10% 
who had no opinion comprised of 8% men and 12.7% women .
TABLE VI11.4 CONSTITUENCY WISE DEPENDENCE ON PMs
FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N o.*0 N o.*0 N O*“o
A lot 39 10.8 22 4.3 16 5.4
A Fair Amount 73 20.2 114 23.0 128 42 .9
Not at all 210 58.2 307 62 .0 131 43 .6
No opinion 39
0
0
otH 52 10.7 24 8.1
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
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As shown in table VIII.4, almost half (48.3%) of Nagarkurnool 
respondents depended on PMs for election information when compared 
with just over a quarter of respondents from Hyderabad (27.3%) and 
Secunderabad (31%) . From another angle, well over half of urban and 
less than half of rural respondents do not depend on PMs at all for 
election information. They include 62% from Hyderabad, 58.2% from 
Secunderabad and 43.6% from Nagarkurnool.
Therefore, nearly half of the respondents depended on PMs in 
varying degrees from a lot to a little for information on 
candidates and parties. More men than women intended to attend or 
depended on public meetings. Earlier we found that of the 33% of 
the respondents who depended on public meetings as a source of 
election information, 20.5% intended to attend the PMs while 6.7% 
were undecided. In the second phase of the survey, we asked the 
respondents if they had attended the PMs and how far they helped 
them in their voting decisions.
RESPONDENTS WHO ATTENDED THE PUBLIC MEETINGS 
TABLE VI11.5 GENDER WISE RESPONDENTS WHO ATTENDED
THE PUBLIC MEETINGS
Gender Yes No No answer
N o. N Q*"O N %
Men 303 46 .7 322 49.6 24 3.7
Women 105 20.8 379 75 .0 18 4.2
Total 408 35.3 701 60.7 46 4.0
46.7% men and almost half this number of women actually reported 
that they attended PMs. This means a little more than one third 
(35.3%) of the respondents attended PMs of candidates and political 
parties. Almost half of the men (49.6%) and three quarters of women 
(75%) did not attend PMs. However, 35.3% had attended the public 
meetings of the various political parties or the religious leaders,
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15 percentage points more than the 20.5% who intended to attend. A 
near equal urban (34.1%) and rural (38.7%) respondents attended the 
election meetings. The number of women, 20.8% who attended public 
meetings was doubled as only 10% had intended to attend the PMs in 
the first phase showing an increased interest in elections.
TABLE VI11.6 PARTY MEETINGS ATTENDED BY
RESPONDENTS
Political
Parties
Yes No No answer
N N "O N O,"o
Cong.I 204 17.7 946 81.9 5 0.4
BJP 273 23.6 877 76.0 5 0.4
TDP 151 13.1 999 86.5 5 0.4
MIM 52 4.5 1099 95.2 4 0.3
SJP 18 1.6 1132 98.0 5 0.4
Others 10 0.9 1124 97.3 21 1.8
As seen in Table VIII.6, there were multiple responses as 
respondents attended the meetings of more than one party. PMs of 
BJP (23.6%), Cong.I (17.7%) and TDP (13.1%) were better attended 
than those of MIM (4.5%), SJP (1.6%) and others (0.9%). Moreover, 
unlike other parties, BJP meetings were not only addressed by their 
own leaders but also by VHP, RSS and religious leaders. At one such 
meeting of Sadhvi Rithambara attended by the researcher, there was 
a large gathering of women. MIM meetings attracted their hard core 
support group.
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THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC MEETINGS IN VOTING DECISION
TABLE VI11.7 GENDER WISE INFLUENCE OF PMs ON
RESPONDENTS
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
N % N O*o N o
A Lot 69 10.6 54 10.7 123 10.6
A Fair amount 175 27.0 69 13 .6 244 21.1
Not very much 62 9.5 37 7.3 99 8.6
Not at all 134 20.6 117 23 .1 251 21.7
Don't Know/No 
Answer
’ 209 32 .2 229 45.3 438 38.0
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
TABLE VI11.8 CONSTITUENCY WISE INFLUENCE OF
PUBLIC MEETINGS
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N "0 N ft,“O N O*
A Lot 29 8.0 44 8.9 51 17.0
A fair amount 85 23.5 92 18.6 67 22.4 ,
Not very much 15 4.2 69 13 .9 15 5.0
Not at all 48 13 .3 149 30.1 54 18.1
Don't know/ No 
answer
184 51.0 141 28.5 112 37.5
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
As observed in table VIII.7 and VIII.8, over 10% of the respondents 
claimed that they were influenced a lot by the PMs in their 
decision to vote, while double the number (men 20.6% and women 
23.1%) reported that they were not at all influenced. A little more 
than a quarter of men (27%) and half that number of women (13.6%) 
were influenced a fair amount. There is no significant difference
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between men (9.5%) and women (7.3%) in the 'not very much' response 
category. But the difference is apparent in the 'fair amount 
category which has half the number of women (13.6%) compared to men 
(27%). Over one fifth of men (20.6%) and about a quarter of women 
(23.1%) were not at all influenced by attending PMs in their 
decision to vote.
As shown in table VIII.8, double the number of those who were 
influenced a lot by PMs in their decision to vote were found in 
Nagarkarnool (17%) when compared with Hyderabad (8.9%) and 
Secunderabad (8.0%). On the contrary 30.1% Hyderabad respondents, 
18.1% in Nagarkarnool and 13.3% in Secunderabad were not at all 
influenced.
Around a quarter of the respondents were influenced a fair amount 
in Secunderabad and Nagarkarnool and less than that in Hyderabad 
(18.6%). 13.9% were not very much influenced in Hyderabad, less 
than half that number in Nagarkarnool (5.0%) and one third of that 
number in Secunderabad (4.2%). The responses flatten out touching 
one fifth mark in all categories to 'a fair amount' response with 
Secunderabad (23.6%) Nagarkarnool (22.4%) and Hyderabad (18.6%). 
Half the Secunderabad (51%), one third of Nagarkurnool (37.5%) and 
a quarter of Hyderabad (28.5%) respondents had no definite answer.
SUMMARY
Overall PMs were attended by a third of the respondents in the 
urban and rural constituencies. Though only 20.5% intended to 
attend the PMs, about 15% more actually attended. 59.6% men and 
76.6% women respondents indicated that they had no intention to 
attend PMs of candidates and political parties. They include three 
quarters of Hyderabad 73.2%, Secunderabad 78.1% and a little less 
than half (44.5%) of rural Nagarkarnool respondents. Men (28.7%) 
out numbered women (10.1%) by three times in their intention to 
attend PMs. While over one third (35.4%) of rural Nagarkarnool
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respondents desired to attend PMs half this number in urban 
Hyderabad (15.8%) and Secunderabad (14.7%) shared this intention. 
Amongst the parties, the BJP meetings were attended by 23.6% of the 
respondents followed by those of Cong. I and TDP. PMs had helped 
nearly a third, a lot for 10.6% men and women and a fair amount for 
21.1%. In actual terms, 80% of all those who attended the election 
meetings found them useful to some degree in their decision to 
vote.
The response to the MICs of communication was high. Nearly half the 
number of men attended some meetings. This could well relate to the 
election tours of party leaders and justify the amount of money and 
time spent by leaders on their election tours hiring aeroplanes and 
helicopters. Though in western democracies, developments in mass 
media, opinion polls, public relations and national campaigns have 
bypassed electioneering at the constituency level, in India, 
despite the use of mass media, campaigning at the constituency 
level, including street corner meetings, door-to-door calls, hand­
shakes and personal calls still dominate the electoral activities 
of the political leaders. The proximity and face-to-face contact 
with party workers and community meetings with candidates as 
evidenced in the campaigns do go a long way in mobilizing support. 
We next evaluate the impact of the door-to-door campaigns.
DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNS AND WALKABOUTS
Door-to-door campaigns are a means of reaching the electorate in 
their homes to identify the likely supporters and opponents. During 
the elections, candidates, party workers and important members of 
society who wield influence in the areas approached voters 
personally and persuaded them to support parties and candidates. 
Though this approach is limited to local level canvassing it is 
claimed by parties to be highly useful in persuading the 
indifferent and uninterested voters. We found that party workers, 
elected or nominated at the district and state levels form a
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liaison between the party and voters and were constantly 
interacting with the voters in areas they represented and kept the 
party leaders well informed about the trends of support4 . This 
regular interaction with local residents formed a means of long 
term affiliation with political parties and candidates.
During elections, activities are focused with organised strategies. 
Communication programmes are undertaken with candidates and workers 
who conduct regular door-to-door campaigns. Party supporters and 
volunteers are recruited for decentralised work to mobilize support 
right from the registration of voters to the final act of voting.
Organizational support at the grassroots level was an important 
prerequisite for campaigning at the local level, hence efforts were 
made by parties to strengthen the organization at the village, 
district and state levels. A party of long standing like Cong.I has 
a well established decentralised system of party workers who are 
identified with them. In the years between 1989-91, the BJP also 
increased its network from the northern states to the entire 
country. However, parties, like the NF and SJP, have yet to develop 
their network of support to co-ordinate their work at the 
grassroots level. TDP and MIM have a well organised network of 
party functionaries in the state and MIM in Hyderabad.
Though the interpersonal meetings were considered to be more 
effective in rural and semi urban areas, we find evidence from our 
study that these techniques were important even in urban areas, 
where voters were also motivated by the personal visits of party 
workers. During the 1991 elections, all parties were actively 
involved in door-to-door campaigns in the urban and rural areas. In 
our constituencies we found that Cong.I, BJP, TDP, MIM and several 
independent candidates conducted door-to-door campaigns, street
4 Author's interviews with Cong.I and BJP party workers in 
Hyderabad and Nagarkurnool.
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corner meetings and walkabouts. MIM was most prominent in
Hyderabad. The party workers in the primaries were involved in
campaign activity and in organising public meetings and walkabouts.
BJP had an extensive campaign in the state. According to a BJP 
activist their work was much more difficult as they intended to 
make inroads into Cong.I and TDP strongholds5 . TDP, through their 
network, were able to gauge the voters attitudes through the
extensive information and feedback system. Based on assessments of 
party representatives, they were confident of regaining political 
power in the state. We investigated the reactions of respondents 
who were approached by various political parties, and the extent to 
which their coming made a difference to their voting behaviour.
VOTERS VISITED BY THE PARTY WORKERS
Given the large numbers in the Indian electorate, an overwhelming 
70% respondents reported to have been visited by workers of
political parties in the door-to-door canvassing. Given the fact 
that most parties gave importance to interpersonal meetings, there 
was no reason to doubt the magnitude of the workforce and expected 
changes that could be brought by personal encounters.
TABLE VI11.9 RESPONDENTS APPROACHED BY PARTY
WORKERS
Location Yes NO No Answer
N O,*o N % N
Urban 567 68.8 203 24.6 54 6.6
Rural 241 72 .8 66 19.9 24 7.3
Total/Average % 808 70.0 269 23 .3 78 6.7
5 Interview with Kishen Reddy, BJP spokesperson in Hyderabad, 
16 May, 1991
299
As shown in the table VIII.9, slightly more rural (72.8%) 
respondents were approached than their urban (68.8%) counterparts. 
Among the constituencies, 73.3% respondents in Nagarkurnool were 
70.9% in Secunderabad and 67% in Hyderabad were met by party 
workers.
TABLE VIII. 10 POLITICAL PARTY WORKERS WHO VISITED
THE RESPONDENTS
Political Party Yes No
N 'o N %
Cong. I 513 44 .4 642 55.6
BJP 608 52.7 547 47.3
TDP 360 31.2 795 68.8
MIM 139 12.0 1016 88.0
JD 101 8.7 1054 91.3
Others/Independent s 87 7.5 1068 92.5
Respondents were approached by more than one political party as 
there were multiple responses from the respondents. From table 
VIII. 10 it can be observed that, BJP workers reached more than half 
(52.7%) respondents. This brings into focus the extensive campaign 
techniques that were employed by BJP at the grassroots level for 
mass mobilization. TDP party workers approached nearly one third, 
(31.2%) respondents. In Hyderabad, the contest was between the BJP 
and MIM and in Secunderabad, it was between the Cong. I and BJP, but 
in Nagarkurnool the contest was between the TDP and Cong. I. In 
Hyderabad constituency 12% respondents were met by MIM party 
workers. We further asked the respondents if their coming made a 
difference to their voting decision.
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THE EXTENT TO WHICH DOOR-TO-DOOR MEETINGS MOTIVATED RESPONDENTS TO 
VOTE
Overall party canvassers were able to motivate 11.2% of the 
respondents a lot and 20% a fair amount. On the contrary, they were 
not successful with 29.8% of the respondents and not at all 
successful with 21.2% of the respondents.
TABLE VIII.11 RESPONDENTS MOTIVATED BY DOOR-TO-
DOOR CAMPAIGNS
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool Total
N % N % N % N O,"o
A Lot 53 14.7 40 8.1 36 12.0 129 11.2
A fair 
amount
96 26.7 111 22.4 24 8.1 231 20.0
Not very 
much
89 24.7 177 35.8 78 26.0 344 29.8
Not at 
all
60 16.7 89 18.0 95 31.8 244 21.1
Don't 
know
59 16 .4 67 13.5 59 19.7 185 16.0
No
Answer
4 0.8 11 2.2 7 2.3 22 1.9
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100 1155 100
In the constituencies, 41.4% urban respondents in Secunderabad 
(14.7% a lot and 26.7% a fair amount) were better persuaded by 
door-to door campaigns of party canvassers than their rural 
counterparts in Nagarkurnool (20% comprising 12% who said a lot and 
8% who said a fair amount) . Though it was felt that personal 
meetings were important for persuading the rural electors, we found 
that urban respondents were more affected by the door-to-door 
campaigns.
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Double the number of respondents in rural Nagarkurnool (31.8%) 
revealed that they were not at all motivated by the door-to-door 
campaigning by party canvassers when compared with their urban 
counterparts in Hyderabad (18%) and Secunderabad (16.7%).
SUMMARY
Door-to-door campaigning and walkabouts constituted an essential 
component of electioneering. These forms help party workers to 
develop a rapport and provide candidates and parties to explain 
their stand on issues. Most political parties deployed a network of 
supporters for canvassing and for organising processions in the 
local areas. Over 70% of our respondents were approached by party 
workers and candidates. While 74.2% of the rural respondents were 
contacted, 68.9% of their urban counterparts were approached. BJP 
workers approached more than half (52.7%), followed by Cong.I 
(44.4%), TDP (31.2%) and others.
Canvassers and candidates succeeded in motivating 32.3% in varying 
degrees.(11.2% were motivated a lot and 20.1% were fairly 
motivated) but were not able to succeed with over half (51%) . 
However it would not be true to say that such strategies are not 
effective as door-to-door campaigns were moderately effective. 
Interestingly, more urban voters were motivated than their rural 
counterparts.
SECTION II
INTERNAL INTERPERSONAL CHANNELS
So far we have discussed the mass media and mass interpersonal 
channels as sources of information and influence on political 
behaviour. In this section we analyze the internal forms of 
communication like family, social groups and local leaders. We 
examine how far social and cultural factors of caste, language and 
religion are significant in influencing the political behaviour at 
the group and community levels as campaigns are generally targeted
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at specific groups that vary in different parts of the country. 
Political parties refer to these groups as 'Vote Banks' where these 
groups vote en bloc as advised by community or religious leaders 
rather than as individuals.
This section is in four parts: we first establish the importance 
and characteristics of family and other social groups; second, we 
evaluate the extent to which respondents sought and depended on 
family, friends, local community and religious leaders for 
political information; third, we analyze the importance given to 
certain social factors that are likely to influence an individual's 
personal voting behaviour and those of the community and last, we 
conclude with an evaluation of these forms on voting behaviour.
ROLE OF FAMILY AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR
Guru (1991) argues that family forms the primary unit of political 
socialization and political behaviour. Earlier studies have 
revealed that families voted as units. There has been a change in 
the Indian family structure and we tried to find out if they 
reflected any changes in voting patterns.
Family structure has changed from joint to nuclear families 
especially in urban areas. Most respondents were from nuclear 
families. However, in Nagarkurnool, we found several joint families 
who were classified as Cong.I, BJP or Communist supporting families 
based on the continued support that at least two generations have 
given to particular parties. There was also a noticeable change in 
the members of families supporting different parties and also 
standing as candidates. This was evident in the Scindias of 
Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh and the Rajus in Vizianagaram in AP. In 
Gwalior, Rajmata Vijaye Raje Scindia and her daughter represented 
the BJP, while her son Madhav Rao Scindia, represented the Cong.I. 
In Vizianagaram, Anand Gajapathi Raju represented the Cong.I, and 
his brother Ashok Gajapathi Raju represented the TDP.
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Press reports from northern India suggested that political and 
religious uprisings had led to changes in voting behaviour within 
families, especially in the women's voting behaviour. Most women 
were more likely to vote for the BJP^ after the Hindutva campaign. 
We did not find similar trends in our constituencies. Women 
respondents consulted their men or simply made men answer our 
questions claiming their responses were the same as those of their 
spouses. To evaluate such changes and trends, we investigated the 
extent to which respondents depended on discussions with family. We 
believed that with the increase in media exposure, the importance 
given to the influence of family might be reduced.
FAMILY AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
As seen in Table VIII. 12, Despite the exposure to mass media and 
MIC, 69.6% (22.5% depended a lot and 47.1% a fair amount) of the 
respondents depend upon family as a source of election information. 
Only a quarter 25.7% do not depend on family for election 
information. Men and Women sought family discussions as sources of 
information on political issues.
Almost three quarters of women respondents (74.7%) against two 
thirds of men (65.6%) stated that they depend on family as a source 
of election information. Moreover more men (23.9%) than women 
(20.8%) depend a lot on the family for such information. On the 
other hand, over half the women (53.9%) depended a fair amount on 
the family as against less than half 41.7% men. But more men 
(27.7%) are less dependent on the family for election information 
than women (23.1%) .
 ^The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 21 May, 1991
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TABLE VI11.12 GENDER WISE DEPENDENCE ON FAMILY AS
A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
N o*o N % N O,"o
A Lot 155 23 .9 105
00o<N 260 22 .5
A fair amount 271 41.7 273 53 . 9 544 47.1
Not at all 180 27 .7 117 23.1 297 25.7
Don't know 43 6.7 11 2.2 54 4.7
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
TABLE VI11.13 CONSTITUENCY WISE DEPENDENCE ON
FAMILY FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N *0 N % N a.o
A Lot 109 30.2 99 20.0 52 17.4
A fair amount 159 44.0 241 48 .7 143 47 . 8
Not at all 79 21.9 128 25.8 91 30.4
Don't know 14 3.9 27 5.5 13 4.4
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
As shown in table VIII.13, between the constituencies, urban 
respondents in Secunderabad (30.2%) and Hyderabad (20%), depended 
a lot on family as a source of election information than 
Nagarkurnool (17.4%). Over 40% and less than half respondents in 
all the constituencies depend a fair amount on discussions with the 
family. 30.4% in Nagarkurnool, 25.8% in Hyderabad and 21.9% in 
Secunderabad are not at all dependent on family. We examined how 
important it was to consult family members in the voting behaviour.
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RESPONDENTS LIKELY TO FOLLOW ADVICE OF FAMILY MEMBERS IN VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR
While 70% of the respondents depended on discussions with family 
for political information, where actual voting behaviour was 
concerned, just over half (51%), considered it important to consult 
family members for advice to vote. 18.7% considered it very 
important and 32.3% somewhat important. The other half were 
negatively inclined towards consulting the family members. 22.2% 
did not find it very important.
In respect of the final voting behaviour, 23.4% of the respondents 
were influenced a lot by the family and 46.2% were somewhat 
influenced. Overall, over two thirds, (69.6%), appear to have been 
influenced by the family. Although it was presumed that families 
were more influential in rural areas, we, in fact, found that the 
importance given to families was higher in urban constituencies. 
Therefore family remains an important source of information and 
influence in voting behaviour.
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL GROUPS
In all social systems people aggregate as social groups. The 
political parties use these groups to channelise political 
information through leaders of these small groups in villages and 
small towns. With close proximity of houses, men, women and 
children, gather for an evening talk. These social groups become 
important sources of election information in voting behaviour 
patterns within the communities. They often have the potential to 
become the 'Blocks' of votes that are wooed by the political 
parties. Through a series of questions, we established the 
formation of such groups, the homogeneity of groups and the general 
topics of discussion with emphasis on political discussions. The 
analysis was done by constituency, gender and education.
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SOCIAL GROUPS OF RESPONDENTS
As seen in table VIII.14, An overwhelming 88.1% of the respondents 
interacted with friends and neighbours. While over two thirds, 
64.8% met sometimes, 23.3% got together regularly. There were a lot 
of similarities in the social groups within the constituencies and 
between men and women.
TABLE VIII.14 FREQUENCY OF INTERACTION WITHIN
SOCIAL GROUPS
Attitude variable Number Percentage
Regularly 269 23.3
At times 749 64.8
Never 109 9.4
No Answer 28 2.4
Total 1155 100
TABLE VIII. 15 AVERAGE SIZE OF THE GROUPS
Number of Persons Number Percentage
Less than 5 420 36.3
5-10 388 33.6
11-20 53 4.6
More than 20 18 1.6
It varies from time to time 144 12 .5
No answer 132 11.4
Total 1155 100
From table VI11.15, we found that over a third -(36.3%) of the 
groups comprised of less than five and 33.6% were between 5-10 
members. Thus around two thirds were in small group situations. We 
further evaluated the characteristics of these groups.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL GROUPS
We examined if respondents interacted with persons of similar 
background as themselves in terms of age, occupation, language, 
caste and religion. The respondents were asked to mark the extent 
to which the given statements in the questionnaire were true or 
untrue on a four point scale as true, untrue, uncertain or if they 
preferred not to answer. The responses are presented in table 
VIII.16.
TABLE VIII. 16 SIMILARITY OF SOCIAL GROUPS BY AGE,
OCCUPATION AND LANGUAGE
Attitude variable Age Occupation Language
N o,o N O,o N %
True 472 40.9 367 31.8 586 50.7
Uncertain (may or 
may not)
359 31.1 430 37.2 238 20.6
Untrue 173 15 .0 202 17.5 187 16.2
No Answer 151 13 .0 156 13 .5 144 12.5
Total 1155 100 1155 100 1155 100
Did the members move around with the same age group?
40.9% of the respondents confirmed that they socialised with 
persons of their own age group while 31.1% said that they may or 
may not mix with persons of their own age group. 15% tend to 
socialise with other age groups and 13% did not respond at all. 
Women, tend to interact with women of other age groups when 
compared with men.
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Do members of social groups do the same work?
While socialization to the extent of 31.8% is true within 
occupational groups, less than half this number (17.5%) confirm it 
is not so, while 37.2% opine that it may or may not be so. Language 
appears to bring together 50.7% of the respondents to which another 
20.6% can be added further. It is untrue for 16.2% of the 
respondents and 12.5% chose not to answer.
Nearly a third, 31.7% of the respondents were in the same 
occupation and generally socialized with colleagues, while 37% 
replied in the negative or were uncertain, signifying greater 
socialisation among friends, relatives and neighbours, as stated by 
17.5%. More men than women moved around with members of the same 
occupation. Language was not a restrictive factor as 80% 
respondents spoke Telugu.
TABLE VIII. 17 SIMILARITY OF GROUPS BY RELIGION AND
CASTE
Attitude
variable
Belong to the same 
Religion
Belong to the 
same Caste
N % N o*o
True 322 27.9 172 14.9
Uncertain 356 30.8 348 30.1
Untrue 312
o(N 454 39.3
No answer 165 14.3 181 15.7
Total 1155 100 1155 100
Did Respondents move around with members of same religion ?
Some interesting findings were noted in responses to whether 
respondents moved around with members of the same religion and 
caste. In table VIII. 17, we find that though 80% of the respondents 
were Hindus, over a quarter (27.9%) of the respondents do and do 
not socialise on the basis of religion. This could partly be
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attributed to the religious uprisings and caste differences that 
had become controversial issues during the elections and 
respondents were hesitant to admit their differences.
Did respondents socialize with members of same caste 
Over 30% may or may not socialise on the basis of religion or 
caste. 39.3% are certain that they do not base their socialisation 
on caste. About 15% of the respondents chose not to answer to these 
questions. Only 13.1% reported that they mixed exclusively with 
persons of their own caste. Though most of the respondents were not 
hesitant to reveal the caste they belonged to, many preferred to be 
uncertain about moving about with members of their caste and 
religion.
Age (72%), language (71.3%) and occupation (69%) appear to be 
important if not possible characteristics that lead people to 
socialise in groups. For over half the respondents caste and 
religion was not a restricting factor for socialization.
TOPICS OF DISCUSSION AT SMALL GROUP MEETINGS
The talks at group meetings ranged from day-to-day general matters 
to specific areas. Though the topics are not definitive and most of 
them overlap, they do give an indication of the major issues 
discussed. Nearly three fourths marked most of the categories. A 
respondent stated 'when we get together, we discuss anything and 
every thing' , 'we do not get together to discus a set of topics, 
it's not a trade or business meeting'7.
There was little variation in each of the listed topics. As seen in 
table VIII.18, day-to-day matters were most discussed (65.7%), 
followed by social issues (60.9%) and gossip (56.7%). Political 
matters rated fourth (50.1%) followed by economic issues (47.8%).
7 Mr.Chandra Reddy, resident of Nagarkurnool.
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TABLE VIII. 18 TOPICS OF DISCUSSION AT SMALL GROUP
MEETINGS
Topics of 
discussion
Yes No
N O, N *o
Day-to-day 759 65.7 396 34.3
Political issues 579 50.1 576 49.9
Social issues 704 60.9 451 39.1
Economic issues 552 47.8 603 52 .2
Gossip 655 56.7 500 43 .3
Others 228 19 .7 927 80.3
As seen in the above table VIII. 18, day-to-day matters were 
generally discussed by nearly two thirds or 65.7% of the 
respondents in all the three constituencies followed by social 
affairs, gossip and economic affairs. Political discussions rated 
fourth in the order of priority by 50-60% respondents in each 
constituency. Among the constituencies, politics were discussed the 
most by 60.3% of the respondents from Nagarkurnool, followed by 
those in Hyderabad (53.3%) and 50% in Secunderabad. Even though 60% 
of the respondents in Nagarkurnool discussed politics, it was the 
last among the topics of importance.
Social issues were discussed by 60.9% of the total respondents. 
They were most discussed by 66.9% respondents from Nagarkurnool 
followed by 62.3% in Secunderabad and 56.4% in Hyderabad. Economic 
issues were discussed by 47.8% of the respondents. It was rated 
last in all three constituencies compared to other subjects. 
Economic issues were discussed by 65.2% of the respondents from 
Nagarkurnool followed by 48.4% in Secunderabad and 32.2% in 
Hyderabad.
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During elections, politically active persons in such groups become 
influencing agents and mobilize members for supporting and voting 
for candidates and parties. The influence of social groups of 
neighbours and friends was important especially among the younger 
generation. Therefore, we further examined the extent to which 
these social groups formed sources of political information and 
influence in voting behaviour.
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL GROUPS: LOCAL LEADERS, FRIENDS AND 
NEIGHBOURS
THE ROLE OF LOCAL LEADERS
In India, with high illiteracy rates, the two-step flow from mass 
media to community leaders to masses has been successful in 
diffusion of innovations. Accordingly, information provided by the 
media or government agencies is most likely to reach the higher 
status and better educated members of the community commonly 
referred to as the Opinion leaders and trickle down from them to 
the others. This was confirmed in three villages in a study 
conducted on mass media and village life (Hartman, Patil & Dighe, 
1991) .
Opinion leaders are constantly interacting with people giving 
information and motivating them on adoption of new ideas, 
technologies and the government's policies and programmes. For 
street corner meetings and home visits, opinion leaders have become 
important sources for channelising information. The changes have 
been seen in the adoption of farm practices, agricultural 
technologies and rural industries8. The obvious examples are, the 
literate villagers reading a newspaper aloud to others, or raising 
topics first encountered through the media for discussion at a tea 
shop or small group meeting.
8 Members of Field Publicity units of the government, the 
village development workers as well as certain educated members of 
the village serve as opinion leaders
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Just as the various consumer groups use the opinion leaders for 
persuading persons about new products and technology, political 
parties use them as sources of influence in the community groups to 
gain political support as they become important in communicating 
and convincing the local communities. Earlier we found most parties 
had held door-to-door campaigns to reach the electorate through the 
party functionaries elected at the local units. Here we discus the 
dependence and influence of these leaders in mobilising support for 
parties and candidates.
TABLE VIII. 19 DEPENDENCE ON INTERNAL SOURCES FOR
ELECTION INFORMATION
Sources A lot A fair 
amount
Not at all No Opinion 
/Don't know
N O ,O N % N N "O
Friends and 
neighbours
192 16.6 628 54.3 275 23.8 60 5.3
Local
Leaders
87 7.5 314 27.2 635 55.0 119 10.3
TABLE VIII.20 CONSTITUENCY WISE RESPONDENTS
DEPENDENT ON LOCAL LEADERS
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N O,*0 N % N %
A Lot 47 13 .0 27 5.5 13 4.3
A fair amount 70 19.4 97 19.6 148 49.5
Not at all 218 60.4 301 60.8 116 38.8
Dont know / 
No answer
26 7.2 70 14.1 22 7.4
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
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As seen in table VIII.19, double the number (16.6%) of respondents 
depend lot and a fair amount on friends and neighbours when 
compared with local leaders (7.5%). The same holds true for those 
who do not depend at all or who offered no opinion. Over half the 
respondents (54.3%) depended a fair amount on friends and 
neighbours for election information and almost the same percentage 
of respondents (55%) do not depend for such information on local 
leaders.
In the constituencies, over one third in Nagarkarnool (38.8%) and 
a less than two third of the respondents in Hyderabad (60.8%) and 
Secunderabad (60.4%) do not depend at all on local leaders for 
election information. While nearly half the respondents in 
Nagarkarnool (49.5%) depended a fair amount on local leaders, only 
19% of their urban counterparts did so. While 13% of Secunderabad 
respondents depended a lot on local leaders, around 5% of their 
counterparts in Hyderabad and Nagarkarnool did so.
Earlier we found that most parties had held door-to-door campaigns 
to reach the electorate through the local party functionaries 
elected at local units. Here we discuss the dependence and 
influence of these leaders in mobilising support for parties and 
candidates.
THE INFLUENCE OF FRIENDS AND NEIGHBOURS
The influence of friends and neighbours was more important than 
local leaders but scored less than family. A little less than two 
thirds of the respondents in rural Nagarkarnool (64.5%), over half 
in urban Secunderabad (54.6%) and a little less than half in 
Hyderabad (48%) depended a fair amount on friends and neighbours 
for election information.
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TABLE VI11.21 CONSTITUENCY WISE DEPENDENCE ON
FRIENDS & NEIGHBOURS FOR ELECTION
INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N % N % N %
A lot 79 21.9 76 15.3 37 12 .4
A fair amount 197 54.6 238 48.0 193 64.5
Not at all 70 19.3 150 30.3 55 18.4
Dont Know /No 
answer
15 4.2 32 6.4 14 4.7
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
While a little over one fifth in Secunderabad (21.9%) depended a 
lot on friends and neighbours only 15.3% of their counterparts in 
Hyderabad and 12.4% in Nagarkarnool did so. Less than one third did 
not depend on friends and neighbours in Hyderabad (30.3%), while a 
fifth of their counterparts did not do so in Secunderabad (19.3%) 
and Nagarkarnool (18.4%). We further investigated if there was any 
difference of opinion in the different age groups.
TABLE VIII.22 AGE AND THE DEPENDENCE ON FRIENDS & 
NEIGHBOURS FOR ELECTION INFORMATION
Attitude
variable
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65 +
% % b “o % %
A lot 14.0 18 .4 15.7 18.2 18.0 11.1
A Fair 
Amount
53 .8 52 .7 56.7 56.0 52 .5 66.7
Not at all 26.9 24.9 22.6 18.9 21.3 11.1
No answer 5.3 4.0 5.0 6.9 8.2 11.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
In the age wise distribution, as observed in table VIII.22, the 
age group 26-35 years are a majority of nearly 70% who would 
depend a lot (18.4%) and a fair amount (52.7%) on social groups
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for providing election information. These are closely followed 
by the young voters (18-25 years) of which 14% depend a lot and 
53.8% a fair amount. About a quarter do not depend on social 
groups for election information of which the young voters occupy 
the highest position with 26.9% and the senior citizens over 65 
years the lowest at 11.1% indicating a downward trend in the 
dependency on social groups.
INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCES IN THE DECISION TO VOTE
Noting the importance given to family, friends and neighbours and 
local leaders we asked the extent to which they actually 
consulted them in their voting decision. The question asked was 
'Talking about the local people in your area, who were the people 
most involved in helping you to decide ? Enquiries were focused 
on the discussions in the family, discussions with friends and 
neighbours and talking to local leaders.
TABLE VI11.2 3 THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL
INTERPERSONAL SOURCES OF
COMMUNICATION
Internal
Personal
factors
A lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No
Answer
N % N o,*0 N o."0 N 0^*o
Discussions 
with friends 
and
neighbours
167 14.5 606 52.5 317 27 .4 65 5.6
Discussions 
with local 
leaders
77 6.7 384 33.2 642 55.6 52 4.5
Others 48 4.2 132 11.4 909 78 .7 66 5.7
Discussions with Friends and neighbours, local Leaders and 
others.
Over half the respondents were somewhat influenced on their 
decision to vote on account of discussions with friends (52.5%) 
but not at all influenced by discussions with local leaders
316
(55.6%) as indicated in table VII.23. Double the number of 
respondents were influenced a lot by discussions with friends 
(14.5%) than with local leaders (6.7%). But discussions with 
local leaders somewhat helped a third (32.3%) of the respondents. 
Discussion with others helped only 4.2% a lot and somewhat for 
11.4% re spondent s .
SUMMARY
Respondents looked upon discussions with the family and friends 
and neighbours and to some extent the local leaders as important 
sources of political information in both urban and rural areas. 
A low percentage of urban respondents depended upon local leaders 
compared to a higher percentage of rural respondents in 
Nagarkurnool.
In the final voting decisions, nearly three fourths of the 
respondents were influenced by families. Friends followed with 
two third respondents. Local leaders helped 40%, but on an 
overall basis they were more prominent in the rural constituency. 
Despite the use and impact of mass media and interpersonal 
factors, the ultimate decision to vote is that of the individual. 
We therefore examined some of the individual factors that 
influenced the voting behaviour of the respondents.
SECTION III
PERSONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTING BEHAVIOUR
The Indian constitution was built upon equality, justice, 
fraternity and liberty offering the people the advantage of 
following any belief, faith or worship. Over the years, political 
parties, especially Cong. I has used electoral tactics of dividing 
the society into many unequal blocks through localized appeals 
to the dominant majorities thereby claiming to maintain the socio 
political fabric of secularity in the country, at the same time 
enjoying political support for over four decades. However, the 
emergence of other rival parties like BJP, SJP and JD structuring
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their political support on such issues as caste, religion and 
economic differences, parties have been able to break the Cong. I 
foothold (Ahuja & Paul, 1991).
During the 1991 elections, voters were bombarded with various 
issues, religious 'fatwas' and clarion calls from political 
parties and several community and social groups. We attempted to 
investigate how individuals7 perceived these messages and if 
these factors tended to influence voting behaviour. The question 
asked was: In deciding how to vote, how important would you
consider the following aspects:
1. To consult and follow the advice of family members.
2. To make a decision after evaluating the performances of the
various parties.
3. To follow the advice of senior and respectable members of the 
community.
4. To follow the religious leaders.
5. To follow the majority of the caste group.
The respondents were given five statements and were asked to mark 
on a five point scale the level of importance they gave to each 
of the factors as, 7 very important7, 7 somewhat important7, 7 not 
very important7, 7not at all important7 and 7no opinion7.
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TABLE VI11.24 PERSONAL FACTORS AFFECTING VOTING DECISIONS
Attitude
variable
Follow 
members of 
family
Decide after 
evaluation 
of parties 
and
candidates
Follow 
senior 
members of 
community
Follow 
advice of 
religious 
leaders
Follow 
members of 
caste
N O, N Or N % N % N %
Very-
important
216 18.7 318 27.5 86 7.4 102 8.8 97 8.4
Somewhat
important
372 32 .2 302 26.1 267 23 .1 153 13.2 155 13 .4
Not very 
important
256 22 .2 229 19.9 296 25.6 249 21.6 228 19.7
Not at all 
important
230 19.9 162 14.0 361 31.3 489 42 .4 490 42 .4
No opinion 81 7.0 144 12 .5 145 12 .6 162 14.0 185 16.1
Total 1155 100 1155 100 1155 100 1155 100 1155 100
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1. To make a decision after evaluating the performances of 
parties and candidates. As seen in table VIII.24, an 
important criteria for impartially selecting a particular 
party, only over a quarter, 27.5% considered it very 
important and 26.1% found it somewhat important to evaluate 
the credentials of the candidates before casting their vote. 
19.9% did not find it very important and 14% not at all 
important to evaluate the party characteristics before taking 
a voting decision. 12.5% did not have any opinion on the 
issue. It would not be wrong to conclude that the performance 
of party and its evaluation for its merits and demerits was 
not a very important factor for nearly half the respondents.
2. To follow the advice of senior and respected members of the 
community. During the 1991 elections several senior members 
of the community like the senior public servants, army 
personnel, industrialists and others, expressed their support 
for particular parties and campaigned for them during the 
elections. Was it true that people would take their voting 
decision by following the members of the community. 7.4% of 
the respondents reported that it was very important to follow 
the dictates of the senior members of the community while 
more than four times this number (31.3%) did not consider it 
important and a quarter of the respondents (25.6%) did not 
find it very important. Therefore 30.5% appear likely and 
over half (56.1%) may probably follow the advise of the 
community members in their decision to vote.
3. To follow the advice of religious leaders of the Community.
As discussed in the earlier chapters, during the 1991 
elections, religious leaders had campaigned for the BJP and 
JD. Opinion polls showed a marked support for these two 
parties who had aroused the voters on religious grounds.
42.4% of the respondents felt that it was not at all 
important to follow the advise of religious leaders while 
voting. While 8.8% respondents considered it very important 
to follow the religious leaders, 13.2% said it was somewhat
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important, thereby making one fifth of them likely to follow 
the religious leaders. However 14% who had no opinion may 
consider the advise of religious leaders in exercising their 
franchise.
Given the communally polarised voters in the Hyderabad 
constituency it was somewhat difficult to attach much 
credibility to these findings with people not giving much 
importance to religious groups. Moreover, the results from 
the polling booths in the localities in Hyderabad indicated 
a definite voting pattern in the Hindu and Muslim dominated 
areas. We presume that, with intense communal riots in the 
run up to the election, religion had become a sensitive issue 
and maybe people preferred to be non-committal. Earlier too, 
we found a similar response, when most respondents refused to 
answer if they socialised with members of the same caste or 
religion.
4. To follow a majority of the members of the Caste
Like religion, caste had also become an controversial factor 
in dividing the electorate. JD/NF had made it their main 
election issue. Only 8.4% respondents stated that it was very 
important while 13.4% found it somewhat important. However, 
about 40% of the respondents may not follow the fellow caste 
members in their voting behaviour. A near identical trend was 
noticed on the importance given to caste and religious 
factors in making voting decisions. Even in Nagarkurnool, a 
reserved constituency for an SC candidate, there was little 
declared inclination to vote on caste basis.
THE RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON COMMUNITY VOTING BEHAVIOUR
We further investigated the respondents' perceptions of how 
others generally voted. In this we found quite the opposite views 
from the respondents' own attitudes. The respondents were asked 
to scale their opinions on factors of caste, religion and party 
affiliation through the question, How do you think other people 
in the community generally voted in the elections?
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TABLE VIII.25 RESPONDENT VIEWS ON HOW OTHERS IN
THE COMMUNITY VOTED
Attitude
variable
Caste Religion Party
affiliation
N Q.O N % N %
A lot 385 33.4 447 38.6 310 26.8
Somewhat 284 24.5 254 22 .0 403 34.9
Not at all 244 21.1 216 18.7 204 17.7
Don't know 162 14.0 142 12 .3 134 11.6
No answer 80 7.0 96 8.4 104 9.0
Total 1155 100 1155 100 1155 100
While less than 10% of the respondents said that caste and 
religion were important factors for their own voting decisions, 
more than half agreed that others voted on these two factors. As 
seen in the table VIII.25, 58% respondents said that others voted 
based on caste (33.4% a lot and 24.5% somewhat) and 60.6% (38.6% 
a lot and 22% somewhat) voted based on religion. Contrary to 
their own attitudes, less than a quarter, positively stated that 
other community members voted on the basis caste or religion.
In examining how far party affiliation affected the voting 
patterns as families were referred to as Cong. I or BJP or 
Communist supporting families over their long time association 
with the parties, we found that over a third (34.9%) said that 
party affiliation was somewhat reflected in the voting behaviour 
and 26.8% respondents opined that a lot of people voted because 
of their affiliation with the parties.
SUMMARY
The importance given to the three major internal sources of 
political information, family, friends and neighbours and local 
leaders of the community became important in exchanging 
information and discussion. Though local leaders were not 
significant in the urban constituencies, their influence was more 
important in the rural constituency. The interaction with family 
not only formed an important source on which the respondents
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depended for information, but it also formed a significant source 
of influence in voting behaviour for nearly half the respondents. 
In assessing the social factors affecting voting behaviour, 
interesting results emerged as questions were approached from 
different angles to review the answers and establish a degree of 
credibility of the respondents attitude towards elections.
To follow the members of the family was an important factor in 
voting decisions for half the respondents (very important for 
18.7% and somewhat important for 32.2%). We could conclude that 
in India, despite the changes in the family structure arid greater 
exposure to the mass media 'families generally supported and 
voted as single units' . Discussions with local leaders had helped 
only a very few respondents. Though earlier studies on the 
diffusion of innovations have established the importance of the 
local leaders in bringing about change at the grassroots level, 
in our study, discussions with the local leaders had helped 6.8% 
respondents a lot in their voting decisions.
In evaluating individual factors influencing voting behaviour, 
nearly half (27.8% said that it was very important and 26.2% said 
it was somewhat important) the respondents did not find it 
important to evaluate the characteristics of the party before 
making their voting decision.
In following the members of caste and religious groups in their 
voting behaviour, an equal percentage (42.5%) of the respondents 
emphatically stated the extreme of 'not at all important' . 
Contradictory views were found when respondents were questioned 
on their own voting behaviour in relation to caste and religion 
and their opinions on those of the community voting behaviour. 
An under current of this view can be found when 40% appear quite 
likely to consider their views. Also in our constituencies, caste 
uprisings were not so apparently felt, but in Hyderabad the 
voters were highly divided on religious grounds, the clever 
voters refrained from admitting their voting behaviour on the 
same grounds.
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CHAPTER IX
VOTING BEHAVIOUR AND THE IMPACT OF THE CAMPAIGNS
Thus far we have evaluated how the mass media and interpersonal 
forms of communication have helped in gaining ' information and 
helping voters to decide. We now evaluate the extent to which 
these factors led to voting or non-voting behaviour and the 
overall impact of the campaigns in the 1991 elections. We 
investigated the respondents voting behaviour in the 1991 
elections with a review of their voting patterns in the 1989 
elections and whether the assassination influenced voting 
behaviour (in Nagarkurnool). Second, we examined the extent to 
which respondents campaigned for the party they supported, third 
we evaluated the non-voting trends; and last, examined how far 
the campaigns helped them in their voting behaviour.
The voting act is a response to internal and external stimuli, 
the former in terms of preference and commitment, and the latter 
in the context of pressures, campaigning and manipulation (Varma
&. Narain, 1973) . Voting behaviour of a community is to a large 
extent conditioned by its cultural orientation and general 
political disposition. The main reasons for party preference have 
been identified in broad categories as: past record and future 
expectations, group representations, ideology and programmes, 
role in the freedom struggle, the ruling party, family 
traditions, electoral issues, and personal image of the leaders 
(Quaraishi, 1987) .
Though it may be understood that many of the voters gave 
information on their intention to vote and their final voting 
behaviour, one could not take it to be totally credible or 
accurate as our interviewers found the respondents hesitant in
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revealing the names of the party that they intended to vote for 
and for whom they had finally voted. However, we have taken the 
available information provided to at least gauge the general 
attitudes to voting. Analyses from the first and the second 
phases were checked and reviewed in order to evaluate the changes 
in the trends of voting behaviour and finally, to determine the 
extent to which campaigns helped them in their ultimate voting 
behaviour.
The intention to vote reflects the readiness of the voter to 
exercise his franchise, and in doing so be receptive to political 
information through the mass media and other channels of 
communication. Intention to vote may be defined as a mental 
resolve to action (Varma and Narain,1973) . We have evaluated the 
voters' intention as well as the final act of voting.
SECTION I
VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE 1989 AND 1991 ELECTIONS 
TABLE IX. 1 RESPONDENTS' INTENTION TO VOTE IN THE
1991 LOK SABHA ELECTIONS
Voting Intention N %
Intended to vote 980 84.9
Undecided 112 9.7
Will not vote 49 4.2
No answer 14 1.2
Total 1155 100
Despite reports of disinterest and indifference among voters in 
the national daily press1, an overwhelming 84.9% intended to 
vote during the elections. As observed in table IX.1, 9.7% were 
undecided and only a small 4.2% had decided not to vote. This 
relatively high trend of intention to vote was observed in both 
men and women and also in the three constituencies.
-^The Hindu. Madras, 22 April, 1991 and The Times of India, 
Bombay, 12, May 1991.
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TABLE IX.2 RESPONDENTS WHO VOTED IN THE 1989 AND
1991 ELECTIONS
Attitude
variable
1989 1991
N % N %
Yes 897 77.7 902 78.1
No 243 21.0 208 18.0
No answer 15 1.3 45 3.9
Total 1155 100 1155 100
Reviewing the 1989 elections in table IX.2, we found that 77.7% 
of respondents had voted in the 1989 elections. As seen in table 
IX. 1, though 84.9% respondents intended to vote in 1991, actually 
78.1% claimed to have finally voted, a negligible increase from 
the 1989 elections.
The total all India voter turnout during 1991 was 51%, and in AP 
it was 61.42% As seen in table IX.3 the actual official record 
of voting pattern reveals that against the above responses, 
77.12% in Hyderabad, 59.96% in Nagarkurnool and 45.08% in 
Secunderabad of the eligible voters had actually exercised their 
franchise.
TABLE IX.3 CONSTITUENCY WISE VOTING PATTERN AMONG 
THE ELECTORATE IN THE THREE 
CONSTITUENCIES.
Constituency Size of 
the
electorate
No Of
persons
voted
Valid
votes
% of
electors 
who voted
Secunderabad 1,183,787 533,666 526,930 45.08
Hyderabad 1,296,145 999,602 984.878 77.12
Nagarkurnool 1,001,633 600,608 579,204 59.96
Total 2,481,575 2,133,876 2,091,012
Source: Report on the Tenth General Elections to the House of the 
People in India. Election Commission of India, New Delhi 1991.
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TABLE IX.4 CONSTITUENCY WISE RESPONDENTS WHO VOTED 
IN 1991
Constituencies Yes No No Answer
N % N % N %
Secunderabad 281 77.8 61 16.9 19 5.3
Hyderabad 401 81.0 79 16.0 15 3.0
Nagarkurnool 220 73.6 68 22.7 11 3.7
Total 902 78.1 208 18.0 45 3.9
However, in our sample, there were distinct variations in voting 
behaviour compared with the average turnout in the constituencies 
with a majority of the respondents having voted. As seen in table 
IX.4, in the three constituencies, three fourths of the 
respondents claimed to have voted in the elections, with the 
highest, 81% in Hyderabad, followed by 77.8% in Secunderabad and 
73.6% in Nagarkurnool. Compared with the official turnouts as 
shown in table IX. 3 there was a difference of nearly 33 
percentage points in our sample from Secunderabad, 77.8% of the 
respondents in our sample claimed to have voted compared to the 
official turnout of 45.08%. In Hyderabad, the difference was only 
3.9% points, with the turnout of 77.1% when 81% of our 
respondents claimed to have voted. In Nagarkurnool the difference 
was 13 percentage points.
TABLE IX.5 GENDER WISE RESPONDENTS WHO VOTED IN 1989 & 1991
Attitude
Variable 1989
1991
Men Women Men Women
N % N % N % N O,*o
Yes 540 83.2 357 70.6 523 80.6 379 74.9
No 101 15 .6 142 28.0 126 19 .4 127 25.1
No
Answer
8 1.2 7 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 649 100 506 100 649 100 506 100
As in table IX. 5, in the 1989 elections men outnumbered women 
by 12.6 percentage points among the respondents who cast their
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vote. 83.2% men voted and 70.6% women voted. In all the three 
constituencies the percentage of male voters was higher than 
female voters. In 1991 the trend seem to be similar with a 
marginal decrease in the number of men (80.6%) and and increase 
in the number of women (74.9%) who voted.
THE PARTIES MOST LIKELY TO BE VOTED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS
We examined which parties the respondents intended to vote for 
compared to those they voted for in 1989, and the parties that 
they finally claimed to have voted in 1991.
TABLE IX. 6 THE PARTY THAT THE RESPONDENTS INTENDED TO VOTE (FIRST 
PREFERENCE)
Political Party N %
Cong. I 311 26.9
TDP 113 9.8
BJP 390 33 .8
MIM 39 3.4
JD 28 2.4
CPI/CPM 9 0.8
Others 251 21.7
No answer 14 1.2
Total 1155 100
As seen in table IX.6, BJP was the first preference for one third 
(33.8%) of the respondents followed by over a quarter (26.9%) who 
favoured Cong I. A significant number, a little more than a fifth 
(22.3%) appeared to keep their option open to others. TDP (9.8%) 
was the choice of less than 10% of the respondents. The low 3.4% 
choice for MIM can be accounted for MIM's influence in the old 
city areas of the Hyderabad constituency. JD (2.4%) and CPI/CPM 
parties (0.8%) have been chosen by a very small number of 
respondents.
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TABLE IX. 7 CONSTITUENCY WISE PARTIES LIKELY TO BE VOTED FOR BY 
THE RESPONDENTS (FIRST PREFERENCE)
Political
Party
S ecunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N Q,“D N % N %
Cong.I 85 23 .5 145 29.3 81 27 .1
TDP 18 5.0 45 9.1 50 16.7
BJP 126 35.0 128 25.9 136 45 .5
MIM 8 2.2 26 5.3 5 1.6
JD 11 3.0 14 2.8 3 1.0
CPI/CPM 2 0.5 6 1.2 1 0.3
Others 108 30.0 127 25.7 17 7.7
No Answer 3 . 0.8 4 0.8 7 2.3
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
As observed in table IX.7, BJP was the most favoured first 
preference party in Nagarkurnool with the maximum (45.5%) 
respondents followed by those in Secunderabad (35.0%) and a close 
second choice in Hyderabad (25%). Cong.I led the field in 
Hyderabad (29.3%) , was second choice in Nagarkurnool (27.1%) , and 
third (23.5%) in Secunderabad. Interestingly 30% of the 
respondents in Secunderabad and 21.7% in Hyderabad appeared to 
keep their options open in contrast with a small 7.7% of their 
counterparts in Nagarkurnool.
TDP was third choice in Nagarkurnool (16.7%) and fourth in urban 
Hyderabad (9.1%) and Secunderabad (5%) . Except in Hyderabad where 
the MIM party was selected by 5.3% respondents its influence 
elsewhere was insignificant. The JD and Communist parties fared 
even worse. We further enquired the second most preferred 
party/alternate party, if the respondents were unable to vote for 
the first party of their choice.
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TABLE IX. 8 THE ALTERNATE PARTY THAT RESPONDENTS WERE LIKELY TO
VOTE FOR (SECOND PREFERENCE)
Political
Party
N %
Cong.I 261 22.6
TDP 164 14.2
BJP 224 19.4
MIM 39 3.4
JD 64 5.5
CPI/CPM 16 1.4
SJP 6 0.5
Others 378 32.7
No answer 3 0.3
Total 1155 100
One third (32.7%) of the respondents preferred to keep an open 
mind, as seen in table IX. 8. This is an increase of 10 percentage 
points from the previous response. There were a lot of 
duplications with many of the respondents marking the same party 
as the first and second choice, indicating a firm intention to 
vote for a particular party. In contrast to the first choice 
earlier, Cong.I was the second preferred party as over one fifth 
(22.6%) chose Cong. I, with the BJP at (19.4%) not far behind. TDP 
fared better with 14.2% respondents when compared with the 
previous 9.8% as did JD with 5.5% against 2.4% and Communist 
parties with 1.4% against 0.8%. MIM (3.4%) appears to have 
retained its previous supporters. Table IX.9 examines the 
distribution of party preferences in the three constituencies.
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TABLE IX. 9 CONSTITUENCY WISE ALTERNATE PARTY LIKELY TO BE VOTED
BY THE RESPONDENTS
Political
Party
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N Q.*0 N % N O,.*o
Cong.I 88 24.4 68 13 .7 105 35.1
TDP 31 8.6 60 12 .1 73 24.4
BJP 65
o00rH 98 19.8 61 20 .4
MIM 4 1.1 29 5.9 6 2.0
JD 18 5.0 23 4.6 23 7.7
CPI/CPM 1 0.3 11 2.2 4 1.3
SJP 1 0.3 5 1.1 0 0.0
Others 151 42.0 201 40.6 26 9.0
No answer 2 0.6 0 0 1 0.3
Total 361 100 -3 495 100 299 100 ^
As referred in table IX. 9, over 40% of the respondents of 
Secunderabad (42.3%) and Hyderabad (40.6%), preferred to give 
other than established political parties a try. Over a third 
(35.1%) the largest group in Nagarkurnool preferred to give 
Cong.I. the alternate option, while TDP (24.4%) and BJP (20.4%) 
were the parties most chosen by the Nagarkurnool respondents. 
Therefore in Secunderabad, Cong.I was most favoured alternate 
party by 24.4% respondents followed by BJP with 18% and TDP by 
8.6%. In Hyderabad, BJP had gained popularity with 19.9% likely 
to vote for it. Cong.I was preferred by 13.7% and TDP was close 
with 12.1%. These trends indicate the changes in parties that 
respondents had voted for in 1989 and in 1991 elections.
THE PARTIES RESPONDENTS VOTED FOR IN 1989 AND THE SAMPLE VOTE IN
THE 1991 ELECTIONS
*
78% of respondents claimed to have voted in the elections. Most 
people did not hesitate to reveal the party that they voted (by 
then it was established that the interviewers were involved in 
academic work).
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TABLE IX. 10 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PARTY VOTED IN 1989 AND 1991
Party voted 
for
1989 1991
N % N %
Cong.I 490 42 .4 282 24 .4
BJP 127 11.0 409 35 .4
TDP 146 12.6 111 9.6
JD 25 2.2 32 2.8
MIM 27 2.3 60 5.2
CPI/CPM 5 0.4 8 0.7
Others 4 0.3 21 1.8
Do not 
remember
331 28.8 232 20.1
Total 1155 100 1155 100
As seen in table IX.10, BJP showed a marked improvement, gaining 
24.4 percentage points between 1989 (11%) and 1991 (35.4%) as
revealed by the respondents. On the other hand Cong. I was the 
major loser, losing 18 percentage points on voter choice between 
1989 (42.4%) and 1991 (24.4%). TDPs vote share dropped by three 
percentage points from 12.6% to 9.6% .
Marginal gainers were MIM with three percentage points (2.3% to 
5.2%), JD and communist parties with less than one percentage 
point. While over a quarter (28.8%) claimed that they could not 
remember the party they voted in 1989, only a fifth (20.1%) 
claimed this in 1991. MIM which won the Hyderabad seat obtained 
5.2% gaining three percentage points.
Overall of the 33.8% respondents who intended to vote for BJP, 
a little more than same percent (35.4%) finally voted for it. BJP 
had effectively made inroads into the state with an overall 9.64% 
vote share in the state, won the Secunderabad constituency but 
narrowly missed the Hyderabad seat by four percent votes in a 
close contest with MIM. We further examine the voting behaviour
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in relation to the constituencies, gender, age and religious 
background for significant trends.
TABLE IX. 11 CONSTITUENCY WISE PARTIES VOTED FOR IN THE ELECTIONS
Political
Party
Secunderabad Hyderabad Nagarkurnool
N % N N 'o
Cong.I 89 24.7 107 21.6 86 28.8
BJP 145 40.2 181 36.6 83 27.8
TDP 24 6.6 41 8.3 46 15 .4
MIM 3* 0.8 49 9.9 8 2.7
JD 13 3.6 11 2.2 8 2.7
CPI/CPM 3 0.8 1 0.2 4 1.3
Others 16 4.4 5 1.0 0 0.0
Do not 
remember
68 18.8 100 20.2 64 21.3
Total 361 100 495 100 299 100
* Though there was no candidate, some persons marked MIM.
In the constituencies there were distinct differences in the 
voting patterns. In Table IX.11, it can be seen that a majority 
of urban respondents in Secunderabad (40.2%) and Hyderabad 
(36.6%) voted for the BJP. BJP cornered the second highest votes, 
(27.8%) in rural Nagarkurnool too.
The Secunderabad seat was won by the BJP. While it was narrowly 
ahead of the BJP in Nagarkurnool with 29.1% votes, Cong.I was 15 
percentage points away from the BJP in Secunderabad (24.7%) and 
Hyderabad (21.6%). While the influence of TDP was manifest in 
Nagarkurnool (15.4%) and that of MIM (9.9%) in Hyderabad, the 
influence of these parties and others was not significant 
elsewhere. Incidentally, about 20% of the respondents did not 
reveal the party they voted for.
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TABLE. IX. 12 THE PARTIES MEN AND WOMEN VOTED IN THE 1989 AND 
1991 ELECTIONS
Political
Party
1989 1991
Party 
voted for
Men Women Men Women
N ft,o N O,O N % N %
Cong.I 284 43 .8 206 40.7 166 25.5 116 22.9
BJP 78 12.0 49 9.7 253 39.0 156 30.8
TDP 91 14 .0 55 10.9 66 10.2 45 8.9
NF/JD 23 3.6 2 0.4 16 2.5 16 3.2
MIM 12 1.8 15 3.0 16 2.5 44 8.7
CPI(M) 5 0.8 0 0.0 6 0.9 2 0.4
Others 2 0.3 2 0.4 15 2.3 6 1.2
Do not 
remember
154 23.7 177 34.9 111 17.1 121 23.9
Total 649 100 506 100 649 100 506 100
Among men and women there was a marked shift towards BJP from 
1989 to 1991. As observed in table IX. 12, While over 40% men 
(43.8%) and women (40.7%) voted for Cong. I in 1989, this was 
reduced to half in 1991 with 25.5% of the men and 22.9% of the 
women voting for the party. On the other hand BJP had increased 
its vote tally by more than three times from 1989 when compared 
with 1991 among both men (1989-12%, 1991-39%) and women (1989- 
9.7%, 1991-30.8%). The gains and losses among others does not 
appear significant. Unlike reports in the press, in our 
constituencies more women did not vote for the BJP.
We further observed the voting trends in terms of age groups as 
in table IX.13. We have taken only the three major parties and 
the state MIM, hence the totals of the tables do not tally with 
the overall figures.
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TABLE IX. 13 PARTY WISE VOTING BY AGE GROUP IN 1991
Age Group Cong.I BJP TDP MIM
N % N Q,'O N o,*o N o.*o
18-25 66 23 .4 107 26.2 23 20.7 10 16.7
26-35 85 30.2 156 38.2 45 40.6 31 51.7
36-45 66 23.4 72 17.7 25 22 .5 11 18.3
46-55 33 11.7 47 11.5 15 13 .5 3 5.0
56-65 24 8.5 21 5.2 3 2.7 3 5.0
66 + 8 2.8 6 1.5 0 0.0 2 3.3
Total 282 100 409 100 111 100 60 100
In 1991, three quarters of the respondents claimed to have voted 
for either Cong. I, BJP, TDP and MIM. One fifth claimed that they 
did not remember who they voted for while the rest voted for 
other parties. In table IX.13 and IX.14 we isolated the block of 
voters in Cong.I, BJP, TDP and MIM to determine age-wise voting 
preferences for these parties.
The age groups 26-35 years and the young voters between 18-25 
years contribute a major chunk of the votes for any party. As 
observed in table IX.13, it contributed 50% of the votes for the 
BJP, 40.6% to the TDP, 38.2% to the BJP and 30.2% to the Cong.I. 
The age groups 18-25 years and 36-45 years contributed over 2 0% 
to Cong.I.and TDP while the got the maximum votes in the 26-35 
years category.
Identical trends were observed among the distribution of age 
groups who voted for different parties. 30-40% who were in the 
age group of 26-35 years voted for BJP, Cong. I and TDP except in 
the case of MIM where over half (51.7%) of the voters in this age 
group voted for MIM. About a fifth of the votes for all parties 
came from the age group 18-25. Cong.I got (23.4%), BJP (26.2%) 
and TDP (20.7%) while 16.7% of the same age group voted MIM.
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Cong. I, BJP and TDP got 11%-13% of their votes from the 46-55 
year old while MIM got only 5%. Cong.I got the highest 11.3% of 
votes from the 56 years and above age group compared to BJP 
(6.7%) and MIM (8.3%).
TABLE IX. 14 VOTING BY AGE GROUP FOR PARTIES IN 1991
Age
Group
Cong.I BJP TDP MIM Total
N g**© N % N % N o . N g.*o
18-25 66 32 .0 107 51.9 23 11.3 10 4.8 206 23.9
26-35 85 26.8 156 49.2 45 14.2 31 9.8 317 36.8
36-45 66 37.9 72 41.4 25 14.4 11 6.3 174 20.2
46-55 33 33 .7 47 47.9 15 15.3 3 3.1 98 11.3
56-65 24 47 .0 21 41.2 3 5.9 3 5.9 51 5.9
65 + 8 50.0 6 37.5 - - 2 12 .5 16 1.9
Total 28
2
100 409 100 Ill 100 60 100 862 100
Overall 23.9% in the age group 18-25 years cast their votes for 
these parties. 51.9% from this group voted of the BJP, 32% voted 
for the Cong.I, 11.3% for TDP and 4.8% for MIM.
The age group 26-35 years was dominant among different age groups 
with 36.8% of the voters. - Of this group, nearly half (49.2%) 
voted for the BJP. 26.8% for the Cong.I, 14.2% for TDP and 9.8% 
for MIM. 20.2% of the respondents made up the age group 36-45 
years. Of this group 41.4% voted for BJP, 37.9% for the Cong.I, 
14.4% for the TDP and 6.3% for the MIM. 11.3% were from the age 
group 46-55 years. Of this too nearly half (47.9%) voted for the 
BJP and 33.7% for Cong.I.
A small 5.9% of the age group comprised of 56 to 65 years age 
group. Here 47% voted for Cong.I and 41.2% voted for BJP. 1.9% 
who made up the 66 years and above category had 50% choosing to 
vote Cong.I, 37.5% for the BJP and 12.5% for the MIM.
336
BJP leads the rest scoring between 41.2% and 51.9% in the age 
group 18-65 years. The Cong.I is nearest contender. Except in the 
oldest groups 56 years and above, BJP has got extra votes in all 
other age groups.
TABLE IX. 15 RELIGION WISE DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE WHO VOTED IN THE
ELECTIONS (IN THE THREE CONSTITUENCIES)
Religious
Groups
Yes No No Answer
N % N o,"0 N *o
Hindus 723 77.9 168 18.1 38 4.0
Muslims 95 88.0 12 11.5 1 0.9
Sikhs 8 57.1 6 45.8 - -
Christians 69 74.2 18 19.4 6 6.4
Others 7 61.9 4 28 .4 0 0.0
Total/Average % 902 78.1 208 18.0 45 3.9
TABLE IX. 16 RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS AND THE PARTIES
THEY VOTED.
Reli
gion
Cong.I BJP TDP MIM Others
N “O N "O N o.'o N % N *©
Hind
ii
227 24 .4 372 40 86 9.3 17 1.8 22
7
24 .4
Musi
im
26 24.0 18 16.7 10 9.3 37 34.3 17 15.7
Sikh 3 21.4 5 35.7 2 14.3 0 0.0 4 28.5
Chri
stia
n
23 24.7 12 12.9 12 12 .9 6 6.5 40 43 .0
othe
rs
3 27.2 2 18.2 1 9.1 0 0.0 5 45.5
India is generally talked about as a communally fragmented 
electorate. In the table IX.16 we examine the voting pattern on 
religious lines. The highest turnout (88%) was of the Muslims
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compared to 77.9% Hindus followed by Christians and others. 40% 
of Hindus voted for BJP, a Hindu revivalist party with the 
secular Cong.I getting 24.4% of the Hindu vote. While the Muslim 
MIM party secured 1.8% of the Hindu vote, the regional TDP got 
9.3% of the Hindu vote. 24.4% of the Hindus either voted for 
others or kept away from the polling booth. Muslims (88%) turned 
out in the largest numbers to vote. One third (34.3%) preferred 
to vote for the MIM, followed by 24.0% for Cong. I, and 
interestingly 16.7% voted for the BJP.
Cong.I (24.7%) got the highest number of votes from the 
Christians. 12.9% of the Christians voted for the BJP, 12.9% for 
the TDP and 6.5% for MIM. The Sikhs are not a dominant group in 
AP. Over a quarter (28.6%) chose not to answer. Incidentally, 
nearly half (45.5%) of other communities likewise had no answer 
but 27.2% voted for the Cong.I, 18.2% voted for BJP and 9.1 for 
the TDP.
THE TIMING OF THE DECISION TO VOTE AND EXPOSURE
In evaluating the effectiveness of campaigns we investigated the 
timing of the decision to vote and evaluated the findings in 
terms of the constituencies and the religious background of the 
respondents.
TABLE IX. 17 THE TIME OF THE DECISION TO VOTE
Attitude variable N %
Long before the election 
campaign
563 48.7
Early in the campaign 195 16.9
During the campaign 143 12 .4
On the voting day 53 4.6
No answer 176 15.2
Don't Know 25 2.2
Total 1155 100
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As observed in the table IX.17, nearly half (48.7%) of 
respondents had decided who to vote for long before the election 
campaign. Campaigns, we presume, were important to the other half 
of those who were undecided, who decided early in the campaign, 
during the campaign or on the voting day. 16.9% stated to have 
decided early in the campaign, 12.4% decided during the campaign 
and 4.6% decided on the voting day. In terms of the decision 
taken, based on the religious groups, nearly two thirds of 
Muslims 65.2% had decided early in the campaign compared to 48% 
Hindus. There were no interesting differences by constituencies.
On the whole, most respondents had decided early or long before 
the campaigns were launched. Here two factors become significant, 
one, the need and effectiveness of large scale election 
campaigning when most of the electors had already decided on the 
party they wanted to vote, and second, the mass mobilization 
campaigns especially those of the BJP and JD/NF that had begun 
long before the elections were announced gaining momentum and 
support from the voters.
NON-VOTING TRENDS IN THE ELECTIONS
If voting is an act of ultimate political behaviour, then it is 
equally important to ascertain why people refrained from voting. 
The voter turnout in India has been averaging between 50-60% and 
in 1991 it was estimated at a lower level of 51%. Though every 
effort was made by political parties and the government to 
persuade voters to exercise their franchise non-voting trends 
continued. We therefore asked the non-voters, their reasons for 
not voting in the elections and compared these responses with 
those of the 1989 elections.
THE REASONS FOR NOT VOTING IN 1989 AND 1991
In the 1989 elections 22.3% of the respondents did not vote for 
various reasons and nearly the same percentage 21.9% did not vote 
in 1991. Several interesting inferences arise from the reasons 
for which the respondents did not vote.
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TABLE IX. 18 REASONS FOR NOT VOTING IN 1989 & 1991
Reasons for not voting in the 
elections
1989 1991
N Q,'o N
I was away on that day 60 23 .2 43 17.0
I was not eligible to vote 25 9.7 - -
I was scared to vote NA* NA 38 15.0
My vote would not make a 
difference
50 19.4 53 20.9
I don't think any of the 
parties were worth voting for
31 12.0 58 22.9
I did not receive information 
about parties and candidates
7 2.7 7 2.8
Any other 13 5.0 31 12 .3
No particular reason 57 22 .1 13 5.1
No answer 15 5.8 10 4.0
Total Non voters 258 100 253 100
Voters 897 77.7 902 78 .1
Total 1155 100 1155 100
* This question was not asked in the first wave of the survey.
As seen in the table IX. 18, 9.7% of the respondents who were not 
eligible to vote in 1989, were in the voters' list in 1991. More 
respondents were available on the day of polling in 1991 than in 
1989. While 23.2% respondents claimed they were away on voting 
day only 17% were away on the polling day from their home town. 
Like wise, those who were present but kept away from the polling 
booth because their vote would not make a difference increased 
marginally from 19.4% to 20.9%. Similarly, the number of those 
who kept away for no particular reason decreased substantially 
from 22.1% to 5.1%.
i
However disenchantment with political parties kept more voters 
away from the polling booth in 1991 than 1989. While in 1989, 12% 
of the respondents felt that none of the parties were worth 
voting for, nearly double the number (22.9%) felt that way in
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1991. This trend was also seen in a number of articles published 
in the newspapers that the voters were tuned away from the 
electoral system2 .
There was very little change for those who did not vote on 
account of either no information about parties and candidates. 
It could be inferred that a large amount of election information 
had filtered to the grassroots level and the electorate was well 
informed by political parties and government agencies through 
mass and interpersonal channels.
In the second round of data collection, another variable 'I was 
scared to vote' was introduced to cover the 1991 election. 15% 
of those who did not vote chose this reason to keep away from the 
polling booth. The rise in political violence was regularly 
reported in the past elections with cases of booth capturing, 
voters being barred or threatened from casting their votes and 
widespread rigging in some states. In Hyderabad such reports were 
common. This reason was not surprising as the researcher in an 
attempt to cast her own vote faced the same experience of seeing 
some voters being pushed away and herself went home. The other 
reasons included sickness or being busy with personal work. 
Next, we examined the voters involvement in the elections and if 
they campaigned for the party they supported.
DID THE RESPONDENTS CAMPAIGN FOR THE PARTY THEY VOTED ?
The support for the party can be gauged by the way of people 
helping out in campaign activity, campaigning at the local 
community level, in the publishing and distribution of campaign 
aUstig fiith fir tie paly ad arising piiic radtiirp ad pooEsaoE. Terfrip^  in tie 
first round, we introduced the question 'Did you campaign for the 
party you voted?
2 The Hindu. Madras, 16 May, 1991.
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TABLE IX. 19 THE RESPONDENTS WHO CAMPAIGNED FOR THE PARTY
Attitude
variable
Men Women Total
N % N N %
Yes 149 22.9 62 12 .2 211 18.3
No 493 75.9 432 85 .4 925 80.1
Don't Know/No 
answer
7 1.2 12 2.4 19 1.6
Total 649 100 506 100 1155 100
As seen in the table IX. 19, nearly a fifth of the respondents 
(18.3%) reported that they were involved in campaigning 
indicating an involvement in the political process. More men 
(22.9%) than women (12.2%) campaigned for the parties they 
supported. We also asked the respondents if party affiliation in 
any way affected the community voting behaviour
TABLE IX.20 DID THE COMMUNITY MEMBERS VOTE BECAUSE OF PARTY 
AFFILIATION
Attitude
Variable
N %
Not at all 204 17.7
A little 403 34.9
A lot 310 26.8
Don't know 134 11.6
No answer 104 9.0
Total 1155 100
Affiliation with a party affected people's voting behaviour. As 
seen in table IX.20, 61.7% of the respondents believed that
community members vote on account of the party affiliation. Of 
these 26.8% stated a lot and 34.9% a little while 17.7% said that 
community voting behaviour is not on account of such affiliation.
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DID THE ASSASSINATION MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO THE VOTING DECISION
In Hyderabad and Secunderabad, elections were held before the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. But in Nagarkurnool, elections 
were held after the assassination. In the overall result of the 
elections in AP, TDP had prominently gained 12 of the 17 seats 
in the first phase but it was routed in the second phase with the 
Cong. I gaining most of the seats. The gain was claimed to be 
mainly because of the 'sympathy factor' in favour of Cong.I. We 
asked the voters of Nagarkurnool, where the Cong.I candidate had 
won, if the assassination had made a difference on their voting 
behaviour.
TABLE IX.21 THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ASSASSINATION INFLUENCED 
VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN NAGARKURNOOL.
Attitude variable N %
A Lot 90 30.1
Somewhat 93 31.1
Not at all 76 25 .4
No answer 40 13 .4
Total 299 100
It was found the 28.8% had voted for Cong.I and a close 27.7% 
voted for the BJP followed by 15.4% who voted for TDP. In 
Nagarkurnool nearly a third 30.1% respondents stated that the 
assassination did influence their voting decision a lot and 31.1% 
to some extent. Interestingly, more women, 20.1% compared with 
15.3% men were influenced by the assassination.
SECTION II
THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
We finally asked the respondents the extent to which the party 
campaigns helped them in their decision to vote. Four separate 
statements were framed to evaluate if the campaigns helped in
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knowledge gain about parties and candidates, credibility of the 
campaigns if parties forced them to believe things that were 
incorrect, to judge impartially the best party to vote for and 
if the campaigns helped them change their opinion on the images 
of parties and leaders.
TABLE IX.22 THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED THE VOTERS
Attitude variable A lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No answer
N o* N o,“0 N % N %
To increase your 
knowledge about 
political parties 
and candidates
168 14.5 621 53.8 249 21.6 117 10.1
Forced you to 
believe things 
that were not 
correct
83 7.2 407 35.2 539 46.7 126 10.9
To judge 
impartially the 
best party to 
vote for
182 15.7 525 45.5 321 27.8 127 11.0
To change your 
views on the 
images of the 
parties and their 
leaders
121 10.5 507 43.9 389 33.7 138 11.9
The response to the campaigns was high as indicated in table 
IX.22. Campaigns had helped in increasing knowledge for two 
thirds (68.3%) of the respondents (a lot for 14.5% and 53.8% 
somewhat). Over a fifth (21.6%) were not helped at all by party 
campaigns in either increasing their knowledge about parties or 
candidates.
It was also revealed that voters were not led away by the 
presumed false promises of the political parties. Close to half 
(46.7%) felt that party campaigns did not force them to believe 
things that were not correct while 7.2% said that they did force 
them a lot and over one third (35.2%) said that they were forced 
a little to believe things that were not correct.
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61.2% of the respondents believed that campaigns of political 
parties helped them to judge impartially the best party to vote 
for. Of these 15.7% were helped a lot. Over a quarter (27.8%) 
were not helped at all by the campaigns.
Campaigns were also useful at a medium level in changing the 
respondents views on the parties thereby indicating a positive 
impact of the campaigns. Over half (54.4%) the respondents were 
influenced by party campaigns to change their views on the images 
of parties and their leaders of which 10.5% were influenced a 
lot. One third (33.7%) remained unaffected by the campaigns. Over 
10% of the respondents preferred not to answer the above 
questions. The changes in attitude differed between men and women 
and the level of education.
1. THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED TO INCREASE KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT POLITICAL PARTIES
TABLE IX.23 THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS INCREASED KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT PARTIES AND CANDIDATES
Constituencies A lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No Answer
N *0 N % N "O N o,“o
Secunderabad 59 16.3 208 57.6 63 17.5 31 8.6
Hyderabad 74 14 .9 289 58.4 80 16.2 52 10.5
Nagarkurnool 35 11.7 124 41.5 106 35.5 34 11.4
Total 168 14 .5 621 53.8 249 21.6 117 10.1
Over two thirds (68.3%) were helped by campaigns of political 
parties in increasing knowledge about parties and candidates 
among the respondents. While such campaigns were of some benefit 
to over half (53.8%), a lot of benefit accrued to 14.5% and of 
no benefit to over one fifth (21.6%) of the respondents. While 
around 15% of the respondents in urban Secunderabad (16.3%) and 
Hyderabad (14.9%) claimed that campaigns had increased their 
knowledge about parties and candidates a lot, only 11.7% made 
such a claim in rural Nagarkurnool. While over half the
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respondents in Hyderabad (58.4%) and Secunderabad (57.6%) claimed 
that their knowledge was somewhat increased by campaigns, only 
41.5% said so in Nagarkurnool. While 17.5% in Secunderabad and 
16.2% in Hyderabad stated that campaigns did not increase their 
knowledge, double the number (35.4%) said so in Nagarkurnool. 
About 10% of respondents did not answer.
TABLE IX. 24 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS
INCREASED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PARTIES AND CANDIDATES
Educational
level
A Lot Somewhat Not at all No Answer
N *© N O,"0 N *© N %
Uneducated 17 16.8 39 38.6 26 25.7 19 18.8
Primary 10 7.8 72 56.3 33 25.8 13 10.2
Secondary 12 7.8 88 57.1 41 26.6 13 8.4
Intermediate 47 19.4 127 52.5 47 19 .4 21 8.7
Graduation 53 14 .6 195 53 .6 84 23 .1 32 8.8
Post
graduation
29 21.3 77 56.6 14 10.3 16 11.8
Technical - - 21 77.8 3 11.1 3 11.1
Others - - 2 66.7 1 33 .3 - -
Total/
Average%
168 14.5 621 53 .8 249 21.6 117 10.1
According to Table IX.24, less than 10% (8.8%) uneducated and the 
rest with different levels of education made up the sample. The 
degree of benefit differed with these levels. Over one fifth 
(21.3%) of post - graduates, 19.4% intermediates, 14.6% graduates 
and 16.8% of uneducated respondents reaped the maximum advantages 
in increasing knowledge about parties and candidates from 
campaigns. For those respondents whose educational level ranged 
between primary and secondary level the percentage was between 
seven to eight.
Over half the respondents whose education ranged from primary 
level to graduation, there was some knowledge gain on account of 
campaigns, while in the case of uneducated it was over one third
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(38.6%), two thirds (66.7%) for those with other qualifications 
and over three quarter (77.8%) in the technical category.
For about a quarter of the respondents in the uneducated category 
(25.7%) , primary level category (25.8%) , secondary level category 
(26.6%) and graduates category (23.1%), there was no knowledge 
gain an account of political campaigns. Incidentally, one third 
(33.3%) with other qualifications, 19.4% with intermediate, 11.1% 
with technical and 10.3% of post graduates did not benefit from 
political campaigns. While 18.8% of the uneducated had no answer, 
it was much less for the others (ranging between 8.4% and 11.8%) .
2.THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS FORCED THE RESPONDENTS TO BELIEVE 
THINGS THAT WERE NOT CORRECT
TABLE IX.25 DID THE CAMPAIGNS FORCE THEM TO BELIEVE THINGS THAT 
WERE INCORRECT
Constituencies A Lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No Answer
N O*o N % N "o N o.o
Secunderabad 16 4.4 142 39.3 169 46.9 34 9.4
Hyderabad 64 12.9 190 38.4 192 38.8 49 9.9
Nagarkurnool 3 1.0 75 25.1 178 59.5 43 14 .4
Total 83 7.2 407 35.2 539 46.7 126 10.9
The credibility of the campaigns were assessed in terms of their 
believability in what was said in the election campaigns in light 
of the fact that there is a general indifference to election 
promises made by the leaders which are never fulfilled. As seen 
in table IX.25, an equal number of over 38% of the respondents 
in Hyderabad were somewhat or not at all forced by the election 
campaigns while 12.9% believed that they were forced a lot to do 
so. 59% of the respondents in Nagarkurnool, 46.9% in Secunderabad 
and 38.8% Hyderabad claimed that they were not at all forced by 
election campaigns to believe things that were not correct. In 
Nagarkurnool, 59% of the respondents revealed that campaigns did 
not force them to believe incorrect things while 25.1% felt that
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they were somewhat forced. Only 1% felt they were forced a lot 
to believe.
In Secunderabad, while 4.4% of the respondents claimed that they 
were forced a lot to believe the incorrect, 39.3% stated that 
they were somewhat forced and 46.9% of them answered in the 
negative and stated that campaigns did not force them to believe 
things that were incorrect.
From the data, it appears that urban voters can be influenced 
better by political campaigns than rural voters. While 14.4% in 
Nagarkurnool did not reveal what they thought about the issue, 
in the urban constituencies, it was just above 9%. Here one could 
reiterate the conclusion of earlier studies on the political 
maturity of the India voter (Kar & Chaudary, 1992; Vakil, 1994) .
TABLE IX.26 EDUCATION AND THE BELIEVABILITY OF ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS
Educational
level
A Lot Somewhat Not at all No Answer
N o . N o N O .*© N o ,"o
Uneducated 4 4.0 27 26.7 46 45.5 24 23 .8
Primary 4 3.1 41 32.0 66 51.6 17 13 .3
Secondary 11 7.1 50 32.5 77 50.0 16 10.4
Intermediate 13 5.4 79 32.6 130 53 .7 20 8.3
Graduation 29 8.0 138 37.9 166 45.6 31 8.5
Post
Graduation
19 14.0 55 40.4 47 34.6 15 11.0
Technical 2 7.4 17 63 .0 7 25.9 1 3.7
Others 1 33 .3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 66.7
Total 83 7.2 407 35.2 539 46 .7 126 10.9
Though the higher educated respondents said that campaigns had 
increased their knowledge about parties, they also agreed that 
campaigns to some extent made them believe things that were 
incorrect. As seen in the table IX.26, 46.7% of the respondents 
had no belief at all in the claims made in the election
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campaigns. While 25.9% with technical qualifications, post 
graduates (34.6%) and the uneducated (45.5%) lie below average, 
those educated up to primary, secondary and intermediate level, 
comprising of more than half the sample are non believers with 
graduates at 45.6% not far behind.
Those who believed a lot make up 7.2% of the respondents. 14% 
post graduates followed by graduates (8.0%), secondary level 
(7.1%) and technically qualified (7.4%), Intermediate (5.4%), the 
uneducated (4%) and those who went to primary schools (3.1%) are 
the ones who believe a lot in the election campaigns.
Interestingly, the most educated and the least educated generally 
appear to be the greatest believers and non believers of the 
election communication campaigns. Close to a quarter of the 
uneducated respondents shield away from committing themselves 
with any response.
3. TO JUDGE IMPARTIALLY WHICH PARTY TO VOTE FOR
How useful were the election campaigns in helping respondents in 
selecting which party to vote. Were the election campaigns 
helping to increase knowledge, chose between the alternatives to 
make an impartial judgement on the political party to vote.
TABLE IX.27 TO JUDGE IMPARTIALLY THE BEST PARTY TO VOTE FOR
Constituencies A Lot Somewhat Not at all No Answer
N % N O.*o N % N *o
Secunderabad 45 12 .5 187 51.8 97 26.9 32 8.9
Hyderabad 60 12 .1 233 47.1 150 30.3 52 10.5
Nagarkurnool 77 25.8 105 35.1 74 24 .7 43 14 .4
Total 182 15.7 525 45.5 321 27.8 127 11.0
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TABLE IX.28 EDUCATION AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED
TO JUDGE IMPARTIALLY THE BEST PARTY TO VOTE FOR
Educational
Level
A Lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No Answer
N 0^*0 N N % N %
Uneducated 19 18.8 42 41.6 17 16.8 23 22.8
Primary 22 17.2 42 32.8 50 39.1 14 10.9
Secondary 25 16.2 68 44 .2 45 29.2 16 10.4
Intermediate 32 13 .2 118 48.8 67 27.7 25 10.3
Graduation 63 17.3 170 46 .7 96 26.4 35 9.6
Post
graduation
12 8.8 70 51.5 42 30.9 12 8.8
Technical 9 33 .3 13 48 .1 3 11.1 2 1.5
Others 0 0.0 2 66.7 1 33 .3 0 0.0
Total 182 15.7 525 45 .5 321 27.8 127 11.0
As in table IX.27, election campaigns had helped a quarter 
(25.8%) of Nagarkurnool respondents a lot to judge impartially 
which party to vote for and for only half their urban 
counterparts in Secunderabad (12.5%) and 12.1% in Hyderabad. Some 
help from the campaigns was claimed to have been availed by half 
(51.8%) the Secunderabad respondents, 47.1% in Hyderabad and 
35.1% in Nagarkurnool. More than a quarter of the respondents in 
all the constituencies were not at all helped by the campaigns 
in choosing the best party to vote for.
In terms of level of education and the ability to judge the party 
to vote for, we observed interesting and conflicting trends. From 
table IX.28 it can be seen that over half (51.5%) of the post 
graduates and 41.6% respondents who did not attend school and a 
third (32.8%) of those who attended school up to the primary 
level claimed that they were helped somewhat by political 
campaigns to judge impartially the best party to vote for. Around 
50% of others who studied beyond primary level also used 
campaigns to narrow down their choice of a party.
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Among the uneducated, 17.8% claimed that they were helped a lot, 
while an almost equal number, 16.8% claimed that they were not 
at all benefited. 45.5% said that they were somewhat benefited. 
17.2% of those who were educated upto the primary level appear 
to have benefited a lot. But around double this number appear to 
take opposite positions: 32.8% saying somewhat and 39% stating 
that they were not at all benefited. From 10.9% there was no 
answer.
16.2% of the secondary school were benefited a lot, while close 
to double this number (29.2%) claimed the opposite. While almost 
the same percentage, around 17% (except Intermediates-13%) of 
those educated till the graduation level stated that the 
campaigns helped them a lot to make an impartial decision, 8.8% 
post graduates felt the same.
4. THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED TO CHANGE VIEWS ON IMAGES 
OF LEADERS AND PARTIES
Fourth, on the question of whether the campaigns helped them to 
change their views on the images of parties and leaders. 10% of 
them found themselves convinced about changing their opinions of 
the parties. Campaigns helped nearly a half (43.9%) of them to 
some extent, but for one third (33.7%) of the respondents in all 
the three constituencies and at the different educational levels 
campaigns did not change their opinions in any way.
TABLE IX.29 THE EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED TO CHANGE VIEWS 
ON THE IMAGES OF PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE 
CONSTITUENCIES
Constituencies A Lot Somewhat Not at 
all
No Answer
N % N % N % N o.o
Secunderabad 38 10 .5 179 49.6 110 30.5 34 9.4
Hyderabad 50 10.1 225 45 .5 156 31.5 64 12.9
Nagarkurnool 33 11.0 103 34.4 123 41.1 40 13 .4
Total 121 10.5 507 43 .9 389 33 .7 138 11.9
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TABLE IX.30 EDUCATION AND EXTENT TO WHICH CAMPAIGNS HELPED TO
CHANGE VIEWS ON IMAGES OF PARTIES AND LEADERS
Education A Lot Somewhat Not at all No Answer
N % N % N O,*o N g,0
Uneducated 8 7.9 40 39.6 27 26.7 26 25 .7
Primary 19 14.8 49 38.3 49 38.3 11 8.6
Secondary 6 3.9 73 47 .4 55 35.7 20 13.0
Intermediate 31 12 .8 113 46.7 74 30.6 24 9.9
Graduation 39 10.7 161 44 .2 126 34.6 38 10.4
Post
Graduation
14 10.3 60 44.1 48 35.3 14 10.3
Technical 4 14.8 9 33.3 9 33 .3 5 18.5
Others 0 0 2 66.7 1 33 .3 - -
Total 121 10.5 507 43.8 389 33 .7 138 11.9
As in table IX.29, campaigns helped a lot for 11% of Nagarkurnool 
respondents to change their views on the images of leaders and 
parties and conversely it also did not help 41.1%, the highest 
number in the same constituency. Nearly half the respondents in 
Hyderabad (45.5%) and Secunderabad (49.6%) found the campaigns 
somewhat helpful in changing their opinions on leaders and 
parties while only a third (34.4) in Nagarkurnool had the same 
opinion.
The level of education made a little difference on the extent to 
which the campaigns helped. As seen in table IX. 30, nearly half 
the educated and the uneducated respondents said that the 
campaigns somewhat changed their views on the images of party 
leaders and candidates. Campaigns helped a lot for 14.8% of those 
educated upto the primary level and with technical qualifications 
followed by the Intermediates (12.8%), graduates(10.7%), post 
graduates (10.3%).
Two thirds of the respondents positively stated that campaigns 
had helped them gain information and increased their knowledge 
about political parties and candidates. Campaigns had to some
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extent increased their opinion of parties and leaders, but were 
not convincing enough to motivate them to vote for a particular 
party.
SUMMARY
In the 1991 election, more than three fourths, 78% of respondents 
claimed to have voted in the three constituencies. There was 
marked change in the parties they voted for from 1989 and 1991 
elections. There was a shift towards the BJP from the respondents 
who had earlier voted for Cong.I or TDP. In 1989, over 40% of 
respondents had voted for Cong.I followed by 13.1% who voted for 
TDP. The BJP was third with 11.6%. In 1991 there was a shift 
towards the BJP in all the three constituencies. 37.4% voted for 
BJP while a quarter, 25% voted for Cong. I. Less than 10% had 
voted for TDP. MIM in Hyderabad got only a small percentage of 
2.7% votes, despite the highest number of respondents being from 
Hyderabad constituency. Since the higher percentage of 
respondents were Hindus, BJP scored over it in this sample from 
a communally divided electorate. 16.7% Muslims voted for BJP 
while only 1.8% Hindus voted for MIM. Party affiliation was an 
important determinant of continued support and loyalty to a party 
for which most of the respondents clearly agreed that a lot of 
people in their community voted because of party affiliation.
A fifth, 21% of the respondents did not vote. Though the reasons 
for non voting were many, the most prominent ones were a sense 
of indifference and a lack of interest to the political system. 
A fifth of the respondents claimed that none of the parties were 
worth voting for, while nearly the same percentage thought that 
their vote would not make a difference. The fear of violence kept 
15% from casting their vote. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
in the middle of the election made a difference to 60% of the 
voters in Nagarkurnool.
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Finally, election campaigns had helped in increasing the 
information level on the political process especially among the 
educated. Over three fourths of the educated stated that 
campaigns had helped increase their knowledge either a lot or 
somewhat. The respondents were not led away by the false promises 
generally made by the politicians during elections as stated by 
half the respondents, but the others were taken in by the false 
promises made by parties to gather votes. Overall campaigns had 
helped two thirds of the respondents either a lot or somewhat in 
making their voting decisions and also in their views about the 
leaders and parties.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
Organised and systematic political communication in India is a 
phenomenon of the 1980s. Since the 1980 general election and 
thereafter the 1984, 1989 and 1991 elections, the system of
political communication has evolved from the conventional to the 
modern and from the grassroots to the national. The years between 
1984 and 1991, were particularly important in bringing about 
changes in Indian election campaigning. The 1991 election was 
claimed to be the biggest media event in the country's history, 
at a time of unusual political and cultural upheaval.
The use of professional advertising agencies for political 
communication first began in the 1984 general election by Cong.I 
under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, and by 1991 almost all 
parties were using marketing and advertising agencies to promote 
their leaders and policies. The 1991 election, was notable in 
many ways. It was one of the biggest electoral exercises, with 
the modernization not only of election campaigns but also the use 
of new technology in the conduct of elections. Satellite 
technology and computers were used to monitor the elections 
through a giant earth station in New Delhi. A direct 
communication link was established between the EC of India at 
Delhi and the states. The system generated enormous data on the 
elections and could also detect booth capturing and rigging.
In comparing the system of political communication in the western 
countries, we find that the general practices of campaign 
management and the uniform system of national campaigns are not 
conducive to the Indian context, given the diverse electorate, 
with low levels of literacy, multiplicity of languages and the 
poverty of the country. Unlike the western countries, where 
election campaigns are centered around television, in India radio 
and TV, the media of the masses are controlled by the government
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and generally project the governments point of view. Though used 
for creating awareness of the political process and motivating 
persons to participate in the electoral process, they allow 
little in the form of political debates or advertising, except 
for the PEBs.
But despite limitations of the mass media, Indian campaigns have 
adapted from the new technologies to suit its diverse nature. 
Through a system of narrowcasting, audio and video technology has 
contributed to the development of innovative methods of 
electioneering at the grassroot level. Traditional and modern 
techniques have melded into Indian campaigning. For example, we 
found that the public meetings of leaders were accompanied by 
video presentations about the party policies. Audio cassettes are 
extensively used for persuading people with speeches of party 
leaders and party songs. Though audio cassettes are popular they 
do not form a substitute for radio. PMs, rallies and personal 
meetings of leaders continued to be important in reaching the 
electorate and the organizational support from local workers was 
important in mobilizing support at the grassroots. Outdoor forms 
like the posters, wall writing and symbol displays are popular 
and were extensively used to remind and persuade those sections 
of voters not reached by the other forms.
Indian campaigns have acquired an organizational and professional 
framework through well researched campaigns and a systematic 
multi-media approach. Campaigns were professionally managed as 
most parties used advertising and marketing agencies. Cong.I 
initiating with the services of four advertising agencies to plan 
and execute its campaign. The campaign objectives were drawn on 
basis of indepth research conducted by political parties and 
research organizations for gauging public opinion on the 
attitudes of voters to the political process in general, and in 
particular on the policies and image of the leaders. This was 
evident in the Cong.I and BJP campaigns. Parties communicated 
their electoral strategies with extensive use of mass and 
interpersonal channels with well defined themes and media
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schedules. Campaigns revolved around themes such as 'Stability7 
of the Cong.I, 'Ram, Roti and Insaaf' of BJP and the social 
equality of JD/NF. The independent local party like MIM did not 
have any such theme but stressed local issues and the minority 
status of the Muslims.
Indian campaigns were generally negative. Political communication 
during elections centered around attack and counter attack 
strategies in mudslinging matches mostly between the Cong.I and 
other parties. But in 1989, when Cong.I projected itself through 
a highly illustrated negative attack campaign in the press, it 
had resulted in a backlash among the public and from within the 
party. Hence, in 1991 the party had a more positive approach. In 
1991, though most parties cautiously used attack strategies in 
the press campaigns, it was surprising to note that, in the 
videos and audio cassettes, they resorted to name calling and 
abuse. This was evident in almost all the video films and in the 
audio cassettes. In the Cong. I video, the leaders of other 
parties were referred to as 'hungry wolves' and in the TDP video 
Cong.I workers were referred as Goondas (vandals). The audios of 
Sadhvi Ritambhara of VHP came under criticism from the public for 
its abusive language.
Newspapers formed the most important source of election 
information for the literate in the urban and rural areas. The 
extensive coverage in the newspapers is largely restricted to 
factual and descriptive reporting. There is limited commentary 
in the form of editorials and opinion columns. Similarly the PEBs 
in the electronic media offer little to objectively evaluate the 
parties when leaders of parties are given time to read their 
policies and appeal to the electorate. These rather dull messages 
broadcast at the prime time were seen or heard by respondents but 
were of little use in voting behaviour. Despite the government 
control, a change in political broadcasts could be made in the 
mode of presentation, similar to the Party Political Broadcasts 
in the UK. Moreover, on radio and TV, politicians are not
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subjected to any interrogation nor is there any comment by 
broadcast journalists.
In India there is high political awareness of issues and 
electoral discourse although the voter turnout in 1991 was as low 
at 51%. Campaigns of the major political parties were evaluated 
on their effectiveness on voters selected from three 
constituencies in AP. The sample was skewed by gender and higher 
status, but it is this section of the Indians who are rapidly 
growing as the 'middle class' (classified without the 
connotations of caste or religion) the section of the population 
(As extensively discussed in Chapter III, Case Study of JD/NF) 
who are forming a large section of the Indians and have to some 
extent contributed to the changes in the electoral support for 
parties.
POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE 1991 GENERAL ELECTIONS
India is the largest competitive democracy in the world with a 
population of over 840 million and an electorate of 521 million. 
Elections to the Lok Sabha are held every five years, unless the 
parliament is dissolved under unfortunate circumstances. Since 
independence in 1947, ten general elections have been held, the 
last one, a mid-term election was in 1991. Congress had 
monopolised the Indian political system and formed the government 
at the centre in eight out of ten elections. The stability of 
Congress showed signs of falling, first in 1977 and later in 1989 
elections, when non-Congress parties combined to form the 
governments. These governments failed to complete their term and 
lasted less than three years. On both occasions, Cong.I emerged 
victorious in the subsequent mid-term elections.
In 1991, the failure of two successive coalition non-Congress 
governments within fifteen months led to the 1991 elections. The 
1991 mid-term general election was generally a culmination of the 
instability of the party system with four of the nine national 
parties, three led by former prime ministers and the BJP with 
L.K.Advani as the likely prime ministerial candidate contesting
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the 521 seats that went to the polls. The regional parties in the 
states, especially in AP and TN made efforts to strengthen their 
support within the state as well as at the national level. 
Parties tried to arouse the electorate on caste, religious and 
sectarian grounds among other issues of rising prices, inflation 
and increasing unemployment. The voters were subjected to intense 
and extensive political communication by parties and government. 
The campaign practices of these parties were studied and their 
impact on a section of the electorate in AP was evaluated.
CONGRESS-I
Cong. I was led by Rajiv Gandhi and after his assassination in the 
middle of the election, by the present Prime Mimister, 
P .V.Narasimha Rao. The party won 227 seats, 12 short of a 
majority and an all India vote share of 37.57%, two percentage 
points less than 1989. There were definite pre and post 
assassination trends with overall a 7.75% swing after the 
assassination. In the pre assassination phase, Cong I won 50 of 
the 196 seats with a success rate of only 25.51% and in the 
second phase, it won 177 seats, with a success rate of 62.11%. 
In AP, there was a similar trend with rival TDP as Cong.I won 23 
of the 41 seats, though the vote share dropped by 5.17%. In the 
first phase Cong.I won only three seats and in the second round, 
Cong.I gained 20 of the 25 seats
Cong.I campaign was the most extensive among all the parties. The 
party projected itself as the only one that could establish a 
stable government. Four advertising agencies and private 
producers were involved in the campaign. The objectives of the 
campaign were drawn from intensive research conducted by the 
advertising agencies and MARG to gauge public opinion. Rajiv 
Gandhi oversaw the planning of the campaign. Mass and 
interpersonal channels were used to reach different segments of 
the electorate. In the newspaper campaign, ten different target 
groups were identified to represent ten important policies of the 
party. According to ORG estimates, the party spent £1,680,433 on 
the press campaign, which was about 59% of the entire amount
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spent by political parties. Party advertisements were published 
in over 400 newspapers and magazines. Audio and video cassettes, 
posters, stickers and direct mail shots were extensively used. 
The audio cassettes included devotional and patriotic songs while 
pop songs with western tunes were used to persuade the young 
voters. Video films with programmes and policies were translated 
into various regional languages and shown through VOWs. Until his 
assassination on 21 May, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was the sole national 
campaigner in the country addressing public meetings. The party 
changed its electoral strategy to gain the electorate's sympathy 
and the assassination led to a swing in support. Though the party 
did not win a majority of seats, it was able to form the 
government.
Cong.I newspaper advertisements were seen by more than half the 
respondents who found them interesting and informative, but less 
than 10% respondents were motivated a lot. Nearly half of them 
were somewhat motivated. The audio and video cassettes had helped 
in their voting decisions. However, in the outdoor and the 
interpersonal channels, BJP had scored over Cong.I, as voters 
recalled being far more exposed to the BJP campaign than all 
other parties.
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY
BJP emerged as the biggest gainer in the 1991 elections with 119 
seats and a 20.9% vote share, a rise from two seats in 1984 and 
85 in 1989. Though it emerged as the largest opposition party, 
the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the subsequent postponement 
of voting in more than half of the constituencies prevented a 
strong swing for the BJP. The party had one of the most sustained 
campaigns. It made every effort to gain national status as an 
independent party and an alternative to Cong.I. The campaign 
began after the party withdrew support from the NF government, 
much before the elections were announced.
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The BJP first played on the communal card through a well 
organised #Hindutva' campaign with the support of the VHP and the 
RSS. Advani's successful all India 'Rath Yatra' was followed by 
several mass mobilization programmes. These mass mobilization 
strategies, with the decentralised network of party workers 
enabled the party to gain a large following from the rural and 
poorer sections. The well publicised all India campaigns of 
leaders helped the party to gain extensive support.
In the run-up to the elections the party projected itself as a 
secular party than a communal one. The campaign strategy was 
built around the concepts of 'Ram,Roti and Insaaf' to bring about 
Ram Rajya. In general terms, these concepts focused on the 
'Freedom from fear', 'Freedom from want' and 'Justice for all'. 
At the same time the party attacked Cong.I on charges of pseudo 
secularism, misrule and corruption. After the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi, the party projected itself as the only one to bring 
about stability.
BJP had the second most extensive advertising campaign after 
Cong.I. The party advertised in the English and vernacular 
newspapers, but of magazines, only used India Today. The party 
spent large sums on the electronic and interpersonal channels. 
Over 100 VOWS were hired from Jain Studios in New Delhi to spread 
the BJP message. The party made three to four video films during 
elections and one after the assassination. Apart from the PMs 
held by the four major leaders of the party, religious leaders 
held rallies and campaigned for the party. Most prominent among 
them was Sadhvi Ritambhara, whose speeches, through audio 
cassettes were extensively distributed in the country. Apart from 
these, street plays, musical programmes and door-to-door 
campaigns were used to mobilize support. Print forms, including 
posters, flags, handbills, stickers and photographs of Lord Rama 
and the proposed temple at Ayodhya were widely circulated.
We found a remarkable shift in support for BJP in our three 
constituencies. BJP took over a share of votes from Cong.I and
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TDP, the two major parties in the state. Though the party won 
only the Secunderabad constituency in AP, its vote share in the 
state increased to 9.64% from 1.97% in 1984. The election 
campaign was successful in the urban constituencies when the 
twice elected Cong.I candidate was defeated by the BJP. The 
contest with MIM in Hyderabad was noteworthy. In a communally 
divided constituency, after hectic campaigning, on the polling 
day, large scale rigging was resorted to as some polling booths 
recorded 90% voting. However the twice elected MP, Salahuddin 
Owaisi finally won the election, but with a small majority.
A large number of respondents were exposed to the BJP press 
campaign. Nearly half the respondents found the advertisements 
to be informative and interesting and the maximum number from 
among the respondents were motivated by them. The video films 
were seen by the highest number of respondents in both urban and 
rural constituencies. Over half the respondents had attended the 
BJP public meetings and were approached by the party workers in 
door-to-door campaigns which had again persuaded respondents to 
vote for the party. In the three constituencies, nearly a third 
of the respondents had voted for BJP.
THE JANATA DAL/NATIONAL FRONT
The JD/NF party was made up of a coalition of national parties 
and was in friendly alliance with regional parties like TDP in 
AP, Assom Ghana Parishad and DMK in TN along with the support of 
CPI and CPM. In the 1991 elections the party stressed the need 
to bring about social equality through the implementation of the 
Mandal Commission Report (MCR).
Limited resources restricted an elaborate press advertising 
campaign and since the campaign was directed towards the rural 
and poorer sections of the electorate the party did not find the 
need for large scale advertising. Hence, the campaign was based 
on the election meetings and posters. Some literature on issues 
was circulated to various sections of the audience. Overall the 
strategy helped the party to gain support from the backward
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sections in Bihar and some parts of UP, and also the Muslims by 
giving them greater privileges as a minority community. In AP, 
it was in alliance with TDP and contested two seats.
Though efforts were made to regain the popularity similar to that 
of 1989, it was one of the worst losers winning only 54 seats 
losing 87 seats from the 143 it had won in 1989. In AP, its 
alliance party TDP won 13 seats and the CPI and CPI (M) won a seat 
each in Nalgonda and Miryalguda with a vote share of 1.96% and 
2.97%.
TELUGU DESAM PARTY (TDP)
The regional TDP, had gained national recognition in 1984 when 
it emerged as the largest opposition party with 30 parliamentary 
seats. However in 1989 it lost power in the state to Cong.I and 
its number in parliament was reduced to two. In 1991 the party 
was in alliance with NF and made efforts to regain their 
popularity in the state. The leader, NTR toured the state to 
regain the trust of the Telugu people. The campaign strategy was 
to attack the Cong.I government in AP on alleged charges of 
mismanagement, corruption and communal violence in comparison 
with TDPs seven year rule. Telugu newspapers advertised the poll 
strategies but emphasis was placed on the electronic forms. Audio 
and video cassettes, documentary and feature films were used, 
with the technique of, first to entertain and then to inform. 
Twenty three publicity vans called as the Vishwamitra Prachara 
Rathams. one for each district in the state were deployed to 
spread the TDP message. 15 minute documentary films were shown 
in the local cinema theatres. The party also used posters and 
huge cutouts of NTR in the guise of various Hindu gods.
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi had led to widespread violence 
in the state. It was alleged that the Cong. I workers had resorted 
to violence and had destroyed properties of the non Cong.I 
parties which included three cinema theatres owned by NTR 
himself. This led to an indefinite fast by NTR to protest against 
the alleged atrocities committed by Cong.I workers. Criticised,
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as an election gimmick to counteract the sympathy wave, it did 
little to shift the balance of support from Cong.I. TDP with 
other non Cong. I parties brought out a video film to project the 
alleged atrocities but failed in restricting the sympathy wave 
for Cong. I. The assassination influenced more that a third of our 
respondents in Nagarkurnool. TDP gained 12 of the 17 seats in the 
first phase but only one in the second phase. Cong. I on the other 
hand, won three in the first phase and 20 of the 25 seats in the 
second phase.
MAJLIS-ITTEHADUL-MUSLIMEEN (MIM)
MIM was the independent party with the origins in the erstwhile 
princely state of Hyderabad. Since independence, the party has 
practised communal politics and has the support of a large Muslim 
population of the state, mainly concentrated in the state 
capital. Over the years, the party had retained power in the city 
politics despite the Cong.I domination in the state. During 1991, 
it faced a keen contest with BJP in the communally sensitive 
constituency and emerged victorious but with a small majority.
MIM has a centralised leadership in Sultan Salauddin Owaisi. The 
party has sustained its popularity through philanthropic 
activities for the Muslim communities with emphasis on education, 
women and child development and the upliftment of Harijans. 
During elections it functioned through a decentralised network 
of elected party workers working within the polling booth areas 
called the Primaries. The campaigning was through public meetings 
and walkabouts of Salahuddin Owaisi along with posters and 
cutouts. During meetings, he stressed general issues like 
electricity, water, housing and minority status of Muslims. The 
party had a varied display of its election symbol, (Scales) which 
was decorated or illuminated. Elections in Hyderabad were marked 
by violence and alleged rigging by the rival parties, BJP and 
MIM, of which MIM emerged winner by a small margin of 4.12% vote 
share.
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With the changing political scene and greater political awareness 
through the media, we could from our study define the profile of 
the average Indian voters and their perceptions of the political 
process. We found that a majority of the voters are in the age 
group of 18-45 years being born in the post Independent India. 
The size of the households indicates a shift from the joint to 
the nuclear families. There is an increase in the level of 
education among the voters and education has an effect on the 
interest in the political process. Men outnumber women in 
participating in the political process. Hence, most of the voter 
behaviour studies are structured with a male bias. The average 
Indian rural and urban voters do not show much interest in 
politics with women showing even lesser interest. However, they 
are well informed of the political system and the functioning of 
the government and show interest in the electoral process.
The 1991 elections were described as one of the biggest media 
events. Mass media was extensively used in the national campaigns 
by the parties and by the government to increase awareness and 
for greater political participation.
MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
NEWSPAPERS
Newspapers were an important source of election information. A 
general survey of most national, regional and local newspapers 
circulating in the three constituencies indicated that newspapers 
gave detailed coverage on the elections. These included news 
stories, editorials, opinion polls and campaign trends of major 
parties. National, regional and local papers offered profiles of 
constituencies and candidates, and trends of support in opinion 
polls. Most newspapers and several magazines brought out special 
supplements on the election.
Most national and regional parties used the press for political 
advertising. Cong. I has used 400 newspapers, followed by the BJP. 
These two parties used national and regional papers while
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financial constraints restricted other parties who concentrated 
on the regional and local press.
The readership of newspapers was high among our respondents. 85% 
read or were read to. More than half read newspapers at least 
four times a week. Regional and local newspapers were more 
popular than national newspapers. Eenadu in Telugu and Deccan 
Chronicle in English had the highest readership.
Newspapers formed the most important source of election 
information for urban and rural voters. When we asked the 
respondents the extent to which they sought newspapers for 
election information, almost all (85%) of readers answered in the 
positive and more than a third (34.3%) stated that they depended 
a lot on newspapers. Regarding the interest in political news in 
newspapers, 16.4% were very interested and this increased to 25% 
during elections. More than half (55%) of the respondents found 
the coverage given to election news adequate. When asked if the 
coverage on elections in newspapers helped them in deciding how 
to vote, 17.7% said that it had helped them a lot and half (50%) 
of them were helped a fair amount.
Political advertisements in the newspapers were seen by over half 
(54.6%) of respondents. Big spenders got better noticed. Cong.I 
(44.7%), BJP (33.4%) and TDP (30.6%) advertisements were noticed 
by more than a third of the respondents. While most of the 
advertisements were found to be informative and interesting less 
than a quarter of the respondents found them to be persuasive. 
BJP scored here as 23% of the respondents found their 
advertisements persuasive followed by the TDP (17.5%) and the 
Cong.I(15.8%).
The impact of advertisements was at a medium level as it somewhat 
influenced a quarter (27.5%) and only 4.6% a lot in deciding how 
to vote. Therefore nearly two thirds of the respondents were not 
affected by the political advertisements. Political advertising 
is yet to take off on a more competitive scale in India.
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MAGAZINES
The readership of magazines was high as three quarters of the 
respondents were reading magazines with a third (39.7%) of them 
reading at least two to three magazines. The Sunday supplements 
of the newspapers were popular. Cong. I and BJP as well as the 
regional parties including TDP had released advertisements in the 
magazines.
Over one third (38.5%) came across political party advertisements 
in the magazines. A little less than a quarter (23.9%) had come 
across Cong.I advertisements while 16.4% had seen the BJP 
advertisements. JD and TDP advertisements were seen by less than 
3% of the respondents. Political party advertisements had helped 
only 6.1% a lot and 16.9% somewhat in their decision to vote. 
Less than a quarter were helped by magazines in their decision 
to vote.
THE BROADCAST MEDIA: RADIO AND TELEVISION
Radio was the most easily accessible medium for both the rural 
and urban populations. Television ownership was high in the urban 
areas compared to the rural areas but the viewership was high in 
both rural and urban areas. Radio and TV under the Ministry of 
I & B reach about 97% and 84% of the Indian population 
respectively. Election programmes on radio and television covered 
a wide range of topics by specialists drawn from various 
backgrounds. These were in the form of discussions, messages, 
plays, quizzes and poetry. A round-the-clock programme during the 
declaration of election results was interspersed with 
discussions, interviews and news reports. Though comprehensive 
information was given in these pre-election programmes, they were 
not adequately publicised and it could be a hit or miss 
situation. But, during the elections and the declaration of 
results, the viewership of television was high and most of our 
respondents had found the coverage to be very good.
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THE IMPACT OF RADIO
90% of our respondents owned and listened to radio. More than
half (54%) , listened regularly. News on radio was the most
popular programme as half the respondents listened regularly. 
However, current affairs programmes were not very popular, 44% 
never listened to them and less than a third listened sometimes.
When asked how much they depended on radio for election
information, 70% sought radio as a source of election
information. 22% depended a lot while 58.4% a fair amount. During 
the election period, 21% respondents listened regularly to the 
news and current affairs programmes and 35% heard them sometimes. 
Nearly 70% heard the Telugu news, while the Hindi and English 
news were heard by less than half the respondents. 44.7% heard 
the announcements and slogans followed closely by the discussion 
programmes in English, Hindi and Telugu that were heard by 44.7%. 
The other election related programmes such as the messages of 
government officials and quiz programmes were heard by about a 
quarter of the respondents.
The PEBs of the national and regional parties had a fair 
response. They were heard by 46% of the respondents with the 
Cong. I and BJP broadcasts heard by about 30%. TDP and JD 
broadcasts were heard by less than 15%. More than half (54%), 
found the coverage given to election information on radio to be 
very good or adequate. Radio formed an important source of 
information and helped a fair amount for half the respondents in 
their voting decisions. A higher number (8.8%) of respondents in 
rural Nagarkurnool, were more influenced by radio compared to 
those in the urban areas.
TELEVISION
Television reaching 84% of the population and overcoming the 
barrier of literacy is emerging as one of fastest growing mass 
media with international networks - the CNN, BBC, STAR and ZEE 
TV, now reaching the urban audiences. 74% of our respondents 
owned a television and over 85% watched it. The programmes
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generally watched on TV were similar to radio, with news watched 
by 63%. Telugu news was popular compared to the Hindi and English 
news. The current affairs programmes were not regularly watched 
except for The world this week watched regularly by 34.9% of the 
respondents.
Television formed a major source of election information for 78% 
of the respondents (a lot for 28.2% and somewhat for 50.5%). 
Nearly a third (33.5%) of men and a fifth (21.5%) women. Nearly 
80% watched the news during the election. Over half (57%) watched 
the discussions, the short announcements and slogans. The 
interviews with officials like the CEC and DGP were watched by 
a third of the respondents. The PEBs on television, telecast 
between the Hindi and the English news in the evening by the 
national parties were seen by more than two thirds, (68.2%) of 
respondents. Like the radio broadcasts, here too, the Cong.I 
telecast was seen by over half (51.5%) the highest number of 
respondents, followed by those of BJP (46%) , JD (27%) , SJP 
(18.6%), (8.9%) CPI and (6.3%) CPM. This may be, in part because 
these PEBs were telecast before the news for which there was high 
viewership and partly because the respondents recalled those 
parties whose leaders they were able to recognize and associate 
with parties.
Television was a major source of information on the election 
results. An overwhelming 70% found the content given to election 
news very good or good, and over half found the coverage 
adequate. PEBs drew contrasting results between exposure and 
impact. While over 70% had seen the PEBs only 5.7% were helped 
a lot and 29.7% were helped a fair amount. The news and current 
affairs programmes helped a lot for 11.9% and a fair amount to 
a quarter of the respondents. The other voter education 
programmes had the least impact at the highest level. Only 3.6% 
stated that they were helped a lot by the voter education 
telecasts. Overall, the election related programmes helped a 
quarter of the respondents, that too mostly a fair amount in 
their voting decisions
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OTHER ELECTRONIC MEDIA-VIDEO AND AUDIO CASSETTES 
There was an increased and extensive use of audio and video 
cassettes during the 1991 election from the 1989 general 
election. This could well be one of the permanent features of 
election campaigning in India, at least till Indian TV is granted 
full autonomy and could be used for political advertising or have 
PEBs and Election debates similar to those in Britain or USA.
Videos have brought in an entertainment culture to political 
election campaigning in India. Given the diverse nature of the 
Indian electorate, videos, using localised dialects, combining 
a package of news, information and entertainment have provided 
a wider scope for election information. In evaluating the 
election videos of major parties, we found the content of most 
videos was similar. These videos included the policies and 
programmes of the party, highlighted the characteristics of the 
leaders and popularised the symbols. Without any censorship laws 
governing them, video films abused the rival parties and leaders.
Songs, commentaries, folk theatre and folk songs accompanied the 
visuals. Each party brought out at least two to three videos. 
BJP, Cong.I and TDP also released separate videos after the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Cong.I to gain the sympathy, BJP 
to project itself as the only party to bring about stability in 
a crisis situation and TDP to project the atrocities committed 
by the alleged Cong.I members to counter the expected sympathy 
wave for the Cong.I.
Election videos were generally targeted particularly for the 
rural electorate, and since our sample was more urban oriented, 
the exposure was low. Overall, about a fifth (19.5%) of the 
respondents saw these videos. Double the number of rural (31.1%) 
respondents saw them compared to the urban (14.8%). In rural 
Nagarkurnool, a third (31.4%) saw the election videos. BJP videos 
seen by 15% had the maximum viewership in the rural and urban 
areas followed by those of Cong.I (11%) and TDP (8.7%). Videos 
were effective as three fourths of the respondents who saw them
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found them useful in their voting decisions. Therefore, the 
impact of the videos depended on their exposure as all those who 
saw them stated their use in the affirmative.
Audio cassettes of songs and speeches played through loud 
speakers from election stalls, tree tops, etc. in rural and urban 
areas added to the election festivities and noise pollution. The 
listening to audio cassettes was incidental and nearly half 
(45.4%) of the respondents had heard them. Here too the BJP 
scored high. The party cassettes were heard by nearly 40% of the 
respondents closely followed by a third (35.5%) who heard Cong.I 
and (32.9%) TDP cassettes. Audio cassettes were of little help 
to a majority (80%) of the respondents. Less than 5% stated that 
they helped them a lot while 18.6% were helped a fair amount 
thereby making it difficult to estimate the importance of audio 
cassettes as a substitute for the government controlled radio.
Feature and documentary films along with with video films were 
part of the political communication media during the elections. 
Documentary films of TDP were shown in cinema houses and through 
the videos. Film and television stars were used by parties for 
campaigning and as candidates, some of who also won the 
elections. However, the results revealed that popularity gained 
through films was not an only criteria for winning elections, but 
it also depended on the popularity of the party that they 
represented.
INTERPERSONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Indian campaigns continue to be characterised by interpersonal 
forms of political communication which continue to be effective. 
Public meetings, door-to-door campaigns, rallies and processions, 
walkabouts, street corner meetings and the election tours were 
a means of personally interacting with the electorate. Second, 
importance was given to the influence of family, friends, 
neighbours and the local leaders as the forces of influence 
within the community.
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Despite the development of national campaigns (largely restricted 
to the English language press) newspapers and other print and 
electronic forms, PMs continued to be important. Leaders of the 
major parties toured the country by hiring aeroplanes and 
helicopters to address in as many constituencies as possible. 
Meetings of religious leaders, senior party leaders and film and 
television stars drew large crowds. MIM in Hyderabad based its 
entire campaign strategy on public meetings and walkabouts.
Though there was criticism regarding the use of hired men to 
attend such meetings, we found that a third of our respondents 
depended on public meetings as a source of information and 
attended the meetings, a near equal number from the urban and 
rural constituencies. Nearly half (47%) the number of men, and 
a fifth women attended the meetings. We tend to link this to the 
BJP meetings that were well attended.
The large attendance and support for BJP in AP was an indication 
of the extensive campaign techniques employed by the party which 
did not have a single seat in the state. This was also obvious 
from the exposure to the press campaigns, outdoor and 
interpersonal forms in which the BJP scored over Cong.I and TDP, 
the main parties in the state and in Hyderabad it provided a 
tough contest for the MIM. Overall, PMs had influenced 10.7% of 
the respondents a lot and 21% a fair amount. A maximum of 39% in 
rural Nagarkurnool were influenced by these PMs.
The door-to-door campaigns also could not be totally ruled out 
of campaign strategies. 70% of the respondents were approached 
by party workers and candidates. A lot of importance was given 
to mobilizing voters at the grassroots through a network of 
supporters. We found that organizational support was very 
important for gaining long term support for the party. Cong.I, 
BJP and TDP had well organised network of representatives and 
supporters in the state and the constituencies. In Hyderabad, we 
found a well organised MIM party with a centralised single
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leadership of Salahuddin Owaisi and a decentralised system of 
party activists who worked at the level of polling booths.
70% of the respondents were approached by the party workers of 
which, more than half, were approached by the BJP workers, 
followed by those of Cong. I and a third by TDP. MIM reached 12%. 
About a third of the respondents, half of those who were 
contacted were motivated by the party workers, giving this system 
a success rate of 50%. It was interesting to note that more urban 
voters were motivated by canvassers compared to their rural 
counterparts.
In the Internal Interpersonal channels of communication; family, 
friends and neighbours and local leaders became sources of 
exchanging political information and influencing voting 
behaviour. The interaction within families as the primary source 
of socialization formed a significant source of influence on 
voting behaviour. Nearly three fourths of the respondents in the 
urban and rural areas and those from small and large families 
stated their dependence on families, leading us to conclude that 
in India families supported and voted as single units. It also 
disqualified press reports that there were changing trends with 
women supporting BJP in the northern states of Uttar Pradesh. In 
the south, and in our constituencies, we did not find any such 
trends and there was not much difference and slant towards BJP 
in their voting behaviour.
Friends and neighbours formed important sources of information 
and influence, 15% stated that discussions with friends had 
helped them in their voting behaviour. Though discussions with 
local leaders were important in the transfer of information and 
change at the grassroots level, we found a relatively low 
response to these leaders as sources of information or influence 
in voting behaviour, even in rural Nagarkurnool.
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PERSONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTING BEHAVIOUR
Apart from the various sources of information sought and exposed 
to from the mass and interpersonal channels, we asked the 
respondents opinions on the importance they gave to campaigns and 
the issues projected by the political parties in their voting 
behaviour and that of their community. Party campaigns had 
exhibited a variety of issues for the electorate to evaluate 
their characteristics and chose between alternatives. We tested 
some such factors whether they decided after evaluating the 
candidates and parties, followed senior members of the community, 
caste or religion. Surprisingly, only a quarter of the 
respondents found it very important to evaluate the 
characteristics of parties before making their voting decision.
Second, when asked if they would follow the members of their 
caste or religion (especially in the two constituencies, 
Hyderabad which was communally sensitive and Nagarkurnool, 
reserved for a SC candidate), contrary to expectations, we found 
that two thirds of the respondents stated that these two factors 
were not at all important in their voting decisions. However, on 
a cross examination on their opinions on the voting patterns of 
the community, the response was quite the reverse. Almost half 
stated that the members of the community based their voting 
behaviour on caste and religious factors.
OUTDOOR FORMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Outdoor forms of communication were an important reminder media 
and added to the electioneering. They formed cheap, yet important 
sources of election communication for the poor and illiterate. 
For many it may be an eyesore, but parties claimed that they were 
a daily reminder of the forthcoming elections. Walls were full 
of election graffiti with posters, slogans and symbols.
Along with these were huge displays of the symbols, which are 
still important in the Indian elections when largely illiterate 
voters identify parties through symbols. Symbols were illuminated 
with colourful decorations to aid in their recognition. Symbols
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representing parties and candidates were varied. The modern 
symbols like televisions, clocks, radios and fans were an 
indication of growing urbanization. Earlier symbols mainly 
consisted of agricultural and rural implements such as bullock 
carts, farmer and a plough etc. The extensive publicity of 
symbols had aided most of our respondents in identifying the 
political parties with their symbols and more than half stated 
that symbols had reminded them about the elections.
A fairly new development were the huge 10-307 cutouts of leaders 
in the cities appealing to people. These were thought to be 
important for the recognition of leaders from the competing 
political parties, especially since the days of leaders of the 
Nehru-Gandhi family who were easily recognised were over.
These outdoor forms were a reminder media for more than a third 
of the respondents. Among the outdoor reminder media, posters 
were rated the highest, followed by symbol displays, wall 
writings, handbills and cardboard cutouts. In the first phase, 
many of the respondents stated that they would look at posters 
and handbills for election information. We conclude that Indian 
audiences are still accustomed to look and expect these media, 
despite the criticism of its use. If it could be argued that an 
urban and literate sample showed a positive attitude to these 
outdoor forms, then we could state that it would be even more 
important to the rural and less educated voters to whom other 
forms are less accessible.
ATTITUDES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR
In the general analysis on the attitudes of the Indian voters to 
the political process, we found that about half the respondents 
were interested in politics, the percentage being much lower 
among women. Politics was not a commonly discussed topic during 
social interactions. However, respondents showed a high level of 
awareness of national and regional current events. Most of them 
scored average to high scores. They were well informed about the 
failure of coalition governments and a majority stated a
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preference for a single party to form the government. A third 
of the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the government and had lost faith in the 
politicians who did not understand their problems. Yet, 70% were 
interested in electoral process and 78% had actually voted.
CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOUR
In the final chapter we discussed the respondents7 voting 
behaviour in 1991 in comparison with 1989. Though over 85% 
respondents had intended to vote, 78% claimed to have actually 
voted. There was a lot of difference between the voter turnout 
of the respondents and the actual voting turnout in the three 
constituencies. There were distinct changes in the parties 
support in 1989 and 1991. The shift was towards the BJP from 
Cong.I and TDP. In 1989, 42.4% respondents had voted for Cong.I 
and in 1991 there was a decrease by nearly 18 percentage points 
as 24.4% voted for Cong.I in 1991. On the other hand, there was 
a three fold increase in the number of those who voted for BJP - 
11% voted in 1989 and 35.4% in 1991. There was a decrease in 
three percentage points in the support for TDP (from 12.6% to 
9.6%). BJP claimed the highest percentage of vote in the 
Secunderabad and Hyderabad constituencies, but in Nagarkurnool 
it was a close second to the Cong.I. Interestingly, in Hyderabad, 
some Hindu respondents voted for BJP and Cong.I, though MIM had 
won the seat. There was not much difference in the voting trends 
between men and women for particular parties. However, 40% 
respondents who were over 56 years of age voted for Cong. I. While 
16.7% Muslims claimed to have voted for BJP and a small 1.8% 
Hindus claimed to have voted for MIM. Involvement in the 
campaigns was not particularly high as about a fifth (18.3%) of 
the respondents stated that they had campaigned for the party 
they supported.
The non voting trends were important to note for motivating them 
for greater participation in the future elections. A fifth, (21%) 
of the respondents did not vote. Though the reasons for non 
voting were many, the most prominent ones were a sense of
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indifference and a lack of interest to the political system. A 
fifth of the respondents claimed that none of the parties were 
worth voting for, while nearly the same percentage thought that 
their vote would not make a difference. The fear of violence kept 
15% from casting their vote.
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in the middle of the election 
changed the election scene in India. Election dates were changed, 
campaign strategies were altered. The results for the Cong.I at 
the all India level and in AP in the pre and post assassination 
elections clearly indicated the sympathy factor that lead to 
their victory. It made a difference to 60% of the voters in 
Nagarkurnool in their voting behaviour and the Cong.I candidate 
got elected.
IMPACT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
As respondents were potentially exposed to the election campaigns 
through several forms of media, we compiled the possible effects 
and usefulness of the election campaigns. Overall there was a 
positive attitude to the election campaigns. Over two thirds said 
that the election campaigns had helped them in their voting 
decisions, a lot for 15% and to some extent for half the
respondents. The effects in terms of knowledge gain, change 
opinion of leaders and parties, to make an impartial judgement 
after evaluating the parties of campaigns varied depending on the 
educational level, constituencies and gender.
Over two thirds (68%) respondents stated that campaigns had
increased their knowledge about political parties and candidates. 
Though more than half the respondents in Secunderabad and 
Hyderabad found the campaigns useful in increasing their 
knowledge, the same was not felt by more than one third in
Nagarkurnool. Election campaigns had helped in increasing the 
information level on the political process especially among the 
educated. Over three fourths of the educated stated that
campaigns had helped increase their knowledge either a lot or 
somewhat. A contrasting trend showed that the uneducated and the
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higher educated post graduates derived the maximum benefit in 
increasing knowledge from the campaigns.
When enquired if the campaigns were useful in making an impartial 
judgement on the party to vote for. Campaigns has helped 26% of 
Nagarkurnool voters a lot compared to half (12%) the respondents 
in Secunderabad and Hyderabad. In both these constituencies 
campaigns had helped at a moderate level with most of the 
respondents being somewhat influenced.
Since most parties gave extensive information comparing their 
policies with their rival parties through the advertisements and 
in audio and video cassettes, we asked voters if the campaigns 
had helped them to change their views about leaders. Campaigns 
had helped a lot for 10% and somewhat for 43.9% of respondents 
in changing their views about parties and leaders. One third were 
not at all effected and 12% did not answer indicating a low level 
of credibility of the party campaigns among voters.
As generally believed that politicians never kept their election 
promises, we investigated if voters were forced to believe things 
that were incorrect. Nearly half of them disagreed and were not 
misled by the false promises generally made by the politicians 
indicating a high level of understanding of the electoral 
process among the voters. However, a third, stated that campaigns 
had to some extent forced them to believe in incorrect aspects 
about parties and candidates. It clearly reflects the maturity 
of the Indian voters who were not easily carried away by what was 
said during the elections.
Therefore, two thirds of the respondents expressed the fact that 
campaigns had helped them gain information and increased their 
knowledge about parties and candidates and to some extent 
increased their opinion on the images of the parties, they were 
not convincing enough to be motivated by them to vote for a 
particular party.
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In our research, we found ample evidence on the effects of media 
and changes in the electoral communication pattern. Of course we 
could not attribute the changes to one particular media system, 
but given the complex nature of the Indian political and 
communication systems, the social and cultural diversities of the 
electorates, India cannot be compared to any one particular model 
of communication and we cannot generalize on any one particular 
medium to be either most effective or least effective. An 
integrated effort through the use of different forms of mass, 
interpersonal and outdoor media had to be used to reach the 
largest electorate in the world.
Extensive coverage was given to elections in all the national and 
regional newspapers and many papers brought out supplements for 
the readers. Newspapers were most sought by the educated in both 
urban and rural areas. Regional language and local English 
newspapers had higher readership than the national ones and 
voters found the coverage given to elections adequate. Apart from 
Cong.I and BJP, most political parties had concentrated on the 
regional language press for advertising. Political advertisements 
in the newspapers had motivated a fifth of the respondents in 
their voting decisions.
Though radio, as the medium of the masses continues to be 
popular, in the past decade, the growth and reach of TV was being 
effectively used for bringing about greater awareness and change 
among the people. Experiments and research on several development 
programmes have shown the impact of television in both urban and 
rural settings. Radio and television were geared to the 
elections. During the run-up to the elections and in the 
announcement of results, we found that radio and television were 
used for creating awareness about the electoral process and 
motivating people for greater participation. The results enabled 
the people to increase their knowledge about the formation of the 
government. The pre-poll programmes were well planned and 
targeted to various segments of the electorate including youth 
and women and offered a variety.
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Last, in terms of motivation and participation, the party 
campaigns had increased the awareness and interest in the 
electoral process, to some extent helped change views on leaders 
and parties and to make an impartial judgement on the party to 
vote for, but had not increased the voter turnout which at 51% 
at the all India level was the second lowest since the first 
general election in 1952. Some political commentators attributed 
this to the weather conditions, when for the first time the 
general elections were held in the middle of summer. However 
Hyderabad recorded an all India highest voter turnout at 77%.
The electronic forms did not allow for any real debate between 
the parties for the electorate to objectively evaluate the 
parties before making their voting decision. Hence efforts are 
to be initiated to take these factors and the non voting trends 
to motivate the people to exercise their franchise in the future 
elections.
THE MODERNIZATION OF PARTY CAMPAIGNS
Since we have concentrated on the electoral strategies of parties 
and changes in the kinds of campaigning, we have argued that the 
impact of the western techniques of campaign planning have 
resulted in the modernization of campaigns with concepts derived 
from the American techniques. Indian political party campaigns 
have acquired a more professional approach through the use of 
commercial marketing techniques which have been in use in the 
western democracies. Almost all political parties had employed 
the services of marketing and advertising professional agencies 
to develop their campaign strategies. The campaign objectives 
were drawn after formal and informal methods of research and well 
documented data collected through opinion polls, through 
professional or private agencies deployed by the parties or the 
advertising agencies. The election themes and media schedules to 
reach various segments were carefully and systematically planned.
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During 1991, direct attack strategies were used most parties. 
However, Cong.I as a lesson from 1989 campaign had developed a 
more positive strategy in the press campaigns but in the other 
electronic forms as well as in the public meetings resorted to 
attack and abuse. The personalities of leaders were projected 
through the press advertisements, in audio cassettes and in video 
films. These audio-visual effects have contributed in a large way 
to the use and development of new and innovative strategies. 
Outdoor forms including posters, symbols displays and cutouts 
reminded people of the elections.
The Indian campaigns within a short span of less than a decade 
and two general elections have provided a large synthesis of 
political campaigning, developing their own peculiar systems 
suited to the socio-economic and cultural needs. The traditional 
forms have been melded into modern technology. For example, we 
found the use of traditional folk theatre and folk songs in 
Cong. I videos to present their policies and programmes and in the 
BJP cassettes, references were made from the religious 
scriptures.
Campaign techniques differed from party to party. But campaigns 
depended on the resources available. Extensive campaigns were 
undertaken by Cong. I and BJP who had far more resources than the 
other parties and got better noticed. The use of video and audio 
cassettes was successful and would be a permanent feature in the 
election campaigns unless television is used more extensively for 
political broadcasts. However, we argue that, given the reach of 
TV and its successful use in several social and developmental 
programmes, and more importantly its success in the production 
of pre and post election broadcasts, it could also open a fair 
debate for the political parties. The post election broadcasts 
during the declaration of results were rated as excellent by 
nearly three fourths of our respondents. In a democracy, all 
political parties should be allowed to present their views, 
especially on radio and TV, the media of the masses. This would 
enable the voters to objectively evaluate the parties and make
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a fair judgement which was not possible through the party videos 
which obviously presented a one sided view of the party that 
produced it. Moreover the expenditure on videos would 
considerably reduce the campaign expenditure by parties. Videos 
could also be governed by similar code of conduct as PEBs, but 
with modifications on the content and presentation.
Another development could be in the form of interviews and 
discussion programmes. Leaders and spokespersons of parties could 
be interviewed and interrogated by journalists, and indirectly, 
this could also reduce the huge expenses incurred in the public 
meetings by the leaders. The text could be translated into the 
local languages at the regional networks.
Evaluation of these multi media events on a diverse electorate 
presents immense opportunity for research and analysis of voter 
behaviour, if one could overcome some of the hurdles we faced. 
Since this was a pioneering effort in understanding political 
communication and its impact in India, we were able to identify 
several problems in the conduct of the research. Another rural 
constituency would have given a more balanced view to our report 
and to evaluate the impact of the electronic and interpersonal 
communication strategies. Despite efforts for a systematic 
analysis, locating respondents was a major inhibiting factor, 
which in a way created a doubt on the reports of other surveys. 
The houses were poorly numbered and sometimes the addresses did 
not match the names of persons on the voters lists. The 
identification card system planned to be completed by the next 
general elections could be useful in conducting similar research 
in the future.
Indian elections provide a wide spectrum of communication 
activity and extensive information could be generated on the 
strategies used by the parties. Given the limitations of 
resources we were able to get a fair understanding of the system 
in the urban and rural areas. Further research, through the 
techniques of observation and indepth interviews, could reveal
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the political socialization and behaviour of the electorate in 
a particular village or city.
Another factor that needs to be investigated is the voting 
behaviour of Indian women. We did not find much literature on the 
women's political socialization and electoral behaviour though 
they formed half the electorate. In our study, we found 
differences in the voting behaviour of the urban and rural women. 
Political parties had special strategies for persuading women, 
Cong.I had targeted their campaigns to motivate women to vote, 
BJP had used the religious banner to motivate the women, JD/NF 
had reserved a percentage for women representatives in their list 
of candidates and in Hyderabad, special schemes for the 
development of women had motivated them to vote for the party.
Finally our study indicates that education, urbanization, gender, 
caste, religion are important factors that influenced the 
receptivity to electoral communication. Education was an 
important factor, though the increased level of information had 
no doubt increased awareness of the political process, but these 
organised strategies cannot determine the final outcome, even in 
the west, never mind India.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A LETTER FROM ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Gram: ELECCOM Telex:ND 31-61312
NEW DELHI 371342
FAX: 3713412
SECRETARIAT OF 
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
NIRVACHAN SADAN, 
ASHOK ROAD, NEW DELHI-110001
No. 577/2/93/3609 199
Dated: 27-9-1993 . 199 .
To
Kavita Karan,
Flat 6,83 Anson Road 
Tufnell Park 
London N .7 OAS 
UK
Subject:- Data on the percentage of urban & rural voting 
patterns at the all India level and in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh.
Madam,
With reference to your letter dated 2nd September, 
1993, on the subject cited, I am directed to say that the 
Commission does not have the information requested by you.
Yours faithfully,
( K. J. RAO ) 
UNDER SECRETARY.
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APPENDIX B SCHEME OF BROADCAST OVER AKASHVANI AND 
DOORDARSHAN BY RECOGNISED POLITICAL 
PARTIES DURING ELECTIONS TO THE LOK 
SABHA/STATE ASSEMBLIES
1. Facilities of broadcasts on Akashvani and Doordarshan may be 
given to political parties recognised as 'National' parties
/ and 'State' parties by the Election Commission under the 
Election symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order,1968.
2. (a) In the case of elections to the Lok Sabha,'National' and 
'State' parties may be given facilities for broadcasting 
from the principal Akashvani Station and Doordarshan Kendra 
(where there is one) in every state in which general 
election to the Lok Sabha is to be held.
(b) Broadcast from the principal station in the state will 
be radiated from all other Akashvani stations in the State.
(c) In addition, 'National' parties may be given facilities 
to have Central broadcasts from All India Radio, Delhi and 
Delhi Doordarshan Kendra which will be relayed from all 
AIR/Doordarshan Kendras.
(d) In the States where a general election to the 
Legislative Assembly of the State is held simultaneously 
with the general election to the Lok Sabha, there may not be 
any need for giving separate time for broadcast/telecast 
for such Assembly Election.
3. In case a 'State' party recognised by the Election 
Commission in one or more states under the Election symbols 
(Reservation and Allotment) Order 1968, fields a sizeable 
number of candidates for election in a State in which it is 
not recognised, a gist of the election broadcast made by the 
said 'State' party in any one of the States will be covered 
in the regional news bulletins of the Radio Stations in that 
State.
4. Broadcast on Akashvani may be of 30 minutes duration (in two 
broadcasts of 15 minutes each. Telecast from Doordarshan may 
be of 15 minutes duration.
5. The dates of Radio broadcasts/telecasts will be pre­
determined in consultation with the Chief Election
Commissioner or his representative, in the case of Central 
and National Broadcasts from Delhi, and the Chief Electoral 
Officer of the State, in the case of broadcasts/telecasts 
from the Principal Akashvani Stations and Doordarshan
Kendras.
6. The order in which and the date on which the various
recognised political parties may broadcast/ telecast from 
Akashvani and Doordarshan will be determined by draw of 
matching lots by the authorities concerned as mentioned in 
item 5 above.
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7. The time for radio broadcasts and telecasts at the National 
level will be as follows;
Broadcasts...................... Between 9.15 P.M. and 9.45
P.M.
Telecasts....................... Between 9.20 P.M. and 9.35
P.M.
The time for the radio broadcasts and telecasts at the State 
level will be between 7.00 P.M and 9.00 P.M.
8. The actual persons participating in the broadcasts may be 
chosen by the 'National' or the 'State parties, as the case 
may be.
9. The Broadcasts on Akashvani/Doordarshan will not permit;
i. Criticism of friendly countries
ii. Attack on religions or communities
iii.Anything obscene or defamatory
iv. incitement to violence
v. anything amounting to contempt of court
vi. aspersions against the integrity of the President 
Judiciary.
vii.anything affecting the unity and integrity of the nation
viii.any criticism by name of any person
ix. Exhibition of films on or after the date of issue of 
notification under section 30 of the R.P. Act,1951 and 
date(s) of poll projecting the image of cine actors and 
actresses who have joined politics; sponsored programmes by 
political parties to telecast/broadcast during election 
period; and
xi. Telecast/ broadcast of programmes of Prime Minister/ 
Chief Ministers/Ministers having a direct relation or 
bearing on elections. However, telecast/broadcast or 
programmes on official activities of Prime Minister/Chief 
Ministers/Ministers will be permitted.
Note: The parties or their representatives shall submit the 
script of their broadcast in advance.
10. The 'party' broadcasts will be in addition to any panel 
discussions or other programmes of political education 
organised in the course of the ordinary functioning of the 
broadcasting media.
11. The 'party' broadcasts will be made after the notification 
calling for election is issued and will be concluded forty 
eight hours before the end of the first polling date.
12. No 'party' will be allotted time either on AIR or 
Doordarshan on Sundays.
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APPENDIX C THE SCHEDULE OF THE PARTY POLITICAL 
BROADCASTS
THE BROADCAST SCHEDULE OF THE PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL AND IN THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
The schedule for the Election Broadcasts on radio of the various 
political parties issued through a press note by the All India 
Radio, Hyderabad a month prior to the broadcasts. We have added 
the names of leaders or representative who recorded the election 
messages.
SCHEDULE FOR THE NATIONAL POLITICAL BROADCASTS AND TELECASTS The 
election broadcasts made by major political parties started from 
1 May 1991. Each party made one television and two radio 
broadcasts at the National level and two radio broadcasts at the 
state level. The following table shows the timings for the 
political broadcasts on radio and television at the national and 
state level of the National Parties.
POL. PARTY NATIONAL
RADIO
STATE RADIO TELEVISION
9.30 PM 9.45 PM 7.15 PM 8.05 PM 8.20 PM
BJP 1.5.91
13.5.91
4.5.91
14.4.91
6.5.91
CPI 17.4.91 2.5.91 15.5.91 3.5.91 13.5.91
CPM 15.5.91 4.5.91 6.5.91 15.5.91 11.5.91
Congress-I 4.5.91
16.5.91
4.5.91 13.4.91 10.5.91
Congress-S 3.5.91 14.5.91 14.5.91 1.5.91 9-5-91
Janata Dal 1.5.91
14.5.91
3.5.91
17.5.91
7-5-91
Janata Dal 
(S)
5.5.91
13.5.91
16.5.91 2.5.91 8.5.91
Janata
Party
2.5.91 15.5.91 2.5.91
13.5.91
12.5.91
Lok Dal 
LKD
3.5.91
16.5.91
1.5.91 16.5.91 14.5.91
Source:Economic Times, 2 May, 1991.
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SCHEDULE OF THE ELECTIONS BROADCASTS IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
I.FIRST ROUND
S.N. Date Time/PM Political
Party
Party/1eader 
Representative
1 . 7.5.91 8.00 CPI(M) M.Hanumantha Rao
2 . 7.5.91 8.15 Lok Dal Pentasam Gupta
3 . 8.5.91 8.00 BJP Bangaru Laxman
4 . 8.5.91 8.15 C P I C.H.Rajeswar Rao
5. 9.5.91. 8.00 JD (S) D .Ramachandra Reddy
6. 9.5.91 8.15 JD Kishen Singh
7. 10.5.91 8.00 Indian 
Congress(S)
Alwar Das
8. 10.5.91 8.15 JD Chaitanya
9. 11.5.91 8.00 Indian 
National 
Congress 
(Cong.I)
V .Hanumantha Rao
10. 11.5.91 8.15 Telugu
Desam
A.Madhav Reddy
II.SECOND ROUND
S.N. Date Time of
Broadcast
/pm.
Political Party Party
leader/represent 
ative
1 . 13-5-91 8.00 C P I S .Sudhakar Reddy
2 . 13.5.91 8.18 Janata Dal P .Rambrahmam
3 . 14.5.91 8.00 B J P C .H .Vidyasagar 
Rao
4. 14.5.91 8.15 Janata Dal(S) C.Manik Rao
5. 15.5.91 8.00 Telugu Desam Mr.Ahmed
6. 15.5.91 8.15 Indian Congress 
(S)
Alwar Das
7. 16.9.91 8.00 CPI(M) K .Satyanarayana
8. 16.9.91 8.15 Janata Absent
9. 17.5.91 8.00 Indian National 
Congress
N.Janardhan 
Reddy
10. 17.5.91 8.15 Lok Dal Anj aneyulu
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APPENDIX D CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PRE-POLL PROGRAMMES 
ON TELEVISION
The following is the list of election programmes on television 
during the pre election and the post elections. We have given the 
title of the programme along with the general content._____
S.
No
Date
1991
Title of the 
programme
Minu
-tes
Time
1 . 5 April, 
1991
Election code for 
candidates
2 7.00 pm
2 . 6 April 
1991
Election code 
guidelines
2 7.47 pm
3 . 7 April, 
1991.
8 April, 
1991
10 April, 
1991
11 April 
1991
Election Guidelines 
in Telugu and Hindi
2.5
2
2
2
8.37 pm
10.20 pm
6.20 pm
8.38 pm
4 . 11 April, 
1991
Current Affairs 
'Election guidelines 
and rules for 
application'
15
5. 16 April 
1991
National
network(Discussion) 
'Elections in Punjab
30 9.50-10.22
pm
6. 22 April, 
1991
Appeal by the Chief 
Election Officer of 
AP. Mr.T .Kamalnathan 
on the arrangements 
made for the poll
15 7.00pm
7 . 22 April, 
1991
Interview with Chief 
Election 
Commissioner.
T.N.Seshan
20 8.20 pm
8. 29 April, 
1991
Telugu Satire 
'Bommala Atta'(Dolls 
Play) A drama on 
politicians and 
voting attitudes
52 7.5 0pm
9 29 April, 
1991
'Your Voice' An 
animation film to 
Vote Fearlessly and 
Honestly' in 
English.(Short 
message)
1.5 8 .20pm
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10 2 May, 
1991
'Slogans on 
elections' Urdu 
Programme covering
1.Booth Capturing
2.Vote Fearlessly
3. Do not Accept 
bribes and 
transportation
20
min
8.20 pm
11 2 May, 
1991
Morning Transmission 
'Quickie on
2 8.57 am
3 May, 
1991
Elections' on 
National and state 
network
2 9.52 am
12 4 May,1991 a.Election 
guidelines and 
Slogans in Telugu.
b.Slogans on 
Elections
2
2
5.25 pm 
7.45 pm
13 6 May, Slogans on Voting 2 7.23pm
1991 Slogans on Voting 2 8.00 pm
14 6 May, 
1991
Party Election 
Broadcasts (PEB) 
begin. Regional in 
AP. Janata Dal by 
Babul Reddy
15 7.45 pm
15 6 May, 
1991
Party Election 
Broadcast(National 
Network)
BJP Dr.Murli Manohar 
Joshi
15 8.20 pm
16 6 May, 
1991
'Election scene in 
A.P.' Coverage on 
National English 
news.
45 7.05pm
17 7 May, 
1991
PEB, Regional, BJP. 
M.Venkaiah Naidu
15 7.45 pm
18 7 May, 
1991
Discussion ' The 10 
the Lok Sabha 
Elections: An 
Observation. 
Hyderabad TV. 
Participants.I.J.Nai 
du, Rtd. Chief 
Secretary, 
M.V.Narayan Rao.
Rtd. DGP, Moderator 
G.Sri Hari, 
Journalist.
15 8.05 pm
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19 7 May, 
1991
PEB. National.
Janata Dal V.P.Singh
15 8.20pm
20 8 May, 
1991
PEB Regional. Janata 
Dal Kota Janardhan 
Rao
11 7.45pm
21 8 May 1991 PEB, National, SJP 
Chandrashekhar
14 8.2 0pm
22 9 May, 
1991
Captions on 'How to 
cast votes' Telugu
4 6.24pm
23 9 May, 
1991
PEB Regional Janata 
Party. Kishen Lai
14 7.45pm
24 9 May, 
1991
PEB National Indian 
National Congress 
(S) K .P .Unnikri shan
14 8.2 0pm
25 10 May, 
1991
PEB Regional INC(S) 
(T) Alwar Das
14 8.0 0pm
26 10 May, 
1991
National Network. 
Report of T.N.Seshan 
to Andhra Pradesh
7 9.3 0pm
27 10 May, 
1991
Guidelines for 
candidates
2 8.17pm
28 10 May, 
1991
PEB, (National)
Cong.I Raj iv Gandhi
15 8.2 0pm
29 13 May, 
1991
Discussion 
'Elections our 
Responsibility'. 
Participants:
M.Virabhadhra Rao, 
Leela Sugunamani and 
Potturi Sambasiva 
Rao.
20 6.00 pm
30 13 May, 
1991
Slogans on voting 2 6.20 pm
31 13 May, 
1991
PEB (Regional), TDP, 
Raghuma Reddy
14 7.45 pm
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32 13 May, 
1991
Election and 
Campaigning 
'Security
Measures' -A Report, 
By Superintendent of 
Police, Nizambad 
district and 
Director General of 
Police.
Slogans on Elections
14
1
2
8.04 pm 
8.18 pm
33 13 May, 
1991
PEB.National CPM by 
Harkishen Singh 
Surjeet
14 8.20 pm
34 14 May, 
1991
Slogans on Elections 2 6.49 pm
35 14 May, 
1991
PEB. Regional,Cong.I 
by V.Hanumantha Rao
14 7.45 pm
36 14 May, 
1991
Discussion on the 
'Rights of the 
voters
'Participants 
A.Sambasiva Rao,
Dr.Siva Reddy and 
Potturi Venkateshwar 
Rao(Regional)
15
37 14 May, 
1991
PEB.National, Janata 
Party by 
Chandrashekhar
15 8.20 pm
38 15 May, 
1991
PEB.Regional CPI(M) 
by Bal Gangadhar Rao
12 7.45 pm
39 15 May, 
1991
Telugu Play' 
Elections have come'
11 8.09 pm
40 15 May, 
1991
PEB, National CPI by 
A .B .Bardhwan
14 8.20 pm
41 15 May, 
1991
Quickie on Elections 
National
2 9.56 am
42 15 May, 
1991
Quiz on Elections 40 10.20 pm
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43 16 May, 
1991
Discussion for women 
'Mahila Voters and 
our
Responsibilities' 
Participants 
Smt.Malladi 
Subbamma,
S .Padmawathi Sarma,
S . V . Soubhagyalaxmi 
and N.Annapurna 
(Regional)
24 6.00 pm
44 16 May, 
1991
PEB. Regional, CPI 
by A.Dasari 
Nagabhushan 
Rao(Telugu) and 
Aziz Pasha (Urdu)
15 7.45 pm
45 16 May, 
1991
'Anjuman7 Regional 
Urdu Programme. 7 Aap 
Ke Liye7 (For You) 
Programme base on 
statements of 
eminent
personalities on 
elections. 'Vote and 
its importance7.
12 8.00 pm
46 16 May, 
1991
PEB, National Lok 
Dal by Ram Avdesh 
Singh
Slogans on Voting
14
2
8.20 pm 
9.28 pm
47 16 May, 
1991
'Prashn Manch7 ( 
Hindi Question Time 
(Quiz) on Elections)
40 10.23 pm
48 17 May, 
1991
Morning transmission 
'Quickie on 
Elections7
1 8.04 am
49 17 May, 
1991
PEB. Regional. Lok 
Dal T.Satyanarayana 
Prasad
14 7 .45
50
17 May, 
1991
Discussion- 
Regional . 'Elections 
1991: Problems 
before people7. 
Participants. 
Dr.Sarojini Regani 
Osmania University, 
Ch. Brij Kishore 
JNTU, B.Ravi Kumar,
D .Sitaram 
journalist.
20 6.45 pm
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51 16 May, 
1991
Afternoon programme 
National network. 
'Elections 1991 Vote 
? Quiz programme in 
English'
2.12 pm
52 18 May, 
1991
Quickie on 
Elections- Telugu 
Slogans on elections 
-Telugu
1
1
7.26 pm
7.27 pm
53 18 May, 
1991
Hindi discussions 
National-'Chunav 
(election) '91'
20 10.20 pm
54 19 May, 
1991
'Many Dreams in 
Elections' Telugu 
Play
16 5.31 pm
55 19 May, 
1991
'Talk on Votes and 
Elections (Telugu 
Play)
27 8.00
56 19 May, 
1991
'Arrangements for 
Elections in AP' by 
C .Kamalnathan CEO, 
AP and Commissioner 
of Police.
10 8.27 pm
57 19 May, 
1991
Regional- 'Slogans 
on Elections' 
Control Room Phone 
no. in case of 
problems. Filler on 
elections
3
2
8.37 pm
58 19 May, 
1991
Interview 'Election 
1991' National. Pran 
Chopra interviews 
T.N.Seshan Chief 
Election 
Commissioner
28 9.57 pm
59 20 May, 
1991
Slogans on Elections 3 6.27
394
ELECTION PROGRAMMES BEFORE THE SECOND ROUND OF POLLS
S No Dates 
3 June - 
18 June, 
1991
Election Programmes Durati
on
mins
Time
1 . 3 June, 
1991
Telugu Programme 
'Elections have come'
16 6.02
pm
2 8 June, 
1991
National. President's 
message.'Elections and 
responsibilities of 
citizens'
17 8.20
Pm
3 . 9 June, 
1991
'Focus'-Elections 1991', 
Journalists in 
conversation with 
T.N.Seshan. Participants. 
Dilip Padugaonkar, Prabhu 
Chawla and Nihal Singh.
20 10.20
pm
3 . 10 June, 
1991
'Elections 91'. Current 
Affairs Review on 
elections
6.00
pm
4 . 12 June, 
1991
Discussion, Regional - 
'Violent Attitudes in 
Elections'.Participants- 
Potturi Venkateshwar Rao, 
Journalist, V.P.Rama Rao, 
Former Chief 
secretary,,K.V. 
Subramanyam,former Home 
Secretary.
23
5. 13 June, 
1991
Mushaira(Urdu poetry) on 
elections
30 8.05
pm
6. 14 June, 
1991
Slogans on Elections 5 6.29
pm
7 16 June, 
1991
RESULTS OF ELECTIONS
Election Analysis in 
Telugu Discussants. 
Prof.Vardhachary, 
D.Sitaram Journalist, 
P .Venkateshwarlu,
A.B.K.Prasad
12 7 .49 
pm
8. 16 June, 
1991
Election Analysis in 
Telugu. Same participants 
as above.
15 11.15
pm
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9. 17 June, 
1991
Election Analysis Telugu 
Participants.
G .S .Vardhachary,
P .S .Sundaram,
A .Satynarayanand 
C.Gyaneshwar
15 9.05
am
10. 17 June, 
1991
Election Analysis. 
Telugu,P.Venkat Rao, 
Prof. Madhusudhan Reddy, 
Venugopal Reddy(BJP) and 
Pannala Subramaniam 
Bhattu
14 1.46
pm
11. 17 June, 
1991
Election Analysis in 
Telugu Same participants 
as above
30 11.15
pm
12 . 18 June, 
1991
Election Analysis - 
Participants,
P.Venkat Rao,
Prof.R .V .R .Chandrashekhar 
Rao, G .Madhav Reddy,
Prof. Acharya and Prof 
Hargopal.
14 7.55
pm
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APPENDIX E MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE GUIDANCE 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES
I GENERAL CONDUCT
1. No party or candidate shall indulge in any activity which 
may aggravate existing differences or create mutual hatred
or cause tension between different castes and communities,
religious or linguistic.
2. Criticism of other political parties, when made, shall be 
confined to their politics and programmes, past records and 
work. Parties and candidates shall refrain from criticism on 
all aspects of private life, not connected with the public 
activities of the leaders or workers of other parties. 
Criticism of other parties or their workers based on 
unverified allegations or on distortions shall be avoided.
3. There shall be no appeal to caste or communal feelings for
securing votes. Mosques, churches, temples or other places
of worship shall not be used as a forum for election 
propaganda.
4. All parties and candidates shall avoid scrupulously all
activities which are 7 corrupt practices' and offenses under 
the election law; such as the bribing of voters, 
intimidation of voters, canvassing within 100 metres of a 
polling station, holding public meetings during the period 
of 48 hours ending with the hour fixed for the close of the 
poll, and the transport and conveyance of voters to and from 
polling station.
5. The right of every individual for peaceful and undisturbed 
home life shall be respected, however much the political 
parties or candidates may resent his political opinions or 
activities. Organising demonstrations or picketing before 
houses of individuals by way of protesting against their 
opinions or activities shall not be resorted to under any 
circumstances.
6. No political party or candidate shall permit its or his 
followers to make use of any individual's land, building, 
compound wall etc, without his permission for erecting flag­
staff, suspending banners, pasting notices, writing slogans 
etc.
7. Political parties and candidates shall ensure that their 
supporters do not create obstruction in or break up meetings 
and processions organised by the other parties. Workers or 
sympathizers of any political party shall not create 
disturbances at public meetings organised by another 
political party by putting questions orally or in writing or 
by distributing leaflets of their own party. Processions 
shall not by taken out by one party along places at which 
meetings are being held by another party. Posters issued by 
one party shall not be removed by workers of another party.
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POLLING DAY
All political parties and candidates shall-
1. Cooperate with the officers on election duty to ensure 
peaceful and orderly polling and complete freedom to the 
voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected 
to any annoyance or obstruction.
2. Supply to their authorised workers suitable badges or 
identity cards.
3. Agree that the identity slips supplied by them to voters 
shall be on plain (white) papers and shall not contain any 
symbol, name of the candidate or the name of the party.
4. Refrain from serving or distributing liquor on polling day 
and during the twenty four hours preceding it.
5. Not allow unnecessary crowds to be collected near the camps 
set up by the political parties and candidates near the 
polling booths so as to avoid confrontation and tension 
among workers and sympathizers of the parties and 
candidates.
6. Ensure that the candidate's camps shall be simple - They 
shall not display any posters, flags, symbols or any other 
propaganda material. No eatables shall be served or crowds 
allowed at the camps
7. Co-operate with the authorities in complying with the 
restrictions to be imposed on the plying of vehicles on the 
polling day and obtain permits for them which should be 
displayed prominently on those vehicles.
POLLING BOOTH
Excepting the voters, no one without a valid pass from the 
Election Commission will appoint observers. If the candidates or 
their agents have any specific complaint or problem regarding the 
conduct of the elections they may bring the same to the notice 
of the observer.
PARTY IN POWER
The party in power whether at the Centre or in the State or 
States concerned, shall ensure that no cause is given for any 
complaint that it has used its official position for the purposes 
of its election campaign and in particular-
(i) (a) The Ministers shall not combine their official visits
with electioneering work and shall not also make use of 
official machinery or personnel during electioneering 
work ,*
(b) Government transport including official aircrafts, 
vehicles, machinery and personnel shall not be used for 
furtherance of the interest of the party in power;
(ii) Public places such as maidans etc. for holding election 
meetings and use of helipads for air flights in connection 
with elections, shall not be monopolised by itself. Other 
parties and candidates shall be allowed the use of such 
places and facilities on the same terms and conditions on 
which they are used by the party in power;
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(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vii)
Rest houses, dak bungalows or other government 
accommodation shall be allowed to be used by other parties 
and candidates in a fair manner but no party or candidate 
shall use or be allowed to use such accommodation 
(including premises appertaining thereto) as a campaign 
office or for holding any public meeting for the purposes 
of election propaganda;
Issue of advertisement at the cost of public exchequer in 
the newspapers and other media and the misuse of official 
mass media during the election periods for partisan 
coverage of political news and publicity regarding 
achievements with a view to furthering the prospects of 
the Party in Power shall be scrupulously avoided. 
Ministers and other authorities shall not -
(a) announce any financial grants in any form or promises 
thereof; or
(b) lay foundation stones etc. of projects or schemes of 
any kind; or
(c) make any ad-hoc appointments in government, public 
undertaking, etc. which may have the effect of 
influencing the voters in favour of the party in 
power.
Ministers of Central or Sate Govt. shall not enter any 
polling station or place of counting except in their 
capacity as a candidate or voter or authorised agent.
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APPENDIX F CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ELECTION MEETINGS 
AND PROCESSIONS
1. The party or candidate shall inform the local police 
authorities of the venues and time of any proposed meeting 
well in time to enable the police to make necessary 
arrangement for controlling traffic and maintaining peace and 
order.
2. A party or candidate shall ascertain in advance if there are 
any restrictive or prohibitory orders in force in the place 
proposed for the meeting. If such orders exist, they shall be 
followed strictly. If any exemption is required from such 
orders it shall be applied for and obtained well in time.
3. If permission of licence is to be obtained for the use of loud 
speakers or any other facility in connection with any proposed 
meeting, the party or candidate shall apply to the authority 
concerned well in advance and obtain such permission or 
licence.
4. Organisers of a meeting shall invariably seek the assistance 
of the police on duty for dealing with persons disturbing a 
meeting or otherwise attempting to create disorder. Organisers 
themselves shall not take action against such persons
Source: Consolidated instructions of the Election Commission 
of India in connection with conduct of elections; 1991.
RULES GOVERNING PROCESSIONS
1. A party or candidate organising a procession shall decide 
before hand the time and place for the starting of the 
procession, the route to be followed and the time and place 
at which the procession will terminate. There shall ordinarily 
be no deviation from the programme.
2. The organisers shall give advance intimation to the local 
police authorities of the programme so as to enable the latter 
to make necessary arrangements.
3. The organisers shall ascertain if any restrictive orders are 
in force in the localities through which the procession has 
to pass, and shall comply with the restrictions unless 
exempted specially by competent authority. Any traffic 
regulations or restrictions shall also be carefully adhered 
to.
4. The organisers shall take steps in advance to arrange for 
passage of the procession so there is no block or hindrance 
to traffic. If the procession is very long, it shall be 
organised in segments of suitable lengths, so that at 
convenient intervals, especially at points where the 
procession has to pass road junctions, the passage of held-up 
traffic could be allowed by stages, thus avoiding heavy 
traffic congestion.
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5. Processions shall be so regulated so as to keep as much to the 
right of the road as possible and the direction and advice of 
the police on duty shall be strictly complied with.
6. If two or more political parties or candidates propose to take 
out procession over the same route or parts thereof at about 
the same time, the measures to be taken to see that the 
processions do not clash or cause hindrance to traffic, the 
assistance of the local police shall be availed of for 
arriving at a satisfactory arrangement. For this purpose, the 
parties shall contact the police at the earliest opportunity.
7. The political parties or candidates shall exercise control to 
the maximum extent possible in the matter of processionists 
carrying articles which may be put to misuse by undesirable 
elements, especially in moments of excitement.
8. The carrying of effigies purporting to represent members of 
other political parties or their leaders, burning such 
effigies in public and such other forms of demonstrations 
shall not be countenanced by any political party or candidate.
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APPENDIX G LIST OF INTERVIEWS
The following is a list of persons interviewed for the study 
apart from the informal opinions taken from academicians, 
newspaper editors, advertising professionals, broadcasters and 
producers of radio and TV programmes, party candidates, local 
party leaders, party workers and voters.
Mr. Mahesh Prasad, Secretary Information and Broadcasting, 
Government of India. New Delhi.
Mr. T.N.Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner. Government of India, 
New Delhi.
Mr. Kamalnathan, Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh.
Mrs Bimla Bhalla, Asst.Director, News Services, All India Radio 
New Delhi.
Mr.Vijay Karan, Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, New 
Delhi.
M r .B a l k r i s h n a , Director General Doordarshan, 
Hyderabad,Government of Andhra Pradesh.
Mr.Gopal Krishna, Deputy Director, All India Radio Hyderabad. 
Government of Andhra Pradesh.
Dr. J.K Jain, Director, Jain Studios. New Delhi
Mr.Jaipal Reddy, Spokesperson Janata Dal/National Front. New 
Delhi
Mr. Pranab Mukerjee, Spokesperson, Cong.I. New Delhi.
Mr. Anand Sharma, MP Spokesperson Cong.I. New Delhi.
Mr. K.R. Malkani. Vice President, Bharatiya Janata Party. New 
Delhi
Dr. Anand Kumar, Jawahar Lai Nehru University, New Delhi
Mr. Kishen Reddy, In-charge of State Elections, BJP, Hyderabad.
Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, Leader MIM, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.
Mr.Babul Reddy, Party Leader Janata Dal, Hyderabad.
Dr.Manohar Rao, Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad. Hyderabad.
Mr. Chandrababu Naidu, Secretary and Spokesperson, Telugu Desam 
Party, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.
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Dr.M.A.Ahmed, Director, Darul Muarif, Osmania University. 
Trustee, Darul Salam Education trust,
Mr.K.Keshav Rao, Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, Hyderabad. 
Andhra Pradesh.
Mr.R .Ravindran, Director, R .K .Swamy/BBDO Advertising Pvt. Ltd. 
New Delhi
Mr.Probir Purokayastha, Vice President, Clarion Advertising 
Services, New Delhi.
Mr.Ved Paul, Chief Executive, Graphisads Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi.
Mr.Shyam Sundar Sain, Chief Executive, Aditi Advertising Pvt. 
Ltd.
Mr.Achal Paul, Megacorp Advertising and Marketing Pvt. Ltd. New 
Delhi.
Mr.Hari Prasad, Niha Communication Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh
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APPENDIX H QUESTIONNAIRE
1. S.No --------------------
2. Name Mr/Miss.Mrs/ /______________________
3. Address_________________
4. Location. 1, Urban 2.Rural
5. Name of the constituency_______________
6. Sex l.Male 2. Female
7. Age (years)
1. 18-25 2. 26-35 3. 36-45 4. 46-55 5. 56-65 6. 65+
8. Mother Tongue
1. Telugu 2. Hindi 3.Urdu 4.English 5. Other
9. Total Number of members in the House hold.
1. Adults  2. Children_____
10. Which Realign do you follow?
1. Hinduism 2. Islam 3. Sikhism 4. Christianity
5. Other (specify)____________
11. How Often do you go to the Temple, Mosque, Church or Gurdwara?
1. Never 2.Rarely 3.Sometimes 4.Regularly
12. Which caste do you belong to? ___________
13. Educational Background
1. Uneducated 2. Primary Education 3. Secondary Education 
4.Intermediate 5.Graduation
6.Post Graduation 7.Technical education/ Vocational Training 8. 
Any other
14. Kind Of Job/Occupation
1. Unemployed 2.Student 3./Government/Public Sector
4.Private Enterprise/ Sector 5. House wife
6. Agricultural worker/Labourer/farmer 7.Retired 8. Other
15. How much is the average income of your family per month?
1. Less the Rs.250 2. 250-500 3. Rs.501-1000 4 .Rs.1001-2000
5. Rs.2001-3000 6. Rs.3001-4000 7. 4001+
16. Do You
1. Subscribe to a newspaper
2. Own a radio
3. Own a Television
4. Own a VCP/VCR
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PART - II
17. Will you let us know the extent to which you expose yourself to 
the following media?
Regularly- 5-7 days a week 
Sometimes- 2-4 days a week 
Rarely - Once in a week or less
Media
1. Read Newspapers
2. Read magazines
3. Listen to radio
4. Watch Television
5. See films at the Cinema.
18. Do You read a newspaper or are 'read to someone in your family?
1. Yes
2 . No.
If 'No' Go to Question 24.
19. Which of the following newspapers do you read?
1. Andhra Prabha
2. Andhra Jyothi
3. Eenadu
4. Udayam
5. Deccan Chronicle
6. Indian Express
7. The Hindu
8. News time
9. Siasat
10.Rahnuma-e-Deccan
11.Other (Specify)______________
20. Thinking about newspapers, how interesting is political news to 
you?
1. Not at all interesting
2. Somewhat Interesting
3. Very interesting
4. No answer
21. Regarding the coverage of political news in your newspapers, do 
you think that the coverage given is too little, adequate or too 
much?
1. Too Little
2. Adequate
3. Too much
4. Don't Know
5. No Answer
22. In the Newspaper that you read, have you seen any advertisements 
released by the government?
1. Yes 2. No
23. If Yes did you find them?
1. Very Informative
2. Somewhat informative
1.Never 2.Rarely 3.Sometimes 
4.Often 5.Regularly
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3. Not at all informative
4. Do not remember
5. Don't Know
6. No Answer
24.a) Coming to magazines, Do you read them?
1 .Yes
2. No
b) If Yes can you name three magazines that you generally read
1. _________  2.___________  3.__________
25.a) How about radio. Do you listen to the radio?
1 .Yes
2. No
25.b) What kind of programmes do you listen to?
1. Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly. 4.No Answer
1.News
2.Current Affairs
3.News analysis/Discussions
4.Film Songs/music
5.Dramas and plays
6.Educational Programmes
7.Any other
26.a) Coming to Television, do you generally watch television
1 .Yes
2 .No
b) What kind of Programmes do you generally watch
1.Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly 4. No Answer
1 .News
2.Current Affairs
3.Film Songs/Music
4 .Dramas/Serial
5 .Agricultural and 
Farmers programmes
6.Educational Programmes
7.Any other
c) In terms of specific Programmes, how often have you seen the 
News in the past four weeks?
1.Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly 4.No Answer
1.Regional news in Telugu
2.National News in Hindi
3.National news in English
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d) And what about programmes like?
1.The World this week
2.Parliament news 
3.Sansad Samachar
4.Focus
5.Saakshi
6.Aaj Kal
7.Any other
27. Thinking about news and current affairs programmes do you find the 
time given to coverage given to politics and current affairs too 
much, adequate or too little.
1.Too little
2.Adequate
3.Too much
4.Don't Know
5.No answer
28. On Television along with the programmes there are a number of 
advertisements, How much do you like to watch them?
1.Do not like them at all
2.Like them a little bit
3.Like them a lot
4.No opinion
5.Don't know
29.a) In the area that you live in, do people get together to talk 
about every day matters
1.never 
2.Sometimes
3.Regularly
4 .No Answer
b) And what would you generally talk about?
1.Day-to-day matters of work
2.Political matters 
3.Social Problems.
4.Economic issues
5.Local gossip
6.Any other
c) Roughly how many people gather on these meetings?
1.Less than five
2.About 5-10 
3.11-20
4.More than 20 
5.It depends
6.No answer
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d) Thinking about the people in your group how true would you say 
are the following statements?
1.Definite true 2.Uncertain 3.Definite untrue 4.No answer
1.Most persons who assemble with me belong to the same age group 
as me
2.Most of them are doing the same work as I am
3.Most of them are of the same religious group as me.
4.Most of them speak the same language as me
5.Most of them are of the same caste group as I am
PART III
30. Generally speaking, could you tell me how interested you are in 
politics and the political developments in the country.
1 .Not at all interested
2.Somewhat interested
3.Interested when it concerns me
4.Very interested
5.Don' t Know
6 .No Answer
31. Thinking about politics do you discuss political matters with 
others.
1 .Never
2.Once in a while
3.Quite often
4.Almost daily
5 .No answer
32. In the past few months government has called attention to a 
number of issues. From the following list let me know how much do 
you know about them.
1.Never 2.Know a 3.Know 4.No
Issues. heard fair a lot answer
of it amount
1. The recent communal riots 
in out state
2. The Government of Dr.
Chenna Reddy has been 
replaced
3.The 'Buddha' statue fell, 
into the tank bund.
4.In some of our districts 
there is a lot of naxalite 
problem
5.Babri Masj id-Ayodhya 
temple issue
6 .Reservation of jobs for 
the backward classes.
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33.a) Considering voting, did you vote in the last Lok Sabha election?
1.No 2. Yes
b) If Yes, which party did you vote for?
1.Cong.I 2.BJP 3.TDP 4.JD 5.MIM 6.CPI 7.CPM 
8.BSP 9.Can't remember 10.Don't know/no answer
c) Did you campaign for the party you voted. 
l.Yes 2.No
34. There are a number of reason why people did not vote. From the 
following what describes your reasons for not voting.
1.1 was away on that day
2.1 was not eligible to vote
3.My vote would not make a difference
4.1 don't think any of the parties were worth voting for.
5.1 did not receive information about parties and candidates
6.Any other
7.No reason
8.No Answer
35 a)In the forthcoming elections what source will you seek for
getting information about candidates and parties
l.A lot 2.A fair amount 3.Not at all
4. No opinion
1.Look into newspapers
2 .Radio
3 .Television 
4.See Posters
5.Handbills and leaflets
b) And what about
1.Discuss with local leaders
2.Discuss friends & neighbours
3.Family
4.Listen to public announcements
5.Any other(specify)
36. During the election will you be attending any of the election 
rallies and public meetings held by the parties
l.Yes 2.No 3.Not yet decided 4.Don't Know 5.No answer
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37. In deciding whom to vote, how important would you consider the 
following aspects
l.Very Important 2.Somewhat important 3.Not very important
4. Not at all important 5.No opinion
1.Consult and follow the advice of the family members.
2.To make a decision after evaluating the performance of the 
various parties
3.To follow the advice of senior members of the community
4. To follow the advice of religious leaders of the community
5.To follow a majority of the members of the caste
38. If you had to chose which of the following statements comes 
closest to your own views on how the country should run after the 
next election?
l.One party should gain a majority and form the government
2.A clear majority may not be necessary but the party with the 
highest number of seats should form the government
3.There need not be a majority but some parties can form a 
coalition government.
39. Thinking about our country's leaders, to what extent would you 
tend to agree or disagree on the following statements
1.Strongly agree(SA) 2.Tend to agree 3.Tend to disagree(TD) 
4.Strongly disagree(SD)
1.Leaders committed to development of the country
2.Leaders do not know and understand my problems
3.1 have confidence & trust in the leaders
4.1 am not at all satisfied with the way the present government 
works
40. During the forthcoming elections, would you care who wins the 
elections
1.Do not care at all 
2.Somewhat care
3.Care a lot
4.Don' t know
5.No answer
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41. Thinking about the elections, how much do you think is the way 
the people vote influenced by
1.The Caste they belong to
2.Their long term affiliation with the party
3.The religious group that they belong to
42. In the forthcoming election are you likely to vote
l.Yes 2.No 3.Not yet decided
43. If 'Yes' which party are you most likely to vote for
1.Cong.I 2.TDP 3.BJP 4.MIM 5.JD 6.CPI 7.CPM
8.BSP 9. Any Other(specify)
44. In case you are unable to vote from the party that you have 
mentioned , which is the next party that you would vote for
1.Cong.I 2.TDP 3.BJP 4.MIM 5.JD 6.CPI 7.CPM
8.BSP 9. Any Other(specify)
46. Thinking about the caste system in our country, to what extent 
would you agree or disagree with the following statements?
1 2 3 4 5
Do not Somewhat Agree Don't No
agree agree a lot know answer
l.It is a part of our social 
system and should be present 
2.It is creating unnecessary 
problems in our society and 
must be abolished
3.Reservations in govt, and 
educational institutions 
should be based on the caste 
classification
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QUESTIONNAIRE -II
1. S.No.
2. Name of the respondent
3. Address
4. Location 1.Urban 2.Rural
5. Name of the Constituency
6. Do you know which party secure the maximum number of seats in the 
just completed election
1.Cong.I 2.TDP 3.BJP 4.MIM 5.JD 6.CPI 7.CPM
8.BSP 9. Any Other(specify)
7. How did you come to know of the results of the elections
1.Newspapers
2.Radio
3 .Television
4.Friends and Neighbours
5.Local leaders
6.Local party offices
7.Government offices
8.Any others
8. How did you find the coverage given to election results .
1.Excellent 2.Good 3.Fair 4.Poor 5.Don't Know
1.Newspapers
2 .Radio
3.Television 
4 .Others
9. In the past few weeks how interested were you in following up the
political development and elections in the newspapers
1.Not at all interested
2.Not very interested
3.Fairly interested
4.Very interested.
5.Don't know
6.No answer
10. Do you think that the coverage given to the election news in the 
newspapers was
l.Far too much 2. Just enough 3 .'Too little 4.Don't Know
11. Has the coverage of election news helped you in deciding how to 
vote .
1. A lot 2.Somewhat 3.Not at all 4.No Opinion
12. Turning to the Party advertisements, have you seen any of the 
advertisements of the political parties in your newspapers.
l.Yes 2.No 3.Do not remember 4.No Answer
13. If Yes, which party/ies did they belong to
1.Cong.I 2.TDP 3.BJP 4.MIM 5.JD 6.CPI 7.CPM
8.BSP 9. Any Other(specify)
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14. Did you find these advertisements
1.Informative 2.Interesting 3.Persuasive 4.Don't know
5.No answer
1.TD
2.Congress
3. BJP
4. JD 
5 .MIM
6.Any Others
15. Have these advertisements motivated you to vote for a particular 
party
1 .Not at all 2.Somewhat 3.A lot 4.Don't know/No answer
16. What about magazines. Have you been reading the magazines that 
you read regularly
l.Yes 2.No 3.No answer
If Yes,
1.7 a) Have you seen any of the party ads in the magazine that you 
read.
l.Yes 2.No 3.Do not remember 4.No answer
, b) Can you name the parties and the magazine 
Parties Name of magazine
1.Cong 
2 . BJP
3 .Janata Dal
4.Telugu Desam
5. JD
6.Others
c) Did these help in deciding whom to vote
l.A lot 2.Somewhat 3.Not at all 4.No Opinion
5.Don't Know/No answer
18. During the elections there were a lot of symbols we associate 
with parties. Can you recognize which party they belong to
l.Yes 2.No
1. TD
2.Congress
3.JD
4. MIM
5. BJP
6. CPI 
7.SJP
8. CPI
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19 a) What about listening to the radio? In the past six weeks how 
often did you listen to the political and current affairs 
programmes
1.Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly
b) In particular did you listen to the following Broadcasts
l.Yes 2.No 3.Don't Know
1.Discussion with CEO
2.Talk with the DGP
3.Quiz Programme on
4 .Discussions on elections
5.Election messages to voters
6.Any other
c) Did you listen to the Election Broadcasts of Party leaders 
l.Yes 2.No 3.Do not remember 4.No Answer
d) If Yes, which party did they belong to -
l.yes 2.no
1.Congress
2. BJP
3.Janata Dal 
4.SJP
5 . TDP
6 . CPM
7. CPI
e) How often did you hear the news on radio
1.Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly
1.Telugu News
2.Hindi News
3.English News
f) Overall how did you find the coverage given to elections on radio
l.Very good 2.Average 3.Not at all good 4.No opinion
5.No answer
g) Has coverage on radio helped you to decide vote
20 a) Coming to television, how often did you see the political and
election related programmes.
1.Never 2.Sometimes 3.Regularly
b) In particular did you listen to the following programmes
l.Yes 2.No
1.The Discussion programmes on elections with various 
groups of important persons
2.The Quiz on elections
3.The Voter education announcements
4.Talks with CEC and other officials
5.Any other
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c) Did you see the Party election telecasts by the leaders of 
various political parties.
1.Yes 2.No
If No, go to point (e)
d) If yes can you name the parties
1.Cong.I 2.BJP 3.Janata Dal 4.SJP 5.CPI 6.CPM
7.Any Other
e) What about the coverage given to election information on TV
l.Very Good 2.Good 3.No opinion 4.No at all good
5 .No Answer
f) Overall how did you find the coverage given to election 
information on TV to be
l.Too much 2.Adequate 3.too little 4.Don't know /No answer
g) Have the coverage of election programmes, news and party 
broadcasts help you in deciding how to vote
l.yes, 2.A fair3.Not 4.Not 5.Don"t6.No
a lot Amount very at all Know answer
much
1.Coverage of News and 
current affairs
2.The Election 
Programmes
3.Party Election 
Broadcasts
21 a) In the area that you live in did you see the election posters 
stuck at different places 
l.Yes 2.No
b) If Yes, which parties did they belong to, You may answer 
as many as you have seen 
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.Telugu Desam 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal 
6.SJP 7.Any other
22 a) How about the songs and speeches of leaders on audio
cassettes. Did you hear them on the loud speakers 
l.Yes 2.No 3.Do not remember
b) If Yes, which parties belong to 
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.Telugu Desam 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal 
6.SJP 7.Any other
23 a) What about video/cinema shows telling us about the
parties and the leaders, did seen any video shows during 
the campaign
1.Yes 2.No
b) If Yes, Which parties did they belong to
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.Telugu Desam 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal
415
6.SJP 7.Any other
a) Did audio tapes and video cassettes help you in deciding
how to vote in the elections 
l.Yes a lot 2.A fair amount 3.Not at all 4.Don't know
5.No answer
b) Did video tapes help in deciding how to vote
1. A lot 2.A fair amount 3.Not at all 4.Don't know
5.No answer
a) Did you attend any public/ election meetings and rallies 
of parties 
1.Yes 2.No
b) If Yes, which one did you attend
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.TDP 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal 6.SJP
7.Any other
c) Did attending these meetings help in deciding to vote 
l.Yes a lot 2.A fair amount 3.Not at all 4.Don't know
5.No answer
a) By the way, did any canvassers come to your house asking
you to vote for a party 
1 .Yes 2.No
b) Which parties did they belong to
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.TDP 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal 6.SJP
7.Any other
c) Did their coming motivate you to vote for their party 
l.Yes a lot 2.A fair amount 3.Not at all 4.Don't know
5.No answer
Finally, did you vote on polling day 
l.Yes 2.No 3.No answer
If yes,
Which party did you vote for 
1.Congress 2.BJP 3.TDP 4.MIM 5.Janata Dal 6.SJP 7.Any other
When did you decide to vote for the party
1.Long before the polling day
2.Early in the campaign
3.During the campaign 
4.On the polling day
In deciding to vote which of the following media helped you 
most in getting information about parties and candidates, 
please rank in order
1.Newspapers 2.Magazine 3.Radio 4.Television 5.Video shows
Did posters, hand bills, wall writings and cutouts of leaders 
remind you of the party you had to vote for
l.Not at all 2.Somewhat 3.A lot
1.Posters
2 .Handbills
3.Wall writings
4.Cardboard Cut outs 
5.Symbol displays
6.Hoardings
32. Talking about the local people in your area, who were the
people most involved in helping you to decide whom to vote in 
the election
l.Not at all 2.Somewhat 3.A lot
1.Discussions with family
2.Local leaders
3.Attending public meetings
4.Talking to party activists
5.Any other
Question no. 33 for Nagarkurnool voters only
33. Did the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
have an influence on your voting behaviour
l.Yes a lot 2.somewhat 3.Not at all
34. The reasons why people did not vote. From the following what
describes your reason for not voting
1.1 was away on that day
2.1 was scared to go and cast my vote
3.My vote would not make a difference
4.1 don't think any of the parties were worth voting for
5.1 did not receive information about parties and candidates
6.Any other
7.No reason
35. Did the election campaigns help you in
l.Not at all 2.Somewhat 3.A lot
1.To increase knowledge about political parties and candidates
2.Forced you to believe the things that were not correct
3.To judge impartially the best party to vote for
4.To change your views on the images party of parties and their 
leaders
Thank You
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